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Abstract
The de magistro is the primary work of Augustine which focuses on his philosophy of 
language. The dialogue, however, is concerned centrally with the question of the 
acquisition of knowledge and it is through an analysis of this question that Augustine 
arrives at his conclusions about language.
Plato’s presentation of the Paradox of Enquiry, in the Meno, pervades the de magistro 
and is at the basis of this thesis on Augustine’s text.
The overall approach, in this study, to the issues in the de magistro is focused upon 
elucidating four main interrelated themes which Augustine employs in his approach to 
the Paradox. These themes are (1) the Stoic ‘commemorative’ sign and the subsequent 
questions concerning the nature of linguistic signs as evidence and as a basis for 
knowledge; (2) the idea of ostensive definition as a means of exposing the limits of 
language and of demonstrating possible ways around these limits; (3) the semiotic 
nature of language with the related analysis of a theory of meaning, and signification, 
so as to attempt an understanding of the relation of language to reality; and (4) the 
Platonic theory of Recollection and Augustine’s use of it as a means of positing a 
possible solution to the Paradox.
The methodological approach will involve a consideration of the primary influences 
on Augustine’s analysis of language; a contextualising of the ideas presented in the de 
magistro by means of other relevant works by Augustine; and a consideration of 
subsequent philosophical and semiotic theories when these can serve to clarify the 
ideas posited by Augustine.
The main focus of the above approach is to clarify Augustine’s picture of knowledge 
acquisition and the philosophy of language which developed together with his
epistemological concerns. Although Augustine is shown to develop a sophisticated 
approach both to knowledge acquisition and to the related theme of language 
acquistion, both approaches are argued to ultimately founder upon the Paradox as 
presented in Plato and as applied to language acquisition in the modem critique 
employed, with particular reference to Augustine, by Wittgenstein.
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1. Introduction.
0001 Augustine is concerned in the de magistro1 primarily with epistemology and 
with the question of the acquisition of knowledge. The approach adopted is, however, 
largely concerned with language and to this extent involves a great deal of analysis of 
language generally and of its semantics and semiotics specifically. The reason for this 
approach is, simply put, that knowledge acquisition implies learning, learning implies 
teaching, and teaching involves either the telling or the showing of something to 
someone. The most obvious form of teaching, for Augustine, would appear to involve 
telling something to someone. Therefore, a sensible approach to the consideration of 
knowledge acquisition would begin with a consideration of language and the ability of 
language to transfer information from one person to another. As will be argued, the 
picture given by Augustine is such that the world is objectively fixed and, therefore, 
determines any language which we might use to describe it. The concepts, and the 
meanings of words which are correlates of these concepts, are determined by the 
world. The implications of such a position are not trivial and Augustine will be shown 
to attempt to make sense of the correlation between word meanings and concepts, and 
to bridge the gap between these meanings and concepts and the world from which 
they derive. Central to this will be the attempt to establish an explanation whereby 
there is a coherent picture both of our relationship with the objective world and of 
whether there is a verifiable way of talking about this world.
0002 The following thesis will consider Augustine’s analysis of language as a 
means of engaging with the problem of knowledge acquisition. Augustine’s approach 
involves a systematic and tightly integrated discussion of an interrelated series of
1 Henceforth referred to as DM.
problems which are introduced through an analysis which constantly shifts from 
comparing to contrasting the pedagogic modes of telling and showing. Indeed, 
passages of discussion which have often been interpreted as digressions, as would 
befit the loose form of an historical discussion, are seen to be integral to the position 
Augustine is positing when considered both in relation to the strictly linear 
development of the dialogue and in relation to the argument as a whole. It has 
therefore seemed sensible, in this thesis, to follow Augustine’s line of reasoning in a 
linear fashion, only digressing so as to elucidate latent implications which must be 
understood so as to fully grasp Augustine’s intention at any specific point in the 
dialogue. This methodological approach is intended to avoid two main obstacles: 
superficiality and repetition. On account of the complex interrelatedness of the themes 
under discussion in the DM, a treatment of topics individually would necessarily lead 
to a simplification of the argument of the dialogue as a whole or, if  this were to be 
avoided, would lead to a great deal of repetition of the central themes which recur 
throughout the dialogue under various guises. Although this thesis makes no claim to 
do justice to the full complexity and integrated nature of the DM it is hoped that the 
linear approach adopted will go some way towards achieving the intention of this 
study : namely, to present a coherent analysis of the central argument as presented in 
the dialogue. The analysis of the argument of the DM as a whole will involve two 
main themes, primarily a consideration of Augustine’s theory of knowledge 
acquisition, and secondarily, the related concern with a theory of language which 
presents itself in the light of the main epistemological considerations of the dialogue. 
A brief description of the thesis as it develops chapter by chapter will now follow. 
0003 In Chapter 2 the proposal that speech is teaching is discussed together with the 
implications of this for Augustine’s preliminary definition of speech and the attempt
to characterise a relationship between language, the mind, and reality. The view that 
speech is teaching qua reminding is presented as raising two possible analyses: either 
reminding in the sense of the Stoic ‘commemorative’ sign, or in the sense of Platonic 
‘recollection’.
0004 Arising from the introduction of possible definitions for speech is the 
discussion in Chapter 3 of Augustine’s semiotic analysis of language. This makes 
evident the implicit presence in the DM of Plato’s Paradox of Enquiry (v. inf. § 2) as 
presented in the Meno. One sign leads to another, one interpretation to another, in a 
regress which appears to negate the possibility of establishing the item which any 
term signifies. This regress is discussed with a view to the problem of clarifying the 
relation of language to reality and of understanding the role of the human intellect in 
this relationship. In this chapter there is also a consideration of the role of signs as 
evidence in Augustine so as to contextualise the commemorative nature of linguistic 
signs, as so presented in the DM.
0005 The problematic relation between language and reality is refocused in Chapter 
4 with an introductory consideration of the showing mode of teaching. Augustine’s 
use of ostensive definition is discussed in this regard. The attempt to break the 
semiotic regress, by means of ostension, is seen to arrive at a preliminary conclusion 
where items may be directly ostended through performance.
0006 The conclusions reached concerning ostension prompt a consideration of the 
three classes of communication, beginning with that of signs shown by signs in 
Chapter 5. The consideration of this class of communication focuses upon 
Augustine’s approach to meaning and signification, and his philosophic sources for 
this approach. Augustine’s analysis highlights the mental intermediary in
communicative acts and in this way introduces the problem of speaker’s intention and 
ambiguity.
0007 The second class of communication, where things are shown by signs, is 
discussed in Chapter 6. This establishes the importance of the problem of ambiguity 
in the communicative process. The complexities of the relation between a linguistic 
term, the related mental event, and the item which is signified are discussed in relation 
to ambiguity and the necessity of contextualisation for disambiguation is introduced.
0008 With the previous two classes of communication having been discussed and 
the problems which they raise having been clarified, the third class whereby things are 
shown through performance is introduced with a reconsideration of ostension in 
Chapter 7. The final theory of ostension, as shown by the Birdcatcher example, 
demonstrates that all knowledge must, according to Augustine, come from a form of 
direct experience. However, the problematic role of interpretation in the process is 
seen to remain. Augustine is shown to have clarified and refined his approach to 
knowledge acquisition, and the role of language in this, but not to have arrived at a 
satisfactory conclusion.
0009 The Paradox of Enquiry is finally considered directly in Chapter 8, with the 
proposal that nothing is learned through signs. Objects (and words qua objects) are 
learned directly and although there is a sense of the Stoic ‘commemorative’ sign at 
play in Augustine’s presentation of language, this is not the model employed in the 
DM such that teaching is reminding. Language acquisition and the difficulties it raises 
for knowledge acquisition are here considered.
0010 Knowledge itself, as discussed in Chapter 9, is taken to be understanding and 
can only be fully grasped by means of the Inner Christ and through direct contact with 
the object of knowledge. In such a way, it is argued, Augustine attempts to negate the
Paradox of Enquiry and to dispose of the lingering problems of ambiguity and need 
for interpretation on the part of humans. The role of the Inner Christ is argued to be 
Augustine’s final attempt to extricate himself from the problems encountered due to 
the model of Platonism which he holds and due to the implications this brings both to 
language acquisition, knowledge acquisition, and the role of verifiability with respects 
to both of these.
0011 In Chapter 10 the issue concerning language and speaker’s intention is briefly 
reconsidered in the light of the idea of knowledge through immediacy and the 
problem inherent in communication from one mind to another is related to this.
While, finally, in Chapter 11 the usefulness of speech is discussed together with its 
relation to the acquisition of knowledge.
0012 In the final analysis Augustine is held, in this thesis, to have demonstrated a 
thorough grasp of the difficulties which are central to the question as to how one can 
both understand the world and speak about it. This said, the attempts made to resolve 
these difficulties are argued to ultimately founder due to a failure on Augustine’s part 
to achieve a theory of knowledge, and language acquisition, which is both compatible 
with his world picture and which resolves, satisfactorily, the paradoxical implications 
of the relation of such a theory to such a world picture.
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2. The Purpose of Speech.
0013 Knowledge and, specifically, how it is acquired is a central theme in the DM. 
The dialogue, written in 389, in many ways forms a companion piece with the earlier 
contra Academicos2 (386). In the contra Academicos Augustine challenges the 
sceptical positions professed by the academic followers of Plato3 and defends the 
thesis that knowledge is possible; while in the DM he considers how such knowledge 
is acquired and in so doing confronts the Paradox of Enquiry, familiar from Plato’s 
Meno (80d-e)4. The Paradox of Enquiry basically proposes that one cannot discover 
either what one knows (if one knows it, there is no need for enquiry) or what one does 
not know (as one does not know what one is looking for)5. The conclusion reached by 
Augustine in the contra Academicos, that knowledge is possible, necessitates an 
account of how such knowledge is acquired. The possibility of the acquisition of 
knowledge, in turn, requires an answer to the Paradox of Enquiry. The problems 
concerning the acquisition of knowledge are at the heart of the approach adopted in 
the DM.
0014 The discussion, in the DM6, concerning the acquisition of knowledge arises 
from the consideration of whether knowledge can be taught by one person to another,
2 All Augustinian texts will be cited by title alone, while those texts by other authors will be cited by 
author and title.
3 Augustine regarded Plato, and Socrates, as holding sceptical views {Acad. 2.14) - a position which 
was also suggested by Cicero {Acad. 1.15-16; 1.44-46). Also, cf. Acad. 3.37, ep. 1.1, and ep. 118.16-21 
for the view that the Academics were in fact simply Platonists who applied sceptical arguments as a 
means o f defending their position against such philosophers as were incapable o f grasping the truths of 
Platonism.
4 v. inf. §2.3.1.
5 The Paradox will be considered at greater length in due course (v. inf. §8.1.1).
6 This discussion takes place between Augustine and his son Adeodatus (shortly before his death at the 
age of 17) and, according to conf. 9 .14, all o f the ideas ascribed to Adeodatus are his own. However, it 
should be said that Augustine does not claim that the DM is the account o f an actual, historical, 
discussion which took place.
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and this is initiated through an analysis of language. The implicit background to the 
opening of the dialogue must be something like the following.
0015 Knowledge is deemed possible and, therefore, it must be able to be acquired.
If knowledge is to be acquired, it must be acquired by means of teaching and learning.
Teaching and learning involve some teacher transferring information such that some
learner comes to know what she previously did not. Information transferral is
achieved through telling or showing7, the primary mode, among humans, of such
transfer is ‘telling’. Therefore, the discussion opens with a consideration of the
purpose of speech.
Aug. quid tibi uidemur efficere uelle, cum loquimur?
(i)8
0016 The consideration of the wider question concerning the acquisition of 
knowledge, is initially the background to the preliminary questions about language 
which must firstly be clarified so as to enable progress to more central issues. As the 
discussion progresses, it becomes clear that, for Augustine, the issues of the 
acquisition of knowledge and of the nature of language are intimately connected; and 
it is only with a great deal of thought and discussion that the two are separated 
sufficiently to allow some degree of clarification surrounding the principal concern of 
the dialogue, namely the nature of knowledge acquisition.
0017 The opening question of the DM (v. sup. 0015) introduces two concepts of 
central concern to the discussion of language between Augustine and his sixteen year 
old son (conf'. 9.14), Adeodatus: performance (efficere) and intention (uelle) in speech 
(loqui). Through these concepts a number of interrelated issues are introduced. Those 
most central to the dialogue are the role of the will in communicative processes; the
7 The importance o f the telling/showing division in the dialogue is discussed at length by Bumyeat: 
1987.
8 The DM quotations will simply be numbered, all other texts quoted will be cited by name.
question as to how a speech act achieves one’s intention; and whether the speech act 
achieves this intention successfully or not (i.e. performance relative to speaker’s 
intention). There is, therefore, an implicit series of interrelationships whereby, in a 
(linguistically) communicative process, one wills something, i.e. what one intends; 
one attempts to achieve this intention through the intermediary of speech; and one 
attains this intention, or not, through the ability of language to perform what is 
intended.
0018 This said, however, the major focus of the question is what one wants to 
accomplish through speech. The above interrelationships are signalled as crucial in 
attempting to answer this, but the issue which is introduced is concerned primarily 
with the end to which language is used and it is this end which is immediately focused 
upon in Adeodatus’ answer and in the discussion of this answer which immediately 
follows.
0019 It is worth noting at this point that the dialogue proceeds along the Academic 
lines of arguing first one side of a question and then the other. Firstly it is argued that 
all teaching is through signs (DM 1-28) and then it is argued that no teaching is 
through signs (DM 29-35). The first line of argument, that teaching is through signs, 
will now be considered.
2.1. Teaching and Learning.
0020 The answer initially given to Augustine’s opening question is that the purpose 
of speech is to teach or to learn.
Ad. ... aut docere aut discere.
(1)
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The inclusion of learning within the description is promptly dismissed, for although
one apparently asks questions so as to learn, one in fact asks questions so as to teach
what it is that one wants (DM 1).
... qui cum causas ab ea quaesisset maestitiae suae cotidianarumque 
lacrimarum docendi, ut adsolet, non discendi gratia...
(conf. 3.19)
0021 The analysis of the complexities of language into statements and questions is
clearly inadequate, nevertheless it does serve to present Augustine’s main thesis that
the purpose of speech may be generally defined by the statement that one speaks so as
to teach (Plato, Crat. 388b), and nothing more.
Aug. ...nihil aliud quam docere nos uelle intellego...
(1)
Therefore, whether language achieves this end must now depend on a clarification of 
what is understood by the additional concept ‘docere'. As the matter now stands this 
general definition of the purpose of speech implies that teaching is simply equated 
with the transfer or communication of information in general9.
0022 In the Retractationes, while stressing the fact that the DM is concerned with
teaching and whether or not there is such a thing as a teacher, Augustine highlights
another related concern, namely the object of teaching, ‘scientiam'.
...de magistro. in quo disputatur et quaeritur et inuenitur magistrum non esse, 
qui docet hominem scientiam nisi deum...
(retr. 1.12.1)
The implication of this is that teaching involves the transfer of knowledge. Whether 
speech achieves what one intends, therefore, depends on whether it successfully 
teaches; that is to say, successfully transfers knowledge, and any answer to this must 
depend on a clearer understanding of what is meant by the term ‘scientid’. It is also 
necessary to clarify what implications arise from the belief that someone can be taught
by means of language and in such a way come to know something which he 
previously did not know.
0023 The opening question of the dialogue and the general answer to it raises a 
number of related issues: the role of the will in language, teaching and 
communication, and its role in knowledge acquisition; the nature of speech, its 
performance and processes; the question as to whether language in fact teaches, and, 
if so, how it does so and whether it does so successfully; the question as to what 
teaching actually is, and what is taught, or communicated, and the related issue as to 
what learning is and what is learned; and the central concerns of what knowledge is 
and how it is acquired.
2.1.1. Speech as Teaching: Singing.
0024 A first tentative definition of speech is given, by Adeodatus, as the producing,
or uttering, of words.
Ad. ...si nihil est aliudloqui quam uerbapromere...
(1)
0025 The objection is raised that if speech is nothing other than the uttering of 
words, then as singing is the uttering of words and as one often sings while alone, 
speech qua the uttering of words cannot be teaching. Speech in this sense cannot be 
defined as teaching as with no-one present to learn, one cannot intend to teach 
anything. Therefore, to teach one must intend to teach, there must be something to 
teach, and there must be someone present to learn.
9 Bumyeat: 1987, 8-9.
24
Ad. ...si nihil est aliud loqui quam uerbapromere, uideo nos idfacere, cum 
cantamus. sed cum saepe soli facimus nullo praesente qui discat, non puto nos 
docere aliquid uelle.
(1)
0026 From this objection it is clear that a more accurate definition is required of 
what speech is in itself.
2.1.1.1. Teaching as Reminding.
0027 There is a kind of teaching which occurs through reminding
(icommemoratio)10, which will be explicated in the course of the dialogue.
Aug. at ego puto esse quoddam genus docendi per commemorationem, 
magnum sane, quod in hac nostra sermocinatione res ipsa indicabit.
( 1)
0028 There is an important distinction which Augustine makes at this point with his
introduction of the concept of commemoratio. In the present discussion the focus is
primarily on teaching, and only secondarily on learning: however, the distinction is
made between the act of teaching which involves commemorare and the act of
learning which involves recordarin .
Aug. ... sed si tu non arbitraris nos discere cum recordamur nec docere ilium 
qui commemorat, non resisto tibi...
(I)12
0029 4Commemorare' means ‘to remind’ and is generally used with reference to 
others, x  reminds y o f z ( x  makes y  remember z ) ,  but it may be used with reference to 
oneself, jc reminds jc of z  ( x  makes herself remember z ) . In the present context, due to
10 Cf. an. quant. 34.
11 The distinction highlighted in the DDC should be noted here: “omnis doctrina uel rerum est uel 
signorum, sed res per signa discuntur” (doctr. chr. 1.2.). The distinctions marked here and their 
relevance to the DM will be discussed below (§ 3).
12 The negatives in this statement are not strictly relevant for Augustine merely wants Adeodatus to 
concede that there are two reasons for speaking, either to teach or remind. What is o f concern to the 
following analysis is that Augustine proposes, whether Adeodatus concedes it or not, the notional 
division o f commemoratio into recordari and commemorare.
the teach (commemorare) and learn (recordari) distinction, ‘commemorare’ must be 
understood to mean ‘remind’ or perhaps more specifically, due to the close connection 
between teaching/reminding and speech, as ‘to bring something to someone’s 
recollection by speaking of it’. It should be noted that Augustine does use 
‘commemorare’ in the sense o f ‘to remind oneself (v. inf. 0043). However, by 
distinguishing these two senses of ‘remind’ {commemorare/recordari) in DM 1 
(0028), he analyses the dual nature of the process at play in the commemorative act 
(«commemoratio).
0030 ‘Recordari’, on the other hand, means ‘to remember’,‘to call to (one’s own) 
mind’, ‘to recall’. Therefore, in the communicative process there is a sense in which jc 
teaches y by means of language; that is to say, jc brings z  to the recollection of y  by 
speaking of it, and thaty recalls z  by calling it to his own mind. This is a picture of the 
teaching/learning process whereby jc reminds andy recalls. Commemoratio, therefore, 
involves two similar but distinct processes, the reminding of others and the recalling 
to oneself. These two aspects of the communicative process are central to the 
development of Augustine’s argument, for in any act of reminding there is necessarily 
the active role of the learner in recalling.
0031 For present purposes it is felt adequate by Augustine to simply draw attention 
to the place of memory in the communicative processes and to the reminding/recalling 
distinction within these processes. With the point made that there is a kind of teaching 
through reminding, it follows that singing may simply be something which one does 
when alone (or speaking to oneself, for that matter) for the sake of reminding oneself 
of something.
Aug. ...sedsi tu non arbitraris nos discere cum recordamur nec docere ilium
qui commemorat, non resisto tibi et duas iam loquendi causas constituo, aut ut
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doceamus, aut ut commemoremus uel alios uel nos ipsos, quod etiam dum 
cantamus efficimus...
(1)
0032 That one may sing to remind oneself does not entail that one always sings to
remind oneself, for one may sing, and indeed does so more often than to remind
oneself, so as to give oneself pleasure.
Ad. ...rarum admodum est, ut ego cantem commemorandi me gratia, sed 
tantummodo delectandi.
( 1)
0033 However, what gives one pleasure, in this sense, in song is the rhythm of the
sound and so song cannot be identified with speech.
Aug. ...nonne adtendis id, quod te delectat in cantu, modulationem quandam 
soni esse? quae quoniam uerbis et addi et detrahipotest, aliud est loqui aliud 
cantare; nam et tibiis et cithara cantatur, et aues cantant, et nos interdum sine 
uerbis musicum aliquid sonamus, qui sonus cantus dicipotest, locutio non 
potest...
(1)
0034 Based on this criticism of the identification of song and speech, speech is not 
to be understood simply as the production of sound. There is a certain rhythm in 
sound {modulationem...soni) such that it may be added to, or taken away from, words 
{quae quoniam uerbis et addi et detrahi potest) and yet speech minus this rhythm does 
not cease to be speech, i.e. words minus this rhythm are still words. While one can 
produce a musical sound without any words {nos interdum sine uerbis musicum 
aliquid sonamus) which is a song {qui sonus cantus dici potest) but is not speech 
{locutio non potest).
0035 The sounds of words are, for this reason, the concern of the grammarian, not 
the philosopher.
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... sed quod sonat nihil ad dialecticam... [res] quae a grammaticis solarum 
aurium tractantur negotia.
(dial. 5.32-39)13
2.1.2. Speech as Teaching: Praver.
0036 Prayer involves speech and yet God is neither taught nor reminded by humans.
Ad. uideretur, nisi me moueret, quod dum oramus utique loquimur, nec tamen 
deum aut doceri aliquid a nobis aut commemorari fas est credere.
(2)
However, prayer is an inner activity and so there is no need for speech.
Aug. nescire te arbitror non ob aliud nobispraeceptum esse, ut in clausis 
cubiculis14 oremus, quo nomine significantur mentis penetralia, nisi quod 
deus, ut nobis quod cupimus praestet, commemorari aut doceri nostra 
locutione non quaerit...quare non opus est locutione, cum oramus, id est 
sonantibus uerbis...
(2)
This consideration of prayer introduces the concept of inner process and of the
rational aspect of humanity which is described as the ‘inner person’. It is inwardly that
one must seek for the divine (cura mort. 7); this suggests that the divine is present to
the rational aspect of the soul or is accessible through it.
Aug. qui enim loquitur, suae uoluntatis signum foras datper articulatum 
sonum, deus autem in ipsis rational is animae secretis, qui homo interior 
uocatur, et quaerendus et deprecandus est; haec enim sua templa esse uoluit.
(2)
The importance of the inner, rational, element is supported through the authority of
Scripture and this in turn, implicitly, raises the important concept of faith or belief
which is to be of major importance in the dialogue.
Aug. an apud apostolum non legisti: «nescitis quia templum dei estis et 
spiritus dei habitat in uobis»15 et «in interiore homine habitare Christum»16?
13 References to passages in the DD are to chapter and line number of PL 32.1409-20; the text used is 
Pinborg’s in Darrell Jackson: 1975.
14 Matth. 6:6. Cf. also 5. dom. m. 2.11.
151 Cor. 3:16.
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nec in propheta animaduertisti: «dicite in cordibus uestris et in cubilibus 
uestris conpungimini. sacrificate sacrificium iustitiae et sperate in domino»17? 
ubiputas sacrificium iustitiae sacrificari nisi in templo mentis et in cubilibus 
cordis? ubi autem sacrificandum est, ibi et orandum.
(2)
2.1.2.1. Definition of Speech.
0037 Speech is given a second, expanded, definition:
Aug. qui...loquitur, suae uoluntatis signum foras datper articulatum 
sonum...
(2)
The speaker produces {foras dat), through articulate sound (per articulatum sonum), a 
sign (sign) of his will (suae uoluntatis).
0038 Through speech one utters words so as to signify one’s thought.
Aug. quare non opus est locutione, cum oramus, id est sonantibus uerbis, nisi 
forte, sicut sacerdotes faciunt, significandae mentis suae causa...
(2)
Therefore, speech consists of uttered, articulate, sound in the form of words with the 
addition of a signifying element which in some way allows these words to function as 
signs for one’s thought or will.
0039 One can schematise these relations: 
(Di)
(1) (2) (3)
(a) articulatum
sonum
n
signum
n
uoluntatis
0
(b) sonantibus
uerbis
significandae
causa
mentis
16 Eph. 3:16-17.
17 Ps. 4:5-6 (Vulgate); 4:4-5 (RSV).
How each of these terms are to be understood and how they interrelate must be 
discovered. Horizontally (from (1) to (3)), the issues are how words/articulate sounds 
can produce a sign, that is, signify, and how this sign can signify the mind or will; and 
most importantly in the vertical direction (from (a) to (b)) is the question of the 
correlating of the will and the mind, and as to what exactly this mental element is.
0040 This definition of speech fits with the general view of teaching forwarded 
earlier in the dialogue, for in giving forth a sign of one’s will, one is teaching or 
transferring information in the sense that one encourages the listener to recall what 
one wants her to recall.
2.1.2.2. Inner Speech and Inner Words.
0041 The objection, to the defence of prayer as an inner act, is raised that Christ
taught the disciples words by which to pray (DM 2). Words, however, serve as
reminders of the ‘things themselves’ (res ipsas); so, words are employed in prayer not
for their own sake but so as to remind one of things.
Ad. nihil me omnino istuc mouet; non enim uerba, sed res ipsas eos uerbis 
docuit, quibus etiam se ipsi commonefacerent, a quo et quid esset orandum, 
cum in penetralibus ut dictum est mentis orarent.
(2)
0042 Words do not need to be uttered but by thinking of the words one in effect 
speaks inwardly.
Aug. ...quamuis nullum edamus sonum, tamen, quia ipsa uerba cogitamus, 
nos intus apud animum loqui . ..
(2)
This raises the idea of inner and outer words and the question as to how they relate to 
each other in terms of the signification process.
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0043 Further, the concept of inner speech supports the thesis that words are used so
as to remind. Words are ‘fixed in’ the memory and are employed by the memory, by
turning them over (as inner speech) so as to make the things themselves come to
mind. Words are signs of these things.
Aug. ...sic quoque locutione nihil aliud agere quam commemorare, cum 
memoria, cui uerba inhaerent, ea reuoluendo facit uenire in mentem res ipsas, 
quarum signa sunt uerba.
(2)
0044 This final paragraph is extremely dense and in effect sums up, in broad 
outline, Augustine’s analysis of language (as it relates to knowledge acquisition). It 
will be worthwhile to briefly consider what is proposed in this sentence.
0045 What is taught by means of words is neither the speaker’s will nor his thoughts 
but rather it is the ‘things themselves’ which come into mind (res ipsas... uerbis 
docuit; memoria... facit uenire in mentem res ipsas). The perspective has changed here 
from that of the speaker (whose will/thought is taught) to that of the hearer (who is 
reminded by the words to call the things to his own mind). This change in perspective 
is extremely significant and reveals the twofold process at play in the communicative 
act: namely, that a word reminds listener jc of the thing to which it refers (whatever 
that thing may be and in whatever sense it may be referred to), and can, therefore, 
teachx what speaker^ is thinking or what it is that he wants x to think o f In this sense 
words teach things (in the sense of reminding the listener) and teach one’s 
thought/will (in that they serve as a sort of evidence, for the listener, for what the 
speaker wants or is thinking)
0046 Also, the purpose of speech is not teaching in some broad sense (as in DM 1: 
Aug. ...nihil aliud quam docere nos uelle intellego...) but rather as specifically directed 
towards reminding (locutione nihil aliud agere quam commemorare). Words are fixed 
in the memory (memoria cui uerba inhaerent) and the words are turned over in the
memory (ea [uerba] reuoluendo), which is to think them {uerba cogitamus) and to 
speak inwardly {intus apud animum loqui). In this way the memory, as it were, 
reminds itself and makes the things themselves come into the mind {facit uenire in 
mentem res ipsas). The process of recollecting is then an active one and when one 
hears a word, or thinks it to oneself, one uses it to access latent information through 
an act of the will.
0047 With this process in mind one can see how Augustine might use the terms 
‘will’ and ‘thought/mind’ with some degree of interchangeability in regards to 
linguistic usage. For, if one accesses latent information through the intentional 
application of words, then it seems a reasonable assumption for Augustine that, when 
one speaks, one intends one’s listener to apply the same process and so access the 
information which one desires. What one wills is the accessing of the information 
which the word applies to, namely, what one has in one’s own mind when uttering the 
word.
0048 Finally, words are here crucially described as signs of the things which are 
brought to mind. The fact that words are signs raises a difficult question concerning 
how they are in fact to be understood as reminding, while the description of that 
which is brought to mind as 4res ipsas’ also requires explanation.
2.2. Speech.
0049 It is clear thus far that there is outer speech, which occurs through uttered, 
articulate words; and there is inner speech, which occurs through words being thought 
or turned over in the memory.
0050 Words teach in that they serve as reminders; they are signs, which signify 
one’s will, one’s thought, or things themselves; and words make these things come to 
mind.
0051 The main questions which this preliminary discussion has revealed concern 
the role of memory and of reminding; the object of the teaching, or reminding, that is, 
what exactly are the res ipsae which can be brought to mind, and how this occurs; and 
what is the semiotic process at work, that is to say, what is a sign and how does it 
signify.
0052 Augustine pursues these questions while always remaining focused upon his 
central concern, namely, the question of the acquisition of knowledge. To this end the 
elements of telling, showing, and understanding are analysed. However, due to the 
nature of his enquiry the whole text is focused around the question as to the nature of 
evidence - what sort of evidence, if at all, are words and sentences, what is showing 
and what sort of showing is valid, and given valid evidence, how does one grasp it. 
Therefore, although the dialogue must be considered as an analysis of teaching, 
learning, language, and signs - all hinging of the question as to what knowledge is - 
each consideration is imbued with the issue of evidence.
0053 In much recent philosophical debate there is a division over the question of 
whether language is primarily an instrument for expressing truths or as a medium of 
social interaction (Harrison: 1979, 63). This, or something rather similar, would 
appear to be at the heart of the debate occurring within the DM - if language is used 
so as to teach, then teaching means providing with knowledge, and so how does 
language transmit knowledge, what does it transmit, what sort of grounds for evidence 
does it have and how reliable are they?
0054 Chomsky states, against the communication model as the ‘essential purpose’ 
of language, that language is ‘essentially a system for the expression of thought’ 
(Chomsky: 1976, 56-7). In the final analysis, Augustine may be seen to collapse these 
ideas together for his picture of language is one whereby it serves to express thought 
with the purpose of expressing it to another, and how he would divide these elements 
is unclear. Yet, as will be seen, in the DM it would seem that one can express one’s 
thoughts but that one cannot, as such, provide any new information to another for they 
can only be encouraged to consider their own thoughts, for no-one can, as the DM 
argues, access another’s thought. For Augustine words express one’s thoughts and 
attempt to communicate them, so words can express thoughts, but it is questionable 
whether they can be said to communicate them in any accurate sense.
2.3. Commemoratio.
0055 There are many issues surrounding the linguistic/semiotic processes in the 
communicative act and surrounding the nature of the knowledge which is intended to 
be transferred. These are considered in due course throughout the following 
discussion. However, there are two closely related themes of which a brief 
consideration at this point will serve to inform the remainder of this discussion. The 
first is the nature of evidence. At the close of DM 2, Augustine introduces the idea 
that words are signs, and this necessarily raises the possibility that what will be under 
discussion will in some way concern their function as evidence. Words qua signs 
transfer knowledge of something distinct and separate from themselves qua signs, and 
so the question arises as to the validity of the grounds by which they function as signs 
and as to the basis on which this knowledge can be said to rest.
0056 The discussion of signs will begin in the next section, but an accurate 
understanding of this discussion depends on the second related theme, namely 
4 commemoratio ’.
0057 Augustine has argued that the purpose of language is to teach, that there is a 
sort of teaching which is reminding, and then that the purpose of speech is nothing 
other than to remind {nihil aliud agere quam commemorare). These points, taken 
together with the general statement that words are signs raises the question as to what 
sort of signs words are.
0058 There had been an ancient controversy over the nature of evidence involving,
originally, the medical Empiricists and Rationalists, which was later taken up by
18sceptics as a route of attack against the ‘dogmatic’ philosophers, primarily the 
Stoics19. This controversy arose from the division of knowledge into the evident 
(ftpoSriAnc), which can be known immediately (these are often directly observable and 
perceptible), and into the non-evident (aSriAnc), which cannot be directly observed or 
apprehended20. These non-evident matters, if at all knowable, must rest on the 
evidence of other, evident, truths. Therefore, all knowledge is either directly 
apprehended, as evident truths, or is grasped indirectly, as non-evident truths, by way 
of these evident truths (Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.141).
0059 Most relevant to the discussion, at this moment, is that non-evident truths and 
the transition from evident to the apprehension of non-evident matters is discussed by 
means of signs and demonstrations (Sextus Empiricus, M. 7.24-6). Knowledge of
18 Discussed in Sextus Empiricus’ extensive consideration o f signs and signification: PH 2. 97-133; M. 
8.141-299.
19 Discussed by Allen: 2001, 87-146.
20 The following discussion is a cursory overview of only those matters specifically relevant to this 
study, accordingly much o f the interpretational difficulty is passed over. For a fuller discussion o f this 
controversy cf. Allen. 2001.
non-evident matters is discovered by means of sign-inference and demonstrations 
from the evident (Sextus Empiricus, M. 7.25).
0060 The sign is understood, in a specific way, as that which is indicative of a non- 
evident thing (Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.143). Just as non-evident matters can be 
divided into different categories (Sextus Empiricus, PH 2.97-98; M. 8.145-148) so too 
can the types of signs which reveal these different kinds of non-evident matters. The 
first type of non-evident things are naturally so and are forever beyond human 
apprehension, such as the invisible pores in the skin and the existence of void (Sextus 
Empiricus, M. 8.146). Also, there are matters which are temporarily non-evident, such 
as the city of Athens to someone distant from it (Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.145)21.
0061 Temporarily non-evident matters are revealed by ‘commemorative’ signs 
(arjpeia UTtopvriaTiKa), and naturally non-evident matters by ‘indicative’ signs 
(aripeia evSeiKTiKCc) (Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.151; 8.156). The commemorative 
sign is defined as that which, having been observed in conjunction with the thing 
signified in a clear perception, brings us, as soon as it is presented and when the thing 
signified has become non-evident, to a recollection of the thing observed along with it 
and now no longer clearly perceived (as in the case of smoke and fire) (Sextus 
Empiricus, M. 8.152). While the indicative sign is that which does not admit of being 
observed in conjunction with the thing signified, but entirely from its own nature and 
constitution (Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.154).
0062 The commemorative sign, at first glance, would appear to fall under the genus 
of inductive generalisation. Taking smoke as a commemorative sign of fire, one can 
see that a limited number of past observations of smoke signalling fire, will in the 
future lead one to the generalisation that, on seeing smoke, there is also fire. However,
this is not strictly accurate to the origin of the controversy22, for it is not the fact of 
‘conjunction in observation’ (aupm parnpTiaiq) that is central but rather 
commemoration (bjropvriaK;). The sign reminds one of what has been observed and 
remembered. The process is not one of inference, involving a rational grasp of the 
grounds for the move from evidence to conclusion, it is wholly memoristic23.
0063 From this general description it would then be tempting to place words, as 
described by Augustine, within this classification of commemorative signs. 
Augustine, as the recipient of the long tradition of semiotic theorising, can be seen to 
adopt many aspects of the commemorative model of signs in his linguistic analysis. 
The commemorative sign is that which was accepted, in somewhat altered form, by 
the sceptics and much of Augustine’s refutation of words as valid grounds for 
learning rests on lines of argument which are themselves an altered form of the 
commemorative class of sign. As mentioned above (0055), the question of evidence 
and grounds for knowledge run throughout the dialogue, and an understanding of 
Augustine’s definition of words as signs which serve to remind will be essential to 
any clear understanding of the thesis which he defends as a whole concerning the 
acquisition of knowledge.
2.3.1. Recollection.
0064 A second, related, issue arises out of Augustine’s account of commemoratio. 
When Augustine suggests that there is a type of teaching through reminding 
(quoddam genus docendi per commemorationem, DM 1), it is unlikely that an ancient
21 The class of absolutely non-evident matters (Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.147) is passed over for the 
present as not relevant.
52 Allen: 2001, 110.
23 Cf. Frede ‘An Empiricist View of Knowledge: Memorism’ in Everson: 1990, 225-50.
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reader, or a modem reader for that matter, would fail to think of Plato’s account of 
Recollection (ava}xvrjau;) which was adopted as a solution to the question of 
knowledge acquisition in the Meno (81c-d).
0065 Augustine would have been aware of the theory from Cicero (Tusc. 1.57-58)24 
and perhaps also from the Phaedrus25 (249), which together with the Phaedo may 
have been familiar to him throught the intermediary of Porphyry26. Also, Augustine 
would have access to the doxographical tradition .
0066 The Meno is referred to by Augustine with regard to the transmigration of
souls, recollection, and the slave boy experiment in the de trinitate.
unde Plato ille philosophus nobilis persuadere conatus est uixisse hie animas 
hominum et antequam ista corpora gererent, et hinc esse quod ea quae 
discuntur reminiscuntur potius cognita quam cognoscuntur noua. retulit enim 
puerum quendam nescio quae de geometrica interrogatum sic respondisse 
tamquam esset illiusperitissimus disciplinae...
(ttrim 12.24)
Recollection is also referred to directly in a letter to Nebridius.
nonnulli calumniantur aduersus Socraticum illud nobilissimum inuentum, quo 
adseritur non nobis ea, quae discimus, ueluti noua inseri, sed in memoriam 
recordatione reuocari...
(ep. 7.2)28
0067 In the DM the idea of commemoratio is presented as a possible solution to the
Paradox of Enquiry, as Recollection is in the Meno, and is used to challenge the belief
that people are taught at all, as also is the case in the Meno.
E Q . ...Kori v b v  epcoTQcc; e i  exco a s  5 i 5 od;ca, o q  o b  (prjpi S i5 a x q v  
e l v a i  a \X ’ ccv6c |x v r |a iv ...
(Plato, Men. 81e-82a)
24 Cf. Hagendahl: 1967, 486-553; Testard: 1958, vol. 1, 205-29; 261-6.
25 That Augustine was, at least indirectly (cf. O’Daly: 1987, 70 n. 197), aware of the content o f the 
Phaedrus is seen from his reference to the contents o f Phaedr. 248-249 in civ. 13.19.
26 Cf. Courcelle: 1948, 226-9.
27 Cf. Solignac: 1958.
28 Cf. also sol. 2.35.
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0068 In the DM Augustine is clearly employing the Platonic notion of Recollection 
in some manner. He does not defend the theory in entirely Platonic terms though, for, 
as will be argued, he avoids any sense in which there is necessitated the 
transmigration of souls, or pre-existence of the soul, but rather proposes a form of 
another Platonic notion, namely, illumination29.
2.3.2. Commemorative Signs and Recollection.
0069 There would appear, therefore, to be a certain tension within Augustine’s 
presentation of teaching as reminding where words are signs and reminders, and 
where learning is Recollection. Whether one of these interpretations is false or 
whether both may, in some sense, be preserved in a form compatible with one another 
will be at the heart of much of the following discussion; and in the solution to this 
issue lies the answer to Augustine’s analysis of knowledge acquisition in general, and 
to the facility of words for providing such a solution. It will be found that the Platonic 
theory of Recollection, in an adapted form, is essentially the correct interpretation of 
commemoratio in the DM; however, it will none the less be found that the approach to 
Augustine’s theory of language qua linguistic signs from the class of commemorative 
sign will prove an extremely informative method for penetrating this theory.
29 Although it may be argued (cf. White: 1976, 199-215) that the Seventh Letter is genuine and its 
philosophical ideas on illumination, etc., coherent with Plato’s epistemological development, what is o f 
importance to this study is that the letter was accepted in the ancient world as genuine and so the 
philosophical contents would have been handed down as part of the Platonic tradition.
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3. The Problem of Communication.
3.1. Words are Signs.
0070 Language is classified as belonging to the analysis of signs, for words are 
signs.
Aug. constat ergo inter nos uerba signa esse.
Ad. constat.
(3)
Signs are described in an extremely general manner, for a sign is a sign in that it
signifies something.
Aug. quid? signum nisi aliquid significet, potest esse signum?
Ad. non potest.
(3)
0071 However, for all of its generality, this description is nevertheless informative. 
Augustine is not overly concerned with signs per se but rather is concerned with the 
analysis of signs in terms of information transfer, and in this respect words are signs 
par excellence. Signs are focused on in two particular ways: that they signify and that 
they signify something. This may appear somewhat tautologous; however, when one 
considers that Augustine is suiting his description to a consideration of linguistic 
signs, it raises interesting and fundamental questions concerning the nature of 
language. For there remains the question as to how a semiotic analysis accords to an 
analysis of language. This is to say, basically and of primary interest in the context of 
the discussion in the DM, does ‘signify’ correspond to ‘mean’ and if so in what sense 
is ‘meaning’ to be understood and how are its underlying processes elucidated by a 
semiotic approach?
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0072 Also, there is the question as to what this something is, that is signified by a 
word qua sign. If a word is a sign in that it must signify something, the implication is 
that Augustine supports a referential theory of meaning.
0073 These questions are progressively explicated throughout the dialogue and will 
be discussed in due course. However, for an understanding of Augustine’s position 
with regards to these issues it will be necessary to clarify Augustine’s approach to 
signs.
3.2. Signs.
0074 Much of Augustine’s thought revolves around the nature of abstraction and the 
philosophy of relations. As a young man he found the idea of an immaterial God 
difficult to conceptualise, difficult to abstract from the everyday material reality 
around him. His attraction to Manichaeism and repulsion from Christianity lay, to a 
large degree, in an overly materialistic appreciation of God {conf. 6.4). Through the 
teachings of Ambrose (con) . 6.4 ff.) he began to think of a Christian God in a complex 
and intellectually satisfying manner and was soon drawn to the transcendental 
philosophical system of the Neoplatonists30. His ruminations on the nature of 
abstraction perhaps culminated in his great work on the Trinity, developed and 
explicated at length in his de trinitate - an interpretation aided in no small part by an 
application of relational philosophy (gained from a reading of Aristotle’s Categories, 
conf 4.28), together with the transcendentalism of Neoplatonic thought31.
30 The famous exposure to ‘quosdam Platonicorum libros ex graeca lingua in latinam uersos {conf.
7.13-27). For a survey o f scholarhip on the contents o f these texts see Hadot: 1971, 201-10.
31 Porphyry had defended the position that the Categories were neither simply a classification of the 
material realm (Plotinus, 6.3) nor a classification o f all being (as held by the Peripatetics), but rather 
that it was mainly concerned with language and logical analysis (Porphyry, in Cat. 57.7-8). Therefore, 
Augustine felt no conflict in employing the categorical approach in his analysis o f the
41
0075 This concern with abstraction interpenetrates every area of Augustine’s 
thought, and is a factor in his lifelong fascination with language and, more 
fundamentally, with signs. Any item can be viewed simply as a thing or can be 
viewed simultaneously as a things and as sign.
0076 In the de doctrina Christiana32 Augustine feels the need to distinguish things
qua things from signs qua signs, and in so doing makes it clear that in the opening
book of the DDC he wants to consider things qua things.
res... quae non adsignificandum aliquidadhibentur, sicuti est lignum, lapis, 
pecus atque huiusmodi cetera sed non illud lignum, quod in aquas amaras 
Moysen misisse legimus, ut amaritudine carerenP...
(idoctr. chr. 1.2)
Insofar as they signify, things can also be signs.
namque ita res sunt, ut aliarum etiam signa sint rerum.
{doctr. chr. 1.2)
While all signs, even those whose entire function consists in signifying (such as
words), are also things.
omne signum etiam res aliqua est; quod enim nulla res est, omnino nihil est...
{doctr. chr. 1.2)
0077 Augustine’s distinction between signs and things is such that there is nothing 
which is exclusively a sign or which is exclusively a thing, but rather there is a single 
item with both aspects continually present. This item can be considered, in 
abstraction, in one aspect or the other while never ceasing to be both34. This idea 
interpenetrates all of the fundamental ideas discussed in the DM, and in general 
reflects Augustine’s view of the human condition: signs and sign theory for Augustine
transcendentalism o f Neoplatonism and Christianity. That Augustine followed the syncretising 
approach, o f the 3rd century, to Plato and Aristotle, cf. acad. 3.42 where they are said to participate in 
‘una uerissimaephilosophiae discipline  (cf. Cicero, acad. 1.4.17; 2.5.15).
32 Henceforth DDC.
33 Exod. 15:25.
34 Augustine’s approach to these, and related issues is influenced by the Porphyrian categorical analysis 
where ontological aspects o f the world can be linguistically analysed and abstracted. This approach,
largely embrace everything in human experience (DDC 2.1-3). Indeed, as can be seen 
in the broad scope of his definition of signs in the DDC {doctr. chr. 1.2.; cf. 0080), 
signs are whatever can be considered relationally or are put to that use.
0078 Therefore, to move beyond signs and the realm of semiotics one must extend 
one’s consideration into the realm of the non-relational, that is, the realm of 
transcendence. The route to this is achieved through an analysis of the relational and 
the application of the intellect (as that facet of the human being which can abstract 
and therefore give consideration to things non-relationally) so as to abstract items and 
therefore think about them in themselves and non-relationally35.
3.2.1. Definition of Signs.
0079 Although the concept of ‘sign’ and the process of signification are referred to 
in numerous works by Augustine, and are in fact directly discussed in a number of 
other works36, these are never actually considered for their own sake. The discussions 
of signs always concern a wider purpose and thus any definition given is affected by 
this context. Consideration will be given so as to contextualise, as far as necessary, 
Augustine’s primary definitions of signs and to analyse, as far as possible, what it was 
that he understood a sign to be and how he understood it to function.
0080 The main discussion which directly relates to signs is in the DDC where two 
related definitions are given.
together with the Stoic logical considerations o f ambiguity will play an important role in Augustine’s 
consideration o f language and its role in knowledge acquisition (v. inf. § 5.2.1.2.3; § 5.6.2 and § 6.1).
35 The Platonic dimension o f  this approach will be discussed below (§ 9).
Most notably in the de dialectica, de magistro, and de doctrina Christiana.
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Di signa res...quae adsignificandum aliquidadhibentur.
{doctr. chr. 1.2)
D2 signum est enim res praeter speciem, quam ingerit sensibus aliud aliquid ex
se faciens in cogitationem uenire.
{doctr. chr. 2.1)
37In the de dialectica the definition of sign is:
D3 signum est quod et se ipsum sensui et praeter se aliquid animo ostendit.
{dial. 5.9-10)
0081 Of particular importance in understanding these definitions is that in DDC
Augustine is concerned with the interpretation of scripture and the rules which may be
employed in the interpretative process:
suntpraecepta quaedam tractandarum scripturarum...
{doctr. chr. praef. 1)
This depends on the process of discovery and of presentation:
duae sunt res quibus nititur omnis tractatio scripturarum, modus inueniendi 
quae intellegenda sunt et modus proferendi quae intellecta sunt.
{doctr. chr. 1.1)
380082 The main focus is on learning {modus inueniendi quae intellegenda sunt) and
39teaching {modus proferendi quae intellecta sunt) so as to facilitate the interpretation 
of scripture {tractatio scripturarum). In this context Augustine is not concerned with
40signs qua signs but rather with their use toward a specific end . He goes on to state 
that all teaching is of things or signs41,
omnis doctrina uel rerum est uel signorum...
37
Henceforth referred to as DD.
38
Augustine’s use o f ‘inuentio’ is significantly altered from its use as a technical term from rhetorc {ad 
Her. 1.3); as Green: 1995, p ,12n.l.
39 .
These two phrases {modus inueniendi...modus proferendi...) constitute a general definition of
‘doctrina\ which accords with the overall conclusion arrived at in the DM (v. inf. § 11).
40
This practical exercise, which is taken up, to an extent, in DDC, is hinted at in DM (46) in which a 
consideration o f the use o f words, signs par excellence for Augustine, is postponed until a later date: 
"sedde tota utilitate uerborum, quae, si bene consideretur, nonparua est, alias...requiremus’.
41 In the DM Augustine approaches this systematically with (1) signs taught by signs, DM 7-18; (2) 
things taught by signs, DM 22-28; and (3) things taught through themselves, DM 29-32.
44
but that things are learned through signs42,
...sed res per signa discuntur.
(doctr. chr. 1.2)
In Di the context is one in which Augustine wants to distinguish things qua things 
from signs qua signs, and in so doing makes clear that in the opening book of DDC he 
wants to consider things qua things (doctr. chr. 1.2; cf. 0076).
0083 Therefore, with these specifics of context clarified what remains is that signs 
are things which are ‘used’ (adhibentur) purposively so as to signify (ad 
significandum) something else (aliquid). One should consider however whether in Di 
the person who uses the sign so as to signify need necessarily be active in the sense of 
giving the sign rather than being more generally actively engaged in the signification 
process, whether that be in ‘using’ signs through, say, speaking, or ‘using’ signs 
through, say, interpreting what a cloudy sky means. That is to say, Augustine leaves 
open the question as to where exactly ‘purpose’ and ‘use’ need lie in the signification 
process.
430084 The definition given in Di has rightly been called ‘general’ , however that is 
not to say that the definition is not of a fundamental nature. The other definitions (D2 
and D3) may be more specific to their own contexts but it is Di which is concerned 
with the distinction between thing and sign, between thing qua being and thing qua
44signifying .
...memoriterque teneamus id nunc in rebus considerandum esse quod sunt, 
non quod aliud etiam praeter se ipsas significant.
(doctr. chr. 1.2)
42 This statement is contentious in light o f the conclusions reached in the DM and will be considered 
below (§8).
Darrell Jackson: 1972, 94.
44 . . .
In the DDC things are considered first - they are primary in that they are considered due to their
being - while signs are considered second in that they have being but mainly in that they also signify.
For this reason Augustine considers words as fundamental in semiotics in that their whole being rests in
their signifying.
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This distinction sets forth what it is that makes a thing a sign, namely that it is a thing 
(res) which is used (<adhibentur) so as to signify (ad significandum) something 
(aliquid).
0085 Therefore, for Augustine, the sign relation is quite clearly triadic45, necessarily 
involving,
(1) Sign (res qua signum)
(2) what is signified (aliquid)
(3) the subject/object for whom the sign is used to signify something
46(adhibentur) .
0086 As has been noted (0082), in the context of the DDC, much of Augustine’s 
concern is to distinguish things from signs in any interpretative process so that things 
qua things can be clearly considered without any confusion with things qua signs 
(doctr. chr. 1.2). Augustine then is clearly making the differentiation in Di between 
things considered in themselves and things considered in that they signify - whether 
that be that they are interpreted as signifying or are intended to signify. This definition 
must then be considered as both general and, for that very reason, as primary.
0087 While Augustine defines a res as, properly (proprie'1), something which is not 
used so as to signify something else,
Ri proprie...res appellaui, quae non ad significandum aliquid adhibentur
(doctr. chr. 1.2)
it is also used, less properly, to refer to anything at all that exists - i.e. whatever is not 
nothing. This is inferred from a point made about signs, which also fall under the term
"res'\
Markus: 1994, 71; Darrell Jackson: 1972, 96.
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Of particular interest is the specifics of the grammatical structure of the definition given by 
Augustine, especially the use o f the passive main verb and the ‘purP0Sive’ gerundive construction.
The significance o f these will be considered below (§ 3.3.4).
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R2 signum etiam res aliqua est; quod enim nulla res est, omnino nihil est.
{doctr. chr. 1.2)
In DDC then, the term 'res' has two possible meanings: its primary use being for that 
which is existent in its own right and does not depend upon that which it signifies 
(Ri). This usage referring to such things as wood and stone. While a secondary, and 
more general, use is for what simply is (R2). So a res is primarily something in a 
concrete sense and secondarily in a sense of being not-nothing. This is borne out by 
the definition of 'res' in the DD.
R3 res est quidquid uel sentitur uel intellegitur uel latet.
{dial. 5.2-3)
0088 A point worth noting is the use of the qualifying 'aliqua' in definition R2 . A 
sign has a material aspect (D2 : signum est... res praeter speciem quam ingerit 
sensibus...; D3 : signum... se ipsum sensui... ostendit.) and yet is a qualified res. The 
reason behind this is that a sign does not have independent existence but rather its 
being is utterly dependent on the fact that it signifies (v. sup. n.44). A sign then is a 
res, or a res may become a sign, through its bearing some sort of relation, for its user, 
to other things.
0089 The question would now appear to concern what sort of a thing it is that is 
signified through signs. To return to the definitions of ‘sign’ given above (0080), 
Augustine states that signs signify (1) aliquid, Di and D3; and (2) aliud aliquid, D2 . In 
fact nowhere in the passages in which he defines what a sign is does he use 'res' to 
describe what it is that a sign refers to, but prefers the rather vague aliquid (cf. also 
DM 3: signum nisi aliquid significet, potest esse signum?).
0090 Taking all of the above points together it would seem that Augustine is 
employing the term aliquid in his definitions of ‘sign’ in a rather precise way. What is
47 A significant and important term in Augustine’s approach to language (v. inf. § 6.1.5).
meant is not some general sense whereby signs signify ‘something or other distinct 
from themselves’ but rather with ‘aliquid' Augustine is employing terminology 
something like the Stoic use of the term ‘xi’ for the primary genus in their ontology48. 
The reason behind this usage, however, is certainly not ontological in Augustine’s 
case, but may be better seen as a terminological expedient in that the use of ‘aliquicT 
gives a broad scope for the possible significata without bringing any ontological 
implications as to the nature of those significata.
0091 The question as to what sort of a res it is that a sign signifies will very much 
depend on what sort of sign and what sort of semiotic relation one is considering. At 
present it will suffice to say that what is signified must, at the very least, be a res in 
the ‘improper’ sense of a thing which is not nothing.
0092 In the definitions considered there is a crucial term which is passed over, 
namely, ‘significare’. In the definition of ‘sign’, with regards to the actual process of 
signifying there are two main considerations: signa qua res, namely, signs as they are; 
and signa qua signa, namely, signs as they signify. It is relevant that Augustine’s 
interest with signs is utterly bound up with the question of the acquisition of 
knowledge and hence with the nature of knowledge itself and with that of reality.
0093 From the definitions given in D2 and D3, where the focus is on the specifics of 
the sign in the interpretational process (D2) and in logical processes (D3), it is clear 
that the sign creates an impression on the senses.
D2 signum...praeter speciem, quam ingerit sensibus
D3 signum... se ipsum sensui... ostend.it
Through this impression it somehow causes something else to come into one’s 
thought.
48 Cf. Alexander Aphrodisias, in Ar. Top. 301.19-25; Sextus Empiricus, M. 2.330; M. 10.218; Seneca,
DD 5
DM2
DM3
DDC1
DDC2
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D2 signum...aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem uenire
D3 signum.. .praeter se aliquid animo ostendit.
0094 The signifying process, as far as it can be understood from the evidence of the 
definitions, is such that a sensible sign strikes one’s perception in such a way as to 
show something to one’s mind, or to cause something to enter one’s thinking. The 
process involved from impression to thought is as yet unclear.
0095 As defined, the process can be schematised. In the table below, which 
compares the terminology employed in Augustine’s sign theory, there will be inserted 
in addition to those passages discussed above (DD 5.9-10; DDC 1.2; DDC 2.1) the 
two sections where Augustine’s comes closest in the DM to a general description of 
the sign (DM 2 and DM 3).
(D2)
( 1) (2) 
signum sensui
(3)
ostendit
(4)
aliquid 
praeter se
(5)
ammo
signum memoria facit uenire 
(uerbum)
res ipsas in mentem
signum significat aliquid
signa ad significandum aliquid adhibentur
signum speciem faciens uenire 
sensibus
aliud aliquid 
ex se
in cogitationem
0096 Therefore, a sign is a material item which affects the senses, (1) & (2), but that 
it can be accessed memorially and therefore has an intelligible or immaterial element. 
Also, there is, clearly, an item which is signified or referred to, and yet how exactly it
ep. 58.13-15.
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is signified or referred to very much depends upon what type of a thing it is (4). That 
something is a sign depends upon it being used as such and accessed by a mind, to 
which it signifies an item (5). Signs have a twofold impact on their receiver: there is 
that which strikes the senses (the impression) and that which is caused to come to 
mind. Finally, the signification process in some way ‘shows’ something, or ‘causes it 
to come’, to mind.
3.3. Signs as Evidence.
3.3.1. Indication and Representation.
0097 In classical Latin ‘signum’ had two main senses: indication (cf. Cicero, div. 
1.82-83\fin. 5.74; de or. 2.174; Lael 17.62) and representation (cf. Cicero, div. 1.77;
Lucretius 1.318)49. In general terms an indication is that which indicates or points
towards something, such as smoke indicating fire, while a representation is that which 
represents or resembles something, as a drawing of fire represents fire. In Greek the 
indicative sign was called a ‘arijieiov’. This word and its cognates do not appear to 
have been used in the sense of ‘representation’.
0098 In Augustine’s definitions, there is no concern in these contexts with the sign 
as representation, but rather, as a student taught in the traditional elements of the 
rhetorical arts (DDC 4.2) and as a thinker in the Greek philosophical tradition, 
Augustine focuses upon signs as indications. Signs are of interest to Augustine in that 
they function in such a way as to lead the mind to something beyond themselves, and 
although representative signs may be seen to do this also, what is of concern to
49 Kirwan: 1989,37. / ,  ‘ \ i ‘
\ /V
50
Augustine is not the representational nature of signs, but specifically their indicational 
nature.
0099 That Augustine is less concerned with the formal relationship of signs and 
their objects than with the conceptual relationship is seen in his lack of interest in 
discussion of ‘nature’ and ‘convention’, and the related issue of ‘correctness of 
names’, with regards to signs and language.
0100 The idea of ‘the correctness of names’50 (ovopaTCOv 6p0oTT(<;51) is a 
recurrent theme in Western philosophy, in one way or another, from the Sophistic 
movement in Greece of the Fifth Century BCE up to debates of the present day. 
However, in Augustine’s DM, his most specific and protracted discussion of the
52‘Philosophy of Language’ , there is no mention of ‘the correctness of names’ nor of 
the related ideas o f ‘nature’ versus ‘convention’53.
0101 Language was a common concern of the Sophists and their analysis of it took
54many directions and many forms . Those areas which concerned the idea of 
correctness in language were opOoerceia55 and dvopaxoov 6p0oxr|^. It is most likely 
that both terms were technical in nature and distinct in their areas of concern: 
dp0oeji8i<x, connected most notably to Protagoras56, concerned correctness of diction 
and would primarily have been directed towards general linguistics, particularly
50 The issues o f ‘nature’ and ‘convention’ extend beyond the bounds of language, but for the purpose of 
this discussion they will be considered within this limit.
Plato, Euthd. 277e; Cra. 383a.
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This rather anachronistic term is perhaps the most accurate description o f what Augustine’s analysis 
of language amounts to in the DM. Philosophy of Language, in a general sense, is perhaps most 
succinctly defined as “[t]he general attempt to understand the components o f a working language, the 
relationship the understanding speaker has to its elements, and the relationship they bear to the 
world...” (S. Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary o f Philosophy, Oxford, 1994).
53 Cf. Sextus Empiricus, M  1.148-154 on nature and convention in general.
54 Cf. Guthrie: 1969, 176-225; 261-319; Kerferd: The Sophistic Movement, 1981, 68-82; Rankin:
1983, 13-63.
Diogenes Laertius 9.48; Plato, Phdr. 267c.
56 Cf. Plato, Phdr. 267c. On Protagoras in general, cf. RE 23 (1957); Guthrie: 1969, 261-269; Rankin: 
1983, 30-35.
57
poetics and grammar ; while ovoixaxcov opQoxriq, connected most notably to
58
Prodicus , appears to have been more particularly concerned with what might be 
termed semantics59.
0102 Closely connected to the Sophists’ concern with language, and with ‘the 
correctness of names’ is the nature/convention controversy (voiioq/cpbaiq)60. This 
controversy interpenetrated a great deal of Sophistic thinking in the latter part of the 
Fifth Century BCE and was central to the issues of language in general and of ‘the 
correctness of names’ particularly. For to ask whether there is such a thing as a 
correctness of names is to imply the prior question as to whether names are merely 
conventional (or, more extremely stated, arbitrary) or inherently natural61.
There is intense debate surrounding this topic but germane is that the term is cited in the list of titles 
of Democritus’ works (Diogenes Laertius 9.48). The fact that opSoerceia is taken together with 
yXmaaai and Homer would tend towards an interpretation more in accord with correct diction rather 
than semantics or more philosophical concerns. That Protagoras was a fellow citizen (of Abdera) and 
younger contemporary (b. c.485 BCE) o f Democritus (b. 460-57 BCE) may add to the position that 
Protagoras would be influenced to some extent by Democritus’ particular concern with the linguistic 
aspect o f correctness in language implied by this term (cf. Fehling, in Classen: 1976, 344-345). As 
Pfeiffer states (Pfeiffer: 1968, 39) it is extremely difficult to attempt a coherent reconstruction of any 
theory o f opQoetteia from the fragmentary references which survive, but what seems most plausible is 
that the rhetorical education consisted to some extent in being able “to distinguish which words and 
sentences are correctly (opQcbq) formed and which not...” (cf. Plato, Prt. 339a).58
Plato, Euthd. 277e; Cra. 384b. On Prodicus in general, cf. RE 23 (1957); Guthrie: 1969, 274-280; 
Rankin: 1983, 45-52; Ambrose, in Anton & Preus: 2, 1983, 129-14 4.
59
Following on from Protagoras, the major Sophist involved in questions of language was clearly 
Prodicus of Ceos. Prodicus’ approach to language (cf. Plato, Prt. 337a-c; 340ab), even though 
presented in hostile sources (Plato, Men. 75e; cf. Guthrie: 1969, 176), can be seen to tend towards the 
analysis of language in terms o f meaning, or semantics (cf. Pfeiffer: 1968, 41). The picture one gains of 
Prodicus’ method is one whereby two or three words o f apparently the same meaning are analysed so 
as to reveal that their precise meanings are in fact distinct. The rare expression opQoxriq, occurs in 
Aristophanes, with this same emphasis (Aristophanes, ra. 1181). The discussion o f poetry in the 
Aristophanes is not concerned with the form of words (as in the ‘Protagorean’ passage o f the nu. 658 
ff), but with their meaning. All o f the direct references to Prodicus in Plato and Aristotle (DK: 84 A
13-19) support this interpretation also (Pfeiffer: 1968, 39-40).
60
Cf. Kerferd: The Sophistic Movement, 1981, 111-130.
On a natural theory o f language, cf. Epicurus, ep. Hdt. 75-76; nat. 28, 31.10.2-12, 28.31.13.23-14.12; 
Diogenes o f Oenoanda 10.2.11-5.15; Lucretius 5.1028-1090; the position forwarded by Cratylus in 
Plato, Cra. passim; while on a conventional theory cf. the position forwarded by Hermogenes in Plato, 
Cra. passim.
52
0103 The issue concerning vofioc; and cpoaiq in language itself concerns two
separate distinctions. These distinctions would appear to have first been recognised, or
at least formulated, by Democritus62. The issue is well summed up in Barnes:
There are two quite distinct questions involved... The first... concerns the 
origins of language, or o f ‘names’: was language deliberately created and 
imposed by a ‘name-giving’ person..? or did language gradually evolve from 
brutish grunts and growls, without the intervention of any conscious 
agent?...The second question concerns the relation between language and the 
world: does language fit the world naturally, like skin on an animal? or is it an 
artificial matching, like clothes on an Edwardian bellel Are names fixed to 
what they name by a natural adhesive? or is the glue man-made?63
The first distinction is concerned with the actual development of language in humans.
However, this is often, and easily, confused with the second distinction; for even if
one accepts that there was at some distant time in the past a name-giver, the question
still remains as to whether he/she imposed names naturally suited to their objects (i.e.
64there is inherently something doggy in the word [dog] ) or whether the names bear no 
relation to their objects and are arbitrarily imposed65.
0104 The second, and more important distinction in relation to Augustine’s analysis 
of signs and language, is concerned with the relationship between language and 
reality. The significance of voixoq and (pban; in this regard is discussed at length in 
Plato’s Cratylus:
EPM KparbAxx; cpqaiv o5e, d) ZmKpaTeq, ov6|i <xto<; 6p06rr|T(x 
eivca  eKaaxco xcbv ovtcov (pbaei Jtecpoicouxv, m i ob  touto e lv a i
62 Cf. Barnes: 1979, 466.
63
Barnes: 1979, 466-7.
64
The following conventions, as used in Ebbesen (1990, 147), will be employed henceforth:
<dog> = a thing which is a dog 
/dog/ = the concept o f a dog 
[dog] = the word ‘dog’; 
adding:
\dog\ = the ‘sayable’ (dicibile) o f dog.
Cf. Barnes: 1979, 466-70, for an interesting discussion on Democritus’ early position in the debate 
whereby he may perhaps be seen to hold that there is a natural origin o f language (i.e. no name-giver): 
(68 B 5, DK: 2, 1952, 135-136; Diodorus Siculus, 1.8.3); whilst holding that names are conventional 
in their relationship to reality (68 B 26, DK: 2, 1952, 148; Proclus, in Cra. 16 p.5, 25 Pasqu.). Cf. also 
on this subject, 68 B 2; 68 B 122a; 68 B 142; 68 B 145, DK: 2, 1952, as discussed by Barnes.
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ovopa o av xive<; £uv0£p£voi koXeiv Ka>xbai, xty; abxcbv (pcovfj<; 
popiov £Hi(p0£yy6p£voi, aAAa 6p06xr|Ta xiva xcbv ovopaxcov 
JtEcp'DKEvai Kai 'EMxiai Kai pappapoiq xpv abxTjv am aiv...
(Plato, Cra. 383a-b)
EPM Kai pf\v eycoyE, & E6)Kpax£( .^.ot) Sbvapai 7t£ia0f|vai ax; 
aAAt| xiq 6p0oxri<; ovopaxoq f[ £ov0tikt| Kai opoXoyia. Epoi yap 
8ok£1, o xt av xiq xcp 0fjxai ovopa, xobxo Eivai xo 6p0ov...oi) 
yap cpt)<j£i EKaaxco rcEcpoKEvai ovopa ot>§£v obSsvi, a ik a  vopcp 
Kai £0£i xcbv £0iaavxcov xe Kai KaXobvxcov.
(Plato, Cra. 384c-d)
The central focus in the Cratylus is on the relationship of words, and language in
general, to their objects: that is, how [dog] fundamentally relates to <dog>.
0105 The implication, inherent in such an analysis of language whereby one 
attempts to understand its relationship to reality, is necessarily one of causality. That 
is to say, when one asks whether a word is natural or conventional, one is essentially 
asking what caused it, what caused it to have the form, structure, which it has: in 
simple terms, a natural explanation would be that words are caused by reality, while a 
conventional explanation would be that they are caused by human beings. Plato, being 
fundamentally interested in the cause of things, is also interested in the cause of 
words.
0106 An important term in Plato’s analysis66, and an important step towards gaining 
a footing on the level at which Augustine is involved in the debate, is ‘GTipaivco’ in 
the sense of ‘to show by a sign’, ‘to indicate’, ‘to make known’, ‘to signify’, and in its 
general sense, ‘to mean’.
XQ. ...o yap &va£ Kai o EKXcop axeSov xi xabxov aripaivEi...
(Plato, Cra. 393a)
66 The ostensible conclusion of the Cratylus is that the causes of words, and the objects of verbal 
‘meaning’, are Forms (cf Crat. 439c-440b). That Augustine held a similar belief concerning the causes 
of the ‘meanings’ o f words and their objects will be elaborated below (§ 5.2.1.2.5.6).
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I Q .  . ..e i  5 e  e v  exepotK; a o A X a lia iq  e v  e x e p a n ;  t o  a o x o  
a r ijx a iv e i ,  o b 5 e v  jc p a y p a ...
(Plato, Cra. 393d)”
Words ‘signify’ and it is therefore a small step to arrive at the conclusion that words 
are, in some sense, signs.
0107 Although the discussion of ‘nature’ and ‘convention’ long remained a 
philosophical topic worthy of discussion68, much of relevance to the debate came, for 
Augustine, to fall within the areas of logic, broadly speaking, and semiotics, more 
specifically.
0108 Augustine forwards the thesis that words are conventional (DDC 2.37), in that
they are agreed among humans, but he also seems to hold that they are, in some sense,
naturally related to reality (DD 6). That is to say, they are imposed among humans by
humans, but that their imposition is determined by their natural relationship with that
which they refer to. This interpretation is further strengthened by his use of
etymology. In any instance where he employs the etymologising approach, the
implication is that there is a relationship between word sound and the item referred to.
Augustine states that the origin of words is important to any linguistic analysis.
omne uerbum... quattuor quaedam necessario uocat in quaestionem: 
originem suam, uim, declinationem, ordinationem.
{dial 6.1-3)
Yet in the discussion in the DD Augustine does not pay any heed to whether words
are natural or conventional but rather is concerned with the futility of tracing the
origin of words qua utterances.
de origine uerbi quaeritur, cum quaeritur unde ita dicatur, res mea sententia 
nimis curiosa et minus necessaria. neque hoc eo mihi placuit dicere quod
67 ,These are to first two occurences o f arnica vco, thereafter it occurs passim.
68
Cf. Aulus Gellius, Noct. Att. 10.3.4.
oh go, declinatio and ordinatio are those headings under which the de lingua latina o f Varro is 
divided (LL 7.110; 8.1).
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Ciceroni quoque idem uidetur. quis enim egeat auctoritate in re tam 
perspicua?
{dial. 6.3-8)
Augustine criticises the practice of etymologising on two grounds: it is an endless 
task,
...ineptum esset aggredi quodpersequiprofecto infinitum e s f
{dial. 6.9-10)
71Stoici autumant, quos Cicero in hac re ut Cicero inridet , nullum esse 
uerbum, cuius non certa explicari origo possit. et quia hoc modo eos urguere 
facile fuit, si diceres hoc infinitum esse, quibus uerbis alicuius uerbi 
originem interpretar is, eorum rursus a te origo <quaeratur, aiunt hoc>
quaerendum esse...
{dial. 6.39-44);
and it is like interpreting dreams in that it depends upon one’s ingenuity72,
Hue accedit quod ut somniorum interpretatio ita uerborum origo pro 
cuiusque ingenio iudicatur.
{dial. 6.12-13)
73Augustine then proceeds to etymologise so as to prove his own point that it is a futile
74and endless pursuit. When he does indulge in etymologising elsewhere , it should be 
said that it is always so as to clarify or elucidate some point which he is making, and 
which is simply reinforced by the etymologising. Augustine never criticises 
etymology in the sense that it is erroneous but rather that it is beyond our scope to 
penetrated back in time so as to successfully resolve all of the etymological issues 
involved.
Cf. Darrell Jackson, de dialectica, p. 127 n.3: ‘in enodandis autem nominibus quod miserandum sit 
laborcmtis...quampericulosa consuetude’ (Cicero, ND 3.62).
71
lmagnam molestiam suscepit et minime necessariam primus Zeno post Cleanthes deinde 
Chrysippus...uocabulorum cur quidque ita appellatum sit causas explicare’ (Cicero, ND 3.63).
72 Plato presents Socrates, in the Cratylus, as a master o f such ingenuity. Socrates is shown to 
effectively argue for and against both theses at dispute in the discussion.
73
There is a degree o f disingenuity in the following discussion of etymologies and it would appear, as 
can also be seen in Cicero (ND 3.62-63), that both take their refutation as an excuse to exhibit their 
own skill and inventiveness in manipulating etymologies. Such an exhibition of ingenuity also occurs 
in Plato’s Cratylus.
Notably in DM 12.
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0109 In the DDC 2 he explicitly describes words, qua utterances, as conventional75,
while in the DD, he accepts, up to a point, the sensory basis of the origin of words.
quam persequi non quidem ultra soni similitudinem possumus, sed hoc non 
semper utique possumus.
{dial 6.111-113)
Augustine accepts that there should be investigation into the etymologies of some 
words but that as far as one can proceed is to the similarity of sound {soni 
similitudinem). To this degree Augustine would appear to follow something similar to 
the Stoic position in that words can be related to reality by means of a sort of 
‘phonetic’ representation (Origen, Cels. 1.24)76, but like the Stoics he too feels that 
etymology is not crucial to the proper investigation of language, or logic (Diogenes 
Laertius 7.83).
0110 The discussion in the DD makes no claim to attempt an analysis of the relation
of language to reality, but rather takes the topic of the origin of uttered words as
neither central to his concerns with language nor even possible. What is of interest to
Augustine is an understanding of what words signify.
Ergo ad te iam pertinet iudicare, utrum ‘uerbum ’ a uerberando an a uero solo 
an a uerum boando dictum put emus, an potius unde sit dictum non curemus, 
cum quid significet intellegamus.
{dial. 6.32-36)
Most notable to an accurate understanding of Augustine’s position is that he states
that although some words can be analysed down to the level of similarity of sound,
there are words where even this cannot be achieved and others which have no origin.
Innumerabilia sunt enim uerba, quorum origo, de qua ratio reddipossit, 
aut non est, ut ego arbitror, aut latet, ut Stoici contendunt.
{dial. 6.113-116)
‘nonnatura, placito et consensione significandi...' (doctr. chr. 2.37).
76 In this sense the Stoics followed a course similar to that taken in Plato’s Cratylus, namely that words 
are phonetic descriptions o f items but that they are too obscure to serve any useful purpose.
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In this important respect Augustine deviates from the Stoic position. This can perhaps
best be explained, as Ruef77 states:
Von Augustins De Dialectica her und unter systematischem Aspekt lasst sich 
bloss folgendes sagen: Die [stoische] Theorie der vier etymologischen 
Prinzipien ist, eigentlich uberraschenderweise, konsequent und geschlossen.
78Sie behauptet keine natural relationship (dies gegen Lloyd 1971 , S. 62 f.) 
zwischen Wortem und Gegenstanden, sondem eine Isomorphie zwischen der 
Struktur des Wortschatzes und der Struktur der Gegenstande der Welt: Auch 
die cunabula verborum sind ja aufgrund einer similitudo mit den durch sie 
bezeichneten Gegenstanden verbunden. Eine 0eaei-Entstehung von Sprache 
ist damit theoretisch nicht ausgeschlossen.
0111 Indeed one can construct a picture of language development, consistent with 
Augustine’s view of sign formation in humans and with his views on language in
79
general , whereby there is a natural development of language (and some of the early
80‘words’ may be imitations of their object ) but over time and during this development 
there are also intentional coinages. Parallel to this, in the relation o f language to the 
world, while all uttered words are essentially conventional, there are those words 
which are natural in the sense that they bear a similarity, in sound, to the object which 
they refer to; and there are those words which are strictly conventional in that there is 
no similarity but simply a community has agreed for the words to refer to whatever 
objects they happen to be chosen to refer to.
0112 It can therefore be concluded that, while there is a degree of ‘phonetic’
representation in some words, Augustine does not hold this to be true for all words
81and so uttered words or signs have no inherent relationship with the world .
77 Ruef: 1981, 136n.3.6.9.
78
Lloyd, in Long: 1971, 58-74. 
v. inf. § 8.1.3.
80
An early human may plausibly be supposed to attempt to express some such concept as ‘wind’ to a 
companion by imitating the wind vocally.
81 The question as to the relationship o f inner words or dicibilia to the world will be seen to be very 
different. This issue will involve an analysis o f language and reality influenced by Plato, together with 
Stoic language theory, and Aristotelian ideas o f concept formation. This will be discussed at length 
below (§ 5).
Augustine is, for this reason, much more interested in the semiotic processes in terms 
of their evidential nature and is therefore interested in signs as indications.
3.3.2. Indications.
0113 That signs were presented in the rhetorical tradition as indications can be seen
by the intellectual and inferential nature of the definition given by Cicero. Cicero
stresses that of things probable there are those which are credible, those on which
judgement has been given, those which afford an opportunity for comparison, and
those which are signs. The context is clearly that of inference and of argumentation,
and the sign is forwarded as of the first order of such things.
omne autem...probabile quodsumitur ad argumentationem aut signum est aut 
credibile aut iudicatum aut comparabile.
(Cicero, inv. 1.48)
0114 The sign is defined as that which pertains to the senses and signifies what
appears to follow from it82.
signum est quod sub sensum aliquem cadit et quiddam significat quod ex ipso 
profectum uidetur, quod aut ante fuerit aut in ipso negotio aut post sit 
consecutum...
(Cicero, inv. 1.48)
0115 Quintillian defines a arjjxeio v as that by which another thing is understood,
again suggesting an evidential/inferential relationship.
signum uocatur, ut dixi, aTipeiov, quanquam id quidam uestigium 
nominauerunt, per quod alia res intelligitur...
(Quintilian, inst. 5.9.9)
0116 Signs as defined, and analysed, by Augustine fit into this tradition of evidence 
and inference. However, there remain two aspects particular to signs that must be
82 This definition, which occurs in a sceptical context, fits well with the commemorative sign as 
accepted by the Pyrrhonian Sceptical School, of which Sextus Empiricus writes, and was an adherent 
(cf. Sextus Empiricus, M  2.145-158).
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considered. Firstly, signs as to their effect, which are described in terms of 
‘indicative’ or ‘commemorative’ signs (cf. §2.3): a terminology not employed by 
Augustine. Secondly, signs as to the cause of signification, which are commonly 
described under the terms ‘natural’ or ‘conventional’ (cf §3.3.1): a terminology 
which is used in an adapted form by Augustine.
3.3.3. Indicative Signs and Commemorative Signs.
0117 The terms of the debate on signs had, to a large degree, been set by Aristotle 
{APr. 2.27.70a3 ff.). Signs were discussed under the terms of deductions and 
inferences.
0118 Within the limits of signs as evidence the debate turned to the nature of the 
sign itself. A controversy concerning sign theory which occurred between the Stoics
83and Epicureans was focused on the actual sign itself in that the Stoics held the 
aripeiov to stand for a proposition, or Aektov, which describes an observable fact. It 
is therefore a constituent of an inference in which that which the sign signifies is 
inferred.
oi I/UG)iKoi...<paai ari|a.8iov elvai a^ioona ev byiei aovTip.ixevcp 
7CpoKa0T|yob|j.evov, eKKaAA)7mic6v too A,f|Yovxo£..fl;poKa0TiYoi)|4.£Vov 
8e Aiyooai to ev aovTi|X|xevcp apxo|i£|icp arco aXr|0ob<; Kai Axiyovti 
ejii aAr|0e(; fiyobixevov. eKKaXorcxiKov 8e ArjyovTog ercei to 
“yaAa e^ei abxri” too “k£KX>tjk£V abxri” St^ xotikov eivai 5 ok£1
«  , * » r - , . 8 4ev xooxcp xco aovTijxixevcp ei yaXa e%e\ aoxri, K£Kotik£v aoxTv
(Sextus Empiricus, PH 2.104-6)
That is to say, taking the sign as <|) in the following modus ponens inference, <|)~vj/
whereby it accords to row (1) of the following truth table:
83
Cf. Philodemus de signis and Sextus Empiricus IToppcoveioi ujtOTUJtmaen; and adversus 
Mathematicos.
84
Cf. Plato, Mx. 237e; Aristotle, APr. 2.21.
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(D3)
♦ V (|>~i|/
1 T T T
2 T F F
3 F T T
4 F F T
0119 In this approach signs are regarded as evident facts which serve to reveal 
further, non-evident facts which are related as:
i. the true antecedent (evident)
ii. the consequent (non-evident)
85iii. in a sound conditional.
Therefore what the sign signifies is inferred by detaching the consequent. <|> then is the
sign and ip is what it signifies; while the hypothetical proposition must be true
otherwise the antecedent cannot be termed a ‘sign’ for it does not in fact signify the
consequent. The Stoics held what can be termed an inferential theory of signs; logic
was Jtepi crnpaivovTa Kai aqpaivopeva (Diogenes Laertius 7.62) and the sign
was clearly defined in propositional terms86:
(paai arjiieiov elvai a^icojia ev uyiei aovvriiievcp Ka0TiYot>|j.£vov, 
eKKa^UTtTiKov too Atiyovto^
(Sextus Empiricus M  8.245).
0120 This sign relation accords with the Stoic view of reality which “is a 
deterministic system in which things are connected by rational necessity. Events are 
logically connected with other events, and the sign therefore analytically entails the
It seems that Chrysippus did not understand the conditional as merely truth-functional but as 
indicating a stronger relationship than this. Cf. HP 1,211: “A weakness o f the conditional formulation 
is that it cannot in itself indicate the truth o f the antecedent (cf. row 3 o f Table 1); hence, perhaps the 
post-Chrysippean Stoics preferred to express signs with the ‘subconditional’:
Since p, q ”
86 It should be noted that ‘sign’ is here used in a strict sense (v. inf. 0127) and implies that the observed 
conjunctions which do not involve a direct causal relationship are not properly speaking signs (cf. HP 
1, 265). Such ‘signs’ which do not involve a direct causal relationship were expressed by Chrysippus 
by negated conjunctions (cf. Cicero, fat. 12-15, esp. 14-15).
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thing or event signified [my italics].”87 For this reason the Stoics felt the necessity for 
“a conceptual intermediary between the sign and the thing signified in the sign- 
relation: a sign signifies its object in virtue of a concept which applies to the object 
signified.”88
...oi qlko xfjq atoac^ Tpia cpapevoi au^uyeiv aAAfiAxn  ^ to te 
aijpaivopevov Kai to crnpaivov Kai to royxavov, tfrv arjpaivov 
pev elvai rqv (pcovitv, olov ttjv Aicov, appaivopevov 5e ai)To 
to Jtpaypa to vk ' amfiq SrjA-obpevov Kai oi) fjpeiq pev 
avTiXappavopeQa tfl ppeTepQc ^apucpiaTapevou Siavoia, oi 6e 
PapPapoi oi)K enatouai Kaiitep Tfj<; (pcovfjq aKouovTe^, Toyxavov 
8e to eKToq ujtoKeipevov, coaTtep auxoc; o Aicov.
(Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.11-12)
0121 In opposition to this the Epicureans held that a sign is a particular sensible 
object, something which is directly observed rather than a proposition within an 
inference. “It is the observed smoke that is the sign of fire, not the proposition
89expressed by the sentence ‘There is smoke over there’.”
0122 They held that a sign must be what signifies, and although utterances signify 
propositions, propositions (as intellectual conceptions) do not themselves signify. 
Therefore, as propositions are signified, but are not signifying, the sign cannot be a 
proposition. In support o f this, they observed that Tower’ animals (and illiterates) 
would appear to be incapable of reasoning by modus ponens but are evidently capable 
of interpreting signs.
0123 This view is superior for framing a general theory of signs inclusive of 
language. The choice of examples used in classical times and particularly that of the 
medical symptom as the paradigmatic sign goes a long way to explaining the Stoic 
position. It would appear, in fact, that it is by way of an inference capable of linguistic
87
Markus: 1994, 61. It should be stated that the ‘analytical entailment’ is to be understood in terms of 
the Stoic analysis o f conditionals, not in any analytic sense applicable to modem logic.
Markus: 1994, 61.
89 Clarke: 1987, 14.
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formulation that inference is made from such evidence as smoke, a fever, etc., to their 
past/present causes or future effects. It doesn’t require an ability to formulate the rule 
of modus ponens so as to in fact use that rule for evidential reasoning.
0124 The Epicureans, however, opposed the intellectualised character of the sign in
Stoic logic and therefore had no conceptual intermediary.
oi 5e rcepi tov ’ EftiKOopov Kai ZTpaTcova tov cpuaiKov 8bo 
povov a7toA£UtovT£q, aripaivov te Kai ruyxavov...
(Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.13)
Therefore it can be seen that the Stoics held the sign as fundamentally intellectual,
the Epicureans as sensible
’ E f t iK o o p o q  p s v  y a p  K a i  o i  J ip o e a w u e q  a b T o b  v f\q  a ip e a e c o q  
sXE^av a ia 0 T |T 6 v  e l v a i  t o  a r j p e io v ,  o i  8 e  arco  t f iq  a t o a q  
votjtov.
(Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.177)
0125 For the Epicureans there is not a logical nexus in the relation between sign and 
thing signified, rather there is a straightforward empirical relationship based on the 
notion of Jip6Xrp|n<; (Diogenes Laertius 10.33-34). This depends upon an empirical 
and regular sequence to establish the TrpoArjTjnc; which enables an inference to be 
made from sign to signified. Inference can only be valid in that it is verifiable through 
empirical, observable means.
0126 The Epicurean theory of signs could therefore easily include both an account 
of language whilst also accounting for such observed phenomena as gestures or 
animal cries (Lucretius 5.1027-1090). However, to what extent the Stoics meant to 
provide, through their theory of signs, a theory of language is unclear. Nevertheless, 
Diogenes Laertius states that the Stoics did, in fact, reduce their theory of language to 
a branch of logic.
AiaX£KTiKf| 5e egtiv, &<; cpqai nooei8cGVio<;, etugttiiiti aA-Tj0d)v 
Kai ij>£D8cbv Kai oi>8£T£pcov- TOYxav£i 8' abrrj, (be; o XpbGiTiito^
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(pqoi, ftepi, ariixaivovxa Kai aruj.aiv6n.eva. ev |xev 0 6 v xf\ Tiepi 
cpeovf|q 0ea)piQt xoiauxa Xiyexai xoiq Exoikoi^
(Diogenes Laertius 7.62)
Their general theory of signs, however, was attacked for its inadequacy in accounting 
for instinctive and non-discursive response to, and interpretation of, signs. This attack 
was focused on its exclusively propositional/inferential character (Sextus Empiricus, 
M  8.269-271)90.
0127 Signs qua indications could, with profit, be separated into evidence (in a strict 
sense) and reminders (Sextus Empiricus, PH  2.101-102; M. 8.152-153). As noted 
above (§2.3), these signs were traditionally classified as ‘indicative’ and 
‘commemorative’. Indicative signs (aqpeiov evSeiKXiKov) are never observed in 
conjunction with the object signified (being ‘cpbaei aSr|A.ov’, and so never observed 
along with its sign) and, according to Epicureans and Sceptics, cannot function as the 
basis for an inference (Sextus Empiricus, M. 2.145-158).
0128 The relationship between signs and inferential reasoning is seen in the 
conception of ‘indicative’ signs (aqpeia evSeiKXiKa), which stand for what is 
unobservable - for example, sweating as sign of invisible pores in the skin - and the 
contrasting commemorative’ signs (aqpeia bTCopvriaxiKa).
0129 There is the following pattern:
(D4)
Epicurean: (semiotic) object/sign signified
(linguistic) utterance thing
Stoic: (semiotic) antecedent consequent.
90 For the legitimacy of the interpretation o f Stoic semiotics by Sextus cf. Allen: 2001, § 3, 147ff. For 
the purposes o f this discussion, what is central, is not the interpretation o f Sextus Empiricus, but rather
0130 Commemorative signs stand for what is observable and for which there is a 
correlation in past experience between the sign and what it signifies (such as the 
observed correlation between smoke and fire) such that on experiencing the sign one 
is brought to recall what it signifies.
0131 Sextus Empiricus, and other sceptics of the same persuasion, held that only 
‘commemorative’ signs were valid as signs, for a sign should be capable of being 
interpreted in a uniform way by all who observe it (‘indicative’ signs can be 
interpreted in various ways, with many different hidden causes assigned, for example, 
by physicians to symptoms where no observable correlation exists).
0132 Whether the distinctions of indicative sign and commemorative sign and the 
controversy which concerned them was directly known to Augustine is difficult to 
ascertain. However, in his analysis of signs and in his analysis of language there is 
clearly an element of both viewpoints in his approach. As the Stoics, he very much 
supports the fact that there is an intellectual element in the semiotic process, yet he 
would appear to support a ‘commemorative’ force behind the semiotic process. The 
fact that Augustine’s treatment of both signs and language is to a large extent 
influenced by Stoicism is well documented91, and relevant to his treatment of the 
effect of signs is that Sextus’ account, and perhaps the Epicurean account also, is less 
than generous to the actual Stoic theory. For the Stoics accepted signs which were 
both indicative and ones which were commemorative92, and indeed to have been
93interested in weaker semiotic connections than inferential demonstrations . 
Augustine’s approach to signs betrays an awareness of the types of signs involved in
is to bring out the divergent forms of signs qua indication so as to more clearly analyse the manner in 
which Augustine applies (verbal) signs.
91 Cf Darrell Jackson (1969), Pinborg (1962), Markus (1957), et a l.
92 That they did not employ the medical terminology o f ‘anpeiov evSeiKiiKOv’ and 
‘oriM^tov i)7COfiVTiOTiK6v’ cf. Bumyeat, in Barnes e ta l .: 1982, 222.
93 Cf. Allen: 2001, 158ff.
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the controversy as described by Sextus, but, as will be shown, Augustine, as the 
Stoics, is interested in signs in a broader way than the indicative/commemorative 
analysis allows.
0133 In the DM Augustine’s approach to the nature of linguistic signs depends not 
only on the effect that the signs have on the sign-receiver, that is whether they 
indicate or remind, but also depends on the question of causality. This is to say, if X is 
a sign of Y, then this can be reformulated in such a way that, if X is a sign of Y 
depends upon whether Y can be used so as to explain X94: whether <smoke> is a sign 
of <fire> depends upon whether <fire> can be used to explain <smoke>. Also, how 
this information is understood, and what type of sign it provides to the sign-receiver 
depends on the causal relation from Y to X and the manner in which the receiver 
understands it.
3.3.4. Siona Naturalia and Sisna Data.
0134 In the DDC, when discussing signs qua signs, Augustine presents two main
classifications of signs, ‘natural’ signs and ‘given’ signs.
signorum igitur alia sunt naturalia, alia data, naturalia sunt quae sine 
uoluntate atque ullo appetitu significandi praeter se aliquid aliud ex se 
cognosci faciunt...data uero signa sunt quae sibi quaeque uiuentia inuicem 
dant ad demonstrandos quantum possunt motus animi sui uel sensa aut 
intellecta quaelibet.
(idoctr. chr. 2.2-3)
Augustine is drawing a distinction, based on the presence of the will ( ‘'ad 
demonstrandos...nisi ad depromendum et traiciendum ”) or lack of its presence (“sine 
uoluntate atque ullo appetitu ”), in which a distinction is also implicit which is very
94 This is not intended to imply that there can only be a sign where there is a causal relation, for it is 
possible that X and Y each occur only and always when Z, which is their cause, and that X could be
similar to that distinction of types of ‘meaning’ found in Grice95. In Augustine the 
focus of the distinction is not so much one of necessary relationships but rather one of 
purposive intention. To this extent it would then seem valid to understand Augustine’s 
significans as having a sense close to meaning6.
0135 Signa naturalia have meaning in that they are part of a causal nexus such that, 
when accurately interpreted, § necessarily means ip, such as ‘smoke means fire’; 
while signa data have meaning, and are classified as ‘given’ signs, only in the sense 
that some person A intends § to mean i\t and that this is understood by some other 
person B, so that § means vp for both A and B, such as “[dog] means <dog>”. In signa 
naturalia there is a causal relation such that the § means v|j without there being any 
intent on the part of the sign-giver, while in signa data (although there may be a 
necessary causal relation also in play) the causal relation depends precisely upon the 
sign-giver intending to signify. There need be no natural causality involved in such 
signs, what particularises these types of sign is that they are intended to function as 
signs. The most obvious example of this type of sign is the word.
0136 Although the role of persons A and B are necessary to any meaningful
exchange in the example of signa data, there must also be a sentient sign interpreter
within the semiotic event classified under signa naturalia. There need not be any
purposive signalling but there must necessarily be an interpreter.
D2 signum est enim res praeter speciem quam ingerit sensibus aliud aliquid ex se 
faciens in cogitationem uenire.
(doctr. chr. 2.1)
inferred from the occurrence o f Y, and vice versa, although neither is the cause o f the other. Such signs 
are not strictly relevant to Augustine’s approach to linguistic signs and will not be elaborated upon.
95
Namely, a distinction between ‘meaning’ in that “[dog] means <dog>” and in that “spots mean 
measles”; the first is a representational connection, in the sense that [dog] ‘stands for’ <dog>, while the 
second is a, natural, causal connection. Grice: 1957, 377-388.
That is to say, having the sense o f ‘represent’ qua ‘standing for’, or ‘evince’, depending on context 
and usage.
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0137 In Augustine’s classification of signs there is observed the distinction between 
sign-giver and sign-receiver. It would appear that there is an added distinction of 
signa naturalia and signa data “according to whether the relation of dependence is
97between the sign and the object, or between the sign and the subject.” These sign 
relationships can be classified as follows (taking subject as sign-giver and object as 
sign-receiver): (1) the signa naturalia relate to natural/necessary causal relations, 
such that there is a cause and effect which is observed by a receiver who then, by
98participating in interpretation, completes the triad necessary for the sign system to 
exist. The sign-receiver interprets the causal nexus from effect to cause and thus 
creates the semiotic triad: for example, a person interprets smoke (effect) as signifying 
fire (cause). There is no intention on the part of the subject to signify but the object 
(receiver) interprets the subject (effect) as signifying the signified (cause).
0138 There is no question of the sign-receiver giving the sign its significance in this 
semiotic relationship. Taking the above example of smoke and fire, the receiver (R) 
observes, for the first time, smoke (Si) and then sees that the smoke is coming from 
fire (Fl). On a second occasion (R) observes, for a second time, smoke (S2) and then 
sees once again that (S2) is coming from fire (F2) and therefore becomes aware of the 
more general causal model (SF) such that, on encountering (S3), (R) can apply (SF) 
and interpret (S3) as meaning (F3). As (R) recognises the causal nexus (SF) so too 
does the meaning (M) of smoke (S) occur for (R). The process is represented in the 
following diagram".
97
Markus: 1994, 72
98
(1) sign; (2) interpreter; (3) signified.
99 Cf. Eco: 1979, 23.
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(D5)
SF = M
Sl/Fl + S2/F2
As is seen, the significance of the above semiotic relationship arises from (R) 
observing and becoming aware of the causal nexus (SF)100. So in a semiotic analysis: 
(S) + (R) = (M/SF).
0139 The necessary addition to the relationship is a sign-receiver who interprets the 
sign as signifying what is signified. That is to say, the signa naturalia are such due to 
the fact that the subject plays no intentional role in the process while it is the object, 
or sign-receiver, who completes the triad through interpretation of the sign qua sign.
0140 While (2), the signa data are defined precisely in the reverse of this for it is the 
subject who intentionally sets forth the sign qua sign. The active role, semiotically 
speaking, is played by a purposeful subject, while in signa naturalia it is the object 
which plays the active role in making the situation a semiotically pregnant one. 
However, “ ... all that Augustine says here [in the opening of DDC 2] is that signa data 
depend upon the will of the sign-giver for their occurrence, not for their meaning. ”1.01
0141 In sum, signa naturalia occur naturally and unintentionally cause their sign- 
receiver to think of something beyond themselves; while signa data are produced so 
as to intentionally cause their sign-receiver to think of something beyond themselves.
100 The receiver, through observation o f natural relations, inductively makes an inference and so grasps
a meaning.
101
Darrell Jackson: 1972, 97
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0142 The purpose of giving (given) signs is equivalent to the definition arrived at in
102the opening section of the DM :
sic quoque locutione nihil aliud agere quam commemorare, cum memoria, 
cui uerba inhaerent, ea reuoluendo facit uenire in mentem res ipsas, quarum 
signa sunt uerba.
(2)
nec ulla causa est nobis significandi id est signi dandi nisi ad depromendum 
et traiciendum in alterius animum id quod animo gerit qui signum dat.
(idoctr. chr. 2.3)
0143 Of particular importance is that signa data are not necessarily conventional in 
the sense traditionally applied to language. Those signs produced with communicative 
intent may not be conventional (in that they do not necessarily conform to a rule 
established within a linguistic community). A gesture made in a foreign community 
so as to communicate one’s intention would seem to be a signum datum as defined 
here - but it may not be equivalent to a conventional sign. Such a gesture may fail to 
communicate because it does not conform to any conventional rule within the foreign 
community, but is nevertheless ‘given’ in that the sign giver intends the sign to 
communicate her intention.
0144 In a later passage of the DDC, signa data are characterised as not given by
nature but ‘placito et consensione significandi’.
sicut enim uerbi gratia una figura litterae, quae decusatim notatur, aliud apud 
Graecos, aliud apud Latinos ualet, non natura, sedplacito et consensione 
significandi, et ideo qui utramque linguam nouit, si homini Graeco uelit 
aliquid significare scribendo, non in ea significatione ponit hanc litteram, in 
qua earn ponit, cum homini scribit Latino; et beta uno eodemque sono apud 
Graecos litterae, apud Latinos holer is nomen est; et cum dico lege, in his 
duabus syllabis aliud Graecus, aliud Latinus intellegit sicut ergo hae omnes 
significationes pro suae cuiusque societatis consensione animos mouent et, 
quia diuersa consensio est, diuerse mouent, nec ideo consenserunt in eas
102
Although the perspective o f the DM passage is from that of how words function when one speaks to 
oneself, nevertheless the basic point is the same.
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homines, quia iam ualebant ad significationem,sed ideo ualent, quia 
consenserunt in eas, sic etiam ilia signa, quibus perniciosa daemonum 
societas comparatur, pro cuiusque obseruationibus ualent.
(<doctr. chr. 2.24.)
This characterises conventional signs but is not necessarily intended to define all 
signa data as conventional, on the contrary the context focuses upon verbal 
utterances.
0145 Conventional signs are clearly signa data and arise due to intention. However, 
this does not mean that there is a straightforward relation between these classes of 
signs, as there is a willed aspect “with respect to both the occurrence and the 
significance of signs.
Not willed Willed
1) Occurrence naturalia data
(doctr. chr. 2.1.)
2) Significance natura placito et consensione
(.Doctr. chr. 2.24.)”“”
The will is active in both ‘given’ and ‘conventional’ signs but to different ends 
(occurrence and significance respectively).
0146 It can therefore be said that what makes ‘given’ signs signs is not any inherent 
causal connectedness with the signified but rather the purposive giving of the item as 
a sign. To this end a ‘given’ sign need not necessarily be explained by its 
significatum, as was seen for natural signs with fire (significatum) being the 
explanation of smoke (sign).
0147 Words fall into the category of ‘given’ signs and although their occurrence is 
not natural it will be fruitful to consider the nature of their significance in terms of its 
explanatory cause.
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3.4. Words and Things.
0148 It is now possible to return to the DM and to consider both what Augustine’s 
analysis reveals about linguistic signs per se and what it reveals about how these 
linguistic signs function in terms of the acquisition of knowledge.
0149 From the opening two sections of the DM, and from the general consideration
of signs, it can be seen that words are signs {uerba signa esse, DM 3), and that a sign
is an item used to signify something {signum... aliquidsignificet..., DM 3). In addition
Augustine proposes the thesis that in any passage of speech every word is a sign and
so every word signifies something.
Aug. quot uerba sunt in hoc uersu: «si nihil ex tanta super is placet urbe 
relinquil0A »?
Ad. octo105.
Aug. octo ergo signa sunt.
Ad. ita est.
Aug. credo te hunc uersum intellegere.
Ad. satis arbitror.
Aug. die mihi, quid singula uerba significent.
(3)
If there are eight words in the verse there are therefore eight signs, and as all signs 
signify something, there are, at least, eight ‘things’ which the words signify. It should 
be noticed that, in addition, it is important that the listener must understand106 {credo 
te hunc uersum intellegere), that is to say that although the verse may be meaningful, 
it is not necessarily meaningful to everyone.
Darrell Jackson: 1972, 98.
104 Vergil, Aeneid 2.659.
105 The fact that the position taken is that there are eight and not nine signs suggests that Augustine 
does not hold with the Stoic view that both propositions and their parts (i.e. individual words) are signs. 
Rist may be correct in arguing that Augustine is here following a Porphyrian model where ‘... the 
proposition as a whole functions in such a way as to clarify and reinforce the meaning of the subject- 
term’ (Rist: 1994, 26; cf. also, 314-316).
106 “[Signs]... constitute an utterance in a language just in case some person or other, if he were now 
living and were to be presented with the [signs], would recognise them as constituting an utterance in 
his language” Harrison: 1979, 4.
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0150 The picture presented in this passage appears to be one in which language
consists of sentences constructed out of strings of words which can each be singly
signified, or defined, and understood separately from the context of the sentence
within which they are set. This tends to suggest the ‘picture theory’ of language
criticised by Wittgenstein {PI, § 1), supposedly, seen in Augustine’s view of
language acquisition {conf. 1.8)107
[This] give[s] us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is 
this: the individual words in language name objects - sentences are 
combinations of such names. - In this picture of language we find the roots of 
the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated 
with the world. It is the object for which it stands.
Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of 
words. If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, 
thinking primarily of nouns like “table”, “chair”, “bread”, and of people’s 
names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; 
and of the remaining kinds of words as something that will take care of itself.
(Wittgenstein, PI § l)108
The broader implications of Wittgenstein’s critique of Augustine’s view of language
acquisition as presented in the Confessiones is highlighted in a later passage of the
Philosophical Investigations in that Augustine’s model suggests that the child who is
acquiring a language in fact already possesses one.
... Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came 
into a strange country and did not understand the language of the country; that 
is, as if it already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child 
could already think, only not yet speak. And “think” would here mean 
something like “talk to itself’.
(Wittgenstein, PI § 32)
This is to say, in Augustine’s model there is a reliance by the child on complex 
concepts such as ‘naming’ and ‘signifying’: “[I]n Augustine’s account the child’s 
mastery of certain basic concepts is presupposed” (Charles: 2003, 104). This
107 Language acquisition (and this criticism by Wittgenstein) will be discussed below (cf. § 4, 7, and 8).
108 Wittgenstein clearly has his own agenda in using the Augustine passage but the section cited from 
the Confessiones is only one section from a wider context, and, more importantly, Augustine is not 
presenting a fully justified and defended description o f a theory o f language acquisition. To properly
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presupposition points to another position presupposed by Augustine, one which 
pervades the account given in the DM, namely that in acquiring a language a child 
already has direct access to, what Charles (2003, 104) has called, ‘basic realist- 
sounding notions’. In an approach such as Augustine’s “...the world (and its objects) 
is fixed independently of us and puts its imprint on any language we are able to use to 
describe it. Thus the structure of the world determines the concepts we possess, the 
meanings of our linguistic expressions. Further, our linguistic expressions are 
correctly used when and only when they reflect (or represent) independent reality. The 
truth of our sentences depends solely on how the world is. It is not determined by, or 
dependent on, our means for establishing or ratifying how the world is. This is why, 
for the Augustinian realist, our indicative sentences possess (what I shall call) realist, 
or ratification-independent, truth-conditions. They can possess truth-conditions of this 
sort because the meaning of the linguistic expressions they contain is determined by 
how the world is” (Charles: 2003, 104). In the Augustinian model it appears that the 
child already has a mastery of those very concepts whose apprehension requires to be 
explained. There is an assumption that concepts and word meanings are determined 
by how the world is, and how this can be so is in fact the very thing which needs to be 
explained. It is necessary to explain how word meanings are established and are able 
to be understood.
0151 Wittgenstein gives a penetrating analysis of the dangers of such an approach to 
language109 and the extent to which Augustine conforms with, and deviates from, this 
approach will cast much light upon his view of language. The answers to many of the 
problems raised by Wittgenstein will need to be considered in due course throughout 
this discussion but what is of relevance here, and what should immediately raise
understand the view given in the Confessiones one must fill in the gaps, as it were, from other sources 
of analysis, notably the DM (v. inf. § 8.1.3).
doubts over how far Augustine follows such an approach to language is that he 
specifically focuses on the kind of words that should be left to ‘take care of 
themselves.’
0152 All words signify something, even conjunctions (si) and prepositions (ex), and 
from this it is argued (v. inf. § 5) that consequently all words are names (in that they 
all apparently refer to something. This simplistic referential theory is progressively 
undermined in Augustine’s and Adeodatus’ subsequent enquiries (v. inf. § 5).
0153 In asserting that every word signifies something Augustine is participating in a 
controversy which existed between the Stoics, who held that every word signifies 
something110, and the Peripatetics, who held that this is only true for nouns and verbs, 
other words being co-significant (i.e. not significant in their own right)111. Augustine 
would appear to align himself with the Stoic position. This need not lead to the 
position envisioned by Wittgenstein, for the difficulties Adeodatus encounters in 
defining the words (‘sz’ and ‘nihil', and later ‘ex') is caused by a methodological error 
(i.e. of considering words in isolation) not necessarily an ontological one. Augustine 
takes a line from Vergil and employs the common school method in rhetorical
119instruction of taking each word in turn and discussing it , and through this 
methodological error the discussion comes to an apparent impasse. While later 
Augustine employs Stoic methods of linguistic analysis (v. inf § 5.6.2 ff.) to 
demonstrate the significance of words without necessitating that they denote in any
113‘simplistic’ way such as the term [chair] might be said to denote or refer to a chair
109 Cf. also Wittgenstein: BB, p.77.
110 The Stoic position, and Peripatetic as far as is relevant, will be important later in the dialogue and 
will be properly discussed in due course (v. inf. § 5).
111 Cf. Aristotle, int. 20al3. Also, certain terms are not significant at all, po. 1456b38 ff.
112 It is o f note that Augustine is, in the DM, criticising the education system and those who profess to 
teach.
113 It will be shown to be doubtful whether any words can be said to denote in this way in Augustine’s 
approach to language, for any reference in Augustinian terms is at the least ‘indirect’ (v. inf § 5).
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0154 While it is reasonable, and acceptable, that words are signs and in this sense 
are representative (in the Gricean sense, v. sup. 0134)114, it can clearly be seen that if 
all words are significant and so represent or stand for something then how one is to 
understand this ‘something’ is crucial. If one is not to arrive at the seemingly 
impossible position where words such as [if] refer to objects, <if>, then a clearer 
description of the semiotic process and of the item signified is necessary.
3.4.1. Si: Mind-Dependent Objects.
0155 With regard to the first word (si) of the verse it is clear that words can refer to 
things which are, in some sense, mind-dependent or specifically intelligible. 
Adeodatus claims to be able to ‘see’ what si signifies but to be unable to explain it by 
means of language.
Ad. uideo quidem, quid significet si, sed nullum aliud uerbum, quo id exponi 
possit, inuenio.
Aug. saltern illud inuenis, quicquid significatur hoc uerbo, ubinam sit.
Ad. uidetur mihi, quod dubitationem significet; iam dubitatio ubi nisi in animo 
est?
Aug. accipio interim; persequere cetera.
(3)
That words may be clearly significant and yet difficult to determine in terms of their 
reference is an important observation for the following dialogue. Also of note is that 
the answer given by Adeodatus is only provisionally (interim) accepted.
114 Words qua signa data are representative in a conventional manner (v. sup. 0145), in that they are 
agreed by a community to ‘stand for ‘something” . Yet the question as to what they represent and how
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3.4.2. Nihil. Words without Referents.
0156 Signs must signify something (DM 3) and yet it is clear that "nihil is a word 
which has significance. The question depends upon what one means by 
‘something’115. It would seem from the treatment of "si (0155) that words can refer to 
a state of mind, such as ‘doubt’, but how this relates to ‘things’ such as ‘nothing’ is 
problematic. If "nihil has significance, which it clearly does, then it must, according 
to the position held in the dialogue, signify something and therefore nothing must be 
something.
Ad. nihil quid aliud significat, nisi id quod non est?
Aug. uerum fortasse dicis, sed reuocat me ab assentiendo, quod superius 
concessisti non esse signum, nisi aliquid significet; quod autem non est, nullo 
modo esse aliquid potest, quare secundum uerbum in hoc uersu non est 
signum, quia non significat aliquid, et falso inter nos constitit, quod omnia 
uerba signa sint aut omne signum aliquid significet.
Ad. nimis quidem urges, sed quando non habemus quid significemus, omnino 
stulte uerbum aliquodpromimus; tu autem nunc mecum loquendo credo quod 
nullum sonumfrustra emittis, sed omnibus, quae ore tuo erumpunt, signum 
mihi das, ut aliquid intellegam. quapropter non te oportet istas duas syllabas 
enuntiare dum loqueris, si per eas non significas quicquam. si autem uides 
necessariam per eas enuntiationem fieri nosque doceri uel commoneri, cum 
auribus insonant, uides etiam profecto, quid uelim dicere, sed explicare non 
possim.
(3)
Augustine himself hints by way of a joke, at an important distinction both for the 
resolution of this seeming impasse and for the following discussion in general, 
namely that there is a difference between a word qua word and a word as a 
meaningful item. In modem terminology, the distinction between use and mention116.
exactly this occurs, semiotically speaking, will be central to answering the above question.
115 As discussed above (0087-0090) something may be a thing in the weak sense that it is not-nothing. 
How terms such as "nihil fit into the definition of res as most fully given in DD 5.2-3 (R3, 0087) will 
be discussed in due course (v. inf. § 5.2.1.2.5.6).
116 The discussion of this is extremely interesting in its own right and significant in terms o f the 
dialogue as a whole (v. inf. § 5.6.2.5 and § 6).
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Aug. quid igiturfacimus? an affectionem animi quandam, cum rem non uidet 
et tamen non esse inuenit aut inuenisse se put at, hoc uerbo significari dicimus 
potius quam rem ipsam quae nulla est?
Ad. istuc ipsum est fortasse, quod expedire moliebar.
Aug. transeamus ergo hinc, quoquo modo se habet, ne res absurdissima nobis 
accidat.
Ad. quae tandem?
Aug. si nihil nos teneat et moraspatiamur.
Ad. ridiculum hoc quidem est et nescio quo tamen modo 
uideo posse contingere, immo plane uideo contigisse.
(3)
0157 The provisional suggestion is that the word refers to a certain ‘affection’ of the 
mind117. The use of the word ‘ajfectio’ is problematic118, yet it is clear that the 
solution to this issue may be resolved by consideration of the nature of the 
signification process and the nature of those things which are signified and their 
relation to the mind (v. inf. § 5.2.1.2.5.6).
3.4.2.1. Affectio animi.
0158 4Ajfectio’ is the usual term for emotions (cf. civ. 9.4119), which would suggest 
some degree of passivity, however, it is contrary to Augustine’s analyses of mental 
events that they be in any way passive. However, these affections120 are always seen 
by Augustine as involving an act of one’s will iconf. 1.13; civ. 14.6) and are taken to 
be affectiones due to their being a motion121 of the soul adverse to that of reason. 
Therefore, these motions are caused by irrational disturbances, in terms of their 
motions, rather than passive in the sense of unintentional.
117 The nature o f perception affecting the mind and causing concept formation is in large part 
Aristotelian, in terms of the practicalities o f the process, while being Platonic, in ontological terms.
118 The Aristotelian background for words referring to affections o f the mind will be discussed in due 
course (v. inf § 5.2.1.2.4).
119 In this passage ‘affectio’ is the direct translation of the Greek ‘JtccQoq’ and refers to ‘motions o f the 
soul’.
120 For a fuller discussion cf. O’Daly: 1987, 46-54.
121 On ‘motion’ in the soul in general cf. O’Daly: 1987, § 2.
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0159 4affectio’ is generally used with reference to emotions but in DM 3 it does
seem to involve reasoning. This can be seen in de animae quantitate where the
context involves thinking about a circle.
Aug. ...si circuius non magnitudine spatii, sedquadam conformatione ceteris 
praestat, quanto magis de uirtute existimandum est, quod non maioris loci 
occupatione, sed diuina quadam congruentia rationum atque concordia 
ceteras adfectiones animi superat?
{an. quant. 27)
This passage clearly involves reasoning and does not, as the DM passage, involve the 
emotions. However, in the de animae quantitate passage what is perhaps notable is 
that what is of importance about the circle is that it is somehow more in accord with 
reason than other affections. In this sense 4affectiones' are rational ‘states of souT 
rather than emotions, and what is stressed by the use of this term is not that the mental 
events are irrational disturbances but that they are less in rational accord than thought 
about the circle - the most perfect of shapes {an. quant. 27).
0160 As for the DM passage, it describes a state of soul or the disposition it attains 
when it does not see a thing {cum rem non uidet) and finds {inuenit) or thinks that it 
has found {inuenisse se put at) what is not {non esse). There would seem to be a 
parallel with the passage in the de animae quantitate in that the mind encounters what 
is contrary to the rational processes in that the mind {animus), rather than ‘seeing’ 
something as is normal in rational processes, actually does not see something. Like 
the other shapes in the de animae quantitate which are less rational so too is the 
thinking of what is not, for what is not can only be thought of in terms of the reverse 
of what is.
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3.5. Words Defined with Words: Regress.
0161 In the attempt by Adeodatus to define words from the line of verse it becomes
clear that the use of words to describe other words gets one no closer to the actual
thing itself which is being signified. This point is considered after Adeodatus’
explaining ‘ ex' by ‘d e \  with Augustine stating a desire to get at the thing itself which
is signified by a word, or words.
Ad. tertiapraepositio est ex, pro qua de possumus, ut arbitror, dicere.
Aug. non id quaero, ut pro una uoce notissima aliam uocem aeque 
notissimam, quae idem significet, dicas, si tamen idem significat; sed interim 
concedamus ita esse, certe si poeta iste non ex tanta urbe, sed de tanta 
dixisset, quaereremque abs te, quid de significaret, diceres ex, cum haec duo 
uerba essent, id est signa unum aliquid, ut tu putas, significantia. ego autem id 
ipsum nescio quid unum, quod his duobus signis significatur, inquiro.
(4)
0162 Yet even when Adeodatus expands his explanation by way of phrases which
demonstrate what "ex' signifies, this is deemed unsatisfactory for again the process
involves words which are used to describe other words. There is therefore an infinite
regress in that one gets no closer to the thing itself422. The Platonic and Aristotelian
use of definition may appear a solution, of sorts, to this problem. However, Augustine
states later in the dialogue that he has doubts about the method of definition.
... aduersus disciplinam defmiendi multa disputata sunt...
(43)
0163 One of the reasons for the doubts over definition, and the reason that the 
disciple of definition is not applied here is that it falls foul of the same problems as 
individual words. For in the DD, although he does not get to actually discussing 
definitions as promised, there is nevertheless the suggestion, when taken with the 
issue raised concerning the infinite regression caused by the attempt to define words,
122 Qf The regress and ultimate aporia reached in Plato’s Theaetetus 202c-208b.
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that words are the words used in definitions lead to the necessity for further
definitions, and so on with these definitions of definitions.
haec omnia quae deflnita sunt, utrum recte defmita sint et utrum hactenus 
uerba definitionis aliis definitionibus persequenda fuerint, ille indicabit locus, 
quo definiendi disciplina tractatur.
{dial. 5.12-16)
0164 Augustine is, in this passage, thinking of sentences as consisting of strings of
123words which are discrete units and make up the basic, independent , units of
meaning. Even with the placing of ‘ex’ into some sort of context, it is felt inadequate
for revealing its significance. In this sense, the defining of a word by giving an
example of its use gets one no nearer an understanding of the term124. Augustine
clearly sees words as each referring to or correlated to some discrete thing which is
signified by the word.
Ad. mihi uidetur secretionem quandam significare ab ea re, in qua fuerat 
aliquid, quod ex ilia esse dicitur, siue ilia non maneat, ut in hoc uersu non 
manente urbe poterant aliqui ex ilia esse Troiani, siue maneat, sicut ex urbe 
Roma dicimus esse negotiatores in Africa.
Aug. ut concedam tibi haec ita esse nec enumerem, quam mult a fortasse 
praeter hanc tuam regulam reperiantur, illud certe tibi adtendere facile est 
exposuisse te uerbis uerba, id est signis signa eisdemque notissimis notissima. 
ego autem ilia ipsa, quorum haec signa sunt, mihi si posses uellem ut 
ostenderes.
(4)
0165 Two themes of note which are raised in this passage are the question as to 
whether different words even signify the same thing, which leads directly into the 
analysis of linguistic signs (classification of signs; v. inf. § 5); and the arrival at an 
apparently aporetic position which signals with the final word a possible solution, 
namely ostensive definition {ostenderes).
These are not memes, in that they are independently meaningful.
124 In this sense it is rather like the common error made in the Socratic Dialogues o f  Plato, where 
instead of defining x the interlocutor simply gives an example of it.
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3.5.1. The Dilemma of Linguistic Communication.
0166 The statement of the dilemma of linguistic communication hinges on the
proposal that words are described by words, which are in turn described by words, ad
infinitum, without ever directly revealing the thing which they signify125.
Ad. miror te nescire uel potius simulare nescientem responsione mea fieri 
quod uis omnino non posse, siquidem sermocinamur, ubi non possumus 
respondere nisi uerbis. tu autem res quaeris eas quae, quodlibet sint, uerba 
certe non sunt, quas tamen ex me tu quoque uerbis quaeris. prior itaque tu 
sine uerbis quaere, ut ego deinde ista condicione respondeam.
(5)
The implication is that one cannot use words to determine what the things are which 
words in fact signify. The purpose of speech is to teach, and speech consists of strings 
of words which (as signs) each signify something, but words themselves do not 
appear to be able to adequately determine what it is that words signify. The dilemma 
is, therefore, that while the purpose of language is to teach, words themselves are 
unable to teach what it is that they allegedly teach. In addition to this is the wider 
implication which will be more fully introduced when there is a rather more explicit 
reference to the Paradox of Enquiry, from Plato’s Meno (v. inf. 8.1.1.), that one either 
knows something or one does not. The ability of words to move one closer to an 
understanding of any item is implicitly undermined by Augustine’s analysis of the 
dilemma of linguistic communication. Augustine’s approach to this question is 
centred on an analysis of language and as such is closer to the approach introduced by 
Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations (v. inf. 0150) then it is to that taken 
by Plato. These broader implications will be progressively revealed over the course of 
the dialogue and an attempt at a solution will be the culmination of the argument of 
the DM.
0167 With this, the opening section of the DM is completed and the issues under 
consideration are set forth. The initial attempt to analyse the value of words in an 
attempt to acquire knowledge, by means of telling has foundered in that they cannot 
even tell what it is that they signify but rather simply do so. A second attempt is now 
attempted where it is attempted to show what words signify.
125 In this Adeodatus touches upon a future theme, namely, that words are the only things that can be 
shown by words via demonstration.
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4. Ostensive Definition.
0168 For language to be involved in the acquisition of knowledge it must at some 
point be put into some sort of relationship with the world. Words, it would seem, must 
be explained not through other words but by reference to the reality they are supposed 
to give information about. That is to say, at least some words should be able to be 
defined by showing or indicating those items for which they stand. It is at just such a 
point that Augustine introduces the notion of ostensive definition126.
0169 The dilemma arrived at above (0167) basically hinges upon the need to 
connect the meanings of words with the reality they, in some sense, refer to and to 
break out of the linguistic regress caused by the attempt to explain words by reference 
to other words. Augustine’s introduction of ostension127, at the least, implies the view 
that once a core of ostensively acquired terms is available then additional terms may 
then be explained discursively, that is, through the use of the available terms in 
complexes which can be used to determine other non-core terms (i.e. ones not able to
126 Ostension appears first, in a philosophically interesting sense, with reference to Cratylus who 
apparently was led by his extreme Heracliteanism (for a discussion o f this as presented by Plato and 
Aristotle cf. Kirk: 1951. The conclusions reached by Kirk concerning the purpose o f his ‘pointing’ - pp. 
243-4 - are questionable.) to hold that language was insufficient for accurate communication and that 
he took to supplementing it with gestures, specifically, pointing (Aristotle, metaph. 1010a7; rh.
1417bl). The passage in the Metaphysics suggests that Cratylus was reduced to only (iiovov) pointing, 
yet taken together with the passage in the Rhetoric the more plausible interpretation would be that 
theoretically one should only point but that in practice Cratylus used both words and ostension. That 
Cratylus took to pointing, taken together with a Heracliteanism where all things are in flux (Plato, Crat. 
402a; Aristotle, metaph. 1010a7-15; DK 43: B12; 44: B49a; 45: B91.), would appear to suggest a form 
of direct reference where what is ostended is ‘that thing there now’. Cratylus would appear to hold that 
what is defined when pointing at a rabbit would be something like the Quinean ‘rabbit stage’ (cf.
Quine: 1960, § 12;1969, 30ff), that is to say when pointing one defines a temporal stage of a rabbit 
and, in the next instant, another temporal stage of a rabbit is present.
Other than Cratylus (and the evidence for his intention is controversial) there is little evidence for a 
philosophically sophisticated theory involving ostension, yet of interest for possible influences upon 
Augustine is the commonplace o f pointing out what some term signifies taken together with the 
Platonic notion that knowledge involves direct ‘visual’ contact with something. Also, there is evidence 
for the idea of words functioning so as to ‘show’ something in Plato {Crat. 394e and passim) and so as 
to ‘point’ in Plotinus (6.4). There is also the possibility o f a Stoic influence on Augustine’s approach to 
these issues (v. inf. § 5.2.1.2.5.6). That said, it is difficult to find any more specific influence on 
Augustine in this regard and so it is possible that much of what Augustine has to say on ostension is 
original.
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be ostensively defined)128. That this is the basic position held by Augustine will be 
seen in reference to his theory of language acquisition (v. inf. § 8.1.3). However, as 
will become clear, that language acquisition depends to a degree upon ostensive 
definition and that terms which cannot be ostensively defined may be determined via 
ones which can, does not necessitate that knowledge is acquired via language.
4.1. Ostension (11.
0170 Augustine introduces ostensive definition as a definition which proceeds by
simply showing what the word in question stands for or refers to.
Aug. iure agis fateor, sed si quaererem, tres istae syllabae quid significent, 
cum dicitur paries, nonne posses digito ostendere, ut ego prorsus rem ipsam 
uiderem, cuius signum est hoc trisyllabum uerbum demonstrante te nulla 
tamen uerba referente?
(5)
This passage reveals that Augustine is not concerned with the, related, problem of 
language acquisition but specifically with the meanings of words and how these can 
be revealed. To this end Augustine has no problem introducing the fact that the person 
to whom the term is being defined can ask what a particular word means or signifies, 
and be understood when doing so: he is specifically concerned with the application of 
ostensive definition rather than with ostensive teaching129. There is therefore a shared 
language and the major problem inherent in language acquisition, namely that of a 
starting point for the learner to begin from which does not imply a background
127 Augustine first refers to ostensive definition in the de ordine (2.18).
128 Cf Quine: 1950, 631.
129 Cf. Wittgenstein: ‘I do not want to call this “ostensive definition”, because the child [being taught a 
first language] cannot as yet ask what the name is. I will call it “ostensive teaching o f words”. ’ (PI 1.6)
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130language , is not immediately apparent, although it will soon become so for this 
issue is central to both ostensive definition131 and to Augustine’s wider concern of the 
involvement of language in knowledge acquisition.
0171 In addition to the very general idea of ostensive definition in the passage 
above (0170) there are also a number of more specific factors introduced in the same 
passage. The object which is defined is a particular physical object, namely a wall 
(paries) which can be seen and the ostension involves pointing at the definiendum 
(digito ostendere). There is implicitly a general sense of ostension which involves 
showing in a broad sense (demonstrante) and a more specific sense which involves 
pointing {digito ostendere). This distinction will be seen to be important in 
Augustine’s analysis, and will also be seen to move away from modem approaches to
132 *ostension in a manner which reveals Augustine’s attempt at a solution to what has 
been referred to by Quine as ‘referential inscrutability’ and the related idea of the 
‘indeterminacy of translation’133 - both of these issues (in ways both differing and 
similar to those of Quine) are at the heart of much of the following discussion of the 
DM.
130 Cf. Wittgenstein: ‘Augustine describes the learning o f human language as if the child came into a 
strange country and did not understand the language o f the country; that is, as if it already had a 
language, only not this one.’ {PI 1.32).
131 Cf. ‘’’[Direct and deferred ostension each has its] own set of problems.. .neither can fix the reference 
of terms of divided reference.. .To interpret these terms, what we do in practice is assume.. the 
ontology o f some background language” Welch: 1984, 263.
132 Primarily Wittgenstein and Quine.
133 On encountering a foreign language there is an indeterminacy of translation for all but a few 
sentences. This is demonstrated by reference to the case o f ‘Gavagai’ where one may equate this 
foreign (one word) sentence with ‘Rabbit’; ‘Temporal stage of a rabbit’; ‘Undetached rabbit part’; 
‘Rabbit’ as a general term; etc. (cf. Quine: 1960, 51-57). “My remarks on indeterminacy began as a 
challenge to likeness o f meaning... Certainly likeness o f meaning is a dim notion... Of two predicates 
which are alike in extension, it has never been clear when to say that they are alike in meaning and 
when not... Reference, extension, has been the firm thing; meaning, intension, the infirm. The 
indeterminacy of translation now confronting us [with ‘Gavagai’], however, cuts across extension and 
intension alike. The terms ‘rabbit’, ‘undetached rabbit part’, and ‘rabbit stage’ differ not only in 
meaning; they are true o f different things. Reference itself proves behaviourally inscrutable” Quine: 
1969, 35.
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0172 The specific picture given in the above passage (0170) is one whereby a 
person asks ‘What does [x] signify/mean?’. In this sense Augustine is following on 
from the discussions of Plato and his concern with Forms in his interrelated, and often 
confused (or perhaps, confusing), epistemological, semantical, and metaphysical 
considerations134. Augustine’s concern is epistemological but it quickly becomes 
concerned with the issue of semantics, and these, apparently, related themes will be 
gradually distinguished by the over-arching discussion of ‘telling’ and ‘showing’. Due 
to the fact that Augustine is primarily concerned with epistemological questions, he 
has a tendency to avoid, often ffustratingly so, the wider metaphysical implications of 
the discussion in the DM. However, for any clear understanding of the dialogue (and 
of the theory of language implicit in it) the metaphysical concerns will need to be 
considered.
0173 In answer to the question ‘What does [x] mean/signify?’ the person points with
their finger to the actual, physical, object signified by the term [x] (namely, a wall).
This description of ostensive definition comes close to that given by Quine (1969, 39)
for direct ostension.
First let me define direct ostension. The ostendedpoint, as I shall call it, is the 
point where the line of the pointing finger first meets an opaque surface. What 
characterises direct ostension, then, is that the term which is being ostensively 
explained is true of something that contains the ostended point.
0174 While the additional class of ostension, known as deferred ostension, would 
not seem to be applicable in this case. Deferred ostension is where one points at, say, 
a fuel gauge and not the fuel to show that there is fuel (to point at the fuel would be 
direct ostension, for what is being ostensively explained is true of something which
134 In the following discussion Augustine will be shown to unravel the easily made confusion of 
epistemological and semantic considerations. To this end it will be shown that statements can be 
meaningful and useful without there necessarily being a theory of how one can have ground for 
believing them (cf. White: 1979, 7-10).
contains the ostended point: in Augustinian terms this would be to point at (ostendere) 
the thing itself {rem ipsam))135. In deferred ostension one thing is shown in order to 
draw attention to another.
0175 However, the question as to what is to be understood by the term ‘paries' is 
important here, for it is not entirely clear whether the ostension here defines some 
particular wall (in this sense it would seem that ‘significare' means something like 
‘refers’ in a narrow sense, where a term refers to a particular object to which it is 
applied), or the concrete general term (that is to say, ‘paries' is a sign of the extension 
or class of all walls); and, further, how one is to understand abstract singular terms 
and their relation to Forms is even less clear. This is to say, the term ‘paries' may 
directly refer to this wall here; may be used to signify this wall as a member of the 
extension or class of all walls; or may even signify, or to put it more clearly, may gain 
its significance from, Wall Itself, that is the Form of wall (depending on how one is to 
interpret ‘rem ipsam').
0176 With proper nouns like ‘Socrates’ or ‘Rome’ the issue is not so ambiguous, for 
it is clear that from one ostensive definition to the next there is the imputing of 
identity of the defined object. However, Augustine specifically chooses to focus upon 
the example of a common noun136 where there is not necessarily any indication of 
identity from one ostension to the next.
0177 It is unclear how direct Augustine takes the above description of ostensive 
definition to be. That is to say, is defining a term equivalent to (1) referring directly to 
a particular material object, or (2) equivalent to signifying a conceptual class of 
objects, with physical extension, by means of an example of that class, or (3)
135 Quine: 1969, 40.
136 This problem arises more clearly at DM 8 with the introduction of the term ‘ fluuius’ and must be 
considered in due course in light of Porphyry’s analysis o f Aristotle’s Categories and the treatment of
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equivalent to signifying an abstract singular by means of a material object. (1) and (2) 
would be direct ostension in Quinean terms but (3) would be indirect, for the abstract 
object does not contain the ostended point, nor any point137?
0178 This ambiguity in Augustine’s choice of definiendum is significant and the 
question of what is understood as direct ostension will be seen to be extremely 
important in his thesis of knowledge acquisition.
4.1.1. Physical Objects.
0179 The example of ‘paries' raises the problem that ostension as presented above
(0170) appears only to be applicable for physical objects which are present. As
Adeodatus signals with the word ‘nominibus', this model also seems applicable only
to nouns, with the further provision that these nouns must signify a material object.
Ad. hoc in solis nominibus, quibus corpora significantur, si eadem corpora 
praesentia sint, fieri posse concedo.
(5)
The provision is made that qualities must also be included, that is, things such as
colour which are said to be ‘in’ bodies138.
Aug. num colorem corpus dicimus ac non potius quandam corporis 
qualitatem?
Ad. ita est.
Aug. cur ergo et hie digito demonstrari potest? an addis corporibus etiam 
corporum qualitates, ut nihilo minus etiam istae, cum praesentes sunt, doceri 
sine uerbispossint?
Ad. ego cum corpora dicerem, omnia corporalia intellegi uolebam, id est 
omnia, quae in corporibus sentiuntur.
(5)
general terms, and the relationship between particular and general term, and their relationship with 
universals or transcendental Forms (v. inf. § 5).
137 Cf. Quine: 1969, 40.
138 Augustine here employs Aristotelian categorical analysis to introduce qualities which are corporeal 
in that they are in bodies.
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All corporeal entities, and all that are perceived in them, are therefore stated as able, 
when present, to be ostensively defined.
0180 The exception is made that all visible entities can be ostensively defined but
not all corporeal things. Properties such as heat and weight and things such as sound
and smell, although corporeal, cannot be defined by being pointed to.
Aug. consider a tamen, utrum etiam hinc aliqua tibi excipienda sint.
Ad. bene admones; non enim omnia corporalia, sed omnia uisibilia dicere 
debut fateor enim sonum, odorem, saporem, grauitatem, calorem et alia, quae 
ad ceteros sensus pertinent, quamquam sentiri sine corporibus nequeant et 
propterea sint corporalia, non tamen digito posse monstrari.
(5)
That ostensive definition cannot be used so as to reveal all of the qualities in a body 
raises the question as to what manner of analysis reveals what specific quality is 
signified by a term.
0181 The deaf and actors (that is, mime artists) are able to demonstrate all manner
of such things without the use of words.
Aug. numquamne uidisti, ut homines cum surdis gestu quasi sermocinentur 
ipsique surdi non minus gestu uel quaerant uel respondeant uel doceant uel 
indicent aut omnia, quae uolunt, aut certe plurima? quod cum fit, non utique 
sola uisibilia sine uerbis ostenduntur, sed et soni et sapores et cetera 
huiusmodi; nam et histriones totas in theatris fabulas sine uerbis saltando 
plerumque aperiunt et exponunt.
(5)
Any description of ostensive definition, therefore, must go beyond the scope of the
present discussion whereby it amounts to pointing something out. Augustine moves
from saying that one shows, or points, with one’s finger to simply stating that actors
and the deaf are able to show something without the use of words. This said, however,
the issue as to whether an actor is able to show "ex' is passed over for the present.
Ad. nihil habeo, quod contradicam, nisi quod illud ex non modo ego, sed ne 
ipse quidem saltator histrio tibi sine uerbis quid significet posset ostendere. 
Aug. uerum fortasse dicis; sedfingamus eumposse...
(5-6)
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0182 The consideration given to ostensive definition of physical objects suggests 
that when one points something out that there is some degree of ambiguity over what 
exactly is the ostended point. For when one points at an item for purposes of 
definition the visual stimulation which is experienced might validly be interpreted as 
the ostensible object or equally as the colour of it, while in addition there are 
numerous other non-ostensible qualities which one must interpret as either essential or 
non-essential to the term under definition. Augustine does not proceed to discuss this 
ambiguity or inscrutability immediately as he is at present more concerned with 
disambiguating the actual ostensive process itself before proceeding to the issues 
surrounding reference and its inscrutability.
4.1.2. non uerbo uerbum sed sis.no signum.
0183 Although actors and the deaf do not use words, they do nevertheless use signs. 
Therefore, the problem still remains for just as words are simply signs of the things 
themselves, and are not the things themselves, so too are other sorts of signs (such as 
gesture) just signs of the things they signify and so one is no closer to the things 
themselves.
Aug. uerum fortasse diets; sed fingamus eumposse, non ut arbitror dubitas, 
quisquis ille motus corporis fuerit, quo mihi rem, quae hoc uerbo significatur, 
demonstrare conabitur, non ipsam rem futuram esse, sed signum. quare hie 
quoque non quidem uerbo uerbum, sed tamen signo signum nihilo minus 
indicab it, ut et hoc monosyllabum ex et ille gestus unam rem quandam 
significent, quam mihi ego uellem non significando monstrari.
(6)
0184 As the use of words to define words leads to a dilemma so too is this the case 
with signs, words are of course signs. Signs were defined as showing something 
beyond themselves (cf 0095: DD 5.9-10; DDC 2.1) and so, as with words, it would
appear that there remains the problem of closing the gap between sign and signified. It 
therefore remains to propose a method whereby the move from sign to signified, from 
word to referent, can be validly and coherently made. To do this one must devise a 
theory of semiotic relations, for signs, and the related theory of meaning, for words. 
Augustine, therefore, proceeds to analyse ‘showing’ so as to determine the validity of 
this method of knowledge acquisition. At present, it is necessary to remove signs from 
the ‘teaching’ process so as to determine the validity of ‘showing’ in this process.
That is to say, it is necessary to forward an acceptable method of knowledge 
acquisition as a hypothesis from which one can then begin to determine the 
applicability of sign theory to this hypothesis.
0185 In revealing the semiotic nature of pointing and gesturing (DM 6; 34) 
Augustine stresses the difficulty of defining signs other than by means of other signs, 
and to this extent it is clear that, in such cases, there is always a ‘background 
language’ present. That is, there are levels of interpretation present which separate 
one from the thing signified. This suggests that there are problems concerning 
specificity as regards the speaker’s intention as to what is signified and as regards the 
hearer’s awareness as to what is specifically the true nature/essence of the object 
referred to, while there is also the potential indeterminacy of necessary rule awareness 
which is inherent in any ‘background language’.
0186 Augustine’s introduction of the difficulty of using one sign to define another 
hinges upon the fact that with signs there is the need for rules, rules require 
interpretation, and interpretation introduces an intermediary between sign and 
signified.
0187 As pointing something out with one’s finger is a sign, it would appear 
problematic as to whether anything can be shown without signs.
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Ad. quipotest quod quaeris, oro te?
Aug. quomodopariespotuit.
Ad. ne ipse quidem, quantum ratio progrediens docuit, ostendi sine signo 
potest, nam et intentio digiti non est utique paries, sed signum datur, per quod 
paries possit uideri. nihil itaque uideo, quod sine signis ostendi queat.
(6)
Pointing is not the wall, but rather is a sign. A sign is here taken as something through 
which a thing can be ‘seen’ and is therefore an intermediary of sorts. It is this 
intermediary role which Augustine is at pains to avoid and this form of ostension 
shows the thing itself through something else, which is strictly speaking a sign.
0188 It can be seen that Augustine would not therefore regard ostensive definition 
in the sense of pointing to the defmiendum as direct at all, rather Augustine is perhaps 
closest here to Wittgenstein in that Wittgenstein questions pointing’s status as direct 
ostension due to the very fact that it presupposes a background language. In his 
Philosophical Grammar (.PG 46-7) Wittgenstein doubts that pointing should be 
considered a ‘primary sign’139, in contrast to words, which are ‘secondary’ signs140. 
Augustine is clearly thinking along the same lines in this, for pointing, like words, is 
not a direct link with reality for it functions by means of a rule, that is, it has a 
meaning which is an intermediary between the gesture and the reality to which it 
refers. Pointing is semiotic and as such it necessitates, for Augustine, a conceptual 
intermediary of sorts (v. sup. 0095).
0189 Although one can usually rely on someone interpreting a sign such as pointing 
in a predictable way141 and can therefore interpret someone’s pointing to be in the
139 ‘Primary’ in that it supplies a direct connection between language and reality (cf. Stem: 1995, 117).
140 The specific context under consideration in the Philosophical Grammar is the context of rule- 
governed activity in, particularly, language learning. This discussion is startlingly similar in many ways 
to much of what is argued in the DM, however, at present what is o f interest is what Wittgenstein’s 
discussion reveals about Augustine’s intention in DM 6.
141 Augustine clearly felt this to be the case, and even describes certain ‘given’ signs (v. sup. § 3.3.4) as 
evident o f the intention o f the giver, a sort of natural vocabulary o f all races (conf. 1.13). Also, 
Wittgenstein held that “[i]t is part o f human nature to understand pointing with the finger in the way 
that we do.” {PG 52). Nevertheless, this does not disallow the possibility of some sort o f deviant 
interpretation (Stem: 1995, 119), and it is in this spirit that Augustine wants to arrive at the
direction from hand to fingertip, it is possible to interpret it in the opposite direction, 
from fingertip to hand. As noted, there is a need to understand the rules or the 
meaning of the sign. Indeed, to look at the finger, rather than looking in the direction 
of the pointing finger, is to fail to grasp any rule or meaning at all142, it is like 
listening only to the sound of a word. When one understands what the pointing 
gesture signifies then one understands to look in the direction of the pointing to the 
object143, and so too with words one hears the sound and understands the semiotic 
correlation of sound to thing, through the medium of memory and mind, and so look 
at the thing. In such a way one can begin to gain a sense of the sort of mental 
intermediary Augustine posits between sign and reality, and the sort of thing he 
understands as the meaning of a word which correlates the word with reality.
0190 It will be useful to distinguish Augustine’s classes of ostension into ‘direct’ (v. 
inf § 4.2) and ‘indirect’ (words, pointing, and in fact all signs fall into this 
category)144.
4.2. Direct Ostension.
0191 Direct ostension for Augustine is demonstration, that is to say it is that in 
which one directly performs what is to be defined, or taught. This category is 
explicated by means of actions: it is notable that the analysis of ostensive definition 
moves progressively from concrete to abstract, from physical object to qualities, and 
then to actions. There is a systematic undermining of the various things which could
definiendum without the possibility o f any deviancy. Accepting the practicalities of communication is, 
for Augustine, one thing, and a rigorous approach to determining the place of language in knowlwedge 
acquisition is another altogether.
142 This grasping of the meaning or rule implied by the sign has been called the ‘interpretant’ or ‘proper
significate effect’ by Peirce (e.g. in ‘Letter to Lady Welby: What is meaning?’ in Peirce vol. 8 (1958)). 
Directly ostended in Quinean terms.
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be taught, in any traditional sense, without signs. However, that said, this type of
ostension, direct ostension, is what Augustine is concerned with - that through which
something is shown directly in itself, with no intermediary sign by which something
other than the sign comes to one’s attention.
Aug. quid? si ex te quaererem, quid sit ambulare, surgeresque et id ageres, 
nonne re ipsa potius quam uerbis ad me docendum aut ullis aliis signis 
utereris?
Ad. fateor ita esse et pudet me rem tarn in promptu positam non uidisse; ex 
qua etiam mihi milia rerum iam occurrunt, quae ipsae per se ualeant non per 
signa monstrari, ut edere, bibere, sedere, stare, clamare et innumerabilia 
cetera.
(6)
0192 It should be said that this does not mean that items other than those which can
be enacted cannot be directly ostended, and indeed this will be seen to be the case, but
rather that for ease of explication certain types of item are better suited than others.
Rather, Augustine holds that reason can be affected through two ‘given’, perceptual
media: deeds and words.
duo igitur uideo, in quibus potentia uisque rationispossit ipsis etiam sensibus 
admoueri, opera hominum, quae uidentur, et uerba, quae audiuntur. in 
utroque autem utitur mens gemino nuntio pro corporis necessitate, uno, qui 
oculorum est, altero aurium. itaque cum aliquid uidemus congruentibus sibi 
partibus figuratum,non absurde dicimus rationabiliter apparere, itemque, cum 
aliquid bene concinere audimus, non dubitamus dicere, quod rationabiliter 
sonat.
(ord. 2.32)
As has been seen, Augustine has been attempting to arrive at a valid description of 
teaching through words and at present he is attempting the same through human 
actions. In fact, the first reference to ostensive definition in Augustine is specifically 
concerned with that type which one can see is, for him, fundamental, namely, 
performance.
quae cum dicta essent, puer de domo, cui dederamus id negotii, cucurrit ad 
nos et horam prandii esse nuntiauit. turn ego. quid sit, inquam, moueri, non
144 Quine’s ‘direct’ and ‘deferred’ and Wittgenstein’s ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ are both useful for 
clarifying some o f the issues raised by Augustine, but neither accurately reflects Augustine’s analysis.
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definire nos puer iste sed ipsis oculis cogit ostendere. eamus igitur et de isto 
loco in alium locum transeamus. nam nihil est aliud, nisi fallor, moueri.
{ord. 2.18)
4.2.1. Specificity (TV
0193 The difficulty which this form of direct ostension does not seem to dispel is
that it makes demands on the understanding of the person to whom the item is being
shown. If, for example, one were walking and were asked by someone who was
completely unaware what the term ‘walking’ means there is the complexity in that if
one adds something to one’s walk to highlight the fact that this is walking (one may
slightly speed up, for example) then the other person may think that it is the act of
hastening that is meant by the term ‘walking’. Once again the problem arises from the
gap between word and reality and at this point, perhaps most clearly yet in the
dialogue, is seen the difficulty caused by the necessity for understanding and
interpretation to be introduced so as to bridge this gap.
Aug. age nunc die mihi, si omnino nesciens huius uerbi uim abs te ambulante 
quaererem, quid sit ambulare, quomodo me doceres?
Ad. id ipsum agerem aliquanto celerius, ut post interrogationem tuam aliqua 
nouitate admonereris et tamen nihil aliud fieret quam id, quod deberet 
ostendi.
Aug. scisne aliud esse ambulare aliudfestinare? nam et qui ambulat, non 
continuo festinat et qui festinat, non continuo ambulat145; dicimus enim et in 
scribendo et in legendo al usque innumerabilibus rebus festinat ionem. quare 
cum illud, quod agebas, celerius ageres post interrogationem meam, putarem 
ambulare nihil esse aliud quam festinare - id enim noui addideras - et ob hoc 
fallerer.
(6)
0194 This example introduces the question of specificity, or where one is to 
understand the determination or delimitation of a definition. There is apparently a
145 Cf. the methodological similarity to the ‘semantic’ differentiations o f Prodicus (Plato, Prt. 337a-c).
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certain degree of inscrutability in regards to the listener/interpreter making sense of 
the intention of the person giving the definition.
0195 The further qualification must then be made that those things/actions can be
shown which one is not doing at the time when asked. The exception here is speaking
itself, for its sole function is signifying and therefore it cannot be performed without
employing signs146.
Ad. fateor non nos posse rem monstrare sine signo, si cum id agimus 
interrogemur; si enim nihil addamus, putabit qui rogat nolle nos ostendere 
contemptoque se in eo quod agebamus perseuerare. sed si de his roget, quae 
agere possumus, nec eo tamen tempore quo agimus roget, possumus post eius 
interrogationem id agendo re ipsa potius quam signo demonstrare quod rogat, 
nisi forte loquentem me interroget, quid sit loqui; quicquid enim dixero, ut 
eum doceam, loquar necesse est. ex quo securus docebo, donee ei planum 
faciam quod uult, non recedens a re ipsa, quam sibi uoluit demonstrari, nec 
signa quaerens, quibus earn ostendam praeter ipsam.
Aug. acutissime omnino. quare uide, utrum conueniat iam inter nos eaposse 
demonstrari sine signis, quae aut non agimus cum interrogamur et tamen 
statim agere possumus aut ipsa forte signa agimus; cum enim loquimur, signa 
facimus, de quo dictum est significare.
Ad. conuenit.
(6-7)
Therefore one may ostensively define, directly and without signs, whatever one is not 
doing when asked and when one is able to do so immediately.
0196 It can be seen then that Augustine stresses how hard it is to explain signs 
except by means of other signs (DM 6; 34) and that, even when one reduces ostension 
to directly showing something in itself, there remains the problem of specificity. This 
idea of specificity primarily raises the question of the speaker’s intention as to what is 
signified (and the apparent inscrutability of this for the listener) and secondly raises 
that of the hearer’s awareness as to what is, in fact, the true nature/essence of the 
object referred to.
146 Cf. signs as things whose whole being rests in signifying (v. sup. 0087-0092).
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0197 The attempted resolution of these questions is passed over for the present and 
are considered suo loco throughout the following dialogue. For the present Augustine 
accepts that direct ostension as so described (§ 4.2) is possible and, therefore, 
proceeds to analyse the possibility of ostension by means of a threefold classification 
of modes of communication and communicables (v. inf. § 4.3). In the course of this 
classificatory analysis the major issues of what has been termed ‘back-ground 
language’, ‘specificity’, and ‘inscrutability’ will return.
0198 In fact, the questions surrounding specificity and of where one is to understand 
the delimitation of a definition leads directly to the following classification of signs 
(DM 7-18) and demonstrates a useful methodological tool. However, specificity, or 
more correctly, ambiguity, will be seen to reveal itself also as of central concern to the 
ability of language to clearly and unambiguously delimit its own items of reference.
4.3. Classification of Communicables and Modes of Communication.
0199 Augustine lists three communicative classifications:
(i) when one is asked about signs: signs can be shown through signs.
Aug. cum ergo de quibusdam signis quaeritur, possunt signis signa 
monstrari...
(7)
(ii) when one is asked about things, which are not signs:
(a) things can be shown through performance, if possible.
Aug. cum autem de rebus, quae signa non sunt, aut eas agendo post 
inquisitionem, si agipossunt...
(7)
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(b) things can be shown through signs, by means of which they can 
be understood.
Aug. aut signa dando, per quae animaduerti queant.
(7)
0200 This classification, in addition to the three modes of communication, also 
reveals two classes of communicables: signs and things. More specifically, signs are 
things, in that they are something (i.e. they are not nothing), but they are things which 
are signs; while things are those things which are not signs147.
147 V. sup. 0087-0092.
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5. Classification (1): Signs Shown by Signs.
0201 The following classification of ‘signs shown by signs’ takes the word as 
representative of the basic semiotic item. This approach is both coherent with 
Augustine’s view of words as signs par excellence (DDC 1.2), and is, of course, also 
coherent with the specific epistemic and linguistic considerations of the DM.
0202 However, although the word is taken as the basic item of consideration, what 
will be of primary concern is not the word per se but rather the relation of the word to 
that which it signifies, or shows (monstrare, cf. DM 7)148. As it has been, 
preliminarily, accepted that there is a basis (that is, ostension qua performance, v. sup. 
§ 4.2) for grasping the significance of a word, or sign (and, accordingly, a basis for 
language learning and development149), it is now possible to move on to a 
consideration of the relationship between words, and signs, and the reality they 
signify.
0203 The analysis of language begins from where that of ostension left off, for if 
one accepts that an epistemic basis exists for language as was seen to be provided by 
ostension then one must clarify any areas of inscrutability which exist in respect to 
language. This inscrutability is more accurately described in linguistic terms as 
‘ambiguity’, and just as with ostension, so too with language this ambiguity must be 
accounted for so as to allow a valid basis for knowledge acquisition by means of 
words, or indeed any signs.
0204 It should be said that much of Augustine’s following consideration of 
ambiguity (which will be seen to be crucial to the conclusions arrived at in the
148 The application o f the ostensive concept of showing as a metaphorical term used to elucidate the 
semiotic/linguistic process will be discussed below (§ 5.2.1.2.5.6).
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dialogue as a whole) is greatly influenced by the Stoic discussions of ‘cqjxpifSoXfa’150. 
The specifics of Stoic influence will be discussed at the relevant points in the analysis 
of Augustine’s arguments, in terms of their discovery, their explication, and their 
resolution.
0205 At present it suffices to say that Augustine approaches the class of ‘signs 
shown by signs’ from the perspective of the conclusions arrived at, and from the 
discoveries made, in the discussion of ostension151, and in this way it is accepted that 
one can demonstrate what a word signifies. However, although the difficulty of the 
linguistic regress (v. sup. § 3.5 and § 3.5.1) is, apparently, defused in this way, it 
remains to deal with the issue of ambiguity in linguistic communication, and, 
therefore, with the related issue of the validity of words as evidence and as a means 
towards knowledge acquisition152.
0206 In the course of this discussion Augustine presents Adeodatus with a 
methodological instrument for the analysis of such issues. This is the Platonic method 
of ‘collection and division’ (Plato, Phdr. 265d-e). Strictly speaking the collection has 
already occurred progressively from the definition of ‘sign’ to the division into 
communicables and modes of communication. However, with the analysis of ‘signs 
shown by signs’ there begins a systematically, and self-consciously, didactic 
application of the method of division as a tool for disambiguation (as described in 
Phdr. 265e-266a). As mentioned above (0204), the approach towards ambiguity in its 
specifically linguistic, or perhaps more properly, semantic aspects is Stoic but,
149 Essential elements needed for a full understanding of the implications of the DM for Augustine’s 
view of language acquisition will be discussed in this chapter (namely, § 5). Therefore, a consideration 
of language acquisition must be postponed for the present (v.inf. § 8.1.3).
150 On Stoic considerations of ambiguity cf. Atherton: 1993. Ambiguity will be considered in due 
course, v. inf. § 6.
151 The discussion of signs will in turn necessitate a return and revision o f the conclusions reached in 
the discussion of ostension (v. inf. § 7).
152 Although both of theses issues are central to the present chapter, their full significance will be seen 
only in the resolution o f the dialogue as a whole.
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nevertheless, this approach is couched in general terms in a Platonic methodology. 
This, unacknowledged, synthesising approach is typical of Augustine.
0207 In this method of approach to signs which are shown by signs Augustine can 
finally begin to elucidate how it is that words signify. This is achieved through a more 
and more accurate consideration of what the signification of words actually is. That is 
to say, by means of a precise understanding of what it is that words actually signify 
one can begin to see how this signifying might be achievable153.
5.1. Signification of Words.
0208 In speech there is a threefold division of signification:
(1) Words are signified by words.
Aug. uidetur ergo mihi loquendo nos aut uerba ipsa signare uerbis...
(7)
(2) Other signs are signified by words.
Aug. ...aut alia signa, uelut cum gestum dicimus aut litteram - nam his duobus 
uerbis quae significantur, nihilo minus signa sunt...
(7)
(3) Something which is not a sign is signified by words.
Aug. ...aut aliquid aliud’ quodsignum non sit, uelut cum dicimus lapis, hoc 
enim uerbum signum est - nam significat aliquid - sed id quod eo significatur, 
non continuo signum est...
(7)
0209 Division (3) is omitted for the present as it belongs to the communicative 
classification (ii.b) where things, which are not signs, are shown through signs (v. sup. 
0199). Therefore, the division of signs which signify signs is twofold, as seen from
153 In arriving at this the concepts of recollection and ostension will be seen to be central (v. inf. § 7, § 
8, and § 9).
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the example of language. In this class signs either signify (1) the same signs134, as
words signify words155, or (2) other signs, as words signify other sorts of signs.
Aug. ...etpartes in eo duas comperimus, cum aut eadem aut alia signa signis 
docemus uel commemoramus...
(?)
5.2. Audible and Visible Signs.
0210 It is possible to further divide signs in that they are perceived in different
ways. Words pertain to hearing, and are audible signs, while gestures pertain to sight,
and are visible signs. With reference to words, it is made clear that written words are
secondary to spoken words in that they are visible signs of audible signs: they bring
that which pertains to the ears to the mind via the eyes.
Aug. die ergo signa quae uerba sunt, ad quem sensum pertineant.
Ad. ad auditum.
Aug. quidgestus?
Ad. ad uisum.
Aug. quid? cum uerba scripta inuenimus, num uerba non sunt? an signa 
uerborum uerius intelleguntur...ita fit, ut cum scribitur uerbum, signum fiat 
oculis, quo illud, quod ad aures pertinet, ueniat in mentem.
(8)
0211 Therefore, with words which are signs of the same sort of signs (i.e. words 
which signify words), although it is possible that there may be visible signs, the 
primary mode is audible. Augustine defines written words as signs of spoken words156 
(DD 5.17-31; DM 8; DDC 2.5) and not as signs of mental events or thoughts, to this 
extent Augustine is in broad agreement with Aristotle {int. 16a3-4). Strictly speaking
154 The class o f signs which signify the same signs does not refer to such cases as that o f sign X and 
sign Y signify the same thing, Z, but rather refers to signs, such a words, which signify the same sort of 
signs as themselves: that is, words as signs which signify words, not words as signs which signify other 
sorts o f signs, such as gestures.
155 There is the additional ambiguity in that ‘signifying the same signs, as words signify words’ may be 
read (1) broadly, as including any case where one word signifies another word, or (2) narrowly, as only 
including those cases where a word signifies itself. In this context Augustine intends the broader 
reading (1). The narrow reading (2) will be discussed in due course (v. inf. § 5.5 ff).
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written words are not even words157 but rather are signs which indicate to the mind 
that which may be uttered as a word. This is to say, the written term ‘chair’ indicates 
the vocal sound, sounded within as it were, [chair] to the mind and it is this vocal 
sound which one sounds within (DM 2) so as to bring the ‘thing itself to mind. The 
mental event which the written word refers to therefore is not the ‘thing’ explicitly 
referred to but rather the vocal word, whether uttered or thought of, and this vocal 
word refers to the thing explicitly referred to158.
0212 The division under consideration, and reached at this point, can be 
schematised159 as follows.
(D6)
Linguistic Signs
signs of other signs signs of the same signs signs of things
visible signs audible signs
0213 This schema of linguistic signs can be inserted into the wider classification 
which has progressively been developed throughout the dialogue. This classification, 
with that of linguistic signs inserted, is as follows.
156 For a fuller discussion of this issue cf. Kirwan: 1989, 54-5.
157 As noted by Kirwan (1989, 54), written letters are not even letters for letters are parts o f a (vocal) 
word, i.e. a vowel or consonant. They are the smallest part of an articulate vocal sound (DD 5.25-26).
138 This may be seen as an example o f Quinean deferred ostension (v. sup. 0174) for the written word 
‘chair’ signifies the ostended point <chair> via the utterance [chair]. For example, if someone who can 
speak but cannot read English were to point to the word ‘chair’ written on a page and ask “What does 
that mean?”, and the interlocutor were to say “Chair”, the direct reference of the written word would be 
the utterance and the direct reference o f the utterance, and hence indirect of the written word, would be 
the item <chair>.
159 At significant points, or breaks, in the process o f division a diagramatic representation of the stage 
reached will be presented for the sake o f clarity.
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(D7)
Things
things qua signs things qua things
signs shown through signs
things shown through things shown through
signs performance
signs of the same signs signs of other signs
visible audible
5.2.1. Definition of 'uerbum' (1).
0214 A word (uerbum) is defined as that which is uttered in an articulate voice
(articulata uoce profertur) with some significance (cum aliquo significatu).
Aug. ...ut uerbum sit, quod cum aliquo significatu articulata uoce profertur - 
uox autem nullo alio sensu quam auditu percipi potest, ita fit, ut cum scribitur 
uerbum, signum fia t oculis, quo illud, quod ad aures pertinet, ueniat in 
mentem.
From this definition it can be observed that in the communicative process there is one 
who produces the word (profertur) and one who receives the word (percipi 
potest... ueniat in mentem), while the word itself is presented as dual in nature. The 
word has, as one element, sound (uox), and as the other, signification (significatus). 
This gives a sequence as follows:
(8)
(D8)
transmitter (sound + signification) receiver
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0215 It is clearly stated that signs, and therefore words, make something come into, 
or to the attention of, the mind. In this case of written words what occurs is that the 
visual sign (i.e. the written word) makes one think of the verbal sign, that is a word in 
the sense o f 4quod cum aliquo significatu articulata uoce profertur ’. The distinction 
between what pertains to the ears and what comes to the attention of the mind will be 
discussed at length below (§ 5.6.1.); however, it is clear that it is the uox which 
pertains to the ears (uox autem nullo alio sensu quam auditu percipi potest), while 
that which comes into mind is in some way related to the other element in a word, 
namely the signification.
5.2.1.1. Siznificatus and Siznificatio.
0216 At this point it will be useful to clarify Augustine’s terminology employed in 
discussing signification and closely related ideas. The translation ‘signification’ is in 
general a reasonably accurate term for the concept under consideration in the DM. 
However, Augustine chooses to use two distinct terms {significatus - cf. TLL 4, 238; 
and significatio - c f TLL 4, 238) in different contexts; this distinction suggests that 
there are different nuances being highlighted in these different contexts. For this 
reason, significatus has generally been translated ‘significance’, while significatio has 
been translated ‘signification’.
0217 ‘Significatus’ only occurs, in the works of Augustine, in the DM and is the 
term consistently employed in the definition of ‘uerbum' 1™. ‘Significatus’ is a 
substantive derived from the verb ‘significare\ with the ‘-tus’ termination from the 
supine stem denoting the action of the specific verb. In both the definition of
160
DM 8; 9; 10; 11;12.
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‘uerbum' and in the two other occurrences o f 4significatus,161 there is a clear sense of 
act or of process involved. In the definition (v. sup. 0214), a word is defined as a 
combination of sound and signification, and the fact that the articulate sound is 
produced (profertur) together with some (act of) signifying (cum aliquo significatu) 
highlights the intentionality implicit in the nature of a word. A word is a meaningful 
utterance in that it is intentionally produced through the combined act of producing an 
articulate sound and of signifying. 4Significatus’ occurs in close association with 
‘uerbum’ and with the communicative act.
0218 Also, the form of the definition of ‘uerbum’ emphasises that a word is that 
which is uttered in an articulate voice with some significance, stressing the close 
connection of uox and significatus: a word is a uox with significatus but can be 
conceptually separated into sonus and significatio.
0219 Therefore, the sense implicit in ‘significatus’ is that of the action or process of 
signifying, and it is for this reason that it is this term which is solely used in 
Augustine’s definition of ‘uerbum’ in the DM, where the interest in words is primarily 
in their role in the communicative act or process.
0220 4Significatio ’ also occurs a number of times in the DM162, however, it does so
in rather different contexts. It too is a derived substantive from the supine stem,
however, the 4-tio’ termination signifies the abstract. Therefore, in distinction to
‘significatus',4significatio’ focuses upon the concept of signification in the abstract
and in separation from the word or communicative process. This is perhaps most
clearly seen in the following examples:
Aug. ...nomen et uerbum, dijferentem habeant significationem...
( 12)
DM32; 33.
162 DM 8; 12; 13; 17; 23; 30; 34; 36.
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Aug. ...in quo...signo [caput]...duo sint, sonus et significatio...
(34)
In DM 12 the concept of signification is being highlighted in abstraction from the 
particular words: both words have a difference, other than sound, and this is their 
signification; while in DM 34 the emphasis is on the fact that there are two elements 
in the word which may be considered separately, namely, sound and signification. In 
Augustine’s definition of ‘uerbum’ the stress is that a word depends on the production 
of sound and signification in unison163.
0221 One can imagine a definition Augustine could have given of ‘uerbum’ where 
he could have made use of the sonus!significatio distinction in DM 34: in a word there 
are two, conceptually164, separable elements, sound (sonus) and signification 
(significatio), when a word is uttered these elements are combined so as to produce an 
articulate sound (uox articulata) together with some signification (cum aliquo 
significatu). In abstraction a word consists of sonus and significatio; while, so as to be 
a meaningful utterance proper, a word must consist of the combined acts of uttering 
and signifying, thus successfully enacting the communicative process.
0222 To reiterate, Augustine draws the distinction as regards signification as (1) the 
intentional application of it in the communicative process, and as (2) an item which 
may be considered in itself in abstraction. Therefore, the translation of significatus 
employed is ‘significance’ so as to distinguish between its use as a term for the 
combined process involved in uttering a word where there is sound with significance, 
and the use of significatio (translated ‘signification’) where the focus is upon a word 
as the separable concepts of sound and signification.
163 Augustine is here considering ‘uerbum’ in much the same way as he does ‘dictio’. This relation will 
be elaborated upon below (§5.2.1.2.).
5.2.1.2. Definition of ‘uerbum’ (2).
0223 In any consideration of Augustine’s approach to language one must confront a 
number of divergent philosophical positions. That which perhaps looms largest is the 
overarching Platonic metaphysics which informs every stage in Augustine’s thinking 
about language and its relationship to reality and knowledge. However, also of central 
importance are the two most important theories of language and meaning in the 
ancient world, namely those of Aristotle and the Stoics.
0224 Augustine essentially employs a Stoic theory of meaning and uses a Stoic 
terminology to do so. However, the materialism of Stoic ontology jarred with his 
Platonic sensibilities and he is seen to employ Aristotelian ideas as a bridge, as it 
were, between the Platonism of his metaphysics and ontology and the Stoicism of his 
theory of meaning. This method also necessarily involves the Neoplatonic 
syncretising of Plato and Aristotle.
0225 In this approach, as he often does, Augustine finds a position which is neither 
one nor the other, which is neither fully Stoic nor yet Aristotelian, but which is 
something different and new165.
0226 At this point in the discussion it will be useful to consider the impact of the 
Aristotelian and the Stoic theories of meaning, and to some extent the reception of 
these theories by subsequent thinkers, on the Augustinian theory of meaning, with 
particular attention being given to those areas most directly affecting the DM.
0227 Therefore, the following discussion will be concerned with the problem of 
‘meaning’: that is to say, that which makes signs into ‘instruments’ of communication
164 This conceptual separation will be o f importance in Augustine’s treatment o f the use/mention 
distinction (v. inf. §6.1.1).
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and understanding. Primarily, a consideration will be given to Augustine’s 
relationship to the theorising of other philosophers both in defining the nature of the 
debate and in the actual investigation into communication. Central to this will be the 
analysis of the relationship between words and ‘ideas/concepts’ and between words 
and reality.
5.2.1.2.1. The Platonic Context.
0228 The concept of ‘natural’ relationships in semiotics is central to the study of 
language. This concept involves the metaphor of ‘growth’ in that it suggests that there 
is a distinction between signs intentionally created by people and those whose 
development is more accurately understood as a process. The question as to how signs 
emerge and how they possess meaning is closely related and an attempt to analyse 
Augustine’s understanding of this relationship will be of major concern in the 
following discussion.
0229 The question of how linguistic signs, or perhaps less anachronistically, of how 
language in general came to be much occupied the thinkers of the Sophistic 
‘movement’ (v. sup. §2.3.1) and it is in reaction to many of the central questions 
raised by these thinkers that Plato wrote his great dialogue concerned with language, 
the Cratylus. The terms of the debate can, therefore, be seen to have been initiated by 
the Sophists but to have been focused and firmly established by Plato.
0230 In the dialogue the discussion between the interlocutors apparently revolves 
around the issue of whether the meaning of a word is based on convention or whether 
its meaning depends upon the nature of that which it signifies. Cratylus supports the
165 Exactly how new is made difficult to ascertain due to the lack of evidence for Stoic theory. 
Augustine maintains a position which is largely Stoic, but, as will be seen, there are elements in his
position that names are natural (Plato, Crat. 383ab), while Hermogenes argues the 
case that names are arbitrary and conventional (Plato, Crat. 384cd). However, more 
accurately, the dialogue is not concerned with “ ... whether language is natural to 
humans, or if signs have natural meanings rather than meanings given them by 
people. That the names for things are made by people...is uncontested. Rather, the
dialogue’s central question is whether it makes sense to distinguish between
166
correctness and incorrectness in naming” (Keller: 1998, 13). To this extent much of 
the focus of the Cratylus concerns the relation of names to their objects and the 
question as to what these objects might be.
0231 Plato confronts the issue, in the terms established by the debate underway 
during the period, by considering whether there is a relationship between words 
(specifically, names) and reality such that there is a natural correctness or whether 
there is a relationship such that there is an arbitrary correctness.
0232 The question of arbitrariness is a vexed one for Hermogenes due to the fact 
that he unwisely opts for an extreme form of arbitrariness. The reason behind this 
extreme interpretation would appear to be that the most obvious example of 
arbitrariness in names is that of proper names (Plato, Crat. 384b; 384d).
Arbitrariness, however, need not be so radical that anything can correctly be called by 
any name that anyone whosoever chooses, and the problems inherent in such an 
extreme position are pointed out by Socrates {Crat. 385a ff.). Yet, the basic position 
taken need not imply so extreme a conclusion and does support the idea that the name 
of a thing is conventional and, therefore, the aspect of language concerned with the 
relation of name to object referred to has no concern with the correctness of names.
theory of meaning which are clearly not Stoic.
‘Correctness’ concerns the relation between a name and its object {signification).
I l l
0233 The assumption of Hermogenes that words in general function like proper 
names most probably derives from the fact that proper names are the most obvious 
example of clearly arbitrary names - also, they are one of the few examples whereby 
humans carry out a deliberate and to an extent arbitrary act of name giving. Proper 
names are in actuality exceptions to the rule and as such are less than ideal for making 
generalisations. Convention is not equivalent to arbitrariness - an error made by 
Hermogenes167.
0234 Socrates proposes a possible description of the function and nature of names 
in which it is initially stated that things have their own fixed reality which is neither 
relative to, nor caused by, humans but exists in itself according to its own reality 
which is imposed by nature (Plato, Crat. 386d e). Also, in accord with this, actions 
also have their appropriate nature (Plato, Crat. 386e-387a). From this it follows that 
actions can be carried out correctly or incorrectly; and since speaking is an action 
(387b) and naming a part of speaking (387c), then humans cannot give names 
according to their will and there is in fact a correctness in naming (Plato, Crat. 387d).
0235 From this Socrates poses the suggestion that names/words are instruments
which are employed so as to perform a specific action (Plato, Crat. 387e-388a). So,
the definition of names is one in which they are instruments which are used to teach
others and to separate things in accordance with their natures.
ovo(xa apa Si5aaKaA,iK6v xi screw opyavov icai SiaKpmicov 
rq; obala^..
(Plato, Crat. 388b)
The instrument (opyavov) functioning in language is employed so as to name/refer 
(ovo|xa), communicate/teach (SiSaaKC&iKov), and classify (SiaKpirtKOv). This 
instrumental theory of signs appears then to lead to the conclusion that there is indeed
167 Cf. Saussure, Cours, Chpt. 5, 3. Saussure held that the word ‘arbitrary’ should not imply that the
a correctness of names and that Cratylus’ natural explanation of language holds true. 
However, the dialogue concludes with the apparent refutation of the natural 
explanation revealed through the process of etymologising and one is left with a 
situation where neither the conventional nor the natural theory of language, as 
presented in the dialogue, hold.
0236 The question concerning the view of names as instruments begs the question 
as to how one is to understand the term ‘instrument’ - is it that ‘instrument’ is 
metaphorical or that “[n]ot all instruments have a form which is dictated by their 
purpose” (Keller: 1998, 19)? Metaphors need not meet every aspect of that which they 
explicate and indeed by the very differences may clarify even more fully and it is on 
this point that the two interpretations of ‘instrument’ perhaps coincide. For the 
difficulty in the extreme form of an instrumentalist theory may be that either 
‘instrument’ diverges from ‘name’ in that names function instrumentally through a 
conventional means, or that “[s]ome instruments are able to fulfil their respective 
purposes due to conventional use; words are such instruments, as are playing cards 
and money” (Keller: 1998, 19).
0237 Cratylus approaches the question of the correctness of names along similar 
lines to that of Hermogenes. That is to say, the relationship of word to object 
functions as names do to their bearers, and so he approaches the problem as though 
there were a direct relationship between word and object. It is for this reason that 
Cratylus, in arguing for the natural correctness of names, does so in terms of an 
etymological analysis (Plato, Crat. 384b).
choice o f the signifier is left entirely to the speaker.
0238 As concerns the question of the difficulties of Cratylus’ etymologies a possible 
explanation may lie in the section of argumentation which leads up to, and introduces, 
the passage on ‘natural’ etymologies.
0239 Irrespective of whether one takes the etymologising of Socrates seriously168 in 
the Cratylus, the ‘name-giver’ must know how to embody in the sounds and syllables 
that name which is naturally fitted to each object, that is, its ‘ideal name’ (Plato, Crat. 
389d). However, the actual physical material from which these names are formed 
would appear to be less specifically relevant (Plato, Crat. 390a). Indeed, the fact that 
one is able to reveal one’s mind to another through words that bear no resemblance to 
what one is referring to suggests that convention can enable things to be indicated 
which do not resemble their designata (Plato, Crat. 434e).
0240 The good ‘name-giver’ may employ the most accurate sounds and syllables in 
his language to best reflect the ‘ideal name’ of any particular thing but this does not 
free one from an interpretation which must be charged with leading to a degree of 
arbitrariness or conventionality.
0241 The Cratylus is a dialogue of two distinct halves, each proposing contrary 
analyses of language, and each finally resulting in a refutation of themselves to the 
benefit of their contrary: Hermogenes’ position (convention) leads to a conclusion 
supporting Cratylus’ (nature), while Cratylus’ position leads to Hermogenes’. The 
solution to this puzzle is that which, with his own modifications, Aristotle arrived at 
in the de interpretatione and is evident in the Cratylus itself. The interpretation which 
Plato would appear to be encouraging the reader to make is one which takes both 
theories as valid but which does not take as extreme a position as either.
16 The following interpretation need not be taken to disagree with, for example, Sedley (1998) who 
takes a positive view of Plato’s intention in etymologising; but the way in which one understands 
‘natural’ in this context would have to be revised by the relativising “.. .for A” such that the Greek word
0242 Words are arbitrary in the sense that they communicate through conventional 
means within linguistic communities. One cannot simply decide upon any name but 
must employ names accepted as meaningful within ones community - indeed, even 
with the atypical example of proper names there does tend to be a certain degree of 
limitation for although one may choose whatever name for a child one desires there is 
the tendency to use names linguistically and phonetically acceptable to one’s 
community. This leads to the fact that different sounds, letters, and syllables may have 
a degree of association (harshness or softness, for example) whereby their sounds 
appear to naturally reflect the meaning of certain words within which they occur. Yet 
this is only apparently true for these sounds are nevertheless conventional.
0243 Both theories, as presented in the Cratylus, make similar errors due to their 
focus upon the naming relation within language, for Hermogenes bases his 
interpretation on the apparent prototypical and arbitrary nature of proper names, while 
the position of Cratylus takes etymology, even at the level of word sounds, to be 
natural. Neither is valid in its extreme form, while in a more generous interpretation 
one may accept that names are in fact arbitrary in that they are conventionally 
accepted within a linguistic community, even on the level of individual sounds which 
although not obviously conventional are, nevertheless, not natural. In addition to this 
there is, in Plato’s interpretation, a ‘natural’ element in language in that there is a 
correct, ideal, name which a particular name (in whatever language one may happen 
to be using) represents. The mode of representation is, nevertheless, conventional.
This may perhaps be best explained by reference to the term ‘table’ which can be 
represented by ‘table’, ‘mensa\ ‘xpoaie^a’, etc., just as the actual item <table> can be 
made of wood, stone, steel, etc. The material by which the item, <table>, is
Axmpov, for example, ‘naturally’ represents “sleekness” for that linguistic community (i.e. the
115
‘represented’ is in this sense conventional while that which is represented by all the 
different material representations, that is the formal item, is natural. Likewise with the 
term ‘table’ the various representations of it are conventional but the correct, or ideal, 
name which the various words represent is natural.
0244 How exactly one should understand this ideal name is problematic. It is
relevant that words are held to bear a similar relation to reality, that is to the world of
Forms, as particulars or pictures.
ecra 5e tc o o  m i t o  ovopa plpripa, daarcep t o  £a>Ypa(pT|p<x.
(Plato, Crat. 431a)
0245 The question of the relation of an ideal name to the ideal Form which it 
presumably refers to is unclear - namely, is it the linguistic equivalent of the Form? 
That is to say, the Form functions as the intelligible element whereby all similar 
things are recognised and understood and it is possible that that which makes 
linguistic signs into instruments of communication, i.e. their meaning, is nothing other 
than the Form. The question of what names are is of central concern in the dialogue 
and the conclusion seems to be reached that in a strict sense only Forms can be 
named169. If this interpretation is accurate it would seem to confirm that Plato is
170primarily concerned with epistemological issues and for this reason, or due to a lack 
of terminological precision caused by the incipiency of the treatment of such issues, 
discusses properly semantic issues in epistemic terms, with the inevitably resultant 
obscurity.
0246 In a ‘natural’ analysis the relation between the name and the object is 
independent of how the name is used in any particular language, while in a 
‘conventional’ analysis the relation is dependent precisely upon the particular
Greeks).
169 For a discussion of this cf. White: 1976, 132.
language and linguistic habits/practices of a linguistic community. Plato arrives at a 
conclusion somewhere between the two.
0247 In the conventionalist theory meaning would appear to depend on usage: by 
using [dog] to stand for <dog>, [dog] conventionally means <dog>. Yet Plato would 
seem to hold that the existence of Forms explain how one can know something and 
how words are meaningful: the Form of Beauty makes it possible for person A both to 
know that x is beautiful and to meaningfully say “x is beautiful”.
0248 Words are tools that enable us to distinguish between objects and all languages 
that carve up reality correctly will have the same ideal names {Crat. 389d). For
“ ... Plato’s attack on naturalism is aimed at ordinary Greek words and not at the deep 
structure of language [i.e. ideal names], where the same name (category) is expressed 
by different words in different languages” (Modrak, 2001,18). Also, “ ...Plato makes 
a strong case for the epistemic requirement for universal concepts of natural kinds and 
the importance of objective standards for correctness” (Modrak, 2001, 18) and it is to 
these that words must then refer if they are to adequately express truth {Crat. 439d- 
440b). How well actual utterances do this is questioned throughout the dialogue but 
the fact that Plato recognises a consistent and objective ideal name/deep structure 
suggests the possibility of accurate referencing
0249 What is of concern to an analysis of Augustine’s theory of linguistic signs is 
that Plato treats only of names, that (spoken) words are instruments which are used so 
as to name, communicate/teach, and to classify, and that they are employed so as to 
cause someone else to ‘look to’ the ideal name which they in some way represent or, 
through greater or lesser accuracy to the ideal name, cause the Form of the thing 
named to ‘come to mind’ more or less correctly.
170
“[T]he Cratylus... is a treatment o f problems having to do with language that arises directly out of
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5.2.1.2.2. Aristotle’s Categories.
0250 In approaching Augustine and his theory of language in relation to the work of
Aristotle the most obvious place to begin is with the Categories. Augustine explicitly
states, in the Confess iones, that he had, at about twenty years of age, read this work171
and had understood it without needing anyone to help explain it to him.
Et quid mihi proderat, quod annos natus ferme uiginti, cum in manus meas 
uenissent Aristotelica quaedam, quas appellant decem categorias...legi eas 
solus et intellexi? quas cum contulissem cum eis, qui se dicebant uix eas 
magistris eruditissimis non loquentibus tantum, sed multa in puluere 
depingentibus intellexisse, nihil inde aliud mihi dicere potuerunt, quam ego 
solus apud me ipsum legens cognoueram; et satis aperte mihi uidebantur 
loquentes de substantiis, sicuti est homo, et quae in illis essent, sicuti est 
figura hominis, qualis sit et statura, quot pedum sit, et cognatio, cuius frater 
sit, aut ubi sit constitutus aut quando natus, aut stet aut sedeat, aut calciatus 
uel armatus sit aut aliquid faciat aut patiatur aliquid, et quaecumque in his 
nouem generibus, quorum exempli gratia quaedam posui, uel in ipso 
substantiae genere innumerabilia reperiuntur.
(conf. 4.28)
0251 This said, for Augustine to say that he had understood the Categories does not 
necessarily make it clear exactly how he had understood it. It would appear that
172following the standard readings of the text at that time that the young Augustine had 
understood, through his own reading (which was confirmed in discussion with others 
who had had the text explained by the ‘most erudite teachers’), that the Categories 
was concerned primarily with linguistic terms, or predication.
crucial themes in Plato s epistemology and metaphysics White: 1976, 131.
171
Marius Victorinus, who was an older contemporary of Augustine’s, is known to have translated 
Aristotelian works, most notably the Categories and the de Interpretations, and since Augustine 
himself mentions reading ‘books of the Platonists’ translated by Victorinus {conf. 8.3), it is possible 
that he may also have had access to his Categories and, perhaps, the de Interpretatione. Although there 
is no evidence for this, what is at least certain is that near contemporary translations, by Platonists, 
were available at the time. Also, in the 2nd century, Apuleius had written an exposition of the de 
Interpretatione in Latin.
172
The prevalent reading from Herminus {ap. Porph. in Cat. 59, 27-9), to Alexander o f Aphrodisias 
(student o f Herminus; also, cf. Simplicius in Cat. 10, 13-15), to Porphyry, through to Augustine’s day 
was that the Categories was principally about linguistic items.
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...illis decempraedicamentisputans quidquidesset omnino comprehensum...et 
tu [deus] subiectus esses magnitudini tuae autpulchritudini...
{conf. 4.29)
0252 The generally dismissive tone with which Augustine looks back upon the
reading of the text173 by his younger self would seem to point towards an
interpretation whereby he had understood the text in a manner perhaps rather more
Peripatetic174 than would have been acceptable to him in later life. Indeed the fact that
he states that the reading given by the most learned teachers agreed with his own
suggests that his interpretation was in accord with one of the prevalent readings of the
time; which, taken together with the generally linguistic terminology in which he
refers to the content of the text {conf 4.29), points towards either a Neoplatonic or
Peripatetic reading175. Most telling perhaps is the fact that his main difficulty with the
Categories as he had understood it as a young man was metaphysical, namely how the
categorical scheme could account for God176.
quid hoc mihi proderat, quando et oberat, cum etiam te, deus meus, 
mirabiliter simplicem atque incommutabilem, illis decem praedicamentis 
putans quidquid esset omnino comprehensum, sic intellegere conarer, quasi et 
tu subiectus esses magnitudini tuae aut pulchritudini, ut ilia essent in te quasi 
in subiecto sicut in corpore, cum tua magnitudo et tua pulchritudo tu ipse sis, 
corpus autem non eo sit magnum et pulchrum, quo corpus est, quia etsi minus 
magnum et minus pulchrum esset, nihilominus corpus esset?
{conf. 4.29)
Accordingly, the reading as presented in the above passage suggests that the 
Categories is indeed primarily about linguistic items but that these linguistic items 
also correspond to an Aristotelian metaphysics where there is a division of simple
173 The question as to how far Augustine is projecting later concerns into his account in the 
Confessiones should be noted, although it does not directly concern the above argument.
174 In this context Peripatetic refers broadly to the followers of the Aristotelian tradition and not 
necessarily to any reading o f the Categories which is loyal to Aristotle.
175 The Neoplatonic reading is one which considers the Categories as essentially concerned with 
semantics, while the Peripatetic one is concerned primarily with ontological issues. These distinctions 
will be elaborated upon in the following discussion.
176 The Aristotelian approach to this was to identify good in the category o f substance, rather than in the 
category o f quality, with god: cf. Nichomachean Ethics 1.6. This interpretation was presumably 
unknown to Augustine
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entities into ten categories. The reading given by the young Augustine was felt in later 
life to have been useful to an extent but it was the metaphysics which led to a 
grounding of its ontology in particulars which was felt to be such an obstacle to his 
understanding. Augustine had understood from the Categories that everything that 
exists could be predicated and that God too could be a subject for such things as 
greatness and beauty so that they might be in God as it were in a subject just as in a 
body {ut ilia essent in te quasi in subiecto sicut in corpore). Therefore, the conclusion 
leads, for Augustine, to metaphysical problems for understanding the possibility of a 
transcendent God: cum tua magnitudo et tua pulchritudo tu ipse sis, corpus autem non 
eo sit magnum et pulchrum, quo corpus est, quia etsi minus magnum et minus 
pulchrum esset, nihilominus corpus esset.
0253 It is perhaps not insignificant that Augustine must have read the Categories 
sometime in the mid 370’s and that during this time he had become a follower of the
177materialistic system of the Manichees . Augustine remained a Manichee, albeit 
becoming progressively more and more dissatisfied with the teachings, until after his
178reading of certain Platonic books {conf. 7.13). In reading these ‘books of the 
Platonists’ Augustine gained an insight into the possibility of immaterial existence 
and of a transcendent God {conf 7.13 ff; 8.3 ff), and of particular interest is the 
choice of such an obviously linguistic form in which to bring out the understanding 
these texts gave him to the relation between God, existence, and human 
understanding.
etprimo uolens ostendere mihi, quam «resistas superbis, humilibus autem»
des «gratiam» et quanta misericordia tua demonstrata sit hominibus uia
It seems that Augustine had become interested in the teachings of Mani not long after he had read 
Cicero’s Hortensius (c. 373, when he would have been 19). It is not implausible that part o f his 
motivation towards the materialism o f that sect was due to the conclusions arrived at through his 
reading of the Categories (c.374).
178
These texts were translated by Marius Victorinus {conf. 8.3), and would in all probability have 
included both Plotinus and Porphyry (cf. Courcelle: 1948; trans. 1969, 173-182).
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humilitatis, quod «uerbum tuum caro factum est et habitauit» inter homines, 
procurasti mihi per quendam hominem immanissimo typho turgidum quosdam 
Platonicorum libros ex Graeca lingua in Latinam uersos, et ibi legi non 
quidem his uerbis, sed hoc idem omnino multis et multiplicibus suaderi 
rationibus, quod «in principio erat uerbum et uerbum erat apud deum et deus 
erat uerbum: hoc erat in principio apud deum; omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et 
sine ipso factum est nihil, quod factum est,» «in eo uita est, et uita erat lux 
hominum; et lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae earn non comprehenderunt»; et 
quia hominis anima, quamuis «testimonium» perhibeat «de lumine, non» est 
tamen ipsa «lumen», sed uerbum, deus, est «lumen uerum, quod inluminat 
omnem hominem uenientem in hunc mundum»; et quia «in hoc mundo erat, et 
mundus per eum factus est, et mundus eum non cognouit». quia uero «in sua 
propria uenit et sui eum non receperunt, quotquot autem receperunt eum, 
dedit eispotestatem filios dei fieri credentibus in nomine eius», non ibi legi. 
item legi ibi, quia uerbum, deus, non ex carne, non ex sanguine non ex 
uoluntate uiri neque ex uoluntate carnis, sed ex deo natus est; sed quia 
uerbum caro factum est et habitauit in nobis, non ibi legi.
(conf 7.13-14)™
0254 Later still, in the de Trinitate Augustine’s perspective on the Categories has so 
altered from his initial reading referred to in the Confessiones that he employs them so 
as to defend the thesis that the Trinity is essentially a unity (Book 5). The discussion 
is introduced by stating that God is such that:
180... cui enuntiando nulla competit dictio...
{trin. 5.1)
and that:
... quae de natura incommutabili et inuisibili summeque uiuente ac sibi
sufficiente dicuntur non ex consuetudine uisibilium atque mutabilium et
mortalium uel egenarum rerum esse metienda. sed cum in his etiam quae
nostris corporalibus adiacent sensibus uel quod nos ipsi in interiore homine
sumus scientia comprehendendis labor emus nec sufficiamus... sic
intellegamus deum si possumus, quantum possumus, sine qualitate bonum,
181sine quantitate magnum...
{trin. 5.2)
179
Cf. also conf. 7.16 ff. in which there are notable parallels with de Trinitate 5.3.
180 Cf. the ineffable nature o f the One in Plotinus, 5.14; 6.3-4.
181
Cf. All three passage (concerning the Categories, the ‘books of the Platonists, and that from the de 
Trinitate) are linked by the common theme of mankind’s being ‘puffed up’ with pride and arrogance at 
self-reliance.
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In de Trinitate (Book 5) Augustine proceeds to forward an analysis whereby material
reality and human concepts formed from this reality are comprehensible in
Aristotelian categorical terms, but God and transcendent reality are not.
est tamen sine dubitatione substantia uel si melius hoc appellatur essentia... 
sicut enim ab eo quod est sapere dicta est sapientia et ab eo quod est scire 
dicta est scientia, ita ab eo quod est esse dicta est essentia... sed aliae quae 
dicuntur essentiae siue substantiae capiunt accidentias quibus in eis fia t uel 
magna uel quantacumque mutatio; deo autem aliquid eiusmodi accidere non 
potest, et ideo sola est incommutabilis substantia uel essentia quae deus est, 
cui profecto ipsum esse unde essentia nominata est maxime ac uerissime 
competit. quod enim mutatur non seruat ipsum esse, et quod mutari potest 
etiamsi non mutetur potest quod fuerat non esse, ac per hoc illud solum quod 
non tantum non mutatur uerum etiam mutari omnino non potest sine scrupulo 
occurrit quod uerissime dicatur esse.
{trin. 5.3)
0255 It can, therefore, be seen that there is apparent a movement in Augustine’s 
interpretation of the Categories from his early years, in which there is a clear 
metaphysical element which leads to a Peripatetic ontology, through to the reading of 
the Neoplatonists, through which he gained a possible answer to the dilemmas raised 
for him concerning a transcendent God by his reading of the Categories, until one 
encounters an interpretation of the Categories employed in the de Trinitate whereby 
Augustine can regard the text as providing adequate grounds for analysing sensible 
reality and concepts derived from there, whilst also providing the scope for a realm of 
the transcendent.
1820256 It will be argued that from as early as the de magistro there is ample 
evidence for an interpretation of the Categories which in large part follows that 
forwarded by Porphyry - an interpretation which had become standard in Neoplatonist
That is, in 389, a number o f years after encountering the Neoplatonists and ample time to have 
either accomplished his own merging of a primarily linguistic reading of the Categories with the 
Neoplatonic metaphysical system; or, more probably, to have encountered the Neoplatonic synthesis of 
Platonism and Aristotelianism initiated to a large extent by Porphyry. This process o f synthesis had 
long been underway, and it is highly probable that by Augustine’s time, it would have already 
infiltrated, on some level, most, if not all, readings of Aristotle (and Plato) and so the step for
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schools . In addition to this is the fact that Augustine had access to translations by 
Marius Victorinus, who himself translated the two most important Aristotelian texts 
for a reading of Augustine’s theory of language, the Categories and de Interpretatione 
(v. sup. 0250 n. 171). Victorinus, also, is known to have been a Neoplatonist and to 
have put a Neoplatonist slant on his interpretation of these texts, and was himself a 
Neoplatonising Christian.
5.2.1.2.3. Porphyry’s Svncretisation of Plato and Aristotle.
0257 The viability of the categorical scheme of Aristotle was much debated in the
ancient world and perhaps the most notable argument against the scheme was that of
Plotinus (6.1-3). This, coupled with the developing prevalence of Neoplatonism,
might well have decided the issue but for the fact that Porphyry opposed his teacher
and held the view that one should not complain that the Categories fail to take into
account the Platonic Forms.
...o\)K av eit| 7iepi Y£vcbv top ovxoq f| JtpaYM.ax£ia o\)5 ’ oAxoq 7t£pi 
TtpaYM'CCTcov Tl ftpotYl-iaTa, cOOdx gaXXov 7i£pi (pcovcbv GtuiavxiKcbv 
TCDV JiptXYtlCCTCOV
(Porphyry, in Cat. 57,4-6)
egtiv yap ftepi cpoovcbv arigavTiKcbv a K\(bv, k<x06 GTmavxiKoa £iai 
xcbv JtpaYM-aTcov...
(Porphyry, in Cat. 58,5-7)
...£7t£i 7C£pi A^ecov crr||i<xvTiKd>v r\ ftpo0£ai(;, a i 5e Xe^eiq 
Kpmcoq eni toc aia0r|Ta £T£0Tiaav (a yap d5ov Kai (bv fiG0ovto 
oi av0pco7toi JcpcoTov xapxa KaxcovopaGav, 6£PT£pax; de xa xfi 
<pPG£i ji£V Ttpcbxa, aiG0f|G£i Se devxepa), eIkotqx; a  xaiq Xi £^Gi
Augustine from a basically Peripatetic reading to a fully Neoplatonic one would not have been all that 
great.
183
“The harmony o f Plato and Aristotle was accepted to a larger or smaller extent by all commentators 
in the Neoplatonist tradition, and the great bulk o f the ancient commentators, Christians included, are in 
that tradition” (Sorabji: 1990, 3).
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rcpcbxa Kaxcovo|xcxa0T| (eaxi 8e xa aia0rixa Kai xa axo|ia), rcpcoxaq 
ouaiai; e0£xo. d>ax£ (bq Tcpdq xaq axipavxiKaq Ai^ Eiq jtpcbxai obaia  
a i axopoi ala0rixai, (bq 5e Ttpdq xx\v cpbaiv rcpcoxai a i vorjtai. 
rcpoKEixai de Kaxa xaq arniavxiKaq Ai^siq Ta yevti xcbv ovxcov 
5isX£iv, a i 6e aruxavxiKai jrpwxax; siaiv xcbv aia0rixcbv axo)icov 
oi)aid)v.
(Porphyry, in Cat. 91,19-27)
In these passages there are two main proposals: firstly, that the Categories is not 
concerned with things but rather with words insofar as they signify things, and
184secondly, that words are applied primarily to sensible things and only secondarily to 
intelligible things. It is the second proposal which is central for making the Categories 
acceptable to Platonists, though the first is necessary so as to make the second 
relevant.
0258 This interpretation by Porphyry crucially meant, due to an acceptance of the
185unity of Platonism and Aristotelianism , that “...Aristotle’s logic and a wide 
selection of his other texts became a standard prerequisite for Platonic studies in the 
Neoplatonist schools...” (Sorabji: 1990, 2). Aristotelian logic, in particular, but by no 
means exclusively, had come to be seen as an introduction leading to the ‘Greater 
Mysteries’ of Plato186, while commentators such as Ammonius {in Cat. 6 ,9 ff.) saw 
the study of the Categories as a necessary initial step on the path which would 
eventually lead one to the Neoplatonic One.
0259 To return to Porphyry’s making the Categories acceptable to Platonists, what 
is particularly problematic in Aristotle for a Neoplatonist such as Augustine is that 
Aristotle argues that what is less universal, in terms of substance, is prior
This assertion will be seen to have no small importance in understanding the relation o f Augustine’s 
view of language acquisition to his epistemology (v. inf. § 8.1.3).
185
Cf. the accreditation to Porphyry o f On the School of Plato and Aristotle Being One and On the 
Difference between Plato and Aristotle (these may be different names for the same work).
In Greek circles there was established a virtual curriculum. However, in the Latin West, due to lack 
of access to material, scholars such as Ambrose and Augustine had to read such texts that did become 
available in whatever order they could (Cf. Sorabji: 1990, 6).
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ontologically to that which is more universal. Substance which is particular is, 
therefore, primary {cat. 2a 11 ff.) and unless particular substances exist, neither can 
anything else.
pf] obocbv o6v xcbv rcpcoTCOv otxjicbv cc5t)vaTov xcbv aAXoov Tl
elvav
(Aristotle, cat. 2b6)
Therefore, universal substances, or Platonic Forms, cannot exist apart from their 
instances and so Aristotle clearly seems to argue that the Theory of Forms, whereby 
the universal F  is the cause of the being of the particular f  is flawed.
0260 Porphyry approaches this issue by giving a very specific interpretation to the 
purpose of the Categories. Porphyry rejects the supposition that the Categories is a 
work concerned with metaphysics or ontology, namely the classification of simple 
entities by their genera, but rather proposes that it is concerned with language and 
with simple terms and the concepts they stand for. According to Porphyry’s 
interpretation then, the Categories considers substances and their properties by means 
of the logical analysis of the language by which they are referred to. The text was seen 
as the primary text in the study of Platonism as it introduces the study of ontology via 
those things that are initially known to humans (i.e. sensible entities), and not those 
which are primary in being (Porphyry, in Cat. 91.20 ff.).
0261 According to Porphyry, Aristotle speaks of particular substances as being 
primary due to the fact that he is considering significant expressions, which are 
applied primarily to sensibles and only secondarily to the universals which are 
predicated of them. This, however, does not entail that a particular substance is in 
itself ontologically prior to its universal, for in matter of fact the whole class of a 
universal is prior to any particular instantiation of it. That is to say, a universal is
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secondary to its extension, not to an individual particular which falls within this
extension. That particular substances are not prior to universals reveals the main thrust
of the argument, namely, that the universal is secondary to its extension.
...5ei...e{) siSevat, oxi o o k  ecjxiv axo|i.o<; oboia o etc; xcbv Kaxa 
pepoq aM/ oi k<x6 ’ em axov av07tcojtot Ttavxe  ^ e£ cbv Kai Kotvfl 
KCiXTiYopot)|A£Vo<; av0pQ)JtO(; £7t£vofi0r|...a 5fj Kai aixia xoiq Kotvp 
KaxriYopoopEvoiq coxi xob Etvar m p a  yap xa Ka0’ £Kaaxov 
[ot)K]...av0pa)7iov...£axi vofjaai. ei Se and  xfjq xcbv KaO’ sKaaxov 
ata0f|a£CO(; etci xo Kotvfl xp Siavoia aq>iKvot)fi£0a, oTtsp ook exi 
xo5e xt voob|i£V aA A a xoiovSe, e i xa Ka0’ £Kaaxov avaip£0f\
£cpa, ot)K£Xi ooSe xo Koivp KaxrjYopot)fi.£vov K ax’ abxcbv saxa i.
(Porphyry, in Cat. 90,30-91,5)
Universals therefore are conceptual entities which cannot exist separately from their 
extension. Such an interpretation allows of a Neoplatonist ontology: particulars make 
up the extension of conceptual universals, while the Platonic Forms are the causes of 
both the particulars and the conceptual universals.
Transcendent Form
Extension of Particulars Immanent/Conceptual Form
0262 Such an interpretation will be seen to be fruitful in considering Augustine’s 
theory of language (v. inf. § 5.2.1.2.5.6) for although the transcendent Forms play a 
significant role in the explanation of knowledge and verification, they are
187unsatisfactory items of reference for any ordinary theory of language
187 Cf. Strange: 1992, 11-12.
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5.2.1.2.4. Aristotle’s de Interpretations.
0263 The de Interpretatione was understood by both the Neoplatonists, and by 
other commentators, as being concerned with assertion. It was studied after the 
Categories, which was taken to concern single terms, and before the Prior Analytics, 
which concerned syllogisms.
0264 It is at the beginning of the de Interpretatione that Aristotle comes closest to 
giving a theory of meaning. However the passage in which this occurs is extremely 
compressed and, for this reason, tends towards obscurity. This would appear to be the 
case due to the fact that Aristotle, to some extent, assumes an awareness of several 
issues raised in Plato’s Cratylus concerning the place of language in an attempt to
understand truth and falsity. Aristotle briefly proposes a scheme whereby the relation
188of words to thought and thought to reality can be understood , and then moves on to 
the more pressing discussion of various types of statements, their properties and 
relationships.
0265 v E g x i  pev obv xa ev xp cpcovp xdw ev xp rcaQppaxcov 
GbppoAa, Kai xa Ypa<popeva xcbv ev xp cpcovp. Kai cnarcep obSe 
Ypappaxa m a t  xa abxa, ot)6e cpcovai a i abxai- cbv pevxoi 
xabxa appeia rcpcbxcov, xabxa 7taai mOppaxa xpc; ty'oxpq, Kai &v 
xabxa opoicajiaxa Ttpaypaxa p8p xauxa.
(Aristotle, int. 16a3-8)
Words are conventional symbols (abppoAa) of affections in the soul 
(xcbv ev xp t|juxp JtaQppaxcov), and yet are also evidence of, or indicate 
(appeia), the affections which they conventionally stand for. That is to say, Aristotle 
proposes a purely conventional relation between word and affection whilst also
Aristotle proposes a general scheme which can be seen to be implicitly proposed in the Cratylus (v. 
sup. 0243-0248).
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proposing a relation between them whereby the word is a proof that there is a 
particular affection in the soul.
0266 The standard meaning of the Greek ‘abpfioAov’ was ‘token’ or ‘tally’
(cf.LSJ). Aristotle would appear to have chosen this term to apply to words due to the
fact that their meanings are fixed by convention, just as a token or tally depends upon
an agreement between those for whom the token or tally is to stand. Something only
becomes a symbol when it is set up as one by convention; and it is clearly with this in
mind that Aristotle defines a name as a sound significant by convention.
" O v o p a  JJ.8V O&V 8GTI (pCOVlj GT||iaVTl1cf\ KOCT<X GDvSpKp...
(Aristotle, int. 16al9)
Nothing is a name by nature, and something only becomes a name when it becomes a 
symbol:
t o  5e m x a  aov0f|Kpv, o t i  cpbaei xebv ovopatcov oi)8ev eaxiv, 
aXk’ oxav yevpxai abp(JoA,ov
(Aristotle, mf.l6a26-28)
0267 Aristotle standardly refers to spoken/written words as oupfioXa (arbitrary 
instituted marks with significance) not as appeia  and would appear to be reluctant to 
apply the term ‘ap p e ia ’ directly to words. Spoken words are abppoAa of the 
affections of the soul and are not the same for all human beings; they are 
conventional. Therefore, Aristotle employs the term ‘abpfioAa’ to focus in this 
context on the conventional aspect of words, while using ‘appeia’ to reflect them in 
their aspect as pointing to something beyond themselves.
0268 The term ‘abp^oXov’, especially when applied in a philosophical context, at 
that time appears to have been more neutral than ‘appeiov’ - although both had been 
used in the Hippocratic tradition with the technical sense of ‘symptom’.
0269 Aristotle states (int. 16a5) that the affections of the soul are likenesses
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( b|xoi6)|xaxa) of things and “as such... [they] cannot be studied in a logical 
(linguistic) framework... In stressing this difference between mental images and 
words, he states, incidentally, that spoken and written words are signs [arijieia] of the 
affections of the soul. Thus prima facie he equates signs with symbols” (Eco: 1984, 
28). However, the very fact that he uses a different term suggests, at the very least, a 
difference in emphasis.
0270 Therefore, following the standard terminology used, ‘sign’ must still mean 
something like ‘ proof/clue/symptom ’; so, a word is a proof that one has a particular 
affection in mind whilst still stating that (although words are proofs of mental 
affections) they don nott necessarily have the same “semiotic and psychological status 
[as] these affections” (Eco: 1984, 28).
0271 Aristotle would then seem to be saying that words, although conventional 
symbols, are also a certain kind of proof. “[However] symbols are different from other 
natural signs because, when they function primarily as symbols (independently of 
their possible use as proofs), they are not based on the model of inference but on the 
model of equivalence” (Eco: 1984, 29).
0272 The affections, or psychological states, which the words represent are the same 
for all people (and, one would suppose, must then be natural) and have a natural 
relation, as likenesses (dbv Toana 6poi&>|iaT<x JtpocYpara), to the reality which 
they represent. “[A] crucial contrast here is between convention as the explanation of 
how sounds carry meaning and a natural relation, the same for all humans, rooted in 
the likeness between a meaning and a reality” (Modrak: 2001, 13).
0273 In the Aristotelian model there are, therefore, the following stages from word 
to psychological state:
A t o  ev xp (pcovfi at)(ipoA.ov -> t o  ev rq
m 0T j|ia
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Also, there are the following stages from psychological state to reality:
B t o  ev t b|i.oico|xa -> t o  jrpaypa 
JtaSripa
0274 Of these stages, it will be most fruitful, in considering Augustine’s model of 
language, to look to the psychological state189. That is to say, the affection in the soul 
which is signified ( to  ev t t \  fta0T||i.a) and which is a likeness ( bpoicopa) of
the object. The above model of language, although similar in a number of ways to that 
of Augustine, is not equivalent to Augustine’s which is largely Stoic in form (v. inf. § 
5.2.1.2.5.5). However, the status of Aristotle’s psychological states within the model 
and their ontological ‘likeness’ to the object in reality upon which they depend are 
extremely significant in Augustine’s process of syncretising Stoic semantics with 
Platonic metaphysics.
0275 ‘Affections of the soul’ seem most plausibly to include thoughts or concepts190
and although Aristotle does not actually state that thoughts/concepts are understood as
falling under the term ‘affections’, thought, and memory, are said to occur in that part
of the soul which can be affected:
...on pvripove'uopev Se, o t i  t o o t o  pev am0e<;, o 5e mOqTiKoq 
vouq (pOapToq-
(Aristotle, de an. 430a24)
It would, therefore, seem reasonable that ‘affections of the soul’ in the de 
Interpretatione at the least include thoughts. Indeed, names and verbs are directly 
compared to thoughts.
189 Also of significance is that Aristotle appears to suggest a semiotic relation whereby a word stands 
for a psychological state, or affection, according to a model of equivalence (crb|J.(toAjOv), but also as a
proof (cxril-ieiov) that one has a particular affection in mind (0265-0270). This is to say, on one level a
word stands for  an affection, and on another it is a sign that one has the particular affection in mind. 
This approach is o f importance in considering Augustine’s view on the evidential nature of words and 
will be considered below (§ 8 and § 9).
190 For a fuller discussion o f this cf. Whitaker: 1996, 13-17.
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Ta pev  o\>v o v o p a x a  a u x a  K ai x a  p ijp a x a  eoiK e xd> a v e u  
a'uvQeaecoq K ai 8 iaipeaeco<; v o f|p a x i...
(Aristotle, int. 16a 13-14)
Also, both speaker and hearer register a word in their thought.
abxa pev obv Ka0’ai)xa teyopeva xa pfipaxa ovopaxa eaxi Kai 
aripalvei xi, - lax-qai yap o Aiycov xf|v Siavoiav, Kai o aKovoaq 
fpeprjaev, - aM /el eaxiv f[ |xr\ otritco aripalvev ox> yax xo elvai 
t\ pr\ elvai aripeiov eaxi xob irpayjxaxo^ oi)5’ eav xo ov eiTtjiq 
iJnXov. auxo pev yap oi>5ev eaxiv, Jipoaarjpalvei 5e abv0ealv 
xiva, fjv aveo xa>v aoyKeipevcov o o k  eaxi vofjaai.
(Aristotle, //zf. 16b 19-25)
0276 As regards the relationship from thought to reality it is necessary to understand 
what it is that Aristotle understands by ‘ bpolcopa’.
0277 How thoughts are understood as likenesses of things is developed along lines 
similar to those in which Aristotle theorises on perception. In perception the organ of 
perception is potentially that which the thing perceived already is in actuality, and 
becomes like it when it perceives it (Aristotle, de an. 418a3ff.). Thoughts occur in a 
similar way.
ei 5ft eaxi xo voeiv (fraftep xo ala0avea0ai, f\ maj(£iv xi av eiri 
vko xob vorixob f\ xi xoiobxov exepov. am 0e; apa 5ei elvai, 
Sekxikov 6e xou ei6ou<; Kai Sovapei xoiobxov aAXa pit xobxo,
Kai opolax; exeiv, dbarcep xo ala0r|XiK6v Jtpoq xa ala0rixa, obxco 
xov vobv Jtpoq xa vorixa.
(Aristotle, de an. 429al3-18)
The process is such that the actual form of the object is taken on by the mind of the
thinker, so that this same form is common both to the object and to the thinker - there
is an analogy between the sensible form of an object and the thinkable form, that is to
say, the senses receive the form of an object qua sensible, and the mind receives the
form qua thinkable. Therefore, a ‘likeness’ of the object is in the mind. The mind is
affected by the object such that it receives its form.
0278 Confusion may result from the supposition that when Aristotle speaks of 
‘likenesses’, he refers to images; as images may be different for different people while
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forms will not be. Aristotle specifically states that they are not images, but are
thoughts, and thought is formally identical with its object. Indeed, he even clarifies
this by stating that while thoughts are not images, some thoughts may involve them.
xa yap cpavxaap-axa cbarcep aia0f||xaxa eaxi, 7iX,f|v aveo bAxiq. 
eaxi 8 ’ fi cpavxaala exepov cpaaeax; Kai a^ocpaaecog ai)|xjtXoKfi 
yap voxjpaxcov eaxi xo aAxi0e<; f[ tyebSo^ xa 5e Jipcbxa vofipaxa 
xivi Sioiaet xob |if| cpavxaa|iaxa elvai; f\ ob5e x&AAa 
cpavxaajiaxa, aAA,’ ook aveo cpavxaapaxcov.
(Aristotle, de an. 432a9-14)
Following this interpretation, it is clear that thoughts are ‘the same for all’ because
when one thinks of an object one’s mind takes on its form; and this form is dependent
on what the object essentially is and must therefore be the same for everyone.
0279 Following on from this it may now be useful to say something about the 
relationship given, in the works of Aristotle, between words and things. This 
important relationship is referred to most notably in Sophistici Elenchi (165a6ff.), 
while also occurring throughout the de Interpretatione where “ ... verbs are defined as 
being signs of a certain sort of thing (16b7, 10); the verb ‘to be’, unlike other words, 
is not a sign of a thing (16b22ff); in chapter 7, assertions are classified according to 
the kinds of things which they take as subject (17a38ff); [and where] the truth of 
utterances matches things (19a33)” (Whitaker: 1996, 20).
0280 An apparent contradiction in Aristotle’s analysis arises when words are
described as symbols not for thoughts but for things in the Sophistici Elenchi.
e7tei yap ook eaxiv abxa xa Jipayfxaxa 5iaAeyea0ai cpepovxat;, 
aXka xoiq ovo |iaaiv  avxi xcbv Jipaypaxcov d><; ai)|i(}6A,oi<;,
xo aojxpaivov e?u xcbv ovoiaaxcov Kai eTti xcbv jipayiaaxoov 
ryyob|i£0a aoujSalveiv, KaOarcep erci xcbv i])f)(pcov xoiq A,oyi£o|ievoi^
(Aristotle, SE 165a6-10)
0281 Of concern to this apparent contradiction and to Aristotle’s theory of 
signification/meaning in general is the, much debated, reference to affections of the 
soul as “...cbv |ievxoi xabxa ar||xeia ftpcoxcDv” (int. 16a6). The most plausible
191interpretation of this phrase would seem to be that suggested by Ammonius, 
whereby ‘primary’ qualifies ‘affections of the soul’. Words then are signs primarily of 
affections of the soul and secondarily of things192. Therefore, according to 
Ammonius’ interpretation, affections of the soul are intermediaries between words
193and things: words signify affections directly and things indirectly .
0282 With regard to what it actually means for words to primarily signify affections 
and secondarily things, it is important to remember that affections/thoughts are formal 
likenesses of things. “The thinker takes on the form of the thing, so that the form is 
present both in the thing and in his mind, just as the same impression might be shared 
by two wax tablets194. If words are signs of thoughts, and thoughts are exact copies of 
things, it would seem to follow inevitably that words would also be signs of things. Of 
course, they are only signs of things by virtue of the fact that the words are already in 
the first place signs of thoughts, which are in turn copies of the things”
(Whitaker: 1996,22).195
0283 It should be made clear that, in Ammonius’ account, words signify thoughts 
immediately and directly, and signify things only indirectly, through thoughts as 
intermediaries (Ammonius, in Int. 24.7-9). In Aristotle thoughts are identical in form 
with things; words express thoughts which are likenesses of things. It is for this
There is, in addition to the debate over the interpretation of this phrase, a textual dispute. For a 
presentation o f the other two main interpretations which I do not present here cf Kretzmann: 1974, 3- 
21; Pepin: 1985, 22-44; and Belardi: 1981, 79-83.
192Ammonius, in Aristotelis de Interpretatione Commentarius, A. Busse (ed.), Commentaria in 
Aristotelem Graeca, IV (Berlin, 1897), 17ff.
193
Ammonius goes on to use this interpretation to deny the necessity for positing an intermediate item 
between the thought and the thing, namely, the Stoic A£Kt6 v . Augustine’s position in respect to this 
will be considered below (§ 5.2.1.2.5.5).
194 Cf. Aristotle, de an. 412b.
195 This point is important in understanding Augustine’s consideration of hierarchies based on 
epistemic priority with regards to things and signs (v. inf. § 6.2).
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reason, and not because thoughts stand as intermediaries, that words are signs first of 
thoughts and secondarily of things196.
0284 Aristotle’s theory of meaning signalled an advance in the philosophy of 
language in the ancient world and a number of the key distinctions made are of 
importance in Augustine’s approach to meaning. There are four of these distinctions: 
firstly, that words are both symbols and are, therefore, equivalent to thought, and are 
also signs and are, therefore, proofs of thought. The importance of this distinction in 
the DM will be discussed in due course (v. inf. §8 and §9). Secondly, words are held 
to signify thoughts; and thirdly, words, in signifying thoughts, do so primarily and 
only signify things secondarily. Augustine’s position relating to these distinctions is 
crucial to understanding his approach to meaning and will be considered in the 
following section (§ 5.2.1.2.5.5), which will discuss his theory in relation to Stoicism. 
Fourthly, Aristotle held that thoughts were the likenesses of things, and that these 
likenesses were the same for everyone. This final distinction must now briefly be 
discussed in relation to the thought of Augustine, for the issues it raises for 
Augustine’s theory of meaning are not trivial.
0285 As noted above (0276-0278), for Aristotle thoughts were likenesses of things 
and this relationship was most apparent in his approach to perception and to concept 
formation based on perception. The approach from the perspective of perception and 
its place in concept formation will also be seen to be somewhat useful in considering 
Augustine, for his theory of perception197 is, in the ways which are relevant to this 
study, very similar to that of Aristotle.
196 For a fuller discussion o f this point cf. Whitaker: 1996, 22.
197 Augustine’s theory o f sense-perception is more fully discussed by O’Daly: 1986, 80-105 (for other 
sources o f discussion cf. ib. 80 n.l). The following brief discussion is much dependent on O’Daly.
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0286 Sense-perception in Augustine is specifically the perception of the images of
198bodies and these images are likenesses (imagines) of those bodies.
Cum...de his, quae aliquando sensimus, quaeritur, non iam res ipsas, sed 
imagines ab eis impressas199 memoriaeque mandatas loquimur...ita illas 
imagines in memoriae penetralibus rerum ante sensarum quaedam documenta 
gestamus...
(39)
A. meministine tandem urbis Mediolanensis?
E. ualde memini.
A. nunc ergo, quia eius facta mentio est, recordaris, quanta et qualis sit?
E. recordor sane ac nihil recentius atque integrius.
A. nunc ergo, cum oculis earn non uideas, animo uides.
E. ita est.
A. meministi, credo etiam, quanto spatio terrarum nunc a nobis longe absit.
E. ita et hoc memini.
A. uides itaque animo etiam ipsam locorum distantiam.
E. uideo.
A. cum igitur anima tua hie sit ubi corpus, nec ultra spatium eius porrigatur, 
ut superior ratio demonstrabat, unde fit, ut ilia omnia uideat?
E. per memoriam hoc fieri puto, non quod illis locis sit praesens.
A. imagines ergo illorum locorum memoria continentur.
E. ita sentio; nam et quid nunc ibi agatur ignoro; quod utique non ignorarem, 
si animus meus usque ad ea loca porrigeretur praesentiaque sentiret.
A. uerum mihi uideris dicere; sed certe istae imagines corporum sunt.
{an. quant. 8)
0287 These images are not corporeal but rather are the forms200 of the objects, 
which are perceived incorporeally201. There are in fact four forms involved in the 
perceptual process: the form of the perceived object; the form effected in the sense, 
which is caused by the form being induced in it by means of the form in the object; 
the form which occurs in the memory; and the form in the mind {trin. 11.16). There is 
a similar relation presented in the de musica (6.22) concerning number.
The term ‘imago' is that which appears in the de magistro, yet ‘phantasia' occurs frequently 
elsewhere. For a discussion o f the difference between Augustine’s and the Stoic’s usage o f ‘phantasia' 
cf. O’Daly: 1987, 106-7.
199 Cf. the image o f an impression of a seal upon wax in trin. 11.3 - an similar use o f this analogy most
significantly occurs in Plato, Tht. 19la-195b and in Aristotle, de an. 424a. 
cf. eg. ‘forma’, civ. 11.27; ‘species', trin. 11 passim.
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(Dll)
trin. mus.
(1) ab specie corporis 
exoritur
(2) ea quae fit in sensu cernentis 
et ab hac
(3) ea quae fit  in memoria 
et ab hac
(4) ea quae fit in acie cogitantis
sonantes numeri
occursores numeri
recordabiles numeri
iudiciales numeri
0288 There is, therefore, a formal continuum from object, through sense, through 
memory, to intellect and this continuum is made possible by the rationality of the 
human mind and by the ‘rationality’ of the impressions (cf. ord. 2.32-33). As noted in 
the discussion of Aristotle on ‘likenesses’ (0277), there is an analogy between the 
sensible form of an object and the thinkable form, i.e. qua sensible and qua thinkable. 
This is to say, what makes an object perceptible is the fact that it is formed, and what 
makes the mind perceive the object is that it is of such a nature as to grasp forms 
because forms are, in essence, thinkable or intelligible.
0289 This picture of sense-perception is not of primary relevance in this discussion 
and for this reason only those factors which are of concern will be highlighted. What 
is of interest concerning forms in objects is that they would appear to be best 
described as immanent forms which are, in the manner described and for the reasons 
discussed, accessible to the human mind. The causes of the objects being formed are 
the Transcendent Forms202 of the Platonic tradition and it is these Forms which
201 It should be noted that in Augustine’s terminology images are identified with forms, whereas in 
discussion o f Aristotle it was important to distinguish forms and images (v. sup. 0278).
202 Via God for the Christian Augustine.
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function as standards by which one may judge one’s perceptions of objects (cf. div. 
qu. 46; vera rel. 58)203.
0290 The forms of objects perceived by the senses are stored in the memory and are 
held there to be accessed as the raw material for thought. The process involved in this 
storing of formal impressions in the memory is achieved through a kind of memory 
trace.
0291 Through direct experience of objects a likeness or immaterial trace is left in 
the memory, which Augustine likens to a great store-house (conf. 10.12-15) or to a 
stomach (trin. 12.23; conf. 10.21). These likenesses are recalled by the will’s 
application of the mind’s attention (trin. 9.16). As with acts of perception so too is 
there a similar process involved in memory acts: just as in perception the sensible 
object produces a form within the senses, so inwardly is an articulate image produced 
by the latent memory image. In vision there is the “species uisibilis qua sensus 
corporis formabatur, et eius similitudo quae fiebat in sensu format0 ” (trin. 11.6), 
while memory acts occur “cwm constet ex corporis similitudine quam memoria tenet, 
et ex ea quae inde formatur in acie recordantis animi; tamen sic una et singularis 
apparet” (trin. 11.6).
0292 The will therefore turns one’s attention towards these latent memory images, 
actualising them as articulate memory images. These memory images are, in so far as 
memory of past perceived objects is concerned, a formal representation of the object 
once seen and one, as it were, looks at this image when recalling its object. In this 
way memory preserves particulars and general categories for recall (conf. 10.13), and 
through accessing these images one is able to not simply access specific memories but
203 The access to the Transcendent Forms via the intellect will be considered in due course (v. inf. § 9); 
as will the related issue as to whether all ‘affections’, as in Aristotle, are the same for everyone and 
what this means for the problems concerning knowledge acquisition through language presented in the 
DM.
can rather employ these images in broader psychological processes such as using 
one’s imagination so as to accumulate memories from this stock of images {trin. 
11.13). Indeed, in such a way can one access and enable linguistic creativity, in that 
one can hear a string of words, in a sentence, in a combination one has never heard 
before and be able to conceptualise what is talked about {trin. 11.14).
0293 In addition to these notions gained through sensory experience, memory also 
has access to intelligible items. These items do not depend upon images but are rather 
directly available to the mind in some sort of latent manner {conf. 10.16-19). These 
intelligible items are unchangeable ‘rationes’ {trin. 12.23) which underlie particular 
objects and which can only be fleetingly grasped by the human mind. In this sense it 
is clear that these intelligible items are Transcendent Forms.
0294 Memory is crucial to Augustine’s epistemology and this is so to such an extent 
that within its bounds lie everything which the human mind can think of or about. 
There is much yet to be considered concerning memory in the argument of the DM 
which will have to be considered in due course (v. inf. § 9.3.1). For present purposes it 
is sufficient to say that concept formation, and accessing, in Augustine’s thought 
depends to a large extent upon images which are formal with regards to their 
ontological status (v. sup. 0288). In addition to these concepts, the remaining concepts 
which are purely intellectual in nature (i.e. the Transcendent Forms, v. sup. 0293) are 
also formal, but are latent in the memory, as it were, and are constantly available to 
the mind for accessing as actualised intelligibles.
0295 The formal ontological basis for psychological events will be seen to be of 
central concern to, perhaps, the most difficult question concerning Augustine’s 
approach to language: namely, what is it that words signify? It is this question which
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will now be discussed, together with the question which is implicit in any answer to 
what they signify: namely, how do words signify the items which they signify?
5.2.1.2.5. Stoicism on Meaning.
0296 The following discussion of the Stoics will necessarily be brief and will focus 
singularly on those areas which are of importance in a consideration of Augustine’s 
theory of language. The issues in the Stoic approach to language are many and 
complex204. The following interpretation is one which best fits that which Augustine 
appears to follow in the DM and in his approach to language in general.
0297 The Stoics regarded the study of ‘the correctness of names’ as beyond the wise
man’s area of research.
ftepi x’ ovofibcxcov 6p0oxpxo<  ^ oKdtq Siexa^av oi vo|xoi ejri xoiq 
epyot^ ot)K av exetv eiiteiv. Suoiv 5 ’ obaaiv aovpOeiociv xoav 
bftOTtutxobaaiv xp apexp, p (xev xi eKaaxov eaxi xcbv ovxcov 
aKOJtei, p 5e xi Kcdeixai.
(Diogenes Laertius, 7.83)
However, what was of concern was the study of what each thing is and of what each 
thing is called. That is to say, in accordance with Plato and as further developed by 
Aristotle, the Stoics were greatly concerned with the study of reality and the relation 
to it of truth and falsehood as, particularly, mediated through language.
5.2.1.2.5.1. Division of speech.
0298 The Stoics clarified the fact that utterance (cpcovp) and speech (A££iq) differ in 
that while vocal sound (pxoq) is also an utterance, only articulated sound (svap0pov)
204 Cf. Long: 1971;Frede: 1974; Rist: 1978; Brunschwig (ed.): 1978; Butts & Hintikka (edd.): 1976.
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can be correctly classified as speech. Further to this, speech also differs from language
(A,oyoq) in that language is always significant (crqpavxiKot;), w hile speech m ay be
without significance (e.g. in  the m eaningless ‘w ords’ pAxTopi or aKivSoojioq205).
Saying ( to  Aiyeiv) differs from vocalisation ( to  rcpocpepeaGai) for utterances are
vocalised, while states of affairs (tcc Jtpaypaxa) are said. States of affairs are
described as ‘sayables’(A£Kxa).
Siacpepei 5e (pcovfj Kai A i^  bxt (pcovfi pev Kai o fytpq eaxi,
A i?iq  5 e  x o  e v a p G p o v  p o v o v .  A£§i<; 5 e  A-oyoo 5 ia (p e p e i, o x t  
Ax>yo<; a e i  a r ip a v x tK o q  e a x t ,  A£§iq 5 e  K a i a a f |p a v x o < ; , cbq t\ 
p X ix o p i, A,oyoq 5 e  o b S a p d x ;  S ta cp ep ei 5 e  K a i t o  A iy e iv  t o o  
JtpocpepeaG ai* J tp o cp ep o v x a i p e v  y a p  a i  cpcovai, A iy e x a i 5 e  x a  
i t p a y p a x a ,  a  5f] K a i A-eKxa x o y x a v e i .
(Diogenes Laertius, 7.57)
0299 Language is, therefore, distinguished from utterance (vocal sound) and speech 
in that it is significant: language is significant speech, speech is articulated utterance, 
utterance is vocal sound. Significance is not reducible to the sound made when 
uttering words, phrases, or sentences: uttering (and speech) is vocalised, but saying is 
meaningful, or significant.
0300 The utterance of an animal is air struck by an impulse ( bppfj), but that of a 
human is articulated and issues from thought. Utterance is a body, for every action is a 
body and an utterance sent forth from a speaker to a hearer is an action206 (Diogenes 
Laertius, 7.55-56).
205 These words are not simply inarticulate cries but are part of the Greek phonetic system and are as
such articulate speech, only they lack meaning.
206
Cf. Speech as action in Plato’s Cratylus (387b) - v. sup.0234.
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5.2.1.2.5.2. Truth.
0301 There was a debate concerning the proper study of truth: some applied truth or 
falsehood to the ‘signification’, others to the ‘utterance’, others to the ‘motion of 
thought’. The Stoics held the first opinion and said that three things were linked 
together: that which is signified (the signification - t o  GTjpoavoiievov), that which 
signifies (the signifier - t o  arjpaivov), and that which possesses (the name 
bearer/the subject - t o  royxavov).
(i) The ‘signifier’ is the utterance (cpcovfj), such as [Dion],
(ii) The ‘signification’ is the actual state of affairs ( to  ftpayiia) indicated
(5'nA.o'bpevov) by the utterance. We grasp the ‘signification’ as it subsists in 
accordance with our thought ( t t | f|(isT8pa mpixpiGTafievou 5iavoia). 
Foreigners don’t understand the ‘signification’ although they hear the 
utterance.
(iii) The ‘subject’ is that which exists externally, such as <Dion> himself.
0302 The utterance and the subject are bodies (aco|iaTa); and the state of affairs,
signified (arip.aiv6|Lievov) and ‘sayable’ (AeKTov), is incorporeal. It is the state of 
affairs, signified and sayable, which is true or false.
...oi jiev rcepi tco GT|paivop.e|j,cp t o  ccAti08<; t s  m i i|jei)5o<; 
brceoTfioavTo, oi 5e rcepi xf[ cpcovp, oi 5e Jtepi tt \  Kivpaei xf\q 
8 iavoia^. m i  8 p Tfj<; |iev Ji:pcoTT|<; So^pq rcpoeGTpmaiv oi and  
rqq 'Zxoaq Tpla cpapevoi ao^uyeiv aAXpA,oi<^  to  Te appai vopevov 
m i t o  apjiaivov m i  t o  royxavov, &v apjiaivov |xev elvai Tpv 
cpcovpv, olov Tpv Aicov, crpjiaivojievov 8 e abTo t o  jrpayiia to  
bit ’ auTfjq 5rjA.oi)jj.svov m i ob fiiieiq |iev avTiAa|xpav6ji80a Tp 
q|i8T8pg mpocpiaTapevoi) Siavoia, oi be papjiapoi oi>k 
em iooai m i  Jtep Tpq cpcovp; aKobovTeq, royxavov 58 t o  8kto<; 
b7coKsi|X8Vov, dxjjtep abToq o Aicov. to u tco v  be 8 0 0  |iev elvai 
acopaTa, mOarcep Tpv cpcovpv m i  t o  royxavov, ev be 
aacopaTov, dxjftep t o  appaivopevov rcpaypa, m i  A sktov, orcep 
6dp0eg Te yiveTai p i)iei)5o^
(Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.11-12)
0303 What can, therefore, be seen to be of particular importance in any 
consideration of the Stoic concept of ‘meaning’ is that significance or meaning is not
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reducible to the sound made. Also the meaning of a statement such as ‘Socrates 
writes’ is something different from the particular moving body which could be 
described in this way: irrespective of whether Socrates is writing, the sentence 
‘Socrates writes’ has meaning which will be true in one case and false in the other207.
0304 It should be noted that, as the Sceptics observed, there exists within the Stoic 
semantic system the difficulty in that what is signified is not necessarily an accurate 
representation of the world, but only what one believes, with more or less 
justification, to be such208. This said, it could also be argued that there would also be a 
difficulty if what is signified were necessarily an accurate representation of the world 
as this would imply that a statement both meaningful and false would be impossible.
5.2.1.2.5.3. Aeicxa.
0305 A teKTDV is that which subsists in accordance with a ‘rational presentation’
(Xoyiicn cpccvxaoia). A ‘rational presentation’ is an impression which can be
presented in language.
A£Kxov 5e b m p x e iv  [o i Zxcoikoi] cpaai xo Kaxa \oy\Kx\v 
(p avxaaiav  ixp iaxapevov, X.oyiKfiv 5e e lv a i cpavxaaiav kcc0 ’ f\v 
xo cpavxaaOev eax i Xoyco m p a a x fja a i.
(Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.70)
What is described as ‘Aoyikti 9 avx<xaia’ is the impression received by rational
animals.
0306 In the process from perception to speech the impression is primary, and then 
secondarily the thought (Siavoia), which can be expressed in language, expresses 
linguistically what has been experienced. That is to say, one receives an impression
207 Cf. HP 1, 199.
208 Cf. Rist: 1994, 26.
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from which there arises an expressible thought, and this thought presents in language
the experience gained through the impression.
JtpoTiYsvTai yap t| (pavxaaia, ei0’ f] Siavoia £KAaAr|xiKfi 
bjtapxouaa, o itaaxei btto xfjq cpavxaaiaq, xobxo eKcpepei A.oyco.
(Diogenes Laertius 7.49)
0307 A thought or rational impression is a particular psychological state of the 
commanding faculty (which is corporeal). To say that ‘sayables subsist in accordance 
with a rational impression’ seems to suggest that because the impression is rational it 
is sayable. Hence there is an insistence on the connection between thought and 
language.
0308 If one thinks of Socrates writing, one’s commanding-faculty ( ryyeiroviKov) 
will be disposed in a certain way: that is one’s thought or rational impression. The 
proposition that Socrates is writing is the logical or linguistic correlate of one’s 
thought, the thought as expressed in a sentence209.
0309 For Aristotle (v. sup. 0281-0283), nouns and verbs signify thoughts
(vofjjiaxa) primarily (jiporiYoopevcoq) and immediately (Tipocexcbc;) and, through
thoughts, signify things (KpaYPOtxa). Nothing else is required as an intermediary
between them, like the Xekxdv  proposed by the Stoics.
ripac; o ’ ApiaxoxeAxji; SiSaaKei 5ia xobxcov, xiva eaxi xa 
JtporiYoojxevax; Kai ftpoaexcbq bit’ abxcbv arijj.aiv6|j.eva, Kai oxi 
xa vofiiiaxa, 5ia 5e xobxcov peacov xa JtpaYiraxa, Kai obSev 
sxepov Set m p a  xabxa ercivoeiv peaov xob xe voqjiaxoq Kai xob 
JtpaY|4axo<;, orcep oi a ko xflq Zxoaq brcoxiSeiievoi X£Kxov r^ioov 
ovoira^eiv.
(Ammonius, in Int. 17.24-28)
209 HP 1, 199-200.
5.2.1.2.5.4. Ontology.
0310 The ‘Aektdv’, ontologically, is distinct from the ‘signifier’ (utterance) and the 
‘name-bearer’ (the corporeal entity which the sayable is about) in being incorporeal.
A name-bearer is an actual thing which can be referred to by the subjects/objects of 
verbs; whereas the Aektdv is not a body, but something which can be said about a 
body.
0311 Aekt 5c as incorporeal items can perhaps best be understood in the fact that 
meaningful sentences can be false as well as true. This is to say, if Socrates is not 
writing, the false statement that he is writing cannot have a corporeal entity, as its 
meaning. Indeed, while statements make a clear distinction between subjects and 
predicates (i.e. between ‘Socrates’ and ‘writes’), there is, in actuality, nothing in the 
physical world which corresponds to this distinction. ‘Socrates’ writing is the material 
body Socrates ‘disposed in a certain way’ (Seneca, ep. 113.23). So, in effect, when 
saying ‘is writing’ of Socrates, what one actually does is abstract a disposition of that 
body, and that abstraction, qua predication, is how the body which is the <writing- 
Socrates> can be meaningfully described in language. Therefore, Aekt 5c can be seen 
to be abstractions from bodies; and although they are not existent things, sayables do 
‘subsist’ within a class o f ‘somethings’ (Seneca, ep. 58.13-15).
0312 The class of ‘significations’ has predicates as its primary members: they are 
abstract, incorporeal entities. Predicates are incorporeal and, therefore, are not ‘things’ 
one can ‘have’ (Simplicius, in Cat. 214.24-37). The relationship of a predicate to a 
subject is parallel to but not reducible to something corporeal having something 
corporeal (Stobaeus 2.97.15-98.6). It is proper to speak of choosing ‘to have’ 
something good (where something good refers to a body), but one cannot say ‘I
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choose to have acting prudently’, since ‘acting prudently’ is not a thing which can be 
had (i.e. not a possible possession) but is a predicate.
0313 The having of, for example, prudence (a corporeal quality) justifies the 
attribution of the predicate ‘is prudent’ to the person who has prudence. In this way 
one may see that predicates are correlates of things, which is another way of 
describing their ‘subsistence’. Therefore, language can accurately mirror the world by 
expressing the corporeal properties of things in the incorporeal form of sayables210.
0314 In Stoicism there are bodily qualities {naturae corporum)211 which give rise to
motions of the soul which can make enunciations about bodies. These motions have a
property peculiar to themselves, which is separate from bodies. When one says
‘wisdom’ one understands a certain corporeal thing, but when one says ‘He is wise’
one speaks about a body. It is very different whether one names it or speaks about it.
“sunt” inquit “naturae corporum, tamquam hie homo est, hie equus; has 
deinde sequuntur motus animorum enuntiatiui corporum. hi habent proprium 
quiddam et a corporibus seductum, tamquam uideo Catonem ambulantem: 
hoc sensus ostendit, animus credidit. corpus est quod uideo, cui et oculos 
intendi et animum. dico deinde: “Cato ambulat”. non corpus” inquit “est 
quod nunc loquor, sed enuntiatiuum quiddam de corpore, quod alii effatum 
uocant, alii enuntiatum, alii edictum. sic cum dicimus ‘sapientiam’, corporale 
quiddam intellegimus; cum dicimus ‘sapit ’, de corpore loquimur. plurimum 
autem interest utrum illud dicas an de illo. ”
(Seneca, ep. 117.13)
This is an exposition of the distinction between ‘goods’ (such as ‘wisdom’) which are 
corporeal, and the incorporeal sayables expressed by the corresponding verbs (such as 
‘to be wise’).
0315 The Stoics can be interpreted as filling in a gap in Aristotle’s theory of 
meaning. That is to say, if one identifies ‘meanings’ with thoughts, it is extremely 
unclear as to how distinct acts of thinking can be the same meaning for different
210 HP 1,202.
211 ‘naturae corporum’ are equated with sentences {'hie homo e s f) and what is described by such a 
sentence is a quality which is in a body.
* * 212individuals . By distinguishing rational impressions from XzKxy. while at the same 
time connecting them together through the concept of subsistence, the Stoics showed 
that the meaning of a thought is something which is transferable, through language, 
across minds. One cannot pass on the content of one’s mind, but can tell what one is 
thinking about.
0316 The Stoics were therefore interested in the nature of verbal signs and with their 
objects of reference. They thought of signs as pointers; that is to say, “[t]he verbal 
signs in which [they] are primarily interested are propositions which refer to and 
indicate a conclusion (Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.245)” (Rist:1994, 25). With 
propositions one is concerned with inferences which are about things or events. The 
Stoics accordingly give consideration to that which signifies (speech) and to that 
which is signified (propositions which may be true or false) about some person or 
event. What is signified is the state of affairs which is shown by the uttered word 
(Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.11-12). These states of affairs are what is said (Diogenes 
Laertius 7.57) and are sayable (Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.11-12).
0317 It should be said that this view of verbal signs appears to leave a gap between 
the sense of a proposition and the reality to which the proposition refers: for one 
assents to the content of propositions, yet (following the Sceptical argument) it is 
impossible to know whether or not one should assent to those propositions formed 
after grasping presentations about and from the world. So knowledge is unattainable 
(Rist: 1994, 25). Elowever, the Sceptical position is overstated as although it follows 
from the Stoic position that there is a question to be asked about whether one should 
assent or not, it does not follow from this alone that one never should.
212 A possible answer to this might be that for an Aristotelian distinct acts of thinking can be the same 
meaning for different individuals due to the fact that they are the same in form.
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0318 What would appear to be supportable from the fragmentary evidence on the 
Stoic theory of meaning is that it comprised a triadic structure: the signifier, the 
significate, and the object referred to.
0319 Each linguistic sign indicates a ‘meaning’ which ‘subsists’ with thought. The 
status of ‘things signified’ is problematic, albeit that it is clear that they were thought 
of as incorporeal items. These ‘things signified’ exist in a sense, however in Stoic 
ontology everything which properly exists (thought included) is corporeal. Yet, what 
this ‘existence’ entails is unclear and the question remains as to whether the ‘things 
signified’ are purely linguistic items related to a signifier as a mental item or as some 
sort of item existing independently of the mind213.
5.2.1.2.5.5. Augustine and Stoicism on Meaning.
0320 The primary reason for introducing the above brief discussion of the Stoic 
position is to elucidate what it is that Augustine holds to be signified in the linguistic 
act. However, to do this fully it will be useful firstly to clarify some of the main 
parallels in the thought of Augustine to the Stoic themes described above (0296- 
0319).
0321 In the DD there would appear to be an adapted version of the Stoic theory of 
meaning.
(D12)
dicibile - A£Kt6v
dictio - A££iq arj|xavi:iKfi
(Diogenes Laertius 7.57)
213 Cf. Graeser in Rist: 1978, 81; HP 1, 201-202.
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Augustine clearly identifies a triadic structure in the signifying process which is at 
least structurally similar to that of the Stoics.
(D13)
signum/uerbum - crnpeiov
significatio/dicibile - oqiiaivofievov/AeKTOv
res - Toyxavov
The triadic structure employed by the Stoics and Augustine is all the more similar due 
to the fact that the signifier ( to  aripsio v/signum) is clearly a linguistic item214.
0322 As has been discussed, the distinction between utterance and signification is
clear throughout the thought of Augustine.
cum ergo nomen ipsum sonus et significatio constet, sonus autem ad aures, 
significatio ad mentem pertineat.
{an. quant. 66)
aliter enim dicuntur uerba quae spatia temporum syllabis tenent siue 
pronuntientur siue cogitentur; aliter omne quod notum est uerbum dicitur 
animo impressum quamdiu de memoria pro f err i et definiri potest...
{trin 9.15)
0323 The Stoics distinguished between an uttered thought (Abycx; JipocpopiKoq) 
and a thought in the mind (Adyoq evSiaSsToq). This distinction raises questions as to 
the status o f  the X ektov.
0324 As regards ‘As k t o v ’, as the neuter of the verbal adjective it can mean both 
‘what is able to be said’ and ‘what is said’. If one takes the former reading then the
214Cf. Darrell Jackson in that for the ‘sayable’ (xo IzkxovIdicibile) both are explained in terms of 
‘understanding’ - barbarians do not understand the X e k t o v ,  the dicibile is what is understood in a word 
and understood in the mind; both are revealed by signs - the A £ k t o v  is revealed (SrtAjobp-evov) by a 
sign while things understood (intellecta), among which are dicibilia, are shown (demonstrandos) by 
giving signs; both are explained by psychological notions - the A £ K t 6 v  subsists with our thought 
(Siavoia), and the dicibile is held in the mind {animus) and attended to by thought {cogitatio)\ both are 
only expressed via a linguistic sign; and the teKTOV is signified by sound (r| (pcovfi), the dicibile is 
understood in a word and comes forth in union with a word as a dictio (Darrell Jackson: 1972 (1969), 
135).
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Xektov exist whether it is said or not, while the second reading would mean that it 
exists only as long as it is expressed.
0325 A£Kt6c are what ‘subsist in conformity with a rational presentation’ (Sextus 
Empiricus, M. 8.70; Diogenes Laertius 7.51, 7.63). This may suggest that A£Kt6c exist
215only insofar as they are expressed in words , which is to say that they have no 
existence independently of the mind, and yet are not thoughts216.
2170326 What is in fact a correct reading is by no means clear , but what is of
218importance is that Augustine uses the word ‘dicibile’ which clearly means 
something which is able to be said. The dicibile in Augustine is prior to speech and is
219something in the mind which may be expressed , it is a linguistic correlate to 
thought. In Ammonius {in Int. 17.24-28) the things expressed primarily by words are
thoughts and need not involve the Stoic addition of an intermediary between the
220thought and the object - to understand this there need be a consideration of
Aristotelian epistemology, particularly the relation between thought and things as
221‘likeness’. There may, therefore, be a possible analysis whereby Augustine’s 
treatment of ‘dicibile’ is to a large degree Peripatetic rather than straightforwardly 
being Stoic.
0327 Indeed, it may be argued that the terminology employed in the DD involves a 
fusion of Peripatetic and Stoic theories. As Nuchelmans argues, “[it would appear
215
Cf. Graeser, inRist: 1978, 89
216 A possible answer may lie in the potential/actual distinction suggested in HP 1, 201-202. What is of 
particular concern to the above discussion is, however, Augustine’s view of the status of the ‘sayable’ 
rather than that of the Stoics.
217
The most convincing interpretation (‘what is able to be said’) is succinctly argued for by Frede, in
Everson: 1994, 109-110.
218
Cf. Seneca, ep. 117.13 for ‘what is said' {dictum), and no reference to sayable as ‘what can be said’.
219
John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 3.5, takes dictio, dicibile, res to refer to an Aristotelian theory of
meaning.
220
Cf. Stoic attack on Platonic Ideas as collapsing the ‘sense’ of a sign and the associated idea into one 
(Graeser, inRist: 1978, 85).
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that] the terms sententia, proloquium, and eloquium are characteristic of the Stoic 
tradition in the Latin West. It may be assumed that they were introduced originally to 
convey...the terms lekton or dianoia and axioma...But almost from the beginning they 
seem to have suffered from a certain ambiguity between two senses, that of the 
thought expressed and that of the linguistic expression indicating the thought, no 
doubt due to their occurrence in contexts which are typical of the increasing fusion of 
Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines. The result...was...[the gradual loss of] their original 
meanings...[which] became synonymous with Peripatetic terms which ousted them 
altogether” (Nuchelmans: 1973, 115).
0328 In the DD (5.57-58) Augustine makes a distinction between:
Di verbum dicibile dictio res
While in the de quantitate animae (32) there is a similar distinction between:
D2 sonus intellectus/notio nomen res'12.
0329 What is of particular concern is that in D2 nomen consists of sound and 
signification, sound pertains to the ears and the signification to the mind. Whereas the 
intellectus/notio is parallel with the dicibile in that it refers to some sort of mental 
content before it is expressed in a word. It can be in the mind without being expressed 
as a word. So too is the dicibile in the mind before being spoken and is able to be 
expressed.
quidquid autem ex uerbo non aures sed animus sentit et ipso animo tenetur 
inclusum, dicibile uocatur...dicibile...quod in uerbo intelligitur et animo 
continetur, significat...cum animo [uerba] sensa sunt, ante uocem dicibilia 
sunt.
( dial. 5.50-74)
v. sup. 0276-0278.
222
Cf. Boethius, in P. herm. (II) p.29,16; p.30,3; p.42,15, it is noted that the Peripatetics held there to 
be three orationes: (i) o f letters, (ii) of sounds, (iii) of thoughts - intellectus; c f also p. 36,10 where 
Porphyry is held to have agreed with this.
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0330 It is questionable whether the Stoic Aekxov ever stands for a mental item
which can be expressed but is not yet expressed. However, the Stoics are in fact
presented in one source as having a term for just such an item.
obxot [oi E tcdikoI] xolvov xa Ttpaypaxa xuyxavovxa KaXobav 
xeA,o<; yap xo xuxetv xobxoov xa vofniaxa £K<popiKcr xabxa yap 
£K(pepo|i.ev 5ia xobv cpcovobv, xaq (pcovaq teicxa.
([Ammonius], inAPr., SVF 2.236)223
The Stoics are here said to have used eKcpopucov to designate what was termed
voqixa by the Peripatetics. The term £K(popiKov therefore seems to mean something
very similar to the item designated by dicibile - i.e. ‘what is able to be said’. Also, the
above passage does seem to suggest a clear distinction between thoughts which can be
said and the actual things said.
0331 What can be said with some confidence concerning the issues discussed above 
(0323-0330) is that there was a certain degree of confusion around in Late Antiquity 
concerning the differentiation between the position held by the Stoics and that of the 
Peripatetics.
0332 There is clearly some obscurity in Augustine’s use of ‘dicibile’ and to come to 
any clear interpretation one must attempt to reconcile the essentially Stoic nature of 
his approach with what appears to be Aristotelian. To do this it will be necessary to 
attempt to answer a particularly problematic question in Augustine’s approach to 
meaning: namely, what is it that is signified by words. In so doing, it will be possible 
to determine whether the fact that the use of ‘dicibile’ necessitates that it is in some 
way equivalent to thought and is therefore more Aristotelian than Stoic. This is due to 
the fact that the Stoic position was opposed to this conclusion in that the equation of
223
Cf. Galen, SVF 2.135 on Abyo<; ev§icx0£TO<;. There is a connection between this and the 
vof[M-tt itpocpopticoc; b u t  can it be said to be a Ae k t o v ?  There may be a parallel similar to Augustine’s 
interior verbum and dicibile.
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meaning with thought creates problems for their approach to logic, for truth and 
falsehood is essentially linguistic and is not dependent on thought.
5.2.1.2.5.6. The Signification of Words.
0333 Words are used with the purpose of signifying something.
nemo enim utitur uerbis, nisi aliquid significandi gratia.
(doctr. chr. 1.2)
Signs cause something else, beyond themselves, to come to mind (DD 5.9-10; DDC
2.1), and therefore words are used so as to make something come into another’s mind.
Words are employed so as to signify one’s thoughts to another.
et utique uerba propterea sunt instituta non per quae inuicem se homines 
fallant sedper quae in alterius quisque notitiam cogitationes suas perferat. 
uerbis ergo uti adfallaciam, non ad quod sunt instituta, peccatum est.
(ench. 22)224
Related to this is that words are used so as to give a sign of the speaker’s will (DM 2; 
DDC 2.4).
0334 Words therefore can be clearly demonstrated as in some sense, conveying 
thought . It is stated in DM (36) that perception of the signification does not occur 
by hearing the sound uttered, but rather by the cognition of the things signified. This 
is to say, one grasps the signification of the words by thinking o f  the thing signified.
In this sense then Augustine can be seen to employ something akin to the abji{5ota)v 
and crnpeiov distinction evident in Aristotle’s de interpretatione in that words are 
signs in the sense that they function as evidence for the hearer that one has a particular 
thought in mind, or that one is thinking about something . In this sense then words
224 Cf. also Io. ev. tr. 37.4.
225 Cf. Locke, Essay 2.1 where the proposal that words signify thoughts follows naturally from the fact 
that thoughts are conveyed by words (Kirwan: 1989, 39).
226 v. sup. 0265-0271.
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can be seen to be signs for the hearer of what the speaker has in mind, but this does 
not answer the question as to what they in fact signify. This is to say, the words 
signify something for the speaker and it is this that the speaker is thinking of when 
speaking, but the words also signify something for the hearer who grasps the 
signification of the words by thinking of the thing signified and is therefore able to 
know what the speaker has in mind. So although it is an important clarification that 
words act as a sort of proof227 of another’s will, it should be noted that being a sign of 
what one is thinking about and being a sign of one’s will amounts to the same thing 
for Augustine. Whenever anyone engages in the mental act of thinking one initiates 
one’s thought by willing it: one actualises a memory trace, or recalls it, by the 
application of the mind’s attention (trin. 9.16)228.
0335 There is clearly a mental element at play in Augustine’s theory of meaning and 
words convey thoughts in the sense that they serve as proofs that a speaker has a 
certain thought in mind. However, it remains unclear as to whether words signify the 
thoughts which they are seen to convey or the things which are the objects of those 
thoughts (as suggested in DM 8; DM 39; and DDC 1.2), or both, or indeed something 
else altogether.
0336 To clarify this issue, and also the issue as to what the dicibile is, will require a 
close comparison of the discussion in the DM and the fragmentary discussions of the 
same issues in the Stoic texts, most specifically, as will be argued, those of Diogenes 
of Babylon.
0337 Perhaps the single most interesting fragment on Stoic linguistic theory in 
relation to these questions surrounding Augustine’s approach to signification and
227 v. inf. § 8 and § 9.
228 v. sup. 0291.
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meaning is that forwarded by Sextus Empiricus in a doxographical summary
concerning truth (Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.11-12)229.
...oi pev Ttepi xco appaivopepcp to aArjBeq xe Kai ipeubot; 
t)7teaxfiaavTo, oi 5e Ttepi xfl (pcovfl, oi 8e Ttepi xfj Ktvfjaei xfjc; 
Siavoiaq. Kai Sfj xfiq pev Ttpcoxriq So^nq TtpoeaxfjKaaiv oi aTto 
tt\c, Zxoat; xpia cpapevot ao^oyeiv aAXfjtanq, xo xe aripaivopevov 
Kai xo arjpaivov Kai xo xoyxavov, &v atjpaivov pev elvai xfjv 
(pcovfiv, olov xf|v Aicov, arjpaivopevov 8e abxo xo Ttpaypa xo 
i)Tt ’ abxfjq SriXobpevov Kai ob f[\Lexq pev avxtAap|5av6pe0a xp 
qpexepg Ttapocpiaxapevou Siavoigc, oi 8e (Jappapot ook  
ertaiooai miTtep xfjq cpcovr|q aKobovxeq, xoyxavov 8e xo eKxdq 
bTtoKeipevov, chaTtep abxoq o Aicov. xobxcov 8e 8bo pev eivai 
acopaxa, KaSaTtep xriv cpcovfiv Kai xo xoyxavov, ev Se 
aacopaxov, (baTtep xo aripaivopevov Ttpaypa, Kai Aekxov, oTtep 
a^ riQeq xe ylvexai f\ i|T£t>5o£
(Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.11-12)
0338 What is of particular significance in this passage is the description of 
signification. There are three items which participate in this process: the sign or 
signifier (xo arjpaivov), the signification or that which is signified
(to a r ip a iv o p e v o v ) , and the name-bearer or corporeal item which the sayable is 
about (xo xoyxavov).
0339 The signifier is relatively straightforward and is the actual word, or sound,
(xf]V cpcovfiv) which is uttered. Language is articulated vocal sound with significance
(Diogenes Laertius 7.57). Augustine’s definition230 is virtually identical with this.
... ut uerbum sit, quod cum aliquo significatu articulata uoce profertur...
(8)
loqui est articulata uoce signum dare.
{dial 5.11)
The actual signifier is the (articulated) vocal sound which requires a signification so 
as to be a signifier.
229 This passage was presented above (0302) but it will be useful to cite it here again in full so as to 
more clearly analyse the key points in context.
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X o y o q  aei GTUiavTiKoq eaxi, 5e Kai aaT||i.avTo<  ^ ax; f[
f&ixupi, X o y o q  5e obSapax;
(Diogenes Laertius 7.57)
0340 The name-bearer ( t o  ruyxavov) is the actual material item existing 
separately within the world ( t o  eKToq brcoKeipevov). Both signifier and name- 
bearer are corporeal ( t o o t c o v  5e 5\)o (lev elvai amjiaxa, Ka0a7tep t t j v  
(pcovTjv Kai t o  Toyxavov). The name-bearer is a body which can be named and 
spoken about.
“sunt” inquit “naturae corporum, tamquam hie homo est, hie equus... non 
corpus” inquit “est quod... loquor, sedenuntiatiuum quiddam de corpore... 
plurimum... interest utrum illuddicas an de illo. ”
(Seneca, ep. 117.13)
There are a number of difficulties concerning the item that is described as the name- 
bearer, and this is also the case for Augustine. There are questions as to the status of 
universal items (such as ‘man’) and of non-existent items (such as ‘(the now dead) 
Socrates). These difficulties, insofar as they relate to the present discussion will be 
considered in due course (v. inf. § 5.2.1.2.5.6). However, for present purposes and so 
as to give a basic sense of what the name-bearer is, it will suffice to describe the 
name-bearer as a particular corporeal item, present here and now (<hic homo>), which 
is available to be spoken about (“hie homo est”).
0341 The equivalent to the name-bearer in Augustine is, simply put, a res. However, 
as discussed above (0084-0091), there is a more specific and a less specific use of the 
term ‘res’. The sense in which name-bearer is to be taken is that of a thing as concrete 
entity and Augustine does clearly hold that there are on definite occasions particular 
concrete items which are what one speaks about. For reasons relating to Augustine’s 
Platonic approach to his metaphysics and the relation of this metaphysics to his 
semantics it is rather difficult to forward an unambiguous example of an item such as
230 V. sup. § 5.2.1.
155
a particular concrete item which one speaks about. In short, when Augustine is 
discussing res with reference to language it is rather difficult to get a clear sense in 
which the term is being used. This problem relates to both his metaphysics and to his 
view as to what it is that is signified by a word and will be discussed in due course (v. 
inf § 5.2.1.2.5.6).
0342 A clear example of a res being a particular concrete item which is available to
be spoken about occurs in a section of the DM where the multiple levels of
signification are under discussion.
... cum uerbum signum sit nominis et nomen signum sitfluminis etflumen 
signum sit rei, quae iam uideri potest, ut inter hanc rem et flumen, id est 
signum eius...
(9 )23.
0343 The final semiotic mode introduced by the Stoics is that of signification
( t o  GT|paiv opevov). This term is equivalent to that of ‘signification in Augustine. A 
basic model of equivalence is as follows.
(014)
TO GTlpaiVOV TO GTllxaiVOfieVOV TO Tt)YX<XVOV
(h cpcovfi)
signum significatio res
(uox/sonus)
0344 To more fully appreciate Augustine’s use of ‘signification (and the related
‘dicibilen) it will be necessary to consider the term as applied in Stoic semantics.
Signification is described at greater length in the Sextus passage than the other two
terms in the triad of signifier, signification, and name-bearer.
GTjpatvopevov 5e abTd to rcpaypa to bit’ abTfjq 5TiX.obia.evov 
Kai ob riixetq pev avTtXap£av6pe0a xf[ fjpsTepa mpocpioTapsvo'o 
5tavoia, oi 5e pappapoi ouk em iooo i Kalrcep tqq cpcovfi; 
aKobovTe^.. TobToav 5e 5bo pev slvat oaapaTa, KaScatep ttjv
231 The fact that Augustine labours the point that the thing which the term ‘river’ signifies is a particular 
item (hanc rem) and is available to be seen now (iam uideri potest) is not insignificant and reflects the 
complexity inherent in his approach to signification (v. inf. § 5.2.1.2.5.6).
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(poovfiv Kai to  toyxavov , sv  8e aacopaxov, dbcntEp to  
arijxaiv6|a.£Vov Jipaypa, Kai Aektov, ojiEp aA,T|0E<; t£  y iv £ ta i f \  
i|j£t)5o c,
(Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.12)
0345 That which is signified, or the signification, is described as the thing itself 
(au to  to  TCpaypa) which is shown (StiA-oojievov) by the utterance, qua sign, and 
which subsists in accordance with thought (tf| fi|i£t£pa JtapaxpiatapEVoo 
SiavoiQt) and is not understood by those who do not speak the language (in which the 
sign is expressed). In addition this thing which is signified is incorporeal (aaw patov) 
and is sayable (A£KTov), which is true or false.
0346 The thing itself is that which is said (Diogenes Laertius 7.57) and is 
incorporeal and so should more accurately be defined as a state of affairs232. This state 
of affairs is, strictly speaking, neither the utterance nor the corporeal name-bearer but 
rather is an intermediate between the two (Plutarch, Col. 1119F; Ammonius, in Ar. de
233Int. 17, 24-8) . When one encounters a body, for example Cato, disposed in a certain
way, say, the walking Cato, then one perceives a state of affairs and it is this which is 
the thing itself. On observing this state of affairs one receives an impression which is 
rational and can be said (Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.70; Diogenes Laertius 7.49). This 
state of affairs is, as it were, ‘attachable’ to something (Diogenes Laertius 7.64): for 
example, there is a particular item <Cato> and when this item is disposed in a certain 
way, <the walking Cato>, then one observes a state of affairs <walking> which is in a 
sense attachable to Cato. This impression is rational in that it can be stated, that is to
232 There is an ambiguity in the term ‘state of affairs’ in that it may be a particular state of affairs on 
one specific occasion and in one specific location or it may be a repeatable one. The actual state of 
affairs is the referent and as such occurs on one specific occasion in one specific location and may be 
described as a token. Whereas the sayable represents a state o f affairs in a manner which is repeatable 
and is best described as a type. This ambiguity will be introduced at greater length below (v. inf. 0377).
233 The fuller significance of this will be discussed below (§ 5.2.1.2.5.6) with reference to res ipsa in 
the DM.
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say, one can attach the predicate ‘is walking’ to the subject ‘Cato’ and so assert that 
Cato is walking. This would seem to be the thrust behind Seneca’s discussion of 
naming and speaking about something (Seneca, ep. 117.13). The senses perceive a 
state of affairs and show (ostendit) it to the mind and this state of affairs is such as to 
be sayable.
0347 The concept of showing (5r|A.ob|xevov) is also of importance to this 
presentation of signification. This term suggests that there may be a terminological 
distinction involved here and may also be a hint towards the influence of Diogenes of 
Babylon on Augustine’s approach to language.234 Diogenes of Babylon had been to 
Rome as part of an embassy from Athens in 156/5, accompanying him were 
Cameades and a Peripatetic. It can be seen from Cicero {de or. 2.157-158) that it was 
Diogenes who introduced to Rome Stoic thinking on dialectic, and therefore on 
language and signification (Diogenes Laertius 7.43). In addition, much of the 
terminology seen in Augustine can be found in passages directly attributed to 
Diogenes (whether Diogenes is devising or simply transmitting these ideas is not of 
great importance from the perspective of this study). The most obvious is the use of
234There are a number o f factors which may suggest that Diogenes, or doxographical treatments o f his 
work, may have influenced Augustine’s approach to language. The fact that Diogenes was a pupil o f 
Chrysippus of course leaves open the possibility that the linguistic material is ultimately attributable to 
him. However, Diogenes’ interest in language is indisputable as can be seen in the inclusion among his 
works of a e v  xfj Flepi <pcovf\<; xexvp and a ev xfi 6kxA£KXIkxi T£XvTI- Augustine’s own de 
dialectica is largely Stoic in content and the definition o f dialectic (“dialectica est bene disputandi 
scientia.” dial. 1.1) is suggestive o f that cited in Diogenes Laertius as the Stoic definition. 
xf{v xe prixopiKfiv e7tiaxii|tT|v ofroav xob eb 7£yeiv...Kai 
xf]v SiaXeKxucfiv xot> opQdx; SuxXeyecyOai rtepi xcbv ev 
epcoxfjcrei Kai arcoKptaei Ajoycov- 60ev Kai obxcoq auxi)v 
5pi£ovxai, eitiaxfiP'nv aA,ri0cbv Kai tjiet>8cbv Kai ouSexepeov.
(Diogenes Laertius 7.42)
This definition is uncredited other than that it is the one given by the Stoics. There is a definition of 
rhetoric and of dialectic which seems to be used in combination for Augustine’s in DD (cf. Darrell 
Jackson: 1972 {1969}, 121-2 n.2). Beyond the parallel given in Darrell Jackson, this definition (as seen 
above) goes on to include the true and false and the idea o f dispute concerning these - in this sense the 
definition is closer to Augustine’s and the terminology used is akin to Cicero’s definition from 
Diogenes of Babylon.
ex tribus istis clarissimis philosophis, quos Romam venisse dixisti, videsne Diogenem eum 
fuisse, qui diceret artem se tradere bene disserendi et vera ac falsa diiudicandi, quam verbo 
Graeco 8 i a A £ K X i K f |V  appellaret? (Cicero, de or. 2.157-158).
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SrjXo'bv (Diogenes Laertius 7.58) and the use of several key linguistic terms and ideas
in Diogenes Laertius 7.57 (the whole passage is not directly attributed to Diogenes but
the overall context from 7.55 upto and including 7.58, where Diogenes is once more
directly referred to, makes clear use of Diogenes’ Flepi cpcovf\q (7.55). In relation to
dialectic, it is also significant that Augustine uses in the DM the first two examples of
non-simple propositions, the hypothetical and the inferential, as attributed to
Chrysippus and Diogenes by Diogenes Laertius (7.71). These examples are used so as
to determine that all words are significant names (DM 16 - this passage, and the Stoic
influences on it, will be discussed at length below, § 5.6.2). Finally, there is the
interesting suggestion of Diogenes as a possible source for Augustine’s implication
(DDC 2.3) that semiotic activity in animals may be instinctive and caused by an
irrational impulse (motus animi):
£cooo pev eaxi cpcovp af\p otco opjipq TC8h:A,t|yp8VO<;, av0pa)7ioD 
6 ’ eaxiv evap0poq Kai arco Siavoiaq eKitepjtopevri, dx; o 
Aioyevriq (prjaiv...
(Diogenes Laertius 7.55).
0348 The use of S'qA.obv occurs in three significant passages: Sextus Empiricus
8.12; Diogenes Laertius 7.58; Diogenes Laertius 7.62235. In all of these sections the
context involves language and the discussion of signification. Perhaps the most
interesting, and suggestive, occurrence is that attributed to Diogenes of Babylon.
eaxi 5e JipoariYopia pev Kaxa xov Aioy£VT|v pepoq Xoyoo 
orjpaivov k o i v t |v  jtoioxpxa, olov Av0pcojio<  ^ vhtKog ovo|xa 
Se eaxi |i8po<; Xoyov SrjXouv idiav Jioioxrixa, olov AioYevp^ 
EcoKpaxTiq* pfjpa 8e eaxi pepot; ^oyou atjpaivov aabv08xov
235 The cognate 6 t |Ajcotik: 6 v  also occurs with reference to signs as used in logical analysis (Sextus 
Empiricus, PH  2.104-106).
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KCtTTiYopTiiia, dx; o Aioyevri^ rj, ax; xivec  ^ axoixeiov Xoyox> 
ajixooxov, arijiaivov xi auvxaKXov rcepl xivcx; f\ xivcbv, olov 
rpacpco, Aeya>...
(Diogenes Laertius 7.58)236 
In this passage it would appear that there is a terminological distinction between the 
terms applied to common qualities, which signify (GTjpoavov); names applied to 
particular qualities, which show, or indicate (StiAguv); and verbs applied to non­
compounded predicates, which once again signify (orijaaivov). The difficulty with 
this interpretation is that the later passage from Diogenes Laertius, on ambiguity237, 
appears to contradict such a strict terminological interpretation238.
’ ApxpipoAfa 8 e eaxi Sbo f\ Kai rcAelova Jipayjxaxa 
arijaalvoooa teKXiKdx; Kai KDpicoq Kai Kaxa xo abxo eGoq, 
d>a0’a |ia  xa rcAelova £K5s^aa0ai Kaxa xabxijv xffv Ae^ iv- 
olov AbXTjxpli; TCETixooKs- StiXouvxai yap 81 ’ abxfjq xo |iev 
xoiobxov, Olida xpi; Jte7ixa)K8, xo 8 e xoiobxov, AbXfjxpia 
jteTtxajKe.
(Diogenes Laertius 7.62)
0349 However, of importance to this discussion is that there is a third and separate 
source for the application of this term to Stoic considerations on the relation of 
language to reality (Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.12). It would therefore seem reasonable to 
regard the term ‘StiAouv’, whether technically or semi-technically, as applied by the 
Stoics as a means of expressing the relation of language to significata139. Words show 
the state of affairs which they signify, and presumably show it to one’s mind since 
they subsist in accordance with thought240.
236 This passage falls within a wider section where the general source of information is the 
riepi (poovfjc; of Diogenes of Babylon (Diogenes Laertius 7.55)
237 Stoic considerations on ambiguity in language and their profound influence on Augustine’s 
approach to knowledge acquisition and the Paradox of Enquiry in the DM will be discussed at length 
below (§ 6.1).
238 This point is made by Atherton: 1993, 302-3.
239 The ultimate source for such a term may be Stoic logical analysis. As suggested by the use of the 
cognate 8t|Acotik6v (Sextus Empiricus, PH 2.104-106).
240 A fuller sense of what this showing might be as seen in DM will be considered in due course (v. inf. 
§ 7, § 8, and § 9).
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0350 The discussion by Seneca in the epistulae (117.13) provides an interesting 
parallel with this usage of ‘show’. For when one observes a state of affairs the senses 
show it (ostend.it) to the mind which in turn makes a judgement about it241. It is 
difficult to know whether Seneca is drawing on a particular source for this or whether 
the example is his own, yet, as will be seen in the following discussion of Augustine, 
it is plausible that the parallel between visual showing and verbal showing was an 
intentional one. If such an interpretation is correct then there is an item available to be 
understood such that it can be shown, visually, to the mind via the eyes and such that 
it can be shown, aurally, to the mind via the ears. Specifically, the state of affairs 
which is the material item <Cato> so disposed as to be walking, is available visually 
as <the walking Cato>; while the same state of affairs242 is available, whether the 
material Cato is present or not243, in an aurally accessible manner, as the statement 
“Cato is walking”. In the first example, the corporeal item so disposed shows the state 
of affairs to one via the senses, while in the second, it is the statement which shows 
the state of affairs to one, also via the senses.
0351 Before moving on to a more specific consideration of Augustine’s position it 
will be useful to briefly review the term used by the Stoics in their approach to 
signification.
0352 A word (<pcovfi) is a sign (ar|ji.aivov) which shows (brjA.obv) its signification 
(aruj.aiv6jj.8Vov) to the mind of the hearer. This signification is a state of affairs 
(at)TO to  JipaY|j.a) which is incorporeal (aaco|J.aTov), is accessible to thought 
([too JipayjiaToc;] avTiXa|j.f}av6|j.£0a xp fijxeTepQc jcapucptaTa|j,evou
241 v. inf § 5.2.1.2.5.6 on the status of res and how the concrete particular shows the state of affairs to 
mind via the eyes and how the word shows the state of affairs to the mind via ears.
242 The question of the ontological status of these states of affairs and their ‘sameness’ will be passed 
over as being extraneous to the present discussion. This ontological question will be central to the 
following analysis of Augustine’s position and will be considered in due course (§ 5.2.1.2.5.6).
SiavoiQt), and is accessed by the mind through the senses as a rational presentaion 
(Aoyikt] cpavtaaioc). The presentation is rational and as such it is sayable (Aeicuov).
0353 In Augustine’s analysis of language in the DM and in the DD there is a picture 
of language which is extremely close to that of the Stoics as presented above. 
Augustine unequivocally describes words as signs (DD 5.1; DM 2). Words are in fact 
signs par excellence in that they are things such that their whole being rests in the fact 
that they are signs (DDC 1.1).
0354 Signs are, most relevantly to this discussion, described in each of these three 
texts (DD, DM, DDC) in the following manner244.
51 signum est quod et se ipsum sensui etpraeter se aliquid animo ostendit.
(dial. 5.9-10)
52 ... memoria, cui uerba inhaerent,ea revoluendo facit uenire in mentem res 
ipsas, quarum signa sunt uerba.
(2)
53 signum est enim res praeter speciem, quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex 
se faciens in cogitationem uenire...
(doctr. chr. 2.1)
54 signa... adsignificandum aliquidadhibentur.
(doctr. chr. 1.1)
0355 A word (uerbum), therefore, is a sign (signum) which shows (ostendit) 
something (aliquid) to the mind (animo) of the hearer. What is caused to come to 
mind (facit uenire in mentem) are the things themselves (res ipsas), these things, as 
will be seen, are in fact states of affairs and it is these states of affairs which are 
signified (ad significandum aliquid). This state of affairs is accessible to thought (DD 
5.9-10; DM 2; DDC 2.1) and is such as to be sayable (dicibile).
0356 The sayable in Augustine is what is understood in the word and contained in 
the mind.
243 It is in this respect that it is the sayable states of affairs are what is true or false (Sextus Empiricus,
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quidquid... ex uerbo non aures sed animus sentit et ipso animo tenetur 
inclusum, dicibile uocatur.
{dial. 5.50-52)
dicibile... in uerbo intellegitur et animo continetur...
{dial. 5.60-62)
It is the conception of a word in the mind and is prior to utterance245.
res autem ipsa, quae iam uerbum non est neque uerbi in mente conceptio...
{dial. 5.54-55)
... cum [uerba] animo sensa sunt, ante uocem dicibilia erunt...
{dial. 5.73-74)
0357 The fact that Augustine stresses the distinction between the res, or state of 
affairs, which is signified and the dicibile as a conception of a word in the mind is 
entirely consistent with the position he adopts in the DM246. This is clarified by two 
points: firstly, the role of memory in the linguistic act (cf. S2 above, 0354) and 
secondly, by the formal nature of images and their place in language (cf DM 39). A 
state of affairs is accessible to the mind and can be thought or spoken but this does not 
entail that it is equivalent to thought or with the sayable aspect of thought.
0358 When discussing the complicated example of ‘nihiV247 and what it is that this 
term refers to Augustine proposes that it refers to a state of mind which is caused not 
by encountering a particular thing but rather by encountering a state of affairs such 
that the mind does not see a thing {cum rem non uidet) and finds {inuenit) or thinks 
that it has found {inuenisse se putat) what is not {non esse)24S.
M. 8.12).
244 v.sup. 0095.
245 The question as to whether the Stoic position was equivalent to this is not strictly relevant to the 
present discussion. What is relevant is that this is the understanding which Augustine has of the term.
46 This point is only fully appreciated with Augustine’s completion of his argument in the DM. Words, 
inner or outer, are only possible after the state of affairs has been experienced and stored in the memory 
in such a way as to be accessible via language (v. inf. § 8 and § 9).
247 v. sup. § 3.4.2.
248 Cf. “[Wittgenstein’s] Tractarian “solution” amounts to conceding that we can’t really talk about 
non-existent objects: when we say something doesn’t exist, we are to be construed as talking about 
certain existent objects and denying that they are arranged in a specific way’ (Stem: 1995, 55); cf. 
Wittgenstein, Tractatus 2.02; 2.026; 2.027; 3.202; 3.221.
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Aug. quid igitur facimus? an affectionem animi quandam, cum rem non uidet 
et tamen non esse inuenit aut inuenisse se putat, hoc uerbo significari dicimus 
potius quam rem ipsam quae nulla est?
(3)
That is to say, the mind is affected not by an encounter with a state of affairs which is 
not, or is non-existent, but rather that it is affected by a state of affairs which is 
contrary to what was expected.
0359 It had been proposed by the Stoics that something can only be taught by
something or by not-something. Since it cannot be taught by not-something due to the
fact that such an item has no subsistence in the mind, it must be taught by something.
Kai |xf\v ei SiSaaKexai xi, qxoi 8ia xcbv otmvcov StSaxOfjaexai 
t\ 8ia xcbv xivcbv. aXka 8ia jiev xcbv oimvcbv ox>x olov xe 
5i5ax0fivav avorcoaxaxa yap eaxi xp SiavolQt xabxa Kaxa xobq 
aTto x-ry; Exoa^
(Sextus Empiricus, M. 1.17)
In this way the term ‘nihil’249 is seen to have meaning and to signify a state of affairs 
in which one does not see a thing and finds, or thinks one has found, that it does not 
exist so that the term reflects a state of affairs which can be thought and therefore 
cause a state of mind rather than something which is a not-something.
0360 That ‘nothing’ is to be interpreted as a reflecting a state of affairs should be 
considered together with the fact that Augustine quickly moves from the discussion of
250terms such as ‘paries’ (DM 5) onto discussion of terms such as ‘ambulare’ (DM 6)
Such terms focus the fact that there are things and dispositions or states of affairs
which are to be understood relationally to them.
obxco Kai xcbv cpavxaaxcbv evia fiev oiovei tyabovxa Kai 
0iyyavovxa xob fiyeixoviKot) Jioieixai xqv ev xobxcp xbjrcoaiv, 
DJtoiov eaxi xo XeuKdv Kai ixeAav Kai Koivcbq xo acbjxa, evia
249 The point in this comparison is not that the word ‘nihil' teaches but rather that the state of affairs 
‘teaches’ so as to cause a state o f mind. Therefore, the state of affairs is the ‘something’.
250 v. inf. § 6 and the role o f the sentence in the DM - obscurity through atomisation but clarity through 
context and therefore the relational quality inherent in states of affairs.
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5s Toiororrtv §x£l 9*001 v, too  tiyeixoviKoo ejt ’ aoToiq 
(pavxaaiooiievoo Kai oox ojc ’ ai)Tcbv, ojtota k m  ta  aacoixaTa 
A£KTa.
(Sextus Empiricus, M  8.409)
Seneca (ep. 117.13) expresses this in terms which are more obviously linguistic, and 
hence closer to the Augustinian approach, in saying that there are things and things 
which are said about them.
0361 This said, Augustine does discuss items such as are signified by terms 
denoting river, wall, and the like. It would seem awkward to describe these items as 
sayable states of affairs and if they are not intelligible or sayable in this sense one 
must consider how they are to be understood or said. A term such as ‘river’ does of 
course have, in general, two possible meanings: a particular river or the universal 
river. The universal river may in turn denote the class, or extension, of all rivers, or 
the abstract river. The general application of the term will be considered in due course 
(§ 5.2.1.2.5.6). What perhaps can be said with reference to such items is that they 
cannot strictly be said at all but can only be named. Such items can be named but 
when they are disposed in a certain way something can be said about them, that is, a 
statement can be made concerning them.
0362 In the use of words to refer to particular items one must be aware of 
Augustine’s approach to perception and concept formation251. Augustine holds that 
the form which is immanent in any object is in fact that which is perceived in any 
perceptual act. This formal aspect is in turn available to perception, this in turn to 
thought, and this in turn to storage as an item in the memory (trin. 11.16; v. sup. 0287). 
What makes this process possible is the inherently rational nature of these forms and 
the rational nature of the human mind (ord. 2.32-33). The manner in which this 
formal aspect of an item can be accessed is various but for Augustine the primary
mode upon which all other rest is through the intellect and this is determined via the 
analogy, used extensively in the DM (and elsewhere), with vision252.
0363 The multiple aspects whereby an item, or state of affairs, can be formally 
accessed is to be seen in Augustine’s stressing the -ibilis termination in the dialogue 
(DM 8 in particular: uisibilia; audibilia; significabilia)252. One can imagine a situation 
such as a girl playing the flute: one may see her playing and receive the form in a 
visible manner; one may hear her and do so in an audible manner; or one may be told 
that she is playing the flute and receive it in a sayable and hence signifiable manner; 
and what links them all is their common intelligibility. This common intelligibility is 
due to the formal nature of the state of affairs. This example brings out Augustine’s 
stress upon the need for direct visual experience (which is of course an analogy to 
explicate the primary need for direct intellectual experience of the formal aspect254) 
first of all for if one has not already seen the girl playing the flute, on hearing the 
sound one could not access the form in an audible way so as to comprehend it255.
0364 In this way one can conceive of the analogy between items which are formally 
intelligible and states of affairs which are also formally intelligible. However, the 
dicibile depends upon one having already perceived the item and therefore as having 
the formal aspect of it stored in the memory257.
231 v. sup. § 5.2.1.2.4, with particular regard to 0273-0295.
252 The ultimate conclusion reached in the DM rests upon this and will be considered below (§ 9.3).
253 Of course intelligibilia and dicibilia are of great importance to this point.
254 v. inf. § 9.
255 There are of course circumstances where one might be deceived, to this extent knowledge, for 
Augustine, is only of intelligible items, i.e. Transcendent Forms.
256 The rational aspect of these items as received as impressions can be understood as analogous to the 
Stoic XoyiKfi (pavxaaia. What determines the rationality o f such an impression is the very fact that it 
is sayable. This will be consideraed at greater length in due course (§ 5.2.1.2.5.6). However, this would 
seem to be the way in which Augustine understand the sayable aspect of the formal presentations.
257 The role o f memory and the importance of Recollection will be discussed in due course (§ 8 and § 
9).
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0365 As Augustine stresses in the Lion Paradox258 (DM 23), whereby what is said 
comes from one’s mouth, and so if one says ‘lion’ then a lion comes from one’s
259mouth , words have sound and signification: the sound comes from one’s mouth and 
bears its significance, which is the element understood in the word. The significance 
is a mental item and is the signification - the signification is what takes the mind to 
the thing.
0366 To recap, if there is a subject x and there is a state of affairs such that Fx, this 
state of affairs is intelligible, it is formally available to the perceiver, and the perceiver 
can assent to the presentation which is perceived due to its intelligibility by means of 
the proposition ‘Fx’ and this proposition is sayable “Fx”.
The particular state of affairs <Fx> is intelligible as /Fx/ which is in turn 
sayable \Fx\ and this sayable is utterable as [Fx],
0367 When one has encountered a state of affairs then it is available, memorially, to 
one whether there is a visible instance of it present or not. Therefore, one can signify 
the state of affairs simply by saying it [Fx]; what is signified is the state of affairs, that 
is, it is the signification. So too with particulars, such as x, for this subject is also 
intelligible in that it is formally available to the perceiver. As one can recall a state of 
affairs by means of a proposition so too can one recall a particular subject by means 
of a name which in turn accesses an image (DM 39). This is not to say that one is 
talking about the proposition or about the image but rather that one talks about the 
subject and/or about the state of affairs and these are the significations which enable 
one to do so. This is one of the important emphases of the discussion of speaking 
about the moon in the following passage of the DM.
258 This is a variant of the Stoic example cited by Clement {Strom. 8.9.26.5).
259 Use and mention as employed in the refutation of this must be considered at some length (v. inf. § 
6.1.3).
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de illis [sensibilibus] cum interrogamur, respondemus, sipraesto sunt ea, 
quae sentimus, uelut cum a nobis quaeritur intuentibus lunam nouam, qualis 
aut ubi sit. hie ille, qui interrogate si non uidet, credit uerbis et saepe non 
credit, discit autem nullo modo, nisi et ipse quod dicitur uideat, ubi iam non 
uerbis, sed rebus ipsis et sensibus discit. nam uerba eadem sonant uidenti, 
quae non uidenti etiam sonuerunt. cum uero non de his, quae coram sentimus, 
sed de his, quae aliquando sensimus, quaeritur, non iam res ipsas, sed 
imagines ab eis impressas memoriaeque mandatas loquimur, quae omnino 
quomodo uera dicamus, cum falsa intueamur, ignoro, nisi quia non nos ea 
uidere ac sentire, sed uidisse ac sensisse narramus.
(39)260
0368 There is a particular state of affairs such that the moon is new. When 
interlocutor A says “The moon is new” to interlocutor B, who is also looking at the 
new moon, B simultaneously perceives the state of affairs as a visible and intelligible 
item and hears the state of affairs expressed as an audible and intelligible item. The
intelligible item is the state of affairs and so it would seem to make little difference, in
261semiotic terms , whether one wants to refer to the res ipsa which is signified in
terms of the visible or in terms of the sayable presentation of it for the reference is in
all actuality the state of affairs which is an intelligible item. It is for this reason that
Augustine often seems to imply that when a particular object is under discussion that
it is that thing there which is the signiflcatum - because in the sense discussed it is.
What is signified is the intelligible, formal, item or state of affairs.
non enim quod latebat in memoria mea sed quod audio, cogito cum aliquid 
mihi narratur. non ipsas uoces loquentis dico ne quisquam putet in illam me 
exisse trinitatem quae foris in sensibilibus et in sensibus agitur, sed eas cogito 
corporum species quas narrans uerbis sonisque significat, quas utique non 
reminiscens sed audiens cogito. sed si diligentius consideremus, nec tunc 
exceditur memoriae modus, neque enim uel intellegere possem narrantem si 
ea quae dicit et si contexta tunc primum audirem, non tamen generaliter
260 This is an important passage with regards to the conclusions reached in the DM and will be 
discussed at length in due course (v. inf. § 9.3.1). There is therefore much of importance, and concerned 
with the actual thrust of the argument employed in the passage, which is passed over at present. The 
above discussion employs this passage so as to clarify Augustine’s approach to signification and should 
not be seen as a focused analysis of the passage in the context of its place in the argument of the DM.
261 There is clearly an epistemic difference, as discussed above (0363).
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singula meminissem. qui enim mihi narrat uerbi gratia aliquem montem silua 
exutum et oleis indutum, ei narrat qui meminerim species et montium et 
siluarum et olearum.
(trin. 11.14)
To this end Augustine for the most part discusses general terms in the DM not 
particular terms which cause or make possible this misunderstanding. Also, in the 
above passage (trin. 11.14) the implication is not that one speaks about an intelligible 
item but rather that one speaks about the actual object before one’s eyes. However, 
the fact that the object can be perceived, understood, and spoken about is due to the 
formal aspect of it and this aspect is that which is signified and it is this aspect which 
can be stored in the memory and enable one to speak about, and signify, the object 
when it is not actually present262.
0369 The relation between a visibly accessible state of affairs and a simultaneously 
accessible audible one can be schematised as follows.
(D15)
<the moon is new> -> State of Affairs [the moon is new]
<visible> intelligible/sayable [audible]
0370 However, if B turns away and, consequently, is no longer looking at the 
particular state of affairs, <the new moon>263, and hears the statement [the moon is 
new], he no longer has available the particular item or state of affairs which is being
262 This suggests difficulties raised by Aristotle {Meta. 103Ob-103 la) concerning whether it is possible 
to identify an individual in general terms - if what is intelligible is necessarily general. The example of 
the Moon is particularly useful here as there is only one of it.
263 This state of affairs is visually accessible to B if and only if looking at it and continually being 
presented formally, each presentation instantaneously being replaced by the next. For Augustine, 
memory is, not unreasonably, acutely involved in every perceptual act and to this extent every 
perception is in fact o f a image. This fact of Augustinian epistemology means that for one to accurately 
talk of any thing it must be before one as this visible presentation is forever, as it were, changing before 
one’s eyes or, perhaps more accurately, one’s perception is constantly renewing itself. This is a 
consequence of his theory of perception and of his Platonic approach to the material world. Intelligible 
items, on the other hand, are always available to one for direct experience. These points will be 
discussed more fully in due course.
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referred to but must use his memory to access the intelligible state of affairs as a 
proposition - in this way he understands the utterance for he has available the 
signification memorially but he does not have the actual, and presently occurring, 
state of affairs available and so must, in strict terms, reply in the past tense if engaging 
in a discussion of the state of affairs as it is available to him in his memory not present 
before his eyes (as intelligible items always are). To talk of the state of affairs, or of a 
particular item, in the present tense one in fact speaks of an image of it, stored in the 
mind.
sed de his, quae aliquando sensimus, quaeritur, non iam res ipsas, sed 
imagines ab eis impressas memoriaeque mandatas loquimur, quae omnino 
quomodo uera dicamus, cum falsa intueamur, ignoro, nisi quia non nos ea 
uidere ac sentire, sed uidisse ac sensisse narramus.
(39)
0371 Augustine’s stress on the use of the past tense so as to clarify signification
may be usefully compared with a passage in Sextus on the Stoic consideration of
truth and falsity in relation to past, present, and future time.
eti, 9<xai, to arjixeiov m pov mpovToq eivai 5ei gtipeiov . evioi 
yap E^amTmpsvoi Kai m pov mpcpXTlPsvoo 0eA,o o g iv  si vat 
crr|jX£iov, cbq etc! too "si ooAjiv ex,£i oi)Toq, eXKoq egxtjkev ooto<;". 
to psv yap "obAjjv e e^i" m pov egti, cpaivsTai yap, to S e eAxoc; 
EG^TjKEvai m pcpxri|i£Vov, ooketi yap egtiv eAk o <^  Kai m pov
M,£M,OVTO<^  (bq TO JtEplEXOJlEVOV TCp TOlOOTCp G0VT||X|X£VCp "si 
K apSiav  TETpcoTai obToq, a m 0 a v £ iT a i obToq". to  p sv  yap  T p abpa  
Tfjq K apSiaq s lv a i  cpaGiv fiStj, tov Se SavaT ov jxeAA^ iv. ay v o o b G i  
Sf] o i  Ta T oiabT a AiyovTEq o ti a M / EGTi t<x mpcpXTm-eva K ai Ta 
|i£AA,OVTa, TO jAEVTOl GTj|i£lOV K ai GTJPEICDTOV KCXV TOOTOiq m p o v  
TCapOVTOq EGTIV. EV T£ yap  T CO JlpOTEpCp T<p "fii 0\)A,f\V EXE I OOTO<^  
EAxoq egxtjkev obToq" to  |i£v E^Koq ysyovEV fj5r| K ai jrapcpxriKEV, 
to  Se eAkg; EGxrjKEvai tootov , a^ioopa Ka0£GTT|K6<;, evegttikev, 
jrspi ysyovoToq tivo<; teyop svov* ev te tco "si K ap S iav  TETpcoTai 
obToc;, a m 0 a v £ iT a i  obToi;" o |xev ©avaToq peAAei, to  Se 
a m 0 a v £ ia 0 a i  to o to v  a^icopa evegttikev, m pi peAA.ovtoc;
AEyopsvov, m p d  Kai vbv e g t iv  oAt|0£^
(Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.254-255)
0372 In the Augustine passage (DM 39) the emphasis is that the past tense is needed 
concerning past perceived objects when speaking of them for one is speaking about a
170
state of affairs but must alter the tense so as to clarify that one is talking about 
something previously experienced, and to clarify that it is not the state of affairs as 
memory item which one is speaking of but as something perceived in the past.
0373 To return to the signification of present states of affairs, when one is asked 
about such a state of affairs one can simply point (there are of course issues at play 
here264) and when speaking of present states of affairs one’s words by analogy point 
also (cf. Si, 0354). When looking at a new moon if B approaches and A points at the 
moon then B grasps, in addition to the significance of pointing as he has experienced 
this before, the state of affairs. Similarly one may say to B that the moon is new and 
then B (understanding the words from his memory store) will look to the moon and 
grasp the particular, presently available, state of affairs.
0374 The Stoics divided dialectic into significations and utterance (Diogenes 
Laertius 7.43); and significations into impressions and derivatively subsistent 
sayables, such as propositions (Diogenes Laertius 7.43). For Augustine these 
impressions are formal and can be accessed as sayables or as images, neither of these 
are the things themselves but are accessible aspects of them. One must essentially and 
fundamentally have had access to the state of affairs so as to be able to say it or to 
understand another’s saying it - one must have it in mind/memory so that it can be 
sayable at all.
0375 Augustine’s theory of meaning, according to this interpretation, is clearly 
Stoic in many of its aspects. However, the actual metaphysical basis for it is Platonic 
and Augustine tends towards the conclusion ostensibly arrived at in the Cratylus that 
words signify the Forms (v. sup. § 5.2.1.2.1). This must be qualified by
264 v. sup. § 4 and v. inf. § 7.
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the fact that there is a strong Aristotelian element (v. sup.5 2 .1.2A) in Augustine’s 
approach to how words actually signify these Forms265.
0376 There remain two related issues to be clarified: the place of general terms in 
this system and the role as the sayable as an objective mode of communication266.
0377 General terms are introduced, in a philosophically interesting sense, with the
discussion of signification at DM (8).
Ad. id scilicet, quod quidque appellatur, uelut Romulus, Roma, uirtus, fluuius 
et innumerabilia cetera... rerumpartim uisibilium sicut est Romulus, Roma, 
fluuius, partim intelligib ilium, sicut est uirtus.
(8)
In this passage there is Romulus, a concrete particular, Roma, again a particular, and 
virtus, an intelligible. However, it is unclear as to how one should interpret ‘fluuius’, 
for is it a particular river, or the class of all rivers, or river in abstraction. Augustine 
goes on to specify that the reference of ‘flumen’ is the thing before one and able to be 
seen now.
flumen signum sit rei, quae iam uideri potest, ut inter hanc rem et flumen,
(9)
However, taken individually these terms (fluuius and flumen) are general and yet 
when asked what one of them refers to at any particular moment one would, as it 
were, point and say “flumen is this thing here”. There is a difficulty in that Latin lacks 
an indefinite article, yet the most straightforward way that such a statement would be 
understood in any natural language would be that ‘this thing here’ is an example of 
flumen. In this sense, it seems most plausible to interpret Augustine’s approach to 
general terms as something close to Porphyry’s treatment of particulars and universals 
in Aristotle’s Categories (Porphyry, in Cat. 90,30-91,5). *flumen’ is a general term
265 The position of Forms qua transcendental items in this argument has been passed over for the 
present and will be reintroduced into the discussion with the consideration of the Inner Teacher and the 
proposed solution to the Paradox of Enquiry (v. inf. § 8 and § 9).
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which applies to a universal concept derived from particular instantiations of it. The 
term refers to its extension and when a particular instance of that class is present the 
term is used to talk about and refer to that instance there and then267. Indeed, this 
sayable universal concept is used so as to confirm that any particular instantiation is in 
fact an instantiation. It is useful to consider the role of the Form stored in the memory 
and which gives rise to that which occurs in the ‘mind’s eye’ (trin. 11.16) and the 
numerical equivalent to this which is the ‘judging number’ (mus. 6.22)268. Both of 
these examples are parallel to this concept of the general sayable.
0378 It is in this sense that the sayable as an objective mode of communication is 
most clearly understood. In Augustine the ontological background is formal and yet 
there is an interesting parallel between the role of the dicibile and the Epicurean 
concept of JtpoA,T|i|n(^69. As to whether this concept is used by Augustine as an actual 
source for his model of signification is questionable for it seems that all of the 
influences necessary for Augustine’s approach can be drawn from Stoic semantic 
theory270 and the Neoplatonic reception of Plato and the subsequent syncresis of 
Platonic ideas with those of Aristotle. Nevertheless, what is of interest is the way in 
which the parallels between the two concepts can be used to clarify Augustine’s use 
of the dicibile as an objective standard. Both dicibile and ftpoXTpjnc; are derived from 
experience and are a means whereby one may evaluate and express these experiences.
0379 As noted by O’Daly271, it seems that the dicibile, although derived from a 
specific impression of a sense-perception, is qua the meaning of a word, such as to
266 As stated in O’Daly (1987, 143) Augustine does not support a position which would imply such a 
thing as private language or the like.
267 v. sup. 0261 for the central role of Forms in this process.
268 v. sup. 0287.
269 Ruef: 1981, 187 n.203a. For a brief discussion of this cf. O’Daly: 1987, 142.
270 Indeed, as the Stoics took the term ‘ftpoXrtijnq’ over from the Epicureans and applied it to ‘natural 
concepts’, there would appear to be little need to seek out a directly Epicurean source for Augustine in 
this respect.
271 O’Daly: 1987, 142.
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allow one to both identify the particular item which has been perceived and also to 
identify other items which fall within the extension of the term. Further, any image 
which is stored in the memory and possessed of an inherent rational structure such 
that it can be presented linguistically and has propositional content, may in fact have 
more than one linguistic correlate: for example, ‘Carthage’ will also have the correlate 
‘city’. Just as these images may have more than one linguistic correlate, so too may 
the dicibile have a number of possible images, that is, images derived from the 
extension of the term. In this sense, different people may indeed have different 
thoughts but there will nevertheless be a general, objective, dicibile to correlate to the 
image of, for example, ‘city’.
0380 Rational impressions (XxjytKf] cpavtaaia) as presented in Stoicism are also 
not to be seen simply as thoughts which directly correspond to their sayable 
(Xe k t o v ) 272. For one may plausibly think of the same linguistic term in any number of 
ways: “The rational impression that my cat is hungry will be a different thought if I 
see the cat or hear the cat or reflect that I failed to feed it this morning” (LS 1: 1987, 
202.). The sayable will be correspondent to all of these thoughts, whether held by the 
same or by different people, and to this extent provides an objective means of 
communication between individuals within a shared linguistic community.
5.3. Audible Signs of Audible Signs.
0381 The discussion will now return to Augustine’s classification of signs. The 
classification had reached the point which is seen in the following schema (v. sup. 
0213).
212 C l HP 1: 1987, 201-202.
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(D16)
Things
things qua signs 
signs shown through signs
| things
signs of other signs signs of the same signs
visible audible
0382 As Augustine is particularly concerned with the disambiguation of linguistic 
signs, the classification now moves on to concentrate on audible signs273.
9740383 ‘Name’ signifies something, and this something is whatever each thing is 
called. Therefore, it can be seen that names denote or refer, as a name is that by which 
a thing is called. ‘Name’ is introduced as a audible sign, [name], which signifies other 
audible signs, [Romulus], [Rome], [virtue], [river]. ‘Name’ then signifies the concept, 
or sayable, which stands for the class, or extension, of all possible examples of it.
273 Written words, qua visible signs, are not defined as proper words (v. sup. 0211) and so are bypassed 
in Augustine’s disambiguation of linguistic signs.
274 Augustine’s use of lnomen\ and that of Latin in general during this period, is ambiguous. The term 
means ‘name’ in the broad sense o f whatever anything is called and means ‘noun’ in its specifically 
grammatical sense. The classification underway at this point in the dialogue is concerned with the 
disambiguation of linguistic terms and it should perhaps be no surprise that one of the primary terms 
under consideration is itself ambiguous. Due to the fact that much of Augustine’s following argument 
intentionally turns on the very ambiguity of the term, and to this extent enforces the thesis which 
Augustine presents concerning ambiguity o f linguistic terms (i.e. that only context can bring about 
disambiguation - and even that only does so partially), ‘nomen’ will be translated as ‘name’. The sense 
o f ‘name’ must be understood as encompassing both o f the English ‘noun’ and ‘name’, sometimes 
meaning one, sometimes the other, and often shifting between the two. To have attempted to fix the 
meaning at any point, beyond the most obvious (such as where ‘nomen’ is defined grammatically as 
‘noun’), would be to limit, and often obscure, Augustine’s purpose and would run the risk of losing 
altogether the complex movement which Adeodatus undergoes from a one dimensional understanding 
of the term (i.e. ‘nome«’ = noun) to an altogether broader and more complex grasp o f the fluidity of the 
term.
things qua things
shown through things shown through 
signs performance
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Aug. id quoque te arbitror assentiri, cum dicimus nomen, significare nos 
aliquid.
Ad. uerum est.
Aug. quid tandem?
Ad. id scilicet, quod quidque appellatur, uelut Romulus, Roma, uirtus, fluuius 
et innumerabilia cetera.
(8)
0384 While the general term ‘name’ signifies all particular names, these names
signify things. Names are signs and what are named by these signs are items which
can be signified, namely signifiables.
Aug. num ista quattuor nomina nullas res significant?
Ad. immo aliquas.
Aug. num nihil distat inter haec nomina et eas res, quae his significantur?
Ad. immo plurimum.
Aug. uellem abs te audire, quidnam id sit.
Ad. hoc uel in primis, quod haec signa sunt, ilia non sunt.
Aug. placetne appellemus significabilia ea...
(8)
0385 Signifiables are, primarily, defined as those items which can be signified by
signs but are not signs themselves.
Aug. ...significabilia ea, quae signis significaripossunt et signa non sunt, sicut 
ea, quae uideripossunt, uisibilia nominamus...
(8)
0386 However, signifiables may also be signs themselves, for names themselves can
be signified as was seen with the example of perceptual distinctions in signification: a
written word is a visible sign of a spoken word, which is an audible sign.
Aug. quid? ilia quattuor signa, quaepaulo ante pronuntiasti, nullo ne alio 
signo significantur?
Ad. miror quod iam mihi excidisse arbitraris, quod ea quae scribuntur eorum, 
quae uoce proferuntur, signorum signa esse comperimus.
Aug. die inter ista quid distet.
Ad. quod ilia uisibilia sunt, haec audibilia; cur enim non et hoc nomen 
admittas, si admisimus significabilia?
(8)
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0387 Also, with regards to audible signs alone, there are those which, in addition to
signifying, are also themselves signified. Particular names signify, but these
particulars are themselves in turn signified themselves by the general term ‘name’.
Ad. hoc quoque recentius dictum recordor; nam nomen responderam 
significare aliquid et huic significationi quattuor ista subieceram, et illud 
autem et haec, siquidem uoce proferuntur, audibilia esse cognosco.
Aug. quid ergo inter audibile signum et audibilia significata, quae rursus 
signa sunt, interest?
(8)
0388 It is notable that only at this point in the dialogue is the theme of signification 
felt to have been sufficiently clarified for the term ‘signification to be introduced, the 
sense being of signification in the abstract, in separation from its ‘bearer’.
0389 The division between this class of audible signs and their audible significata
depends upon their respective objects of signification. ‘Name’ is an audible sign of
audible signs, while names are audible signs of things, both visible and intelligible275.
Ad. inter illud quidem, quod dicimus nomen, et haec quattuor, quae 
significationi eius subiecimus, hoc distare uideo, quod illud audibile signum 
est signorum audibilium, haec uero audibilia quidem signa sunt, non tamen 
signorum, sed rerum partim uisibilium sicut est Romulus, Roma, fluuius, 
partim intellegibilium, sicut est uirtus.
(8)
0390 The next stage in Augustine’s classification can therefore be schematised as 
follows.
(D17)
audible signs
signs of things signs of signs
275 Both signs are clearly signs o f things but audible signs of audible signs are signs of things qua signs, 
while audible signs of things are signs of things qua things (v. sup. 0086-0092).
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5.4. Words and Names.
0391 ‘Word’ signifies ‘name’ and so ‘name’ falls under the broader classification
‘word’ and is within its class or extension.
Aug. ...scisne omnia, quae uoce articulata cum aliquo significatuproferuntur, 
uerba appellari?
Ad. scio.
Aug. ergo et nomen uerbum est, quando quidem id uidemus cum aliquo 
significatu articulata uoce proferri, et cum dicimus disertum hominem bonis 
uerbis uti etiam nominibus utique utitur...
Aug. concedis igitur his duabus syllabis, quas edimus, cum dicimus uerbum, 
nomen quoque significari et ob hoc illud huius signum esse.
Ad. concedo.
(9)
0392 The question is raised as to the difference between ‘word’, which is a sign of
‘name’, and ‘name’, whose sign it is. It is also worth clarification that the
classificatory distinctions which are of importance here relate to a disambiguation of
signs with reference to their significations. The word ‘river’, [river], is a sign of a
thing, <river>; the word ‘name’, [name], is a sign of a sign of a thing, [river]; while
the word ‘word’, [word], is a sign of a sign of signs, [name],
Aug. hoc quoque respondeas uelim: cum uerbum signum sit nominis et nomen 
signum sit fluminis et flumen signum sit rei, quae iam uideri potest, ut inter 
hanc rem et flumen, id est signum eius, et inter hoc signum et nomen, quod 
huius signi signum est dixisti quid inter sit, quid inter esse arbitraris inter 
signum nominis quod uerbum esse comperimus et ipsum nomen, cuius signum 
est?
(9)
0393 It is posited, concerning the difference between ‘name’ and ‘word’, that 
although ‘word’ signifies all names, ‘name’ does not signify all words. That is to say, 
there is a difference in extension between the terms: all names are words, not all 
words are names. It should be noted that ‘nomen’ is in this context translated as 
‘name’ for the argument at this point and following depends to some extent on how
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one understands ‘nomen. There is a certain movement between nomen qua noun, and
nomen as the more general ‘name’ (v. sup. 0383, n.274).
Ad. hoc distare intellego, quod ea quae significantur nomine, etiam uerbo 
significantur - ut enim nomen uerbum est, ita et flumen uerbum est - quae 
autem uerbo significantur, non omnia significantur et nomine, nam et illud si 
quod in capite habet abs te propositus uersus et hoc ex, de quo iam diu 
agentes in haec duce ratione peruenimus uerba sunt nec tamen nomina et talia 
multa inueniuntur. quamobrem cum omnia nomina uerba sint, non autem 
omnia uerba nomina sint, planum esse arbitror, quid inter uerbum distet et 
nomen, id est inter signum signi eius, quod nulla alia signa significat, et 
signum signi eius, quod rursus alia signa significat.
(9)
0394 That the distinction is one of extension is emphasised by the use of an
analogy: ‘Every horse is an animal, not every animal is a horse’276. It is of
significance that the use of ‘uerbum’ meaning ‘verb’ is noted, and that it is made clear
that the term is to be understood generally, just as ‘sign’ can be specifically or
generally applied. Yet this same point is not clarified with regard to the other word
under consideration, namely, ‘nomen\
Aug. concedisne omnem equum animal esse nec tamen omne animal equum 
esse?
Ad. quis dubitauerit?
Aug. hoc ergo inter nomen et uerbum, quod inter equum et animal interest, 
nisi forte ab assentiendo id te reuocat, quod dicimus et alio modo uerbum, quo 
significantur ea, quae per tempora declinantur, ut scribo scripsi, lego legi, 
quae manifestum est non esse nomina.
Ad. dixisti omnino quod me dubitare faciebat.
Aug. ne te istuc moueat; dicimus enim et signa uniuersaliter omnia, quae 
significant aliquid, ubi etiam uerba esse inuenimus. dicimus item signa 
militaria, quae iam proprie signa nominantur, quo uerba non pertinent, et 
tamen si tibi dicerem: ut omnis equus animal, non autem omne animal equus, 
ita omne uerbum signum, non autem omne signum uerbum esse, nihil ut 
opinor dubitares.
276 Extension is most accurately understood in this sense as relating to the Porphyrian interpretation of 
Aristotelian predication in the Categories (Porphyry, in Cat. 90,30-91,5) for the analysis o f these terms, 
‘name’ and ‘word’, by Augustine is framed within the context of the Aristotelian treatment of 
predication. What clarifies the categories of genus and species is the fact that the genus can be 
predicated of the species - such as ‘Every man is an animal’ or ‘Every name is a word’. However, the 
linguistic focus upon the application of the terms is Porphyrian in that the relation of predication to 
subject depends upon the fact that the predicate depends upon its extension, or class of particulars, for 
its meaning (v. sup. 0261; 0377).
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0395 
(D18)
Ad. iam intellego etprorsus assentior hoc interesse inter uniuersale illud 
uerbum et nomen, quod inter animal et equum.
(9)
The next section of the schema of classification is now as follows.
audible signs
signs of things signs of signs
signs of signs signs of signs
of things of signs
0396 The overall classification will now be given before moving on to the two final 
classifications aimed at the disambiguation of the various modes of signification as 
developed thus far by Augustine (DM 7-9).
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(D19)
Things
things qua signs things qua things
signs shown through signs ______________________
| things shown through things shown through
______________________  signs performance
signs of other signs signs of the same signs
visible signs audible signs
signs of things signs of signs
signs of signs of things signs of signs of signs
0397 The process of classification has clearly proceeded to disambiguate the various 
modes of signification and has also demonstrated a method for doing so.
Consideration will now turn to the two final modes and to the most complicated areas 
of linguistic ambiguity.
5.5. Self-signifving Signs.
0398 There is a distinction between the word itself and the word in that it signifies. 
This is to say, there is the distinction between the word qua thing and word qua
7 7 7  * 7 7  8  *signifier (as DDC 1 . 2 ) .  This focuses upon the use/mention distinction” , in that
277 V. sup. 0082-0092.
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‘animal’ is the three syllable word [animal] when mentioned, and is that which
signifies a particular item, <animal>, when used.
Aug. scisne, etiam cum dicimus animal, aliud esse hoc trisyllabum nomen, 
quod uoce prolatum est, aliud id quod significat?
Ad. iam hoc supra concessi de omnibus signis et significabilibus.
(10)
Implicit in this distinction is the definition of ‘verbum’ (DM 8)279, in which there is 
the differentiation between uttered sound (uox) and signification (significatus). This 
distinction is fully clarified with the sonus and significatio division of uerbum (DM 
8)280.
0399 Some signs signify something else, but some signify themselves also and to
this extent may be classified as self-signifying signs. ‘Sign’ is an example of the
latter, for ‘sign’ signifies other signs but also signifies itself qua word, which
necessarily is a sign.
Aug. num omnia signa tibi uidentur aliud significare quam sunt, sicut hoc 
trisyllabum, cum dicimus animal, nullo modo idem significat quod est ipsum? 
Ad. non sane; nam cum dicimus signum, non solum signa cetera quaecumque 
sunt, sed etiam se ipsum significat; est enim uerbum et utique omnia uerba 
signa sunt.
(10)
0400 ‘Word’ is another example of such self-signifying signs, for ‘word’ signifies
both other words and itself qua word. ‘ Verbum ’ has already been clarified as being
used in the general sense of ‘word’ and not in the more specific sense of ‘verb’ (DM 
(^281
Aug. num omnia signa tibi uidentur aliud significare quam sunt, sicut hoc 
trisyllabum, cum dicimus animal, nullo modo idem significat quod est ipsum?
278 Use/mention is an extremely interesting area of discussion in the DM and, as will be seen, does not 
accord strictly with the standard modern interpretation of these terms and the distinction highlighted by 
them. The distinction is first introduced here for discussion in the DM but as it is most fully considered 
later in the DM (cf. § 5.6.2.5 and § 6).
279 v. sup. 0214.
280 v. sup. 0388.
281 v. sup. 0394.
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Ad. non sane; nam cum dicimus signum, non solum signa cetera quaecumque 
sunt, sed etiam se ipsum significat; est enim uerbum et utique omnia uerba 
signa sunt.
(10)
0401 Both ‘signum’ and ‘verbum’ are uncontroversial as self-signifying signs and
the same may be said for the third term introduced by Augustine, ‘nomen’. This use of
‘nomen’ is applied most specifically in its aspect qua noun. It is clear that the same
point applies to ‘nomen’ qua, the more general, name (cf. DD 10.66-69). However,
what is of interest to the development of Augustine’s argument as developed over the
following few sections (DM 10-18) is that the initial position clearly fixes the use of
‘nomen’ in its aspect qua noun. It is at this point that there begins the blurring of
reference between ‘name’ in general and ‘name’ in particular. Here ‘nomen’
specifically means (and legitimately so, with regards to the point being made at
present in the argument) noun but the point being made concerning self-signifying
signs applies equally to ‘nomen’ qua name in its broadest sense.
Aug. quid? nomen nonne similiter habet? nam et omnium generum nomina 
significat et ipsum nomen generis neutri nomen est. an si ex te quaererem, 
quae pars orationis nomen, posses mihi recte respondere nisi nomen?
Ad. uerum dicis.
(10)
0402 The treatment of ‘nomen’ at this point is philosophically significant for unlike
the treatment of ‘uerbum’ there is no clear signalling of the general/specific
distinction beforehand, but rather there is a shift in focus in the use of the term over
the course of the central sentence.
... nam et omnium generum nomina significat et ipsum nomen generis neutri 
nomen est.
In the context of the previous discussion, in the DM, one has a general sense of 
‘nomen’ as meaning the non-specific ‘name’ while in the course of this sentence the 
sense shifts to such an extent that it is clear by the next sentence that ‘nomen’ means
‘noun’. The development of this is created by the shift in context provided by the 
word 4genus' which, like 4nomen\ can initially be interpreted generally as ‘kind’282, 
or the like, but in its second occurrence is most readily rendered ‘gender’ due to the 
qualifying pronominal adjective 4neuter’. The purpose behind this is so as to draw 
both Adeodatus and the reader into making assumptions about Augustine’s use of the 
word "nomen’ and so create a pregnant situation for bringing about insight into the 
related themes of use/mention and the inherent ambiguity in all language.
0403 The shift in meaning which occurs for both 4nomen’ and 4genus’ focuses the 
ambiguity in Augustine’s choice of words283 and the necessity for the hearer/reader to 
interpret these ambiguous words depending on the context within which they occur. 
The development of Augustine’s argument concerning these observations will be 
considered incrementally as each passage is discussed in its place. However, at 
present, it is worth drawing attention to three key terms, which will be of great 
importance in the development of Augustine’s argument over the remainder of the 
DM. These are: ambiguity, context, and interpretation.
0404 From the examples o f 4signum’, 4uerbum’, and "nomen’ the conclusion is 
reached that there are signs which signify themselves, as well as signifying other 
things.
Aug. sunt ergo signa, quae inter alia, quae significant, et se ipsa significent.
(10)
282 Cf. translation by King: 1995, 108 n. 29.
283 If one holds to a consistent translation o f these terms one achieves two rather different possible 
sentences.
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5.6. Reciprocal Signs.
0405 The question is now raised as to whether there are signs which can signify 
each other in turn. Examples of signs which signify each other reciprocally are ‘name’ 
(inomen) and ‘word’ {uerbum). This can be seen in the fact that both ‘name’ and 
‘word’ are both words, and likewise are both names (or, to make the point more 
clearly, nouns).
Aug. tu ergo nescis, cum dicimus nomen et uerbum, duo uerba nos dicere?
Ad. scio.
Aug. quid? illud nescis, cum dicimus nomen et uerbum, duo nomina nos 
dicer e?
( 11)
Therefore the conclusion is reasonably drawn that these signs, ‘word’ and ‘name’,
signify each other reciprocally.
Aug. scis igitur tarn nomen uerbo quam etiam uerbum nomine significari.
(11)
0406 ‘Name’ and ‘word’ may reciprocally signify, in that ‘name’ is a word and
word is a ‘name’, but there remains the issue as to how they differ, as indeed they do,
other than between how they are written or how they sound.
Aug. potesne dicere, excepto eo quod diuerse scribuntur et sonant, quid inter 
se differant?
( 11)
0407 It is proposed that the divergence lies in the fact that all names are words but
not all words are names. Therefore, there must clearly some divergence in the
extension of the two terms, for if this proposal is correct then it would seem that
‘name’, and by implication the extension of the term (all examples of names falling
within the class), are part of a species of the wider genus that is ‘word’.
Ad. possum fortasse; nam id esse uideo, quodpaulo ante dixi. uerba enim cum 
dicimus, omne quod articulata uoce cum aliquo significatu profertur,
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significamus. unde omne nomen et ipsum cum dicimus nomen uerbum est; at 
non omne uerbum nomen est, quamuis nomen sit, cum dicimus uerbum.
(11)
0408 Augustine does not, at this point, give enough attention to the possibility of a 
difference in extension to clarify the issue. There is a movement towards the need for 
a definition of sorts, for although the extension may be different, the reason for this 
difference must be clarified. However, before an attempt at this is made it is proposed 
that, as it is difficult to determine how the two terms differ, it may be that their 
extension is in fact the same but that they differ in some other way. The proposal (2) 
that it may be that every word is a name and that every name is a word dismisses the 
prior proposal (1) that every name is a word but not every word is a name. Proposal
(1) is insufficiently tested, indeed it is in fact not tested at all, but rather, as soon as it 
is found that it is difficult to determine the difference in extension between the two 
terms, hypothesis (1) is set aside and the new hypothesis (2) is introduced. Augustine 
can be seen in this to assume that all words are names and although he does proceed 
to argue this point, it must be said that he does proceed rather too lightly to hypothesis
(2) at this stage in the argument.
0409 This said, the hypothesis (2) that is raised is a rather interesting one. The
suggestion is forwarded that the extension of the terms may be the same but that there
may be a difference in signification.
Aug. quid? si omnia quidem, quae uoce articulata cum aliquo significatu 
proferuntur, et uerba sunt et nomina, sed tamen alia de causa uerba et alia de 
causa nomina sunt, nihilne distabit inter nomen et uerbum?
Ad. quomodo istuc sit non intellego.
Aug. hoc saltern intellegis omne coloratum uisibile esse et omne uisibile 
coloratum, quamuis haec duo uerba distincte differenterque significent.
Ad. intellego.
Aug. quid? si ergo ita et omne uerbum nomen et omne nomen uerbum est, 
quamuis haec ipsa duo nomina uel duo uerba, id est nomen et uerbum, 
differentem habeant significationem?
Ad. iam uideo posse id accidere, sed quomodo id accidat, expecto ut ostendas.
( 12)
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There is therefore a difference between what one refers to and how one understands, 
or thinks about, what one refers to. This proposal of course raises for the modem 
reader the spectre of Frege’s ‘SinrC and ‘ Bedeutung’1** and in an extremely broad 
sense it is not unhelpful to use Frege’s example. However, it is important that one 
should not introduce too much of the actual philosophical distinctions which Frege is 
specifically making into the discussion285. Augustine’s treatment of these issues are 
not Fregean, or vice versa. This said, the idea of sameness and identity which is 
central to Frege’s analysis is also an important theme, albeit implicit, in the DM. The 
DM centrally focuses upon the nature of identification which clearly entails the ability 
to differentiate and to identify sameness. For both philosophers these considerations 
lead to a consideration of reference: namely, what is referred to in a linguistic act and 
how is it referred to.
0410 Therefore, with this caveat, one may see a broad relationship between the 
distinction drawn by Frege in his analysis of ‘Sinn’ and ‘Bedeutung,286 and the 
distinction in Augustine287 between what is referred to and how it is understood.
In the Augustinian analysis one may have the extension (X) of term x and the 
extension (7) of termy such that all the particulars of class X  are members of class Y,
^ o o
and vice versa: all particular names are words, and all particular words are names
284 Frege: ^liber Sinn und Bedeutung", Zeitschr.f. Philos, undPhilos. Kritik, 100 (1892).
285 Although there is a general relatedness due to a concern with similar philosophical problems, it is 
not helpful to introduce such distinctions as Frege is making into Augustine’s argument. Both 
philosophers have their own metaphysical background to which the foreground of language analysis 
can be applied and it is important to avoid any confusion which may arise from a comparison of the 
linguistic foreground of the two philosophers so as not to imply that this suggests a comparison 
between the metaphysical backgrounds. Perhaps of most importance to this following discussion is not 
to confuse the Fregean ‘Bedeutung’ with what is here called ‘extension’ with reference to Augustine’s 
analysis. The ‘sense’/ ’reference’ terminology will be considered, in regard to Augustine, in due course 
(v. inf. § 5.6.1).
286 This broadness essentially avoids the specifics o f the terms ‘Sinn/Bedeutung' in the Fregean 
analysis, particularly ‘Bedeutung’ (cf. Evans: 1982, 8-10). Also, one should note that the similarity is in 
the distinction between these terms (‘Sinn’ and ‘Bedeutung’) not between the terms themselves.
287 This distinction in Augustine ultimately deriving from Stoic semantics (v. sup. § 5.2.1.2.5.5).
288 The obvious objection that all words are not names will be discussed below (§ 5.6.2).
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Therefore, the extension (X/Y) encompasses all possible references of the terms jc and
y-
(D20)
cm
X
In terms of their extension these terms are therefore identical, that is to say, that 
“... any two co-referring expressions can be intersubstituted anywhere salva verite 
(Evans: 1982, 9). However, this does not entail a semantic identity. The distinction is 
comparable to that in (a = a) and (a = b)\ where (a = a) reflects a semantic identity 
and (a = b) reflects an extensional identity.
0411 In this sense one may consider a particular from the extension of two such 
terms (‘name’ and ‘word’), for example ‘river’.
(D21)
‘river’
‘word’ <—> ‘name’
‘River’ is a word and ‘river’ is a name such that the reference of both terms is 
identical, extensionally. Therefore, it is in this way that (‘word’ = ‘name’) and 
(‘name’ = ‘word’), as {a = b), but these both differ from (‘word’ = ‘word’) and
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(‘name5 = ‘name’), as {a = a). This point clearly focuses the central analysis of 
Augustine in the DM, that one must not only know what is being referred to but, 
crucially, one must know how it is being referred to. Strictly speaking, for Augustine 
to know how one is referring to something is actually to know what it is that is being 
referred to. That is to say, the object of reference is a mentally graspable item (formal
289in content) and this item is what is thought about and expressed linguistically, in 
sayable terms, by the speaker. So to know how a speaker is referring to an item is in 
effect to know what it is that the speaker is referring to290.
5.6.1. Word and Sound. Name and Thought.
0412 Augustine further clarifies the distinction between what is referred to by a 
word, or its extension (the tantum)291, and how this referent is referred to, or its sense 
(the significatio) , by recourse to etymologising.
289 V. sup. § 5.2.1.2.5.6.
290 This fact in Augustinian semantics will ultimately be fatal for language as a mode of teaching but 
not necessarily as a mode o f communication (cf. § 8 and § 9).
291 Adeodatus summarises the first section of the argument (DM 19-20) and in so doing describes the 
types of signs of reciprocal significance in the following terms: “in hoc autem genere, quo inuicem se 
significant, quaedam non tcmtum, quaedam tantum, qnaedam uero etiam idem ualere monstratum e s f  
(DM 20). Words which signify the same as each other quantitatively, or extensionally, are describes as 
those which ‘tantum . .. valere’. For this reason Augustine’s concept of extension will be rendered by 
the term ‘ tantum ’, these words signify as much as each other in that every member o f the class of one 
word is the same as the class of another - they are numerically, or quantatively, identical. This passage 
(DM 20) is well discussed in a footnote in King’s translation, King: 1995, 120 n. 50.
292 The terms ‘extension’, ‘intension’, ‘sense’, and ‘reference/meaning’ (in the Fregean sense) are all 
problematic translations for Augustine’s analysis of the distinction variously drawn by such terms. 
‘Extension’ is in many respects least problematic for, in the sense that the extension is the class or set 
of items to which a term refers, it is acceptable to Augustine’s argument as presented in the DM. The 
Fregean analysis o f ‘reference/meaning’ {Bedeutung) is problematic in that it can include concepts and 
so is not to be seen as the extension in any standard sense of the term. ‘Sense’ and ‘intension’ are 
broadly similar in that they denote the concept/description under which a particular extension falls. In 
the Augustinian approach one should perhaps consider the tantum or extension as the class of all items 
falling under a particular term (or terms, for, as discussed, different senses/intensions can correspond to 
the same extension). While the significatio or intension/sense is the comprehensible and sayable formal 
element whereby any member of an extension can be picked out and understood as such. In this sense, 
the Augustinian distinction of these two elements do to an extent collapse into one, the fact of this is 
due to the formal nature o f the metaphysical background to his linguistic analysis.
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Aug. omne, quod cum aliquo significatu articulata uoce prorumpit, 
animaduertis ut opinor et aurem uerberare, ut sentiri, et memoriae mandari, 
ut nosci possit.
Ad. animaduerto.
Aug. duo ergo quaedam contingunt, cum aliquid tali uoce proferimus.
Ad. ita est.
Aug. quid? si horum duorum ex uno appellata sunt uerba ex altero nomina, 
uerba scilicet a uerberando, nomina uero a noscendo, ut illudprimum ab 
auribus, hoc autem secundum ab animo uocari meruerit?
(12)
Words {uerba) are so called due to the effect they have on the ear {aurem uerberare), 
names {nomina) due to the effect they have on the mind {nosci). These etymologies 
introduce the crucial element, in any complete analysis of the semiotic relations at 
play in the communicative processes, namely, that of causality. How a particular word 
is understood qua word is due to its conceptual, or formally intelligible, relationship 
to the ear as sound and how a particular name is understood qua name is due to its 
conceptual, or formally intelligible, relationship to the mind as signification.
0413 It is clear that there is a causal link between the word and its reference. This 
link is the formal relation293 which holds among all members of a class and the formal 
relation which allows one not merely to grasp such a member but also to assent 
propositionally to it as such a member and to be able to describe it as such, qua 
sayable item, to others.
0414 The twofold classification into sound and signification parallels with that in 
the definition of uerbum (DM 8; 0214). Vox is parallel with sentiri while significatus 
is parallel with nosci, and there is the additional idea of the intelligible item being 
consigned to, and accessible from, the memory {memoriae mandari). The parallel 
between significatus and nosci reintroduces the idea that words have both an element 
relating to the ear, and one relating to the mind, that there is in effect an outer 
(uttered) word and an inner word (the word sounding within): the outer word enabling
190
one to perceive it, the inner enabling one to consign something to memory and know 
it. At this point the concept of signification is germane, for a word is an uttered sound 
which signifies something and it is knowing that to which a word signifies which is 
what constitutes knowing the word.
0415 It is now possible to draw out a number of factors relating to memory in the
process involved in linguistic signs. The involvement of these processes are suggested
as early as DM 2 and this passage can now, in the light of the intervening sections, be
more fully understood.
A.: ... quamuis nullum edamus sonum, tamen, quia ipsa uerba cogitamus, nos 
intus apud animum loqui, sic quoque locutione nihil aliud agere quam 
commemorare, cum memoria, cui uerba inhaerent, ea reuoluendo facit uenire 
in mentem res ipsas, quarum signa sunt uerba.
(2)
The uttered word is related, by the speaker/hearer, to the word sounding within294, this 
is not the concept of the word but rather the subvocal word, which enables one to 
remember the word qua sound. The word, either vocal or subvocal, bears a 
signification, which one recalls via the vocal, subvocal, word and this signification is 
an intelligible item which one has stored in one’s memory. The mental item, in turn, 
correlates to an particular item to which it directs (when the item is present) one’s 
attention.
5.6.2. All Words are Names.
0416 The above discussion of extension {tantum) and sense {significatio) omitted to 
consider the one glaring problem in this distinction as presented in DM 12, namely 
the role of names in Augustine’s argument. The problem is not fatal for the distinction
293 V. sup. § 5.2.1.2 5.6.
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of sense and extension per se but it does cause difficulties for it as presented by
Augustine. The fact of the matter is that although it would seem obvious, and
commonly acceptable, that all names are words, the same is by no means the case for
the proposal that all words are names (or, nouns, to put the problem in the most
extreme sense, available to the Latin speaker, for ‘nomen )295. Adeodatus, correctly,
raises this issue and states that he will not concede the point until Augustine can show
that all words are indeed names just as all names are words.
Ad. concedam cum ostenderis, quomodo recte possimus omnia uerba nomina 
dicere.
(13)
0417 The issue concerning all words being names and the relation of these terms to 
the wider distinction of extension {tantum) and sense {significatio) occurs due to the 
fact that Augustine is specifically concerned with the question of knowledge 
acquisition and the role of language in this process. It is on account of this specific 
concern of Augustine’s in the DM that the problematic example of nomen is used in 
the argument, for the extension/sense distinction is introduced as part of a wider 
concern. This concern involves the attempt to disambiguate linguistic (and semiotic) 
items so that one may achieve the point where a term may clearly and unambiguously 
refer to its significatum and be so understood by the sign receiver.
0418 Augustine embarks on a series of five arguments in an attempt to clarify the 
point that all words are names. The position adopted reveals itself to be distinctly 
Stoic in its approach and employs what is most plausibly interpreted as the Stoic
294 How this relation occurs must be considered in the light of Augustine’s approach to language 
learning. For discussion o f this see below (§ 8.1.3).
295 In the diagram above (D21, 0411) it is clear that the model makes sense with an unproblematic 
linguistic item such a ‘river’ but this unproblematic term begs the question as to how Augustine might 
explain less clear cases such as verbs, adverbs, conjunctions, etc., for it seems rather strained to 
describe a conjunction, such as ‘and’, as a name (or, more extremely, as a noun) and if it is a name, 
what exactly is the item which it purports to name.
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296theory of ambiguity . Augustine has progressively refined his classification of signs 
until the point as it now stands where the final distinction between terms is their 
sense, or signification, and in defending the use of "nomen, when considered with 
‘uerbum', as an example of this he gives consideration to the final level of 
disambiguation of linguistic signs, namely, the question as to the possibility that, 
when stripped of all extraneous ambiguities, a term can be understood unambiguously 
in terms of its signification and the reference of that signification.
0419 In the process of developing this argument Augustine uses the primary 
example of ‘nomen\ both for the specific purpose of supporting the sense/extension 
distinction, and for the wider purpose of attempting to clarify this final level of 
possible ambiguity in linguistic signs. "Nomerf is the primary example for the reason 
that this final level of ambiguity turns on the use-mention distinction (or a form of it), 
a distinction which, as will be seen, itself depends upon the role of naming in 
linguistic acts. "Nomen’ is also a particularly well chosen example due to the fact that 
it both serves as a term which can be used (when considered with uerbum) to reveal 
the secondary level of ambiguity in linguistic signs, namely that of the 
extension/sense distinction, while it also raises the question as to whether all words 
are names and so introduces the final level of potential ambiguity, namely that 
concerning the sense of particular terms.
0420 The philosophical background of the following discussion of "nomen\ and the 
subsequent development of Augustine’s thesis over the second half of the DM, 
concerns the Stoic classification of fallacies. In particular, Augustine is concerned 
with that class involving ambiguity297.
296 V. m /§ 6 .1 .
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a|X(pipoA,ia S e  e a x i  S v o  f\ K a i r c A d o v a  r c p a y p a x a
crn ia .cavo'uaa A£ktikcd<; K a i icuplcoq K a i K a x a  t o  a u x o  £0o<;, 
a>a0 ’ a f i a  x a  J iA d o v a  £ K 6 e ^ a a 0 a i K a x a  x a o x r jv  x f]v  A i^ iv .
(Diogenes Laertius 7.62)
0421 The related classes of ambiguity which are of concern to Augustine in the DM
are those relating to simple and complex expressions298.
xas 8e Siacpopaq xd>v teyopivcov a|i<pi(5oX,id)v abxaq XxpcxEov... 
5£t)X£pa 5e rcapa xfjv £v xoiq aftAxriq <bpa)vupiav>, olov 
"av5p£io<;", p yap xtxcbv r\ avOpcorcoc;- xpixov 8e m p a  xfiv ev xoiq 
aov0£xoi<; ojicovoixiav, olov "av0pa>Ji6<; £axiv"- aji<pif}oA.o<; yap o 
X o yo c , £ix£ xqv ouaiav £tx£ xfjv ftxcbatv dvai ar|ja.aiv£i.
(Galen, soph. 4)
Augustine will, however, concern himself primarily with the first class (the second - 
S£\)X£pa - in Galen’s list), namely simple expressions. However, the manner in which 
he concerns himself with such expressions is seen rather in Galen’s example given for 
complex expressions, for what makes the complex expression is the ambiguity 
concerning the question as to whether the term ‘av0pGO7to<;’ signifies the external, 
extra-linguistic, item or signifies the word itself. Such ambiguities involving simple 
and complex expressions would seem to concern the same central ambiguity: with 
simple expressions there are two, or more, possible significations for the ambiguous 
term; while for complex expressions, an ambiguous term, or string of ambiguous 
terms, is not disambiguated by context299 and, therefore, for such expressions also 
there may be more than one possible signification. For example, “Man is” is 
ambiguous in a way in which “Man is a three letter word” is not.
297 The following discussion relies on the excellent study of Stoic treatment of ambiguity by Atherton 
for its analysis o f the Stoic position and to some extent also for Augustine’s position.: Atherton: 1993.
298 Simple expressions will be considered primarily due to the fact that they are central to Augustine’s 
wider concerns, and the requirements of his argument in the DM, however, complex expressions will 
be referred to as necessary.
299 Consideration will be given to the important term ‘context’, and its application, in due course.
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0422 The treatment of such ambiguities ultimately depends on Chrysippus300 and a
consideration of relevant statements attested to Chrysippus will assisit in
understanding the import of Augustine’s thesis concerning ‘nomina’. In addition, as
argued in Atherton (1993, 37-8; 289-310), it will be shown that Augustine will in turn
assist in making sense of the difficult and fragmentary remains of the Stoic treatment
of what may be termed autonymous ambiguity301 and its relation to the statement
attested to Chrysippus that every word is by nature ambiguous.
Chrysippus ait omne uerbum ambiguum natura esse, quoniam ex eodem duo 
uel plura accipi possunt.
(Aulus Gellius 11.12.1)302
0423 The five arguments employed by Augustine concerning the nominal aspect of 
all words will now be considered. The arguments are: the argument from pronouns; 
that from verbs; that from foreign languages; that from authority; and that from 
logical form.
5.6.2.1. Argument from Pronouns.
0424 The standard definition303 given in schools (grammatico reddidisti) for a 
pronoun is cited such that it is used in place of a noun/name but with less full 
signification.
Aug. facile est; nam credo te accepisse ac tenere pronomen dictum, quod pro 
ipso nomine ualeat, rem tamen notet minus plena significatione quam nomen.
300 Chrysippus’ interest in fallacy in general and ambiguity in particular can be seen from the list of 
works on logic attested in Diogenes Laertius (7.192-198).
301 v. inf. § 5.6.2.5.
302 Cf. also Cicero, inv. 2.117; Quintillian, inst. 7.9.1; Augustine, DD 8-9.
303 Cf. M. Valerius Probus, gramm. 131.1.
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nam ut opinor ita definiuit ille, quem grammatico reddidisti: pronomen est 
pars orationis, quae pro ipso posita nomine minus quidem plene idem tamen 
significat304
(13)
From this definition it is asserted that pronouns can only replace names.
Aug. uides igitur secundum hanc definitionem nullis nisi nominibus seruire et 
pro his sol is poni posse pronomina, uelut cum dicimus hie uir, ipse rex, eadem 
mulier, hoc aurum, illud argentum, hie, ipse, eadem, hoc, illud pronomina 
esse, uir, rex, mulier, aurum, argentum nomina, quibus plenius quam illis 
pronominibus res significatae sunt.
(13)
As pronouns can be shown to replace words such as conjunctions, it is therefore
argued that it follows that these conjunctions must also be names.
Aug. tu ergo nunc mihipaucas coniunctiones quaslibet enuntia.
Ad. et, que, at, atque.
Aug. haec omnia, quae dixisti, non tibi uidentur esse nomina?
Ad. non omnino.
Aug. ego saltern tibi recte locutus uideor, cum dicerem: haec omnia, quae 
dixisti?
Ad. recteprorsus et iam intellego, quam mirabiliter ostenderis me nomina 
enuntiasse; non enim aliter de his recte did potuisset haec omnia.
(13)
0425 Adeodatus states as a possible objection that4haec’ can refer to sets of words
and therefore ‘all these’ {haec omnia) can be said of a set of, for example,
conjunctions because the pronoun is in effect a periphrasis for ‘all these words’ {haec
uerba omnia). Consequently, as ‘words’ is a name, the pronoun {haec) was attached
to the implicit name, ‘words’.
Ad. ...sed enim uereor adhuc, ne propter ea mihi recte locutus uideor is, quod 
has quattuor coniunctiones etiam uerba esse non nego, ut ideo de his recte 
did potuerit haec omnia, quoniam recte dicitur haec uerba omnia, si autem a 
me quaeras, quae sit pars orationis uerba, nihil aliud respondebo quam 
nomen. quare huic nomini fortasse pronomen adiunctum est, ut ilia recta esset 
locutio tua.
(13)
304 This definition is virtually identical with that given in Augustine’s de grammatical arspro fratrum 
mediocritate breuiata: “pronomen est pars orationis quae pro ipso nomine posita minus quidem bene
196
5.6.2.2. Argument from Verbs.
0426 Augustine proceeds to focus his argument in a manner which does not concern 
the formal appearance of the word or its sound but rather is concerned with the word’s 
signification. Words consist of a sound (and letters) which signify something. All 
words have a meaning and thus for Augustine there is a ‘thing’305 which they signify. 
A word is what something is called, or named, and so all words are, in this sense, 
names.
Aug. uerba certe sono et litter is constant.
Ad. ita est.
Aug. ergo, ut eapotissimum auctoritate utamur, quae nobis carissima est, cum 
ait Paulus apostolus: «non erat in Christo est et non, sed est in illo erat», non 
opinor putandum est tres istas litteras, quas enuntiamus, cum dicimus est, 
fuisse in Christo, sed illud potius, quod istis tribus litter is significatur.
Ad. uerum dicis.
(14)
0427 Words are what one ‘calls’ what one signifies. The sound, and letters, of the
word are irrelevant to this point. Augustine demonstrates this through the use of the
relative clause where its antecedent* functions as a name: the answer to the question
‘What do you call what was in him?’ is ‘It is called *’. Therefore, if ‘esf  was in him,
it is called ‘e s f . Augustine employs the verbal form to argue that the formalities (of
sound and letters) of language do not matter, as what matters is that all words signify
something and that it is this something which is in fact named.
Aug. intellegis igitur eum qui ait: «est in illo erat», nihil aliud dixisse 
quam:est appellatur, quod in illo erat, tamquam si dixisset uirtus in illo erat, 
non utique dixisse acciperetur nisi uirtus appellatur, quod in illo erat, ne duas 
istas syllabas, quas enuntiamus, cum dicimus uirtus, et non illud, quod his 
duabus syllabis significatur, in illo fuisse arbitraremur.
idem tamen significat.” (gramm. 3.1).
305 As discussed above (§ 5.2.1.2.5.6) the status of this ‘thing’ is formal or at least intelligible.
306 It should be noted that in the phrase ‘est in illo eraf from 2 Corinthians 1:19 ‘esf  translates the 
Greek ‘vat’, and therefore means ‘yes’. There is nothing to suggest that Augustine understands ‘esf  in 
this context as ‘being’ rather than ‘yes’. The term ‘being’ is used above for the purpose o f emphasising 
the point being made by Augustine, namely that ‘esf  is, grammatically, the verbal form.
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(14)
For what one calls something is what it is named.
Aug. quid illud nonne intellegis etiam nihil interesse, utrum quisque dicat 
uirtus appellatur an uirtus nominatur?
Ad. manifestum est.
Aug. ergo ita manifestum est nihil interesse, utrum quis dicat est appellatur an 
est nominatur quod in illo erat.
Ad. uideo et hie nihil distare.
(14)
0428 A name is that by which something is named, and so it follows that the verb
‘to be’ (est) as used in this context is functioning as a name.
Aug. itane tu non uides nomen esse id, quod res aliqua nominatur?
Ad. hoc plane nihil certius uideo.
Aug. uides ergo est nomen esse, siquidem illud, quod erat in Christo, est 
nominatur.
(14)
0429 Formal grammatical descriptions are irrelevant to the point being made by
Augustine. Reason is the authority applied to the issue.
Aug. at si ex te quaererem, quae sit pars orationis est, non opinor nomen, sed 
uerbum esse diceres, cum id ratio etiam nomen esse docuerit.
Ad. ita estprorsus ut dicis.
(14)
0430 In this discussion Augustine has not only shown Adeodatus that one should 
not simply employ grammatical description as a solution to the issue at hand (that all 
words are names) but has, in addition, introduced a first level of ambiguity for single 
terms. This ambiguity is the mention element in the modem use-mention distinction, 
for Augustine stresses the fact that he is not concerned with the sound, or the three 
letters e-s-t, of the word ‘e s f307 but rather he is concerned with the fact that it signifies 
and therefore, if it signifies, it must signify something, and is then the name of that 
something.
307 As suggested in Burnyeat (1987, 11), the dictio!uerbum distinction is possibly a discovery of 
Augustine’s. Much of the following discussion of Augustine’s treatment of the use-mention distinction 
is indebted to Burnyeat: 1987.
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0431 It will be preferable to use the expression suppositio material is, as used in 
mediaeval logical theory by the schoolmen308, on account of the greater degree of 
complexity exhibited in Augustine’s approach to ambiguity in single terms than the 
modem use-mention distinction allows for309. The distinction made by the expression 
suppositio material is is that in the sentence ‘Dog is monosyllabic’ what is talked 
about is the “very sign material” (Christensen: 1967, 363), the three letter sound 
[dog]. There is no sense in this example that one is attempting to use the word ‘dog’ 
as an utterance with some significance and as a sign which signifies something 
beyond itself, such as the class of dogs or a particular member of the class of dogs.
0432 Augustine will be seen to employ the following distinctions.
(Di) uerbum suppositio materialis mention
(D2) dictio 3 insuppositio semantica
(D3) dictio suppositio formalis use311.
5.6.2.3. Argument from Foreign Languages.
0433 One can ask what another language names anything that we name by a part of 
speech in our language. Taken in isolation this argument would appear to be a gross 
over-simplification of the act of naming for it is rather like asking ‘What verbal sound 
do you use for x?\ This over-simplification suggests a picture of language such as 
that attributed to Augustine by Wittgenstein (PI 1; BB p.77), where sentences are seen
308 The mediaeval distinction between suppositio materialis and suppositio formalis may have 
originated in a combination of Stoic and Aristotelian theory (Atherton: 1993, 288).
309 For a discussion of the over simplification introduced by the use-mention distinction cf. Christensen: 
1967.
310 A term introduced by Christensen: 1967, 363.
311 These distinctions will be expanded upon below (§ 5.6.2.5 and § 6). The use-mention dichotomy is 
here used to provide a general clarification of, and parallel for the Latin terms but, as argued by 
Christensen (1967), this terminology is inadequate beyond any general application, for mention is 
essentially simply another form o f use.
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simply as strings of names, and where there is no suggestion of, for example,
Aristotle’s sub-categoricals312. However, in light of the previous two arguments (from
pronouns and from verbs) it is clear that Augustine is certainly not making this
simplification but is rather making the more subtle point that all words are
independently significant, or meaningful. To this extent he is aligning himself with
the Stoic position, that every word in fact signifies something, and against the
Aristotelian position whereby this can only be asserted of nouns and verbs while all
other words are co-significant (cf. Plutarch, quaest. Plat. 10.1)313.
0434 In the examples cited to demonstrate that one can ask what another language
names any part of speech Augustine specifically uses seven of the eight parts of
speech (pronoun, verb, adverb, adjective, conjunction, preposition, and
interjection)314. The part which is missing is the name/noun which, as an obvious
example of a name, can be left out of Augustine’s list315.
Aug. ...ratio, qua demonstratur omnibuspartibus orationis significari aliquid 
et ex eo appellari; si autem appellari, et nominari, si nominari nomine utique 
nominari quod in diuersis linguis facillime iudicatur. quis enim non uideat, si 
quaeram, quid Graeci nominent, quod nos nominamus quis, responderi mihi 
tic, quid Graeci nominent, quod nos nominamus uolo, responderi mihi QeAxo, 
quid Graeci nominent, quod nos nominamus bene, responderi mihi KcOfbc, 
quid Graeci nominent, quod nos nominamus scriptum, responderi mihi 
to y sY p ap p evov , quid Graeci nominent, quod nos nominamus et, responderi 
kou, quid Graeci nominent, quod nos nominamus ab, responderi coto, quid 
Graecinominent, quod nos nominamus heu, responderi o l  atque in his 
omnibus partibus orationis, quas nunc enumeraui, recte loqui eum, qui 
sic interroget quod, nisi nomina essent, fieri non posset, hac ergo ratione 
Paulum apostolum recte locutum esse, cum remotis omnium eloquentium 
auctoritatibus obtinere possimus, quid opus est quaerere, cuius persona 
sententia nostra fulciatur?
(15)
312 The broader implications of a Wittgensteinian critique, as introduced above (0150), will be 
discussed in due course (v. inf. § 7, § 8.1.3, § 9.2, and § 9.3.2).
313 For a fuller discussion of these issues and sources for them, cf. Atherton: 1993, 304-310; Frede: 
1978; Graeser, inRist: 1978.
314“ partes orationis sunt octo nomen pronomen uerbum aduerbium participium coniunctio praepositio 
interiectio” (gramm. 1.2).
315 This point is made by King: 1995, 114 n.41.
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5.6.2.4. Argument from Authority.
0435 The question of the status of arguments intended to convince through authority
was considered by Augustine with reference to his use of the Pauline example (DM
15) and it was decided that one should prefer the use of reason to that of authority
Aug. minus enim tibi uidetur idonea remotis auctoritatibus ipsa ratio, qua 
demonstratur omnibus partibus orationis significari aliquid... ?
(15)
Nevertheless, authority is introduced as a support reason, in that Cicero can be shown
to call a preposition, or adverb, a name.
Aug. ...sed ne quis tardior aut impudentior nondum cedat, asseratque nisi illis 
auctoribus, quibus uerborum leges consensu omnium tribuuntur, nullo modo 
esse cessurum, quid in Latina lingua excellentius Cicerone inueniri potest? at 
hie in suis nobilissimis orationibus, quas Verrinas uocant, coram 
praepositionem, siue illo loco aduerbium sit, nomen appellauit316
(16)
5.6.2.5. Argument from Propositional Form.
0436 The argument from propositional form is the final, and in many ways most 
interesting, approach used to demonstrate that all words are names. As can now be 
seen, the proposal that all words are names is essentially an elaboration on the thesis 
that all words signify and that this general statement amounts to the fact that every
317word is, non-autonymously, significant. This is to say, a word may be used to name
316 Uuiditisne totum hoc nomen coram ubi facit delatum esse in litura?’'’ Cicero, Verr. 2.104.
317 The idea that the various types of suppositio are ‘uses’ is a modem idea (introduced by Christensen: 
1967). Both Augustine and the Stoics worked with the idea that words signify variously rather than are 
used variously. However, due to the fact that “... words signify [ing] themselves.. .could be redescribed 
as their being used to signify themselves... [and this] would surely not constitute a real distinction for a 
Stoic dialectician” (Atherton, 1993, 325) the terminology o f usage has been employed in the following 
discussion. The reason for this is so as to avoid any implication o f a use-mention distinction while also 
clarifying the various modes of signification which Augustine introduces into the DM.
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itself, autonymously318, as a material sign (the use of ‘dog’ to name itself as a three 
letter sound) but also may be used, non-autonymously, to name, or signify, something 
beyond itself (the use of ‘dog’ to name a domesticated canine mammal). This is the 
straightforward use-mention distinction, or rather the suppositio formalis and 
suppositio materialis distinction.
0437 Augustine proceeds to demonstrate that all words are non-autonymously 
significant by a method rather similar to the Stoic procedure of demonstrating and 
isolating the significance of connectives such as ‘i f  and ‘because’ by determining the 
truth-conditions of propositions (Diogenes Laertius 7.71-74)319.
0438 A complete proposition (sententialpronuntiatum32°) consists of a name/noun
and a verb and is what is true or false.
Aug. ...tradunt enim nobilissimi disputationum magistri nomine et uerbo 
plenam constare sententiam, quae adfirmari negarique possit, quod genus 
idem Tullius quodam loco pronuntiatum uocat. et cum uerbi tertia persona est, 
nominatiuum cum ea casum nominis aiunt esse oportere, et recte aiunt. quod 
mecum si consideres, uelut cum dicimus homo sedet, equus currit, agnoscis ut 
opinor duo pronuntiata esse.
Ad. agnosco.
(16)
0439 Incomplete ‘propositions’321 (‘... sedef or ‘... currit’) demand the question as 
to what is the name, or subject, so as to be complete. It is essential to propositional 
form to complete a proposition by adding a name to the verb so as to enable the 
proposition to be true or false.
318 The additional autonymy of suppositio semantica considered by Augustine in the DM will be 
discussed below (0447-0451).
319 The compatibility of Augustine’s thesis that all words are names with the Stoic approach for 
determining the meaning o f connectives through the truth-conditions of propositions is suggested by 
Bumyeat: 1987, 11.
320 Cicero, Tusc. 1.14., translating the Stoic term a^loapa.
321 To properly be a proposition there must be completion. It is for this reason that Augustine avoids 
speaking of an incomplete proposition but rather o f ‘completing the proposition’ {implere 
pronuntiatum).
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Aug. cernis in singulis singula esse nina, in uno homo, in altero equus, et 
uerba singula, in uno sedet, in altero currit.
Ad. cerno.
Aug. ergo si dicerem sedet tantum aut currit tantum, recte a me quaereres quis 
uel quid, ut responderem homo uel equus uel animal uel quodlibet aliud, quod 
posset nomen redditum uerbo implere pronuntiatum, id est illam sententiam, 
quae adfirmari et negari potest.
(16)
0440 That Augustine is following Stoic procedure in his analysis of the thesis that 
all words are significant (non-autonymously) is enforced by the specifically Stoic 
nature of his approach to nature of propositions. Augustine firstly clarifies his use of 
‘sententia’ by means of reference to Cicero’s translation {pronuntiatum) of the Stoic 
term ‘c^fcoiia’ {Tusc. 1.14). This clearly implies that he is using ‘sentential as a 
translation o f ‘a£ico|ia’. This proposition {sententia) is complete {plena) when it 
consists of a name and a verb {nomine et uerbo) and is incomplete when it is a verb, 
in the third person, which lacks a subject {recte a me quaereres quis uel quid). To 
become a complete proposition the verb requires a name {nomen redditum uerbo 
implere pronuntiatum) in the nominative case {cum uerbi tertia persona est, 
nominatiuum cum ea casum nominis... esse oportere). An example of a complete 
proposition is ‘homo sedet’ or ‘equus currit’ and an incomplete one would be
‘ sedef or ‘ ... currit' which would require something like ‘homo' or ‘equus' or 
‘animal' to be complete. Finally, when a proposition is complete it has a truth value 
{illam [plenam] sententiam... adfirmari et negari potest).
0441 The Stoic a^icoixa is formed from a complete Asktov, and this completion is
achieved when a predicate is attached to a nominative case.
eoTi 5e  t o  KocrriYopTiiia t o  K ara Tivoq bcY opeoopsvov f\ jrpaypa  
auvTaKTov jrepi Tivoq f\ t iv c bv... q Xe k t o v  sXXiKeq auvTaKTov  
op0q ftTcoaei rcpoq a^icoiictToq yevea iv .
(Diogenes Laertius 7.64)
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The proposition, or more correctly the sayable, can be said to be incomplete when its
predicate lacks a subject and demands the question ‘Who?’ or ‘What?’.
ev 8e tcd icepi xcbv Tipaypaxcov icai xcbv aripaivopevcov xotccp 
xexaKxai o Jtepi A^kxcov Kai abxoxeAxbv Kai a i^oopaxcov Kai 
aoAAayiapcbv A,oyoq Kai o rcepi eAAarccbv xe Kai Kaxriyopripaxcov 
Kai op0cbv Kai bftxicov... xcbv 8e Aekxcdv xa pev Aeyooaiv elvai 
abxoxeA.fi oi Z xcd iko i, xa 5 ’ eAAiftfj. eAA.utf| pev obv eaxi xa 
avampxiaxov exovxa xqv eKcpopav, olov "ypacpei"- em^rixobpev 
yap, "xig" abxoxeAxj 5 ’ eaxi xa ajtr|pxiapevT|v exovxa xfjv 
eKcpopav, olov "ypacpei ZcoKpaxrj^ ". ev pev obv xoiq eAAarceai 
AeKXoiq xexaKxai xa Kaxriyopfipaxa, ev 8e xoi<; abxoxeAiai xa 
a^icopaxa Kai oi aoAA,oyiapoi Kai xa epcoxijpaxa Kai xa 
rcbapaxa.
(Diogenes Laertius 7.63)
A proposition is a complete AeKXov and as such has truth value.
...xo pev aAx|0eq aacopaxov eaxiv (a^icopa yap eaxi Kai AeKXov)...
(Sextus Empiricus, PH 2.81)
...7tepi xcp arjpaivopevcp xo aAxjOec; xe Kai tyebSoq bjieaxfiaavxo... 
oi cctco xfjq Zxoaq... arjpaivopevov 8e abxo xo Ttpaypa xo bTi’
[xf]<; cpcovfiq] 8t|A,obpevov... aacopaxov... [eaxi] xo arjpaivopevov 
Jtpaypa, Kai Askxov, orcep aXpOec; xe yivexai fj tyebSoq.
(Sextus Empiricus, M 8.11-12)
0442 With the basic facts established that a complete proposition requires a name 
and a verb Augustine can move on to demonstrate that all words are indeed names and 
therefore are all independently, and non-autonymously, significant.
0443 The proposal is forwarded that on seeing something at a distance, and while
322still unsure of what it is, one were to say ‘Because it is a man, it is an animal’ . This 
statement is altered by Adeodatus to the more correct ‘If it is a man, it is an 
animal’323. Therefore, Augustine states: if is acceptable and because is 
unacceptable324. The conclusion is that there are two complete propositions: ‘If is 
acceptable’ {placet si) and ‘Because is unacceptable’ (displicet quia). The verbal
322 The Stoic inferential proposition (7tapaaovr|p|ievov...6c^ia)pa): Diogenes Laertius 7.71.
323 The Stoic hypothetical proposition (6^ia)pa...aovr[p|ievov): Diogenes Laertius 7.71.
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elements in these propositions are ‘...placef and ‘... displicef and so the nominal
elements must be ‘s f  and ‘quia\  Therefore, it is possible to fashion a complete
proposition by adding an adverbial conjunction to a verb, and so these adverbial
conjunctions are seen to be names.
Aug. adtende cetera, et finge nos uidere aliquid longius et incertum habere, 
utrum animal sit an saxum uel quid aliud, meque tibi dicere: quia homo est, 
animal est, nonne temere dicerem?
Ad. temere omnino, sed non temere plane diceres: si homo est, animal est. 
Aug. recte dicis. itaque in tua locutione placet mihi si, placet et tibi; utrique 
autem nostrum in mea displicet quia.
Ad. assentior.
Aug. uide iam, utrum istae duae sententiae plena pronuntiata sint: placet si, 
displicet quia.
Ad. plena omnino.
(16)
0444 As these conjunctions have been shown to be names so too can the same
demonstration be carried out with all of the other parts of speech.
Aug. age nunc die mihi, quae ibi sint uerba, quae nomina.
Ad. uerba ibi uideo esse placet et displicet, nomina uero quid aliud quam si et 
quia?
Aug. has ergo duas coniunctiones etiam nomina esse satis probatum est.
Ad. prorsus satis.
Aug. potesne ipse per te in aliis partibus orationis hoc idem ad eandem 
regulam docere?
Ad. possum.
(16)
0445 In DM 3, with the introduction of the line from Vergil (Aen. 2.659) for 
analysis325, Augustine had initiated the thesis that all words are signs and therefore 
signify something. The argument deriving from the discussion of the Vergil sentence 
had proposed that even conjunctions (si) and prepositions (ex) are significant. The 
initial attempt to clarify this thesis foundered due to the fact that the implication was 
that to signify something is equivalent to referring to something and therefore the
324 Although it may, following modem convention, seem practical to insert quotation marks around ‘i f  
and ‘because’, this convention is specifically not adopted so as to avoid confusing Augustine’s point 
with a straightforward use/mention distinction.
lengthy, and informative, discussion of ostension was introduced. The referential 
approach to signification, or meaning, has been progressively shown over the course 
of the discussion (DM 3-16) to be insufficient, from Augustine’s standpoint, as a 
theory of meaning. All words are names in that they name something, however what 
they name, or refer to, is in fact themselves as significant, or meaningful, items. 
Augustine’s theory of meaning is perhaps best described as an intensional theory of 
semantics in that the signification, y, of any possible word, *, is an intelligible and, 
therefore, mental item326. The signification may have an external referent, such as 
‘this door’, but due to the formal nature of the perception and comprehension of such 
items the meaning is best described as intensional in that what is grasped of an object, 
even a material one which is here and now, is its intelligible Form. The same point
327holds for universals in that they are derived from particulars. Also, as concerns 
terms such as ‘nothing’ {nihil) or ‘from’ (ex) these are, in the case of terms like 
‘nothing’ (which is clearly not a Form), a mental abstraction from an intelligible state 
of affairs and, in the case of terms like ‘from’, a mental correlate to an intelligible 
state of affairs. In all of these examples the significant, or meaningful, item is the 
linguistic correlate to an intelligible item which is available internally, and 
memorially, to the thinking subject (whether that be sign transmitter or sign receiver). 
0446 In discussing words as names Augustine wants to focus upon the fact that all 
words have independent meaning which can be demonstrated. He is not concerned 
with the material form of words but rather with the fact that they all have independent 
signification, or meaning, and that it is this meaning which may be said to be named.
325 It is significant that this was standard practice in the rhetorical schools of the period (in which 
Augustine had been educated and had, until recently, been a teacher himself).
326 v. sup. § 5.2.1.2.5.6.
327 That is universals qua conceptual/immanent Forms.
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Aug. ... non opinor putandum est tres istas litter as, quas enuntiamus, cum 
dicimus est, fuisse in Christo, sed illud potius, quod istis tribus litter is 
significatur.
Ad. uerum dicis.
(14)
This, however, does not suggest that all words are semantically equivalent for there 
are clearly differences, as is noted in grammatical vocabulary, between different types 
of words.
Aug. ... et speciale dicimus nomen, quod inter octo partes orationis ita est, ut 
alias septem non contineat.
(17)
The concern with words as names is here to demonstrate the independent significance 
of all words and to elucidate what it means for all words to signify something (DM 3). 
Every word is therefore shown to have significance and to have a linguistic function 
such as is correlated to something, or to some state of affairs or to some abstraction 
from some state of affairs, in reality.
0447 In the argument from propositional form it is shown that the statement with 
‘because’ (‘Because it is a man, it is an animal’) differs from that with ‘i f  (‘If it is a 
man, it is an animal’) in that they reflect different mental relationships to a given state 
of affairs and that these different mental relations are signified by the different 
semantic values of each term. The independence of the signification of each term is 
demonstrated by Augustine’s use of the notion of the complete proposition and each 
is shown to be semantically graspable in isolation from the linguistic context in which 
it occurred328. Each term is, therefore, intelligible as an independent item. The manner 
of demonstrating this fact by means of logical propositions demonstrates that,
328 The question of context is crucial to any discussion of the issue of independent, non-autonymous, 
significance. However, although terms such as ‘i f  are better understood, semantically, in context, 
Augustine is at pains to demonstrate their semantic independence and therefore avoid the inclination, 
when describing such terms in any given linguistic context, to make the error, as Augustine (and the 
Stoics) saw it, of ascribing (as the Peripatetics) the status of co-signification to such terms. The 
question o f context will be considered in due course (§ 6).
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although each word has an independent meaning, this meaning actually is only fully 
understood within their relational connections within sentences. The way in which 
such terms are significant, and what might be termed their function, is only seen 
within the context of sentences329.
0448 There can therefore be seen to be three instances of any word. These instances 
can be seen with reference to the following examples330.
(1) If it is a man, it is an animal.
(2) If is acceptable in example (1).
(3) If is a monosyllable.
In (1) the term ‘i f  is straightforwardly used as a meaningfully uttered sign which 
points to something beyond itself, namely the concept of doubt. This term is the 
Augustinian dictio (DD 5.62-64) and may be described as being in suppositio 
formalis. In (2) the term ‘i f  is used so as to signify itself as a meaningful utterance 
which points to its own meaning, or rather to its sound and meaning. This term is also 
the Augustinian dictio (DD5.62-64), however it is used differently this context as it is 
used to signify itself as meaningful utterance. A useful way in which to distinguish 
this use from that of the dictio may be to imply the terminology used by Augustine 
himself and to define this usage as nomen in that it refers, primarily, to that which 
affects the mind, namely the signification (DM 12). This use may be described as 
being in suppositio semantica. Finally, in (3) the term ‘if  is used to signify itself as 
sign material, namely sound (or letters). This term is the Augustinian uerbum, in its 
technical sense (DD 5.31-32; 5.59-60), and may be described as being in suppositio 
materialis.
329 Cf. Bumyeat: 1987, 11-12.
330 Although examples of a more straightforward nature could be found, ‘i f  has been preserved to 
make the connection with Augustine’s argument more obvious. Also, the modem convention of
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0449 All words, it can therefore be argued, name their own meanings or themselves 
as meaningful utterances (DM 20), which is not the same as the autonymous use of a 
word to name itself as sign material. The autonymous use in suppositio semantica 
supports the thesis that all words are independently significant and allows one to talk 
about language in the full sense of meaningful utterance331, while the autonymous use 
in suppositio materialis does nothing for, and in fact may be used to contradict, the 
thesis that all words are independently significant and does little in facilitating 
discussion of language in the sense of uerbum as defined in DM 8 but only actually 
facilitates discussion of uerba in the narrower sense as given in DD 5.17-50.
0450 The five arguments developed by Augustine (DM 13-16) were intended firstly 
to distinguish the use in suppositio materialis from the other uses, which employ 
signification, and secondly to distinguish the use in suppositio formalis from that in 
suppositio semantica. With these distinctions clarified Augustine will now be better 
able to develop the Chrysippean thesis that all words are ambiguous
0451 The classification, introduced above (0432), of different types of usage of 
words determined by these arguments can now be completed.
(Di) uerbum suppositio materialis -> use {qua material mention)
(D2) nomen suppositio semantica use {qua semantic mention)
(DO dictio suppositio formalis use
marking off the mention o f words with single quotation marks is avoided here as the use-mention 
distinction is not strictly relevant in this context.
331 “uerbum...quodcum aliquo significatu articulata uoceprofertur.” (DM 8).
332 v. inf. §6.1.1.
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5.6.3. Reciprocal Signs Completed.
0452 After establishing the distinction between words with the same extension 
{tantum)333 but with different sense (,significatio), such as nomen/uerbum334, and 
establishing the nominal aspect of all words Augustine proceeds to the final 
classification of signs signified by signs, namely those with the same extension 
{tantum) and sense {significatio).
0453 The words nomen and uocabulum (‘term’) signify themselves, each other, and
all the other parts of speech.
Aug. transeamus ergo hinc et iam die mihi, utrum, sicut omnia uerba nomina 
et omnia nomina uerba esse comperimus, ita tibi et omnia nomina uocabula et 
omnia uocabula nomina esse uideantur.
Ad. plane inter haec quid distet praeter diuersum syllabarum sonum non 
uideo.
Aug. nec ego interim resisto, quamquam non desint, qui etiam significatione 
ista discernunt335, quorum sententiam modo considerare non opus est. sed 
certe animaduertis ad ea iam signa nos peruenisse, quae se inuicem 
significent nulla praeter sonum distantia et quae se ipsa significent cum 
ceteris omnibus partibus orationis.
(17)
‘Name’ is here to be taken in the broad sense considered in the discussion above and
in this sense it is equivalent to ‘term’ {uocabulum).
Aug. non ergo intellegis et nomen uocabulo et uocabulum nomine significari 
et ita, utpraeter sonum litterarum nihil intersit, quantum ad generale nomen 
attinet; nam et speciale dicimus nomen, quod inter octo partes orationis ita 
est, ut alias septem non contineat.
Ad. intellego.
Aug. at hoc est quod dixi sese inuicem significare uocabulum et nomen.
(17)
These words signify themselves as other words such as coniunctio do not.
Aug. quid? ipsum nomen, id est sonum istum duabus syllabis expressum, si ex 
te quaeram, quid appelles, nonne recte mihi respondebis nomen?
Ad. recte.
333 For the use of ‘tantum  ^ as extension v. sup. 0412 n.291.
334 Cf. also coloratumiuisibile (DM 12).
335 Cf. Cledonius, gramm. (Keil) p.351-3; Donatus, gramm. (Keil), p.373,5.
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Aug. num. ita se significat hoc signum, quod quattuor syllabis enuntiamus, cum 
dicimus coniunctio? hoc enim nomen inter ilia, quae significat, numerari non 
potest.
Ad. accipio
Aug. id est, quod dictum est nomen se ipsum significare cum aliis, quae 
significat; quod etiam de uocabulo per te ipsum licet intellegas.
(18)
0454 However, as nomen can be used both generally and specifically but uocabulum
cannot, this suggests that there is in fact a difference between them.
Ad. iam facile est. sed illud mihi nunc uenit in mentem nomen et generaliter et 
specialiter did, uocabulum autem inter octo partes orationis non accipi. quare 
hoc quoque inter se praeter diuersum sonum differre arbitror.
(18)
0455 Finally it is proposed that equivalent words in different languages, such as
‘nomen’ and ‘ovopa’, demonstrate absolute reciprocity. These terms therefore exhibit
the same extension {tantum) and sense {significatio) in that there is no difference
between them other than their sound.
Aug. quid? nomen et onoma distare inter se aliquidputaspraeter sonum, quo 
etiam linguae discernuntur Latina et Graeca?
Ad. hie uero nihil aliud intellego.
(18)
This claim is clearly problematic for although the use of the equivalent terms from 
foreign languages does achieve Augustine’s aim of demonstrating that there is a 
difference between a word’s extension and its sense, the general claim is 
unsatisfactory. The proposal that there is absolute reciprocity between ‘nomerf and 
‘ovopa’, or indeed any words in different languages, is false336. However, it may 
simply be that what Augustine intends here is that when Lnomert and 4ovopa’ denote 
the same thing they demonstrate absolute reciprocity, which is a less controversial 
proposal. In this context it is difficult to determine which position Augustine is 
suggesting, for the purpose of his discussion is to demonstrate that there is a
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difference between words with equivalent extensions and those with an equivalence in 
sense also. The proposal concerning reciprocity between words in different languages 
is subordinate to this purpose and is introduced in terms too general to accurately 
determine his specific intention with regards to and ‘ov o |ia \ The fact that
Augustine does not state that these terms are reciprocal specifically when they denote 
the same thing would appear to suggest that he does intend the general claim that the 
two terms do in fact demonstrate complete reciprocity.
5.7. Classification of Signs.
0456 This final classification of signs can therefore be seen to fall into the 
following:
Signs - (i) signify themselves;
(ii) signify each other;
(iii) have same extension;
(iv) have same sense.
Aug. peruentum est ergo ad ea signa, quae se ipsa significent et aliud ab alio 
inuicem significetur et quicquid ab uno hoc et ab alio et nihil praeter sonum 
inter se differant; nam hoc quartum modo inuenimus; tria enim superiora et 
de nomine ac uerbo intelleguntur.
(18)
0457 The complete classification of the various modes of signification can now be 
represented.
336 Both terms are seen to differ in an obvious way in that the term ‘nomen’ can refer to the clan name 
in contrast to thepraenomen and cognomen, while ‘ovojia’ cannot.
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(D22)
Things
things qua signs things qua things
signs shown through signs ______________________
| things shown through things shown through
______________________  signs performance
signs of other signs signs of the same signs
visible signs audible signs
signs of things signs of signs
signs of signs of things signs of signs of signs
self-signifying signs
reciprocal signs
signs reciprocal 
in extension
signs reciprocal 
in sense
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6. Classification (2.1): Things Shown by Signs.
0458 The second classification which Augustine considers involves the second class
of communicables, namely, things (v. sup. 0199-0200). The first class, that is, signs,
was considered above (§ 5). This second class of communicables can be divided into
two subsections, depending on the mode of communication. Things are either shown
through performance or through signs (DM 7) and it is the second mode of
communication which will now be considered.
Aug. age iam ergo illam partem consideremus, cum signis non alia signa 
significantur, sed ea, quae significabilia nominamus.
(22)
0459 This class involves items which can be defined as ‘signifiable’ and, after the 
semantic clarifications of § 5, Augustine can now begin to more fully develop his 
thesis on the relation between language and reality and the role of the human mind as 
mediator in this relationship.
6.1. Ambiguity.
0460 Augustine introduces the class of things shown by signs as related to the 
problem of how the usage of a word is determined. This is initially introduced by
337means of the apparently simple identity statement of ‘ homo homo esf
Aug. ...etprimum die mihi, utrum homo homo sit.
(22)
The question is confused by its very simplicity, as there is no contextualising of what 
is being discussed, and how it is being discussed.
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Ad. nunc uero an ludas nescio.
Aug. quid ita?
Ad. quia quaerendum ex me censes, utrum homo aliud sit quam homo.
(22)
0461 On closer consideration, and in light of Augustine’s analysis that all words are 
names (v. sup. § 5.6.2), one can, potentially, analyse the statement “homo est homo”
338in a number of different ways .
(a. 1) [homo] est [homo]
“the sound ‘person’ is the sound ‘person’”
(a. 2) [homo] est [<homo>]
“the sound ‘person’ is a person”
(a. 3) [homo] est [Ihomol]
“the sound ‘person’ is the meaningful utterance ‘person’”
(b.l) [<homo>] est [<homo>]
“a person is a person”
(b.2) [<homo>] est [Ihomol]
“a person is the meaningful utterance ‘person”
(b.3) [<homo>] est [homo]
“a person is the sound ‘person’”
(c.l) [Ihomol] est [Ihomol]
“The meaningful utterance ‘person’ is the meaningful utterance ‘person’”
(c.2) [Ihomol] est [homo]
“The meaningful utterance ‘person’ is the sound ‘person’”
(c.3) [Ihomol] est [<homo>]
“The meaningful utterance ‘person’ is a person”
0462 Clearly, (a. 1), (b. 1), and (c. 1) are identity statements which are self-evidently
true, while the other examples involve, as the symbols employed make apparent, a
337 The example is cited in Latin to avoid the difficulties introduced by the inclusion or omission of the 
definite or indefinite article in English.
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In the following analysis the following symbols will be employed: (i) [homo] to represent the four- 
letter word which can be used to mention itself as material sign, that is, qua uerbum, (ii) [<homo>] to 
represent the word as used to point to something beyond itself, that is, qua dictio\ (iii) [Ihomol] to
215
confusion over how the words are being used (that is, how they signify) and are false. 
The statement ‘homo est homo’ is an apparently simple identity statement such that 
a = a. However, taken with the clarifications concerning different kinds of use (§ 5.6.2 
- § 5.6.2.5), it is clear that there is a more complex breakdown of the statement than 
simply ‘a = a \
(a.l) a = a (b.l) a' = a' (c.l) a" = a'
(a.2) a = a' (b.2) a' = a" (c.2) a" = a
(a.3) a = a" (b.3) a' = a (c.3) a" = a
This is, in fact, equivalent to the following.
(a.l) a = a (b.i) b = b (c.l) c = c
(a.2) a = b (b.2) b = c (c.2) c = a
(a.3) a = c (b.3) b = a (c.3) c = b
In this analysis the only statements which can truly be described as identity statements 
are ‘a = a’, ‘b = b’, and ‘c = c \
6.1.1. Sound and Signification.
0463 The introduction of the ambiguity evident in such statements as 4homo est 
homo* is to be classified under the Stoic species of ambiguity339 which involves 
homonymy340 in compounds.
represent the word as used to mention itself as a meaningful utterance, that is, qua nomen. For the 
introduction of this terminology cf. 0448.
339 The following discussion o f the Stoic approach to ambiguity o f homonymy in compounds and 
Augustine’s reception of this is much indebted to Atherton: 1993, 273-328.
340 Ambiguity, and homonymy in particular, was a standard topic for rhetoric. Rhetorical approaches 
were practically motivated (cf. Cicero, inv. 2.116-117) and the species o f Homonymy in Compounds 
appears not to have been employed in rhetorical analyses (cf. ad Her. 2.16), due no doubt to the rather 
philosophical nature o f its concerns. This fact may go some way to explaining the fact that Homonymy 
in Compounds was, in some circles (Galen takes this approach, soph. 15.3-6), treated as a version of 
Aristotle’s Amphiboly (Atherton, 1993, 277) where the ambiguity arises from terms which may be 
ambiguous in terms o f their grammatical function in a given context (cf. Quintilian, inst. 7 .9.6, where 
ambiguity ‘in coniunctis’ is more akin to Amphiboly than Homonymy in Compounds). This said, the 
author of the ad Herennium (2.16) attacked the use o f dialectical texts on ambiguity for the teaching of 
rhetoric, due to the impracticality o f  the dialectical approach for rhetorical usage. This may suggest a 
possible source for Augustine, for although the rhetorical approach would only employ those species of 
ambiguity applicable to the ends sought through rhetoric, it appears that the student would be
216
...xcbv X£yo|i.evcov 6t|i(pipo i^a)v... xpixov 8e m p a  xfjv ev xoiq 
<xov0exoi<; opcovoiuav341, olov "avSpcojcoq eaxiv". aiKpijioA-cx; yap 
b A,oyo<; eixe xfjv otxriav eixe xfjv jixcoatv elvai crnM-alvei.
(Galen, soph. 4)342
This species of ambiguity, as Atherton stresses (1993, 273), is partner to, and should
be studied together with, that of homonymy in simples.
...xcbv Aeyoixevcov a|i(pi|3oA,tcbv... 5euxepa 5e napa  xfjv ev xox; 
aflAotq opcov'Dp.iav, olov "avSpeioq", f[ yap xi h^)v f[ av0pco7to .^.
(Galen, soph. 4)
0464 The distinction, between these different types of homonymous ambiguity, as 
Atherton states, .. rests on the assumption that only some (occurrences of) single 
terms characterised by homonymy in isolation (‘in simples’) are so characterised in 
particular contexts. Certain linguistic environments are taken to disambiguate terms 
which out of context are homonymous, and which are all classed as isolated 
homonyms under Homonymy in Simples; under Homonymy in Compounds, by 
contrast, are ranged only single terms not thus disambiguated” (Atherton, 1993, 273).
0465 Augustine touched upon Homonymy in Simples (v. sup. § 5.6) with the 
introduction of the thesis that all words are names. All words are independently, and 
non-autonymously, significant. This was demonstrated through the semantic, 
autonymous, use of the word {suppositio semantica), qua meaningful utterance, to 
show that each word can, through its use to name itself as a meaningful utterance, be 
shown to have its own meaning separate from any context within which one may find 
it used. Therefore, every word can be seen to function as a dictio with its own 
independent meaning. However, in addition to demonstrating that every word has an 
independent meaning, by naming this meaning, the use in suppositio semantica also
introduced to ambiguity through philosophically sophisticated classifications (such as the Stoic 
system).
341 “bprnvupa 8e ecmv, obv cpcovf] pev Kai ovopa t o  auxo, exepov 8e xo anpaivopevov  
UTto vqc, (poovfjq” Theon, prog. 25-27.
342 Cf. also Philoponus, inAPo. 154.26-29 (Atherton, 1993, 287).
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introduces a level of possible ambiguity, for this also demonstrates the use of a word 
to name itself as meaningful utterance (nomerij43. In addition, Augustine also noted 
the material autonymous use in suppositio materialis where the further level of 
ambiguity is introduced in that a word may be used to name itself as material sign 
{uerbum).
0466 Augustine, therefore, has forwarded three possible types of ambiguity for 
Homonymy in Simples in that any individual word may be used as dictio {suppositio 
formalis), as nomen {suppositio semantica), or as uerbum {suppositio materialis).
0467 As noted by Atherton (v. sup. 0464) only some occurrences of words which 
are homonymously ambiguous in isolation are also ambiguous, homonymously, in 
compounds. The following thesis constitutes the basis of Augustine’s argument in § 
5.6.
1. All words are names; in that they name themselves as meaningful items. 
This in turn supports and demonstrates the following thesis.
2. All words are non-autonymously significant; in that they signify some 
extra-linguistic ‘object’.
Taken together these two theses lend support and justification to the statement 
forwarded by Chrysippus (Aulus Gellius 1.12.1):
3. All words are ambiguous.344
343 It is not insignificant that a possible ambiguity in the quotation from Galen {soph. 4), cited above 
(0463), necessitates that one assume that “.. .the infinitive elvai corresponding to the finite verb ecmv 
in the illustration itself is used with T q v  otxriav and with T q v  tctcoctiv alike; so ... the meaning of the 
finite verb must be constant, and that dvOpcottoq alone is homonymous” (Atherton: 1993, 278). 
Augustine quite clearly dismisses this possible ambiguity in his example through the repetition of the 
ambiguous item under consideration (‘homo’). In so doing Augustine would appear to support the 
thesis that “Homonymy in compounds is just that, not homonymy o f compounds” (Atherton, 1993, 
278). Augustine is concerned with the ambiguous use o f the term ‘homo’ in the sentence and this is 
highlighted by the fact that the two occurences o f the term may be used differently so as to elicit a false 
conclusion: for example, that a person [<homo>] is a four-letter word [homo].
344 Cf. Atherton: 1993, 273 ff.
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0468 The proposal that all words are ambiguous depends on the fact that any term 
may signify something beyond itself (some extra-linguistic object), in suppositio 
formalis, or may signify itself as a meaningful utterance, in suppositio semantica. The 
use in suppositio materialis is not something which is focused on by Augustine as of 
central concern to this discussion. This would appear to be due to the fact that such 
items are semantically barren and are, therefore, of little concern to Augustine’s 
consideration of the relationship between linguistic terms, the reality which they 
signify, and the role of human understanding in this relationship345. Also, as will be 
considered below (§ 6), Augustine is concerned with the necessity of interpretation in 
the linguistic act and the barriers this necessity imposes for any epistemological 
clarity. The type of interpretation which Augustine is concerned with is semantic, in 
that he is interested in the necessity of interpretation to evaluate how someone is 
signifying or what they are meaning when using a term or proposition, and therefore 
the semantically barren use in suppositio materialis, although a mode of ambiguity, is 
beside the point. The use in suppositio materialis is generally dismissed, by Augustine 
in the DM, by simply demonstrating the type of autonymy involved by saying ‘the 
sound x’ or ‘the ^-letter wordx’. It is of note, however, that as Augustine is seen to 
briefly dispose of the use in materialis when he is focused on making specifically 
semantic distinctions, so too, when he moves on to properly discuss the ‘homo’ 
sophism, where the focus is on clarifying the use to which a word is put, will 
Augustine drop the distinction in semantica so as to more clearly specify the 
confusion over mentioning a word {materialis or semantica) or using it (formalis)346.
345 Items which are semantically pregnant but are unknown to individuals other than as sounds (such as 
the term ‘sarabara’) will be discussed in due course (v. inf. § 8.1.2). With regard to such terms 
Augustine will return to words in suppositio materialis but, crucially, his concern will be with the fact 
that some individual does not recognise the term as a dictio because he is unaware of the signification 
(v. inf. § 8.1.2).
346 v . inf. §  6 .
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0469 In addition to the DM, Augustine considered ambiguous terms in DD 8-10347 
and, although his discussion in that text is less sophisticated, in its approach to 
ambiguity, than that in the DM, it will be useful to briefly consider the relevant 
passages in the DD.
0470 Obscurity (‘obscuritas') and ambiguity (‘ambiguitas') are of concern to the
dialectician because they may cause a hindrance to the discernment of truth.
itaque nunc propter ueritatem diiudicandam, quod dialectica profitetur, ex 
hac uerborum ui... quae impedimenta nascantur, uideamus. impedit enim 
auditorem ad ueritatem uidendam in uerbis aut obscuritas aut ambiguitas.
{dial 7.66-8.2)
Of particular interest in the introduction of the theme of ambiguity348 is that the 
business of dialectic is the discernment of truth {ueritatem diiudicandam quod 
dialectica profitetur), and that this truth is discerned in words {ad ueritatem uidendam 
in uerbis), and that truth in words is related to the force, or meaning, of these words 
{ex hac uerborum ui). In this Augustine follows the Stoic proposal that truth is 
concerned with the significations of words (cf. Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.11-12).
0471 The hindrance which arises from ambiguity depends upon the force, or 
meaning {uerborum ui), of the words in question and the hearer is impeded in 
discerning the truth {ad ueritatem uidendam) in the words, which is to say, the hearer 
does not grasp the signification of the term, or terms, being spoken. The truth of 
speech depends upon the signification, which is an intelligible and essentially mental 
item (v. sup. §5.2.1.2.5.6) which the hearer either sees (inwardly) or does not. The 
metaphor of ‘sight’ is central to Augustine’s approach to epistemology and the 
grasping of truth entails a sort of clarity of inner vision349. In ambiguous language this
347 For recent discussions of ambiguity in the DD cf. Ruef: 1981; Baratin and Desbordes: 1982;
Amsler: 1989; Atherton: 1993, 289-94.
348 The treatment of obscurity, and other types of linguistic ambiguities, is briefly considered in the DM 
(42-44) and will be discussed in due course (§ 10).
349 The role of inner sight will be considered at length below (§ 9).
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discernment of truth is confused, as it were, due to there being more than one possible
interpretation of the term, or proposition, spoken. The epistemological difficulties
caused by obscurity and ambiguity, the differences between them and their
similarities, and the relation of understanding, for Augustine (and Plato), to the
metaphor of sight are all demonstrated in a wonderful passage.
inter ambiguum et obscurum hoc interest, quod in ambiguo plura se 
ostendunt, quorum quidpotius accipiendum sit ignoratur, in obscuro autem 
nihil aut parum quod attendatur apparet. sed ubi parum est quod apparet, 
obscurum est ambiguo simile: ueluti si quis ingrediens iter excipiatur aliquo 
biuio uel triuio uel etiam ut ita dicam multiuio loco, ibique densitate nebulae 
nihil uiarum quod est eluceat. ergo a pergendo prius obscuritate terretur; at 
ubi aliquantum rarescere nebulae coeperint, uidetur aliquid, quod utrum uia 
sit an terrae proprius et nitidior color incertum est. hoc est obscurum ambiguo 
simile, dilucescente autem caelo quantum oculis satis sit iam omnium uiarum 
deductio clara est, sed qua sitpergendum non obscuritate sed ambiguitate 
dubitatur.
{dial. 8.2-17)
0472 Ambiguous terms are compared to the example of the crossroads where there
are many possible paths, or interpretations, which lead from the term but which are
obscure due to a lack of clarity on account of there being a lack of contextualisation.
The individual word requires further information so as to be understood.
fac enim eos qui aderant et satis sensu accepisse uocem magistri et ilium id 
uerbum enuntiasse quod esset omnibus notum, ut puta fac eum dixisse magnus 
et deinde siluisse. attende, quae incerta hoc audito nomine patiantur. quid si 
enim dicturus est quae pars orationis? quid si de metris quaesiturus qui sit 
pes? quid si de historia rogaturus ut puta magnus Pompeius quot bella 
gesserit? quid si commendandorum carminum gratia dicturus est magnus et 
paene solus poeta Vergilius? quid si obiurgaturus neglegentiam discipulorum 
in haec deinde uerba prorumpet magnus uos erga studia torpor inuasit? 
uidesne remota nebula obscuritatis illud quod supra dictum est quasi 
eminuisse multiuium? nam hoc unum quod dictum est magnus et nomen est et 
pes chorius est et Pompeius est et Vergilius et neglegentiae torpor et si qua 
alia uel innumerabilia non commemorata sunt, quae tamen per hanc 
enuntiationem uerbi possunt intellegi.
{dial. 8.56-74)
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0473 In this passage Augustine appears to refer to Homonymy in Simples and 
proceeds to connect to this type of ambiguity the fact that all words are ambiguous 
(cf. Aulus Gellius 11.12.2, on Chrysippus).
350itaque rectissime a dialecticis dictum est ambiguum esse omne uerbum.
(dial. 9.1-2)351
The additional point is made that it is isolated words that are all ambiguous, while
unambiguous combinations of words are used to disambiguate, or to render
unambiguous, terms which are singly ambiguous.
quod enim dictum est omne uerbum esse ambiguum de uerbis singulis dictum 
est. explicantur autem ambigua disputando et nemo utique uerbis singulis 
disputat. nemo igitur ambigua uerba uerbis ambiguis explicabit. et tamen cum 
omne uerbum ambiguum sit, nemo uerborum ambiguitatem nisi uerbis sed iam 
coniunctis quae ambigua non erunt explicabit... cum dico ambiguum esse 
omne uerbum, non dico sententiam, non disputationem, quamuis uerbis ista 
texantur. omne igitur ambiguum uerbum non ambigua disputatione 
explicabitur.
{dial. 9.13-25)
0474 Rather than progress to Homonymy in Compounds Augustine proceeds to 
discuss different types of ambiguity by means of the Aristotelian terms ‘ uniuoca’ 
(auvcovufia) and ‘aequiuoca’ (bixcovuiia)332. The treatment of the semantics in this 
discussion (DD 8-9) is rather unclear353 and seems to involve a confusing of 
Aristotelian metaphysics and Stoic semantics. Augustine begins by discussing 
ambiguity as semantically grounded (DD 8), and then proceeds, in his introduction of 
univocals and equivocals (DD 9), to change focus and to consider items which bear 
names354 and yet he does so as though they were all, in fact, words. Augustine, also,
3:>0 The dialecticians are here the Stoics.
351 Augustine was certainly aware o f the topic of ambiguity from Cicero’s Hortensius and had enough 
familiarity with it to be aware o f the misrepresentation of the Stoic position: “ ...apud Ciceronem 
calumniatur Hortensius hoc modo ‘ambigua se aiunt audere explicare dilucide. idem omne uerbum 
ambiguum esse dicunt. quomodo igitur ambigua ambiguis explicabunt? nam hoc est in tenebras 
extinctum lumen inferre ’ ” {dial. 9.2-7).
352 Aristotle, Cat. la.
353 This brief consideration draws on a fuller discussion of these issues by Atherton: 1993, 289-94.
354“diximus enim aequiuoca esse, quae non ut uno nomine ita etiam una definitione possunt tenerf 
{dial. 10.30-32).
never focuses clearly on the role of autonymy in the dictum that all words are 
ambiguous. This fact may stem, as Atherton suggests (1993, 293), from Augustine’s 
confusing the dictum with a statement of universal lexical ambiguity, where the 
confusion, in fact, arises not on account of autonymy but rather from the fact that all 
words have more than one meaning355. This may suggest a possible reason as to why 
Augustine did not go on to discuss Homonymy in Compound, for if he confused 
Chrysippus’ dictum with universal lexical ambiguity then the discussion of 
compounds would have appeared superfluous as it appeared to simply restate the 
same point made by the discussion of simples.
0475 Augustine’s consideration of ambiguity in the DM is a development on from 
that in the DD and shows a surer grasp on the issues and on the import of the 
Chrysippean statement that all words are ambiguous.
0476 Augustine proceeds to discuss the ambiguity involved in the 4homo est homo’ 
example, however, it is significant that he does so by apparently contrasting the 
linguistic uses in suppositio formalis and in suppositio materialis and entirely drops 
the autonymous use in suppositio semantica which has been developed at length in 
the preceding discussion with Adeodatus. This seems a rather peculiar move on the 
part of Augustine and may be due to his discomfort “... with the notion of reflexive 
signification, and tried to replace it with his own, parallel, distinction” (Atherton, 
1993, 296). Perhaps a further explanation may be that Augustine felt the import of 
reflexive signification (use in suppositio semantica) to rest in its explanatory power in 
demonstrating the independent meaningfulness of all words, even conjunctions and 
prepositions, and felt that the simpler distinction in formalis and materialis sufficient 
to clarify the ambiguity evident in such cases as the 4homo’ example. This does not
335 Augustine’s choice of'magnus' (DM 8), and his analysis of it, may tend to suggests this.
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necessarily imply that Augustine did not grasp the significance of Homonymy in 
Compounds and the role of autonymy in respect of reflexive signification, but rather, 
as can be seen in DD (8-10), that he is concerned to use them to his own ends and to 
apply them as a means of clarification in the contexts where they best fit his 
intentions. The autonymous use of words, whether in materialis or in semantica, has, 
nevertheless, been clarified and is explicitly applied so as to provide a means of using 
words to talk about words and is used in the case of the ambiguity presented in the 
‘homo’ example, and in the ‘lion’ sophism which follows on from it (v. inf. § 6.1.3).
0477 In the discussion of ‘homo’ there is a distinction between sound and
signification, or between a word and what it is used to signify356. The word qua word
consists of letters joined into syllables and syllables joined to form words, while that
which is signified is a non-linguistic object357.
Aug. ita credo te illudi arbitrareris, si etiam quaererem, utrum prima huius 
nominis syllaba aliud sit quam ho et aliud secunda quam mo.
Ad. ita omnino.
Aug. at istae duae syllabae coniunctae homo est; an negabis?
Ad. quis neget?
Aug. quaero ergo, num tu duae istae syllabae coniunctae sis.
Ad. nullo modo, sed uideo, quo tendas.
(22)
0478 The sophism introduced in this passage can be analysed as follows.
'i  co
Si 1. [A] man {homo) is [a] man {homo)
2. The two syllables [‘ho-’ and ‘-mo’] when joined are man
3. * is a man
4. Therefore, x is those two syllables [‘ho-’ and ‘-mo’].
356For discussions on the similarity with Saussure cf. Kelly: 1975; Mandouze: 1975, 790fF.
357 As discussed above (0468), Augustine is less concerned with the materialistsemantica distinction 
here and, perhaps for the sake o f simplicity, prefers to consider the ambiguity in the dual modes of 
sound and signification. To this extent, Augustine is basically considering the sophism from the use- 
mention perspective and, for the sake of simplicity, the use-mention terminology will be used to 
discuss Augustine’s following argument.
358This proposition is necessary for the argument and was introduced a few lines prior to the passage 
quoted.
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When words are presented in a manner in which there may be confusion over whether
they are used or mentioned, there is a need for clarity or for contextualisation. In such
cases where it is unclear to the listener, one must not make rash assumptions as to
how a word is being employed in a sentence, but should rather ensure clarification
before any judgement is passed. In the example under discussion, ‘homo’ may be
interpreted as ‘homo’ qua thing (use) or as ‘homo’ qua sound (mention). Adeodatus
therefore demands to know whether the question is put de uerbo or de re.
Aug. dicito ergo, ne me contumeliosum putes.
Ad. concludi existimas, quod homo non sim.
Aug. quid? tu non idem existimas, qui omnia superiora, ex quibus hoc 
confectum est, uera esse concedis?
Ad. non tibi ego dicam, quid existimem, nisiprius abs te audiero, cum 
quaereres, utrum homo homo sit, de duabus istis syllabis an de re ipsa quam 
significant, me interrogaueris.
(22)
0479 The issue, therefore, is concerned with how one is to understand the word. The 
use of the term is ambiguous {ambigua) and one must determine in what sense359 the 
term is being used.
Aug. tu potius responde, ex qua parte acceperis interrogationem meam; nam 
si est ambigua, prius hoc cauere debuisti neque mihi respondere, antequam 
certus fieres, quonam modo rogauerim.
(22)
The approach to avoiding such a sophism such that one does not respond until the 
context and specific use of an ambiguous term are clarified would appear to be that 
advocated by the Stoics (cf. Simplicius, in Cat. 24.13-20)360.
0480 The picture presented here is one which may be compared with the crossroads 
image in DD 8.7-11. The sign receiver has two (or possibly more) choices and is
359The metaphor ‘ex parte’ is not particularly helpful in clarifying exactly what Augustine means. The 
interpretation here depends on the general thrust of the discussion over the preceding passages of the 
DM, in that Augustine is concerned that a term may be interpreted in different ways due to the fact that 
any term may be used in different senses. A single term may be used in a variety of ways by a speaker 
and likewise may be interpreted, or understood, in a variety of ways by a listener.
360Atherton: 1993, 278.
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prevented from making a certain decision due to the lack of contextual clarity. The 
sign transmitter has two (or more) choices about how to use the sign. The process 
passes from transmitter choice, via verbal utterance, through to receiver interpretation. 
The following diagram, using ‘homo’ as an example, represents a successful piece of 
information transfer, with the transmitter’s chosen route in bold and the correct 
receiver’s interpretation in bold. The upper terms are the possible transmitter choices, 
the central term is the actual (ambiguous) utterance, and the lower terms are the 
possible receiver interpretations.
(D23)
Transmitter
[< ho m o > ]
[homo] Sign (as Public Utterance)
[< ho m o > ] [/homo/]
Receiver
0481 Adeodatus raises the objection that he may simply take the word ‘homo’ in
both ways and, therefore, would not be misled by the ambiguity.
Ad. quid enim me impediret haec ambiguitas, cum ego ad utrumque 
responderim? homo enimprorsus homo est; nam et istae duae syllabae nihil 
aliud sunt quam istae duae syllabae, et id, quod significant, nihil aliud est 
quam id quod est.
(2 2 )
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However, this objection raises the issue as to when, and with regards to what words,
is this procedure to be applied. This question, also, raises the wider issue as to how
one is to determine the use of words in general.
Aug. scite hoc quidem, sed cur hoc solum, quod dictum est homo, non etiam 
cetera, quae locuti sumus, ad utrumque accepisti?
Ad. unde enim conuincor, quod et cetera non sic acceperim?
(22)
Indeed, if all words were understood as being mentioned, the sentence in which they
occurred would be meaningless.
Aug. ut alia omittam, earn ipsam primam rogationem meam, si tot am ex ea 
parte accepisses, qua syllabae sonant, nihil mihi respondisses; possem tibi 
enim uideri etiam nihil interrogasse.
(22)
0482 The issue is restated by Augustine: how is one to determine whether a term is
being used in accordance to itself as sign {secundum ipsa signa) or in accordance with
that which it signifies {secundum ea quae his significantur)?
Aug. ...nunc uero cum tria uerba sonuerim, quorum unum in medio 
repetiui dicens, utrum homo homo sitprimum et ultimum uerbum non 
secundum ipsa signa, sed secundum ea, quae his significantur, te accepisse uel 
hoc solo manifestum est, quod statim certus ac fidens rogationi respondendum 
putasti.
Ad. uerum dicis.
Aug. cur ergo id tantum, quod in medio positum est, et secundum id, quod 
sonat, et secundum id, quod significat, te accipere libuit?
(22)
0483 In response to this Adeodatus introduces the important point that it is the
natural tendency to understand a word with regards to what it signifies.
Ad. ecce iam totum ex ea tantum parte, qua significatur, accipio; assentior 
enim tibi sermocinari nos omnino non posse, nisi auditis uerbis ad ea feratur 
animus, quorum ista sunt signa.
(22)
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6.1.2. Restated: Sound and Signification.
0484 When discussing syllables with no independent meaning beyond the fact that
they are letters connected to form a syllable, or sound unit, therefore, there is no
confusion over the fact that one should understand them simply as syllables.
Aug. illud ergo, quodprimo quaesieram, quia iam dedisti, non quaeram. uide 
igitur diligentius, utrum syllaba ho nihil aliud sit quam ho et utrum mo nihil 
aliud sit quam mo.
Ad. hie prorsus nihil aliud uideo.
(23)
However, whenever these syllables are joined to form a word there is an immediate
movement from sound unit to significant item. This is seen in the example where one
considers whether ‘ho’ and ‘mo’ make ‘homo\
Aug. uide etiam, num istis duabus iunctis homo fiat.
(23)
0485 This is due to a priority whereby one focuses on what is signified by a word.
Due to this, there is a need for caution in considering the transition from
‘meaningless’ syllables to ‘meaningful’ words.
Ad. nequaquam hoc concesserim; placuit enim et recte placuit signo dato id, 
quod significatur, adtendere et ex eius consideratione uel dare uel negare 
quod dicitur. illae autem separatim enuntiatae syllabae, quia sine ulla 
significatione sonuerunt, hoc eas esse quod sonuerunt concessum est.
(23)
Although Adeodatus has made an important distinction here, he has gone too far the
other way and is suggesting that one should only focus upon what is signified by a
word, that is, the extra-linguistic object.
Aug. placet igitur firmumque animo tenes non respondendum esse 
interrogationibus, nisi ex his rebus, quae uerbis significantur.
Ad. non intellego, cur displiceat, si modo uerba sint.
(23)
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6.1.3. The Lion.
0486 The second sophism which Augustine introduces to clarify the philosophical, 
and semantic, issues at play in the homonymous class of ambiguity and the approach 
needed to avoid such fallacies is a variant of the Stoic3614 wagon’ fallacy.
81 Tl AxxA£l<^  TOUTO 5lOC Tot) (JTOjlOCTO*; GOO 8l8pX£T<XV apogeev 88
XxxX8ig apa^a apa 8ia  to o  gtopoctoi; goo  SiepxeTcu.
(Diogenes Laertius 7.187)
A variant was also used by Clement, in which he also provides a solution362.
q tctcogk; 8e aGd>pccTo<; elvai 6poA,oyeiTai* 8io Kai to  GocpiGpa 
8K8ivo obTcoq X v e x a v  "o Aiyei^ Stepped goo  8 ia  to o  GTopaToq", 
OTtep a^r|08q, "oiKtav 8e Aiyeiq, olida apa Sia to o  GTopaToq goo  
SiepxeTai", oitep tyebScx;* ob8e yap ttjv oiKtav A-eyopev Gcbpa 
obaav, aAAa tt^v jiTd)Giv aampaTov obaav, xiq oiKia Toyxavei.
(Clement, strom. 8.9.26.5)
0487 Augustine presents the rather more colourful version whereby what comes out
of the speaker’s mouth is a lion.
Aug. uellem scire, quomodo illi resisteres, de quo iocantes solemus audire, 
quod ex eius ore, cum quo disputabat, leonem processisse concluserit. cum 
enim quaesisset, utrum ea, quae loqueremur nostro ore procederent, atque ille 
non potuisset negare, quod facile fuit, egit cum homine, ut in loquendo leonem 
nominaret, hoc ubi factum est, ridicule insult are coepit et premere, ut, 
quoniam quicquid loquimur ore nostro exire confessus erat et leonem se 
locutum esse nequibat abnuere, homo non malus tarn immanem bestiam 
uomuisse uideretur.
(23)
This sophism may be analysed as follows.
361This fallacy occurs in a passage listing sophisms used by Chrysippus.
362Clement’s account is rather unclear and involves at least one serious error: namely, that the TtiGoan; 
which comes out o f one’s mouth is incorporeal. The point, surely, of the solution is that there is a 
distinction between the physical sound of the word, or case, which comes out o f one’s mouth and the 
thing which the word signifies. This point is well made by Atherton (1993, 285-6), who notes that the 
clue to the solution is within the example in Diogenes Laertius (7.187) where the verb o f speaking is 
‘Axxtetq’. This verb, unlike ‘Aiyen;’ used in Clement, is “...often applied to the emission of any kind of 
vocal sound... [this] choice... may well have been intended to point the way to its correct solution, by 
emphasising the uttered term’s phonetic - and thus corporeal - aspect” (Atherton, 1993, 286). The
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S2 1. What one says comes out of one’s mouth
2. x says 4 lion’
3. Therefore, a lion comes out of jc’s mouth.
0488 Augustine’s choice of vocabulary in the fallacy is revealing in emphasising the 
structure of the argument and in providing clues towards the fallacy’s solution. The 
basic structure is as follows.
(1) ea quae loqueremur nostro ore procederent
(2) leonem nominaret
(3) homo... tarn immanem bestiam uomuisse
The first stage in the argument (1) is reminiscent of the preliminary, and final,
definition of speech in the dialogue.
qui... loquitur... signum for as dat per articulatum sonum
(2)
uerbum... cum aliquo significatu articulata uoceprofertur
(8)
Although it must be said that the choice of vocabulary in (1) is a perfectly acceptable 
translation of the Greek examples above, nevertheless, due to the suggestion of the 
earlier definitions of speech it is immediately suggestive of the fact that it is of course 
a word which comes out of one’s mouth and that this word is a phonetic item. While 
in the second stage of the argument (2) Augustine significantly chooses to use the 
term ‘nominaref rather than some less provocative term. The use of this term, 
particularly with regards to the preceding arguments, calls to mind the autonymous 
aspect of words as meaningful utterances363. Finally, stage three (3) stresses, through
solution to the fallacy rests not simply on the phonetic or on the semantic aspect but on both together, 
that is to say, the aspect qua meaningful utterance (v. inf. 0488).
363As Bumyeat points out the error which Clement (strom. 8.9.26.5) makes reveals that he is thinking 
of meaning for “.. .the most natural error would be to mistakenly think only o f the sound, i.e. word as 
utterance, rather than the incorporeal meaning as coming out of one’s mouth, it actually points towards 
an original use-mention sense whereby what comes out of one’s mouth is both the corporeal word and
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the vocabulary, the physical absurdity of the conclusion (uomuisse), while also 
emphasising the extra-linguistic nature of the object, namely, the lion. The language 
of the argument can be seen to highlight the three factors at play in the fallacy: the 
corporeal vocal sound; the incorporeal signification, which the vocal sound bears; and 
the actual object which is referred to. The central stage, the signification, is the 
turning point in the fallacy for it is the transition between what is said (the word) and 
what it is said about (the object).
0489 Adeodatus clarifies the ambiguity with the analysis that it is the sign which
comes out of one’s mouth, not the thing signified.
Ad. minime uero erat arduum scurrae huic resistere; non enim concederem 
ore nostro exire quaecumque loquimur. nam quae loquimur, ea significamus, 
non autem res, quae significatur, sed signum, quo significatur, loquentis ore 
procedit, nisi cum ipsa signa significantur, quod genus paulo ante 
tractauimus.
Aug. bene tu quidem hoc modo aduersus ilium essesparatus.
(23-24)
0490 The ‘lion’ fallacy has allowed Augustine to temper Adeodatus’ inclination (v. 
sup. 0485) to focus only upon what is signified by terms, that is the extra-linguistic 
object. The provision is that one must be aware of the linguistic element in speech, 
and not simply the referring mode of language for otherwise one will be open to such 
fallacies as that demonstrated by the ‘lion’.
the incorporeal meaning. Indeed, for the fallacy to work it must be the meaningful utterance which 
comes out o f the mouth” (1987). The fact that the fallacy does not really work without understanding 
the semantic autonymous aspect o f the word use, and that Augustine is seen in his analysis o f names 
and words to appreciate this distinction, adds weight to the fact that this is the sense in which the 
fallacy is understood, although Augustine does not draw the point out.
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6.1.4. Rational Law and Linguistic Rule.
0491 To finalise the clarification of the type of linguistic ambiguity under
discussion Augustine introduces a third sophism.
Aug. ...uerum tamen mihi quid respondebis, utrum homo nomen sit, 
requirenti?
Ad. quid, nisi esse nomen?
Aug. quid cum te uideo, num nomen uideo?
Ad. non.
Aug. uisne igitur dicam quod sequitur?
Ad. ne quaeso; nam mihi ipse renuntio me hominem non esse, qui nomen esse 
responderim, cum homo utrum nomen esset inquireres. iam enim placuerat ex 
ea re, quae significaretur, aut assentiri aut negare quod dicitur.
(24)
The line of argumentation in this sophism is as follows.
S3 1. Man {homo) is a name
2. x  is not a name
3. Therefore, x is not a man.
0492 Adeodatus has apparently arrived at this position due to a Taw of reason’ {lex
rationis) by which the mind is ‘predisposed’ {mentibus nostris indita) to determine the
use of a word dependent on the context within which it occurs. Any term, taken
individually can be interpreted either from the sense in which it is a sign or from that
in which it signifies.
Aug. at mihi uidetur non te frustra in hanc responsionem decidisse; nam 
uigilantiam tuam mentibus nostris indita ipsa lex rationis euicit. nam si 
quaererem, quid esset homo, responderes fortasse animal; si autem 
quaererem, quae pars orationis esset homo, nullo modo posses recte 
respondere nisi nomen. quam ob rem, cum homo et nomen et animal esse 
inueniatur, illud dicitur ex ea parte, qua signum est, hoc qua significatur.
(24)
0493 It is through contextual disambiguation that the use, to which any term is 
applied, can be determined. The context in which the term is used with application to 
the extra-linguistic item is more readily {multo procliuius) grasped, presumably due to
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this being the more standard application of the term. In modem terminology it would
perhaps be referred to as being the more entrenched.
qui ergo quaerit, utrum homo nomen sit, nihil ei aliud quam esse respondeam; 
satis enim significat ex ea parte se uelle audire, qua signum est. si autem 
quaerit, utrum animal sit, multoprocliuius adnuam...
(24)
0494 In the situation where there is a lack of clear contextualisation, the linguistic
rule (loquendi regula) suggested previously (DM 23) is applied. This rule determines
that, without contextual clarification, one interprets the use of a term as being applied
with reference to what is signified. It should be noted that this example (‘homo esf )  is
equivalent to that introduced by Galen (“avOpomoq eGTiv” soph. 4) and that the
implication is that the context does not disambiguate the use of the term ‘ homo’ and,
therefore, can be interpreted as a member of the class of Homonymy in Compounds.
quoniam si tacens et nomen et animal tantum quid esset homo requireret, 
placita ilia loquendi regula ad id, quod his duabus syllabis significatur, 
animus curreret neque quicquam responderetur nisi animal, uel etiam tota 
definitio diceretur, id est animal rationale mortale.
(24)
0495 Accurate communication depends, therefore, on the correct interpretation of
the sense in which a speaker in using any particular term.
Ad. prorsus uidetur. sed cum esse nomen concesserimus, quomodo illam 
conclusionem nimis contumeliosam euitabimus, qua nos homines non esse 
conuincitur?
Aug. quomodo putas nisi docendo non ex ea parte illatam, qua interroganti 
assentiebamur? aut si ex ea parte illam se fatetur inferre nullo modo est 
formidanda. quid enim metuam hominem, id est tres istas syllabas non esse me 
confi ter i?
(24)
The tendency of the mind is to interpret in accord with the rule which is naturally the
stronger, and the stronger is to understand a word as referring to what is signified
rather than to itself as sign.
Aug. quia non possum non putare ad id conclusionem referri, quod his duabus 
syllabis significatur, simul atque ista uerba sonuerint, ea scilicet regula, quae
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naturaliter plurimum ualet, ut auditis signis ad res significatas feratur
364intentio .
(24)
0496 It is worth brief consideration that there is a law {lex) of reason and a rule 
{regula) of speech. The priority resides with the law of reason which determines how 
one interprets any term, and it is only when there is no contextual basis for 
determining use that the rule is applied. The rule of speech is a model, or example, 
which is conventional {placita ilia loquendi regula)365 and is applied, in a sense, 
based on belief, for there is no sound basis for determining how exactly one should 
interpret any given term. The law, however, would appear to be more firmly imposed, 
or imparted upon, the mind {indita) and it has priority, presumably, based on the 
firmer and rationally based grounds for determining the use of a term dependent upon 
context366.
0497 The three sophisms elucidate a number of connected issues. Firstly (S3), that 
there is a law of reason such that the mind turns firstly to context so as to 
disambiguate linguistic usage and signification. This law determines the priority of 
sense in which any term should be understood. Secondly (Si), there is a linguistic rule 
such that, all things being equal, the mind interprets, immediately (cf. “ ... ad id, quod 
his duabus syllabis significatur, animus curreret... ” DM 24), a sign in relation to that
364The term ‘intentio’ is a sort o f inner, mental, concentration (for a fuller description c f  O’Daly: 1987, 
84-7) and is “... an echo, however dematerialized, o f the Stoic concept of tonos .. ” (O’Daly: 1987, 85 
n.13). Cf. Pohlenz: 1980, 220.
365It is true that ‘naturaliter’ is used with reference to the ‘regula’. However, this is used with reference 
not to the distinction between the law of reason and the rule o f language but rather to the different 
levels o f the rule o f language, namely, whether one understands the reference as the word or the object 
signified. Also, the context does not necessitate that the rule is in fact a natural, that is, non- 
conventional one, but rather that the mind turns to the application which is stronger by nature, which 
may simply mean that which is more ‘entrenched’. It may also be possible to interpret the use of 
‘naturaliter’ as depending on the nature of signs, for although the words may be acquired inductively, 
the rule o f language which applies in this context is natural in that it is natural that a sign be interpreted 
as pointing to something beyond itself (v. sup. § 3.2.1).
366As will be discussed below (§ 9) it is apt that these distinctions occur due to the fact that reason is 
something specifically granted and facilitated by God (hence a law) and that language depends upon 
rules, or examples, on account o f it being inductively learned throught the application o f reason (so of 
course language is still due to God) in following the behaviour o f others.
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which it signifies. This rule also implies, as does the example within which it occurs, 
that context does not always disambiguate. Also, there is the need to have an 
awareness of the ambiguous nature of terms and to grasp the different applications of 
any term so as to avoid fallacies (S2). In this way one will be able to make a decision 
based on context and to make the correct interpretation due to what is signified (word 
or object). In contexts where there is no clarification of how a term is applied and in 
which a fallacy may lead to false conclusions then one must refrain from answering 
until one is sure of the context or of how the term is being applied (DM 22).
0498 In his treatment of ambiguous terms, Augustine can be seen to be aware of the 
Stoic arguments and to apply them in ways suited to his own particular concerns. 
Although the full import of the Stoic approach to autonymy and homonymous terms 
in simples and compounds is not always clear from Augustine’s approach it can be 
seen that the Stoic approach to these issues did have a great effect on Augustine’s 
analysis of signs and, as will be seen (v. inf. § 8 and § 9), this analysis also has an 
impact on his approach to the role of language in knowledge acquisition, and indeed 
in his approach to knowledge acquisition per se.
6.1.5. Proprie.
0499 A central concern of the DM is the nature of teaching and Augustine proceeds
367to essentially redefine, or to narrow the application of, the term ‘docere’ . This does
not mean that all other uses are wrong but rather that there is a ‘proper’ or strict 
meaning for the term. This approach reveals a concern of Augustine’s which can be 
observed to recur throughout his work, namely the refocusing or narrowly defining of
367I am indebted to Bumyeat (1987, 6) for this point.
commonly used terms. The proper use of a term is only discovered through reason 
and, as Augustine sees it, with greater understanding of concepts so too do the proper 
applications of words become more accurately refined. The word ‘proprie,368 is 
important in this sense in Augustine and is consistently used in the sense of the 
correct application of words, often when correcting a misapplication or affirming a 
questionable application.
0500 The use of this term occurs elsewhere in linguistic contexts (cf. for example, 
Aulus Gellius 2.6.5; 7.11.2; 9.1.8; 16.5.1). However, it is probable that Augustine is 
using the term as a translation of the Greek term ‘Kropicoq’369. Ancient discussion on 
‘proper’, or strict, uses and ‘improper’, or loose, uses were common and Augustine 
would appear to conform to this tradition.
0501 It is possible that Augustine is using it as a direct rendering of the Stoic 
application of the term and may be influenced by the Stoic approach to these issues. 
Augustine can, in fact, be seen (DD 10) to be interested in the Stoic attempt to 
determine the ‘proper’, or strict, significations of terms through classification such 
as transference {translatio). It must be said that the evidence for any sure attestation of 
a direct influence on Augustine is unavailable. However, that Augustine is concerned 
with such issues, and that there was a tradition within which he is placed is without 
doubt. Augustine may, once again, have become aware of such issues through his 
training as a rhetor for with regard to “ ... rhetorical and grammatical/literary critical 
texts... explicit distinctions between acceptable metaphors and unacceptable
368‘Proprie’ occurs in this sense invariably with appellare; dicere; loqui; uocari; mmcupare. cf. esp. 
ord. 1.29; dial. 10.110; 10.112; mag. 9\doctr. chr. 1.2; 2.13; 4.35; conf. 11.26; 1.10; 1.12; 1.18;
2.19; 2.26; 3.19; 4.24; 5.12; 7.6; 7.10; 13.24; 14.3; 14.26; 15.5; 15.17; 15.29; 15.30; 15.31; 15.32; 
15.37; 15.38; 15.45; retr. 1.4.2; 1.10.3; 1.14.3; etc.
369For a fuller discussion o f ‘Kuptcoq’ cf. Atherton: 1993, 162-167.
370Cf. Atherton: 1993, 167.
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ambiguities would have been found useful for teaching composition or for defending 
canonical authors from charges of stylistic infelicity” (Atherton: 1993, 166).
6.2. The Priority of Sign, Thing, and Knowledge.
0502 With the lengthy discussion and clarification of the modes of communication, 
the class of communicables, and that class of linguistic ambiguity which is deemed 
relevant by Augustine, the focus of the dialogue returns to the relationship of signs to 
reality, reality to knowledge, and knowledge to signs. In doing so, Augustine is 
concerned to determine the relative priorities existing between these different items.
0503 In the following analysis Augustine works from the principle that whatever 
exists on account of another thing, necessarily, has a lower status, existentially, than 
that on account of which it exists.
371Aug. ...quicquid enim propter aliud est, uilius sit necesse est, quam id 
propter quod est...
(25)
This principle can be stated as follows.
Pi If x  exists on account of y, then y  is of more value than x 311
0504 The basis for this principle is causal, for clearly x exists because (propter) of y, 
and in this sense there is a clear priority: y  is the cause of x, therefore y  is existentially 
prior. However, due to Augustine’s hierarchical world view, there is a sense of value
371H o w  exactly one is to understand ‘uilius' in this context is not clear. The most plausible 
interpretation is that there is present some sense o f the Plotinian hypostases (Plot. 5.1) with the sense of 
dependent existence, taken together with the idea that something higher, or prior, is cams and 
something lower, or worse, is vilis\ is said, Augustine may also be influenced in this context by the 
application o f such a principle as seen in Aristotle, cf. APo. 1.2, EN 1.7. The language o f carus/uilis 
also introduces the idea o f the higher being more beloved and morally superior, which would be best 
explained by the Christian context and by the Augustinian approach to the highest caused o f existence, 
and that on account o f which everything exists, being God and God being the ultimate source o f amor. 
The closer to God the dearer (carius) something is, the further removed, the worse (uilius).
372King: 1995, 127 n.57.
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introduced {uilius). The evaluative judgement imposed on the causal principle is 
rather awkward and makes for a rather difficult argument.
6.2.1. Sign and Thing.
0505 The proposal, based on Pi, is introduced that things signified are of more
importance that their signs.
Aug. proinde intellegas uolo res, quae significantur, pluris quam signa esse 
pendendas.
(25)
The argument is that signs exist because of those things that they signify, and are, 
therefore, necessarily, of less value than the things signified.
P i' Signs exists on account of things (signified), therefore things (signified) are of 
more value than signs.
0506 The basis of this proposal is seen in the res/signa distinction in the DDC (v.
sup. § 3.2.1). Words {qua signs) are used solely with the purpose of signifying things
and it follows that signs are things which are used so as to signify something.
nemo enim utitur uerbis, nisi aliquid significandi gratia, ex quo intellegitur, 
quidappellem signa, res eas uidelicet, quae ad significandum aliquid 
adhibentur.
{doctr. chr. 1.2)
Signs are things on account of the fact that they are so employed, that is, to signify
things and it is in this sense that signs are things. However, although all signs are
things, not all things are signs.
quam ob rem omne signum etiam res aliqua est; quod enim nulla res est, 
omnino nihil est; non autem omnis res etiam signum est.
{doctr. chr. 1.2)
The whole basis of the existence of signs is that they signify, and the basis of this 
signifying is that something is signified. Signs are things, but are members of the class
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of things, not vice versa (omne signum... res... non omnis res etiam signum est). The 
reason that signs are things is because of the things they signify, their existence is, 
therefore, on account of these things and so the things signified are existentially prior.
0507 Adeodatus, taking up Augustine’s introduction of valuation, proposes that 
words may be superior to the thing on whose account they exist. This naturally raises 
the point as to the questionable use of value terms in such a context and even how 
such terms can reasonably be understood with regards to such disparate items as 
‘word’ and ‘object’.
0508 The point is made that when one says ‘filth’ (caenum), this term is superior to 
the things it signifies. What is offensive is not the sound of the word, the signifier, for 
with simply one change of letter {caelum) one has the word ‘heaven’, whereas for the 
things signified by these terms there is a vast difference. It is of note that the language 
chosen by Adeodatus recalls the fact that terms are meaningful items {nomen) and that 
the mind is taken primarily to the thing signified (‘loquendi regula’ DM 24; 0494) 
and that this is what causes ‘offence’ {offendit audientes) to those hearing the term 
{“Ad. cur ergo animum offendit, cum dicitur: “non es igitur homo ”?...Aug.
quia... auditis signis ad res significatas feratur intentio” DM 24).
Ad. uidetur mihi non temere hie esse assentiendum; nam cum dicimus caenum, 
longe hoc nomen arbitror rei quam significat antecellere. quod enim nos 
offendit audientes non ad ipsius uerbi pertinet sonum; caenum enim nomen 
mutata una littera caelum est. inter ilia uero, quae his nominibus 
significantur, quantum distet uidemus.
(25)
0509 Taken in material terms, that is, comparing the word sound with the actual 
physical object which is talked about, it is clear that one would rather come into 
contact with the word ‘caenum’ than the object.
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Ad. quamobrem nequaquam huic signo tribuerim, quod in re, quam significat, 
odimus, etpropterea hoc illi iure antepono; libentius enim hoc audimus, quam 
ullo sensu illud attingimus.
(25)
It would, therefore, appear that it is false that all things should be valued more than 
their signs. This position is considered in the light of the purpose which exists behind 
the act of name giving.
6.2.1.1. The Purpose of Naming Things.
0510 After the long analysis and classification of linguistic signs, the dialogue can 
now return to the central question, namely, that of the epistemological issues 
concerning knowledge acquisition and the relation of language to this.
0511 The analysis of things shown by signs does not follow a pattern similar to that 
of signs shown by signs. The reason for this is, mainly, that the question concerning 
the relation of signs to objects was shown to ultimately depend upon the broader issue 
as to how knowledge is acquired and could, therefore, only be determined through an 
analysis of performance (v. sup. § 4): a subject which must await the discussion of 
things shown through performance. Thus far, much has been established about the 
status of linguistic signs, of and in themselves, however, the main conclusions 
reached, for the purposes of the dialogue, are that words do not appear to show what it 
is that they refer to (cf. discussion of ostension below, § 7 and § 8) and to do so they 
must be demonstrated to allow some sort of direct access to their objects. Further, 
words in themselves are ambiguous and their significations may only be determined 
in an inductive manner based on an accepted standard for linguistic interpretation (v. 
sup. § 6.1-§ 6.1.4). In addition, it has been determined that words may be rationally 
disambiguated, in most cases, by means of contextualisation (v. sup. § 6.1-§ 6.1.4).
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However, in considering the question of things shown through signs the analysis falls
between two stools, as it were. This, as mentioned above, is due to the fact that the
analysis of words has highlighted the major issues concerning words, fundamentally
that there is a need for some level of interpretation in the communication process and,
related to this, that there appears to be the need for a mental item between word and
object. While in addition there remains to be considered the status of things shown
through performance and their position in relation to knowledge acquisition, and the
question as to how the facts of performative acquisition can be related to the analysis
of words. The consideration of things shown through signs, therefore, introduces the
mediating factor of intention and what is the true purpose of language.
0512 The prioritising of words and things once again raises the question as to the
purpose behind naming, or applying words, to things.
Aug. die ergo mihi, quid arbitreris eos secutos esse, qui huic rei tam foedae 
atque aspernabili nomen indiderunt, uel utrum eos probes an improbes?
Ad. ego uero illos nec probare nec improbare audeo nec quidfuerint secuti 
scio...
Aug. potesne saltern scire, quid tu sequaris, cum hoc nomen enuntias?
(25)
This question simply refashions the opening question of the dialogue.
Aug. quid tibi uidemur efficere uelle, cum loquimur?
(1)
Thus far in the dialogue, performance (efficere) has been of central concern: that is 
not to say that intention was entirely absent, but rather that the central focus was on 
how words signify and what problems can be determined in the linguistic process. 
Intention {uelle) is now re-introduced to the fore and in the final stages of the dialogue 
an attempt will be made to consider how well the performance meets the intention of 
speech.
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0513 The definition of the purpose of speech is now more fully stated, in
accordance with the conclusions arrived at over the length of the dialogue. One utters
a name {nomen enuntias) with the intention of signifying (,significare uolo). The act of
signifying is with the purpose {ut)m  of teaching or reminding {doceam uel
admoneam) the person what one thinks he/she should be taught/reminded.
Ad. hoc plane possum; nam significare uolo, ut eum, cum quo loquor, 
doceam uel admoneam de re ilia, quod eum doceri uel admoneri oportere 
arbitror.
(25)
0514 This restated definition focuses upon a number of elements which have been 
to some extent been clarified thus far (1): naming {nomen)\ utterance {enuntias)', and 
signifying {significare). There also remain a number of unresolved issues (2): the 
question as to the status of teaching or reminding {doceam uel admoneam) ', the related 
question as to the relation between the sign receiver and the sign transmitter {eum cum 
quo loquor); and the, also related, issue as to the place of the object of knowledge 
which is to be taught {de re ilia). The place of intention {uolo) remains between these 
two groups (1) and (2). Group one relate primarily to language, group (2) to the 
acquisition of knowledge and information transfer, while intentionality depends on its 
success in the successful bridging of (1) to (2).
6.2.2. Sign, Object and Knowledge.
0515 Knowledge {scientia), which is the result of teaching or reminding, is superior
to the sign. However, that does not apply for the relation between objects and signs.
Aug. quid? ipsum docere aut admonere siue doceri aut admoneri, quod uel tu 
exhibes commode per hoc nomen uel exhibetur tibi, nonne carius quam ipsum 
nomen habendum est?
373The closing passages o f the DM will essentially hinge on this ‘u t\ for the question is as to whether 
the act o f signifying does in fact teach or remind, and if so, in what way.
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Ad. concedo ipsam scientiam, quae per hoc signum euenit eidem signo esse 
anteponendam, sed non ideo etiam rem ipsam puto.
(25)
0516 Therefore, it is proposed that although it may be false that all objects are
superior to their signs, this does not falsify Pi (0503). If the purpose of speech is to
teach or remind someone of something, this is equivalent to transferring, or reminding
another of, information. This information is knowledge (of things), or
understanding374, and so signs exist on account of this knowledge, or understanding.
P r ' Signs exists on account of knowledge (of things), therefore knowledge (of 
things) is of more value than signs.
It is not so clear with the relation between signs and objects for, unlike with the
relation between signs and knowledge, it is not so clearly demonstrable that words
exist on account of the objects themselves. According to the description of the
purpose of speech, words (linguistic signs) are demonstrably shown (conuincitur) to
exist to teach, which is the transferral or imparting of knowledge.
Aug. in ilia igitur sententia nostra, quamquam sit falsum res omnes signis suis 
praeponi oportere, non tamen falsum est omne, quod propter aliud est, uilius 
esse quam id, propter quod est. cognitio quippe caeni, propter quam hoc 
nomen est institutum, pluris habenda est ipso nomine, quod eidem caeno 
praeponendum esse comperimus. non enim ob aliud ista cognitio signo de quo 
agimus antelata est, nisi quia illudpropter hanc, non haec propter illud esse 
conuincitur.
(26)
0517 The relation of objects and knowledge is not clarified at this stage but, as one 
has knowledge o f  things, a preliminary causal (if not evaluative) scheme can be 
established.
374Augustine’s treatment o f knowledge and understanding will be considered below (§ 9.1.1).
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(024)
Causal Schema: res i— S cognitio
V
nomen
Although Augustine does not introduce the issue at this point, the causal relation 
between object and knowledge is not as straightforwardly empirical as the above 
schema implies. The fact of the matter is that both the objects and the knowledge of 
them are ultimately dependent on Forms. The above schema might better be presented 
as follows.
Causal Schema375:
(025)
Transcendent Form
Object(s) Knowledge
V
name
0518 It is of note that language is proposed to have been established not directly 
because of external objects but rather because humans have such a nature as to 
understand things, or to be able to think about things. Language is only indirectly 
related to the external world, and this indirectness is on account of the medium of the 
human mind. In this way, the institution of language is inextricably bound up with
375Cf. Diagram D9, (0261).
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thought, and necessarily this thought is of such a nature as to be ‘sayable’ or
expressed in language.
... cognitio quippe caeni, propter quam hoc nomen est institutum...
(26)
6.2.3. Living to Eat and Eating to Live.
0519 Augustine once again restates Pi with the example of the purpose of eating, for 
one should eat to live, not, as the glutton, live to eat376. This example of the man is 
introduced with the effect of enforcing the teleological aspect of communication and 
for the sake of clarifying the importance of one’s choices in determining one’s actions 
in putting things to their proper uses.
377Aug. ...nam ita cum quidam uorator uentrisque, ut ab apostolo dicitur , 
cultor diceret ideo se uiuere, ut uesceretur, non tulit qui audiebat frugi homo 
et quanto inquit melius ideo uescereris, ut uiueres. uterque tamen ex eadem 
ista regula locutus est; nam neque alia de causa ille displicuit, nisi quod uitam 
suam tarn parui penderet, ut earn duceret gutturis uoluptate uiliorem dicendo 
se propter epulas uiuere, neque hie ob aliud iure laudatur, nisi quod in his 
duobus, quid propter quid fieret, hoc est, quid cui subiectum esset intellegens 
cibandum potius ut uiuamus, quam uiuendum ut cibemur admonuit.
(26)
0520 Both individuals in the example base their decisions on Pi but it is the 
temperate man who understands which thing (uiuere and edere) occurs on account of 
the other. Augustine is concerned in this example with the uti/frui distinction which is 
more fully introduced in the DDC378.
376This is a common parable: cf. Quintilian 9.3.85; Aulus Gellius 19.2.7 (where it is attributed to 
Socrates).
377Romans 16:18.
378 Augustine received the utilfrui distinction from Varro, cf. Lorenz: 1952/53, 34-60; and 
Pfligersdorffer: 1971, 195-224.
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0521 There are things for use and things for enjoyment, and those which are for
enjoyment are such as to bring happiness, while those for use are such as to assist in
attaining happiness.
res ergo aliae sunt, quibus fruendum est, aliae quibus utendum, aliae quae 
fruuntur et utuntur. Mae quibus fruendum est, nos beatos faciunt. istis quibus 
utendum est, tendentes ad beatitudinem adiuuamur et quasi adminiculamur, 
ut ad Mas, quae nos beatos faciunt, peruenire atque his inhaerere possimus.
{doctr. chr. 1.3)
Those who enjoy such things as are to be used are hindered in attaining happiness and
lose sight the proper objects of enjoyment.
nos uero, qui fruimur et utimur inter utrasque constitute si eis, quibus 
utendum est, frui uoluerimus, impeditur cursus noster et aliquando etiam 
deflectitur, ut ab his rebus, quibus fruendum est, obtinendis uel retardemur 
uel etiam reuocemur inferiorum amore praepediti.
{doctr. chr. 1.3)
0522 That which makes one truly happy is to return to God and use must be made of
the means at our disposal to move towards what is spiritual and eternal.
... si redire in patriam uolumus, ubi beati esse possimus, utendum est hoc 
mundo, non fruendum, «ut inuisibilia» dei «per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta 
conspiciantur», hoc est, ut de corporalibus temporalibusque rebus aeterna 
et spiritalia capiamus.
{doctr. chr. 1.4)
One must use whatever is at one’s disposal in this world so as to gain an
understanding, through this world, of the eternal.
uti autem, quod in usum uenerit, ad id, quod amas obtinendum referre, si 
tamen amandum est. nam usus inlicitus abusus potius uel abusio nominanda 
est.
{doctr. chr. 1.4)
0523 The purpose of speech is to teach and it should be used properly so as to assist 
in gaining knowledge, if it can do this, so as to enable one to move closer to the 
spiritual and eternal.
0524 The talkative person who teaches in order to talk is such a person who 
confuses use and enjoyment, for one should talk so as to teach.
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Aug. ...similiter et tu fortasse et quilibet hominum non imperite res 
aestimantium dicenti cuipiam loquaci amatorique uerborum ideo doceo, ut 
loquar responderetis homo, cur non potius ideo loqueris, ut doceas?
(26)
Words exist on account of knowledge (cognitio) and the purpose of speech is in 
teaching, and what is taught.
6.2.4. Words and Teaching.
0525 Words are, therefore, in accordance with Pi, of less value than that on account
of which they are used. In fact, the use of words is superior to words themselves on
account of the fact that words exist so as to be used.
Aug. ...quodsi haec uera sunt, sicuti esse cognoscis, uidesprofecto, quanto 
uerba minor is habenda sint quam id propter quod utimur uerbis, cum ipse 
usus uerborum iam sit uerbis anteponendus; uerba enim sunt, ut his utamur...
(26)
P i'"  Words exists on account of their use, therefore the use of words is of more
value than words.
0526 Furthermore, the use of words is so as to teach, so teaching is better than 
speaking.
... utimur autem his addocendum. quanto est igitur melius docere quam loqui, 
tanto melior quam uerba locutio. multo ergo melior doctrina quam uerba. sed 
cupio audire, quidforte contradicendum putes.
(26)
P i" ' '  The use of words exists on account of teaching, therefore teaching is of more 
value than the use of words.
247
6.2.5. Understanding. Things, and Signs.
0527 The inference which Augustine proceeds to make from the preceding
arguments is that, since knowledge of things is more valuable than signs of things,
knowledge of things signified is superior to knowledge of their signs.
Aug. ... cognitionem rerum quam signa rerum esse cariorem. quamobrem 
cognitio rerum, quae significantur, cognitioni signorum anteferenda est...
(27)
This position is not readily accepted by Adeodatus, for, as in the case of ‘filth’ 
{caenum), perhaps knowledge of the name may be preferable to knowledge of the 
thing.
Ad. ... si enim, ut caenum nomen melius est ea re quam significat, ita et huius 
nominis cognitio cognitioni quoque illius rei est anteponenda, quamuis ea 
cognitione sit ipsum nomen inferius?
(27)
6.2.5.1. Fourfold Division.
0528 Four items are determined to be involved in the above consideration.
1. the name
2. the thing
3. knowledge of the name
4. knowledge of the thing
This division naturally falls into two general divisions: (a) name and thing; (b)
knowledge of name and knowledge of thing.
Ad. ...quattuor quippe sunt: nomen et res, cognitio nominis et cognitio rei. 
sicut ergo primum secundo, cur non et tertium quarto antecellat? sed non 
antecellat, num etiam subiciendum est?
(27)
0529 The remaining question on the priority of knowledge of thing over knowledge 
of name is discussed through the example of ‘vice’ {uitium). In this example, although
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the name may surpass the thing, the knowledge of the thing would appear to surpass
the knowledge of the name.
Aug. ... hoc trisyllabum nomen, quodsonat cum dicimus uitium, melius esse 
quam id quod significat, cum ipsius cognitio nominis multo sit inferior 
cognitione uitiorum.
(28)
The point which Augustine is making is that while the three syllable word 4 uitium’ is 
superior to vice itself, knowledge of vice is much better than knowledge of the word 
‘uitium’.
0530 The point is passed over as to whether it is clear how one should determine
priority amongst different types of knowledge. The primary point has been settled,
namely, that the knowledge of things signified is preferable to the signs themselves.
Aug. ... deinde si qua cognitio cui cognitioni praeferenda sit, non hie facile est 
explicare. satis habeo, quod effectum est cognitionem rerum, quae 
significantur, etsi non cognitione signorum ipsis tamen signis esse potiorem.
(28)
0531 With regard to the relationship between knowledge of names and knowledge 
of things it is possible to apply the conclusions reached above (§6 .2 -§6 .2 .5 )to the  
issue. For as the relation between object and knowledge was one whereby knowledge, 
as knowledge of the object, was caused by the object, so too may this relation be seen 
between name, which is also an object, and knowledge of the name. The causal 
relation of name to word depends on the fact that one hears the word and, therefore, 
gains knowledge of the name.
(D26)
name c=£> knowledge 
(of name)
This causal relationship may be considered with that relating an object to knowledge, 
and knowledge to name.
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(D27)
object r —> knowledge 
(of object)
V
name
These two causal schemata may now be united to give the following series of 
relations.
(D28)
object czz> knowledge 
(of object)
name •= >  knowledge 
(of name)
0532 The issue surrounding the relation of the knowledge of the name with the 
knowledge of the thing is one which concerns Augustine’s approach to language 
acquisition379. After clarifying the possibility of the confusion caused by ambiguity 
and the need for contextualisation in the process of information transfer Augustine is 
finally able to return to the solution, proposed above (v. sup. § 4.2), for the correlation 
of items with the terms which refer to them. This solution is that of direct ostension 
and is discussed under the class of things shown through performance.
379 On language acquisition see below (§ 8.1.3).
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7. Classification (2.2): Things Shown bv Performance.
0533 The final classification of communication remaining to be considered is that
involving things which are, when possible, shown through performance. These things
are such as can be shown, or demonstrated, in themselves such as the act of walking,
sitting, lying down, speaking itself, and numerous other things of the same kind.
Aug. ...quare iam illud magis magisque discutiamus, quale sit genus rerum, 
quas sine signis monstrari posse dicebamus per se ipsas, ut loqui, ambulare, 
sedere, iacere atque huius modi cetera.
(28)
7.1. Ostension (2).
0534 After the analysis of signs shown through signs (§ 5) and things shown 
through signs (§ 6), discussion returns to the question as to how one in fact correlates 
a linguistic term with any item which it signifies. This issue is of great philosophical 
concern for the question as to how the meaning of a term is determined is 
fundamentally related to the question as to how one gains knowledge of any particular 
item, or kind of item. The question as to how one gains knowledge of any item in turn 
raises the question as to whether there are in fact any such items which are, 
essentially, knowable.
0535 Augustine is, basically, a Platonist and as such holds that there are items 
which as, essentially, knowable (knowable in theory, at any rate). These items are 
Forms. How one determines the meaning of a term is, therefore, determined by how 
one gains knowledge of any item. To know an item as a member of class X  one must 
explain how one has knowledge of the essential items, which are Forms.
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0536 This may be adequately described by recourse to ostensive definition. An 
individual x is shown an example of dog, y, by having it pointed out to her, and the 
word ‘dog’, z, said, x  receives, via perception, a formal impression ofy, Y. On 
encountering another example of y, y ', x recognises it as such, due to the formal 
information received on the first encounter, x  is now in the position to denote y ' with 
the term z because x  is able to determine the meaning of z by means of the knowledge 
she has of Y.
0537 This model is clearly inadequate and leaves a number of crucial questions 
unanswered. All of the central issues are interrelated and basically reduce to one 
fundamental problem, which is concerned with how one gains knowledge of items 
within the world. This problem is basically that which is raised by the Paradox of 
Enquiry introduced in Plato’s Meno (80d-e).
0538 Firstly, it is unclear how x  knows what is specifically being referred to, in the 
initial act of pointing. This issue has been raised by Augustine in the initial discussion 
of ostensive definition (v. sup. § 4) and as yet remains to be fully explained. However, 
it seems clear that this problem is considered to be a question of induction. That is to 
say, ony’s being pointed out to x on the first occasion, x gains a preliminary sense of 
what z specifically is signifying, and then on a second ostensive occasion x gains a 
clearer sense of what is signified, and so on. As is clear from such a model, x only 
gains an inductive sense of what it is that is being signified by the pointer (who is 
symbolic of the socio-linguistic group within which x lives). Therefore, x has an 
inductive sense of what is signified by particular terms within her socio-linguistic
380group .
380 It should be noted that the description given above for the relation of words to things is rather 
similar to Aristotle’s discussion o f concept formation (cf. Posterior Analytics 2.19). In this respect the 
account of the relation o f words to things is not specifically Platonic, but the account of concepts 
themselves is Platonic due to its involving Transcendent Forms.
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0539 An item, as Augustine makes clear (cf. “ ... intellegis omne coloratum uisibile 
esse et omne uisibile coloratum... ” DM 12), may consist of a number of different 
qualities, and this relates to the question of specificity of signification. The question 
refers to how one knows what particular aspect, or quality, is being signified. Related 
to this problem is that as to how x  gains knowledge of Y through seeing one sample, y, 
for the Forms which are accessed by the human mind through material objects are 
obscured by the material aspect of the world, as corporeal reality. Therefore, x ’s 
knowledge of Y is rather close to what might also be termed inductive knowledge, and 
this sort of ‘knowledge’ does not accord with the strict standard to which Augustine 
requires for true knowledge. That said, as will be seen (cf. § 9 and § 11), Augustine is 
willing to accept a less strict form of earthly knowledge which may assist in the 
movement towards true knowledge. This less strict form of knowledge is put to use 
(cf. DDC 1.3-4) so as to achieve true understanding.
0540 The model which was introduced for the discussion of signs (D5, 0138) may 
be usefully applied to this situation, as encountered by x. In this model x encounters a 
number of samples ofy over the course of her life and establishes a concept of y, 
which, although formal, is unclear and opaque to her understanding. Over time x gains 
a clearer understanding of y  simply by having greater familiarity with samples of it 
and this moves her towards a true knowledge of Y itself. In tandem with this process, 
x is ostensively shown that z signifies y  and also proceeds to gain a clearer 
understanding as to what the specific signification of z is, and so, together with her 
increased understanding of y  she can also gain a clearer sense of the meaning of z. In 
the following diagram the following symbols will be employed: Y for the imperfectly 
grasped formal concept and Y for the Transcendent Form, and M will stand for 
meaning/signification.
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(D29)
Y
Y
Y = M
x y  V  -» f ! z n
0541 The central concern for Augustine is, therefore, to attempt to determine how it 
is that one can move from Y to Y, that is from an imprecise knowledge of the Form, 
based on perception and reason applied to the material world, to knowledge of the 
essential item which is the true object of knowledge, that is, the Transcendental Form. 
An answer to this will also answer how it is that one can, individually, determine the 
meaning of a linguistic term, for one will do so via the essential and knowable item, 
that is the Form381.
0542 A secondary answer must be found to satisfy the thesis discussed in the DM, 
namely that language is employed so as to teach, or remind, others. For even if 
Augustine does satisfy himself in answering the primary question described above 
(0541), there still remains the problem as to the intentions of others in applying terms 
to objects. For although one may have accurate and firm knowledge of an item and 
may be able to determine the meaning of a term, which one uses to signify that item, 
by means of this knowledge, nevertheless, one only has an inductive knowledge of 
how, specifically, other members of one’s socio-linguistic community apply, or 
understand themselves to apply, that same term.
381 The role o f transcendent forms in Augustine’s analysis will be discussed at greater length in due 
course (v. inf. § 9.3.2).
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0543 It is in light of the above difficulties that Augustine’s reintroduction of direct 
ostension (v. sup. § 4.2) must be understood.
0544 After the thorough consideration of signs which has preceded (cf. § 5 and § 6),
the question as to whether the preliminary conclusion reached at DM 6-7 (v. sup.
0195) may be reconsidered.
Aug. omniane tibi uidentur, quae interrogati mox agerepossumus, sine signo 
posse monstrari, an aliquid excipis?
(29)
7.1.1. Specificity (2).
0545 The question of specificity, or inscrutability, is once again raised as a possible 
problem in ostensive definition. Adeodatus responds, with a reconsideration of 
specificity, to Augustine’s question as to whether, after the conclusions reached 
regarding signs and things shown through signs, there are things which can be shown 
through performance and which require no recourse to signs.
0546 The only possible exceptions which Adeodatus can now, on reconsideration, 
suggest as terms definable by means of performance are the acts of speaking and 
teaching.
Ad. ego uero etiam atque etiam genus hoc totum considerans nihil adhuc 
inuenio, quod sine signo ualeat doceri, nisi forte locutionem, et si forte id 
ipsum quispiam quaerat, quid sit docere. uideo enim me quicquidjiost eius 
interrogationem fecero, ut discat, ab ea ipsa re non <discedere>3 2 quam sibi 
demonstrari cupit...
(29)
Speech and teaching are introduced as exceptions on account of the fact that if one is 
asked what speaking is, then no matter what one says one must be speaking so as to 
instruct the enquirer.
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...nisi forte loquentem me interroget, quid sit loqui; quicquid enim dixero, ut 
eum doceam, loquar necesse est.
(6)
The same point is taken to hold for teaching, for if one is asked what teaching is, then 
no matter how one teaches one must be teaching so as to instruct the enquirer.
0547 In the example of walking, it is suggested that if one were asked, while not
engaged in the actual activity, what walking was, and were to immediately
demonstrate it by walking, there would be an issue as to how the enquirer could
determine how to interpret the demonstration. For, the enquirer may suppose that only
the amount of walking exhibited is what the term ‘walking’ means and so on
encountering some other person who walks further, or not as far, will suppose that this
other person has not walked at all. If this holds for ‘walking’, it will hold for all terms
of a similar status, except, as already noted, ‘speaking’ and ‘teaching’.
... si me cessantem, ut dictum est, uel aliud agentem roget quispiam, quid sit 
ambulare, et ego statim ambulando eum quod rogauit sine signo coner docere, 
unde cauebo, ne id tantum putet esse ambulare quantum ego ambulauero? 
quod si putauerit, decipietur; quisquis enim plus minusue quam ego 
ambulauerit, hunc ille ambulasse non arbitrabitur. et quod de hoc uno uerbo 
dixi, transit in omnia, quae sine signo monstrari posse consenseram, praeter 
duo ilia, quae excepimus.
(29)
0548 The proposed problem, raised by Adeodatus, and agreed with by Augustine 
(“Aug. accipio quidem istud... ” DM 30), is further clarified by Wittgenstein. Although 
Wittgenstein is discussing ostensive definition in particular, the general point holds
383for the problem Adeodatus is raising for direct ostension
The definition of the number two, “That is called ‘two’” - pointing to two nuts 
- is perfectly exact. - But how can two be defined like that? The person one 
gives the definition to doesn’t know what one wants to call “two”; he will 
suppose that “two” is the name given to this group of nuts! - He may suppose 
this; but perhaps he does not. He might make the opposite mistake; when I 
want to assign a name to this group of nuts, he might understand it as a 
numeral. And he might equally well take the name of a person, of which I
382 For reference to this variant reading cf. Appendix 2.
383 Augustinian ‘direct’ ostension that is (v. sup. § 4.2).
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gave an ostensive definition, as that of a colour, of a race, or even of a point of 
a compass. That is to say: an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted 
in every case.
(Wittgenstein, PI 28)
0549 Augustine does not confront the difficult problem of specificity immediately 
but firstly wants to dispose of the question concerning the status of terms such as 
‘speaking’ and ‘teaching’.
0550 The status of ‘teaching’ is initially considered. Augustine proposes that
speaking is one thing and teaching another. This introduces a method of analysis
involving genus and species, introduced earlier in the dialogue (DM 9-10). The
principle is applied that because every x is y, this does not entail that every y  is x, as in
the example where every horse is an animal but not every animal is a horse.
Therefore, being aware of this caveat, Adeodatus determines that teaching and
speaking would only be the same if this can be shown not to be a case of genus and
species and, therefore, if every x were shown to be y  and every y  to be x. However, as
is clear that there is teaching with signs other than words, teaching and speaking are
not the same. Therefore, speaking would appear to be, according to the dictum that the
purpose of speech is to teach (DM 1), a species of the genus of teaching. This is to
say, all speech is teaching but not all teaching is speech.
Aug. ... nonne tibi uidetur aliud esse loqui, aliud docere?
Ad. uidetur sane; nam si esset idem, non doceret quisquam nisi loquens. cum 
uero et aliis signis praeter uerba multa doceamus, quis de ista differentia 
dubitauerit?
(30)
0551 Augustine, however, was specifically concerned with whether anything could 
be shown without a sign. Although not all teaching involves speaking, speech is a 
species of the wider genus of signs and, therefore, the broader question is as to 
whether there is a difference between teaching and signifying.
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Aug. quid? docere et significare nihilne inter se an aliquid differunt?
(30)
0552 Adeodatus accepts that they are the same and that it follows that one signifies
in order to teach. If someone were to say the reverse of this, namely, that one teaches
in order to signify would be refuted by what is called the proposal which was given
above {superiore sententia).
Aug. nonne recte dicit, qui dicit ideo nos significare, ut doceamus?
Ad. recte prorsus.
Aug. quid? si dicat alius ideo nos docere, ut significemus, nonne facile 
superiore sententia refelletur?
Ad. ita est.
(30)
What Augustine means by the ‘superior sententia’ is not immediately apparent. 
However, the wording, such that one signifies in order to teach, suggests Pi, 
introduced at DM 25 (cf. 0503-0504).
Pi If x  exists on account ofy, theny is of more value than jc 
Although this argument does not appear to be directly applicable to the situation 
under discussion in DM 30, Augustine’s use of the term ‘sententia’ signals the way in 
which the application of Pi is, in fact, applicable. ‘Sententia’, notably, is used to 
describe Pi at DM 26, where the man who lives to eat confuses the proper use of 
things. Likewise it is argued that someone who teaches so as to speak, and not vice 
versa, confuses the proper order whereby what is used to an end is inferior to that end. 
The proper use to which speaking is put, is teaching, so teaching is, in accordance 
with Pi, superior to speaking.
0553 The person who said one teaches in order to signify would be mistaken in like 
manner to the glutton (“... vorator ventrisque... cultor... ” DM 26) or the lover of 
words (“ ... loquaci amatorique verborum... ” DM 26). The same principle is applied in 
both cases:
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Pi (a) Signifying exists on account of teaching, therefore teaching is of more value 
than signifying
Pi (b) Teaching exists on account of signifying, therefore signifying is of more value 
than teaching
However, as seen in the argument in DM 26, the person applying (b) is confusing the
proper use of the items under discussion. The proper use of signifying is so as to
teach, so, according to Augustine’s analysis in DM 26, the correct application of Pi is
(a) and so teaching is the cause of signifying. Augustine, applying a form of the
genus-species distinction, proposes that if signifying is on account of teaching and
teaching is not on account of signifying, then teaching and signifying are different.
Aug. si ergo significamus, ut doceamus, non docemus, ut significemus, aliud 
est docere aliud significare.
(30)
0554 With the point agreed upon that teaching and signifying are different, the
argument quickly proceeds to establish that someone who teaches what teaching is,
nevertheless, does so by signifying.
Aug. nunc illud responde, utrum qui docet, quid sit docere, significando id 
agat an aliter.
Ad. non uideo, quomodo aliter possit.
(30)
Therefore, teaching is not an example of something which can be shown without
signs. For signifying and teaching are different things, and teaching can only be
shown through signifying and is not shown by means of itself, as Adeodatus had
proposed (DM 29; 0546).
Aug. falsum igitur paulo ante dixisti doceri rem posse sine signis, cum 
quaeritur, quid sit ipsum docere, quando ne hoc quidem uidemus sine 
significatione agi posse, cum aliud esse significare aliud docere concesseris. 
si enim diuersa sunt, sicut apparet, neque hoc nisi per illud ostenditur, non 
per se utique ostenditur, sicut tibi uisum erat.
(30)
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0555 As regards speaking, the last case of something which may be shown through
itself and not through signs, even this is problematic for, although it may show itself,
it is a member of the class of signs. Speech cannot, therefore, show itself without
signifying and so the discussion has, so far, failed to demonstrate something which
can be taught without signs
Aug. ...quam ob rem nihil adhuc inuentum est, quod monstrariper se ipsum 
queatpraeter locutionem, quae inter alia se quoque significat; quae tamen 
cum etiam ipsa signum sit, nondum prorsus exstat, quod sine signis doceri 
posse uideatur.
(30)
0556 Three preliminary conclusions have been reached384:
1. Nothing is taught without signs
2. Knowledge is more valuable than the signs through which one gains 
knowledge
3. Not everything signified is superior to its own sign
Aug. confectum est igitur et nihil sine signis doceri et cognitionem ipsam
signis, quibus cognoscimus cariorem nobis esse oportere, quamuis non omnia, 
quae significantur, possint suis signis esse potiora.
Ad. ita uidetur.
(31)
0557 At this point in the discussion the most important of these conclusions is that 
nothing is taught without signs. This conclusion is, however, invalid385. The question 
of specificity, and the need for interpretation, in ostension neither proves that word 
meaning is never taught through ostension nor, more importantly, does it prove that 
all teaching is through words, or signs.
0558 “[I]t does not follow from
(a) Some teaching is effected through words or signs,
plus
384 These conclusions follow on from the discussion oi'caenum’ (DM 25, v. sup. 0508 ff.)
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(b) All teaching about words or signs is effected through words or signs, 
that
(c) All teaching whatsoever is through words or signs” (Bumyeat: 1987, 13).
7.1.2. Doubt.
0559 Augustine is aware that the conclusion in (c), that all teaching is through
words or signs, is a generalisation and needs to be reconsidered. In addition to the
three conclusions reached above (DM 31; 0556), with much effort386, Augustine
requires a firm understanding as to whether these conclusions are held in such a way
that there can be no doubt about them.
Aug. quanto tandem circuitu res tantilla peracta sit, meministine quaeso? nam 
ex quo inter nos uerba iaculamur, quod tam diu fecimus, haec tria ut 
inuenirentur laboratum est: utrum nihil sine signis possit doceri et utrum sint 
quaedam signa rebus, quas significant, praeferenda, et utrum melior quam 
signa sit rerum ipsa cognitio. sed quartum est, quod breuiter abs te uellem 
cognoscere, utrumnam ista inuenta sic putes, ut iam de his dubitare non 
possis.
(31)
0560 Adeodatus shows himself to have progressed far over the course of the
discussion and to be circumspect in his approach to Augustine’s question. The
language employed in his answer is rather interesting and both refers back to and, as
Augustine so often does in his writings, anticipates themes which will soon be
introduced and discussed.
Ad. uellem quidem tantis ambagibus atque anfractibus esset ad certa 
peruentum. sed et ista rogatio tua nescio quomodo me sollicitat et ab 
assensione deterret - uideris enim mihi non hoc de me fuisse quaesiturus, nisi
385 Bumyeat: 1987, 13. The following demonstration o f the invalid nature o f this conclusion is drawn 
from Burny eat: 1987, 13.
386 Augustine is concerned that Adeodatus appreciate that no matter how much work has gone into a 
conclusion one must be willing to dispose of it if it shows itself to be invalid. Again this reflects the 
importance of use, for the goal is tmth and investigation is a tool employed so as to arrive at this goal.
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haberes quod contradiceres - et ipsa rerum implicatio totum me inspicere ac 
securum respondere non sinit uerentem, ne quid in tantis inuolucris lateat, 
quod acies mentis meae lustrare non possit.
(31)
0561 Adeodatus describes the preceding discussion as one which is comparable to 
an attempt to arrive at security after a long and circuitous path (“ ... tantis
38Tambagibus atque anfractibus... ad certaperuentum... ”). The image of an
intellectual journey is one which Augustine often employs, regularly with regard to
the destination reached (“ ...peruentum... ”) as a safe haven (“ ... ad certa... ”) which is
the happy life gained through reason and divine grace. A similar idea is seen in the
opening of the de beata uita but with the image of a voyage.
si adphilosophiae portum, e quo iam in beatae uitae regionem solumque 
proceditur... ratione institutus cursus et uoluntas ipsaperduceret, nescio, 
utrum temere dixerim multo minoris numeri homines ad eum peruenturos 
fuisse, quamuis nunc quoque, ut uidemus, rari admodum paucique 
perueniant... quotusquisque cognosceret, quo sibi nitendum esset quaue 
redeundum, nisi aliquando et inuitos contraque obnitentes aliqua tempestas, 
quae stultis uidetur aduersa, in optatissimam terram nescientes errantesque 
conpingeret?
(beata v. 1)
Augustine also introduces many of the same themes in the de animae quantitate.
A. hoc initio te admonui etpostulaui, utpatienter ferres aliquantum circuitum 
nostrum., nosse hoc enim plane ac tenere uolumus, si fieri potest... 
si... cupiditatem istam refrenare nonpotes, qua tibipersuasisti ratione 
peruenire ad ueritatem, multi et longi circuitus tibi tolerandi sunt, ut te non 
ratio adducat nisi ea, quae sola ratio dicenda est, id est uera ratio; et non 
solum uera, sed ita certa, et ab omni similitudine falsitatis aliena, si tamen 
ullo modo haec ab homine inueniri potest, ut nullae disputationes falsae aut 
uerisimiles ab ea te possint traducere.
{an. quant. 12)
In the specific context of the DM the image of the application of reason to a problem 
as a journey recalls the example of the road to Larissa from the Plato’s Meno (97a-b). 
In the Meno the proposal is forwarded that the best guide to Larissa would be the 
person who has travelled there himself, with the implication that the most secure
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reasoning is that which one has worked through and understood for oneself388. This is 
what would appear to constitute knowledge, in opposition to correct opinion (cf.
Plato, Meno 98a and 85c-d).
0562 The terminology of ‘ambages' and ‘anfractus', in addition to the general 
reference to the circumlocutions and digressions which have occurred in the course of 
the discussion between Augustine and Adeodatus, also has the specific application to 
the discussion which has just ended. That is to say, the term ‘ambages' may also be 
used to refer to linguistic ambiguity389, while the sense of circumlocution in
‘anfractus' reflects the fact that the discussion has recently returned to the point which 
initiated it. At DM 29 the point where discussion of ostension was left, namely, with 
things which may be shown through themselves by performance (DM 6), is revisited.
0563 The raising of the question as to whether there is any doubt concerning their
conclusions causes Adeodatus to be wary of offering his assent. Assent (assensio)
would appear to be an application influenced by the Stoic term (GUVKtXTaOeau;).
... nunc de adsensione atque adprobatione, quam Graeci aovKCtTaQeaK; 
vocant, pauca dicemus...
(Cicero, Acad. 2.37)
This is perhaps enforced by the fact that Augustine, in his response to Adeodatus (DM 
31; v. inf. 0566), uses the equivalent term 4adprobatione' cited in the Cicero passage 
above {Acad. 2.37). Augustine also employs (DM 31; v. inf. 0566) a rather vivid 
image in which he describes things which are held with an easy and ready assent 
(“ ... ea quaeprona etprocliua adprobatione tenebamus") as being tom from one’s 
hands (“ ... quasi extorquentur e manibus"). This imagery recalls Zeno’s description of 
scientific knowledge, comparing it to various stages in the clasping of the hand.
387 Cf. Ovid, M. 8.161; Vergil, A. 6.29.
388 This point will be seen to be central to the thesis of the DM (v. inf. §  7.1.3, § 9, and § 11).
389 The terminology o f a circuitous or roundabout route, together with the idea of linguistic ambiguity, 
also recalls the use o f the image from the DD (8.6-10) o f the crossroads as an image for ambiguity.
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et hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat. nam cum extensis digitis aduersam 
manum ostenderat, “uisum” inquiebat “huius modi est”; dein cumpaulum 
digitos contraxerat, “adsensus huius modi”; turn cum plane conpresserat 
pugnumque fecerat, conprensionem illam esse dicebat, qua ex similitudine 
etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non fuerat, KaTCcArpJnv imposuit; cum autem 
laeuam manum admouerat et ilium pugnum arte uehementerque conpresserat, 
scientiam talem esse dicebat, cuius compotem nisi sapientem esse neminem.
(Cicero, Acad. 2.145)
0564 Adeodatus’ withholding of giving his assent until he is sure of all of the issues 
is an application of the rule concerning ambiguous terms stated by Augustine (DM 
22)390 However, the role of doubt (dubitatio) and the with-holding of assent may also 
be influenced by the Sceptics’ suspension of judgement (r| ETtoxfi)391.
0565 The language used by Adeodatus in the passage above also suggests themes 
which are to be taken up over the remainder of the dialogue. Most particular are the 
themes of inner vision, which is suggested, although not directly implied by 
Adeodatus, by the phrase ‘acies mentis’ , and the idea of understanding coming
through a kind of inner enlightenment of illumination (lustrare) which would appear 
to be a sort of complete vision of all of the aspects of a problem (totum inspicere).
0566 Augustine praises such careful hesitation and tranquillity of mind.
Aug. dubitationem tuam non inuitus accipio; significat enim animum minime 
temerarium, quae custodia tranquillitatis est maxima, nam dijficillimum 
omnino est non perturbari, cum ea, quae prona etprocliua adprobatione 
tenebamus, contrariis disputationibus labefactantur et quasi extorquentur e 
manibus. quare, ut aequum est, bene consideratis perspectisque rationibus 
cedere, ita incognita pro cognitis habere periculosum; metus est enim ne, cum 
saepe subruuntur, quae firmissime statura et mansura praesumimus, in tantum 
odium uel timorem rationis incidamus, ut ne ipsi quidem perspicuae ueritati 
fides habenda videatur.
(31)
390 v. sup. 0479. This approach appears to be Stoic, cf. Simplicius, in Cat. 24.13-20.
391 Cf. Diogenes Laertius 4.28; 4.32-33; Cicero, Acad. 1.43-46.
392 Adeodatus means something more like ‘mental acuity’, however, the language reflects the concept 
which Augustine will employ to discuss such things as mental acuity and the grasping of intelligible 
items.
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The hatred or mistrust of reason {odium uel timorem rationis), which may result from
the overturning of a conclusion one had supposed valid, may refer to the misology
(ixiaoXoyoi) in Plato’s Phaedo (89d-e). Also, Augustine refers to the danger of
having a lack of diligence or even halting the search for truth altogether because one
has gained a false opinion that one has found the truth.
... qui error omninopopulorum est, falsa opinione inuentae a se ueritatis nec 
diligenter homines quaerunt, si qui quaerunt, et a quaerendi uoluntate 
auertuntur...
(Acad. 2 .1)393
7.1.3. The Birdcatcher.
0567 The example of the Birdcatcher is introduced as a refutation of the proposal
that all teaching is achieved through language, or signs. It is enough for present
purposes that it be shown that some men {quosdam homines) can be taught some
things {de quibusdam rebus tametsi non omnibus) without signs.
... satis est namque ad rem et de quibusdam rebus tametsi non omnibus et 
quosdam homines doceri posse sine signo.
(32)
0568 One can imagine a situation where someone, x, who is ignorant of the craft of 
birdcatching {ignarus deceptionis auium), encounters a birdcatcher {obuiam fieret 
aucupi) who is not at present engaged in this act {non tamen aucupanti) but is on his 
way to do so {iter agenti) and has all of the equipment for doing so {armis . .. suis 
instructo). When jc sees the birdcatcher he is filled with wonder {admirans) and 
reflects {cogitaret) and attempts to learn {quaereret) what the man’s equipment means 
{quid sibi hominis ille uellet ornatus), and to this end he follows the birdcatcher
393 1 am indebted to King: 1995, 134 n.73, for the reference to Plato’s Phaedo and Augustine’s contra 
Academicos.
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(premeret gradum). The birdcatcher, for his part, on seeing x’s attention focused upon
him (adtentum), in the desire to show himself (ostentandi se studio), carries out the
act of birdcatching. In such a way, the birdcatcher would teach {doceret) that spectator
{spectatorem), x, what he wanted to know {quod ille scire cupiebat) with no act of
signifying {nullo significatu) but by means of the thing itself {re ipsa).
Aug. ...sedage nunc expeditius retractemus, utrum recte ista dubitanda 
putaueris; nam quaero abs te, si quisquam ignarus deceptionis auium, quae 
calamis et uisco affectantur, obuiam fieret aucupi armis quidem suis instructo 
non tamen aucupanti, sed iter agenti, quo uiso premeret gradum secumque, ut 
fit, admirans cogitaret et quaereret, quidnam sibi hominis ille uellet ornatus, 
auceps autem cum in se uideret adtentum ostentandi se studio cannas 
expediret etprope animaduersam aliquam auiculam fistula et accipitre figeret, 
subiret et caperet, nonne ilium spectatorem suum doceret nullo significatu94, 
sed re ipsa quod ille scire cupiebat?
(32)
0569 This example presents a resolution to the difficulties evident in ostensive
definition as presented in the DM. The Teaming’ involves a experience of directly
perceiving not only a particular object or set of objects but rather of viewing a
complete process together with all of its individual parts. Augustine also uses the
image of birdcatching, on the question of the immateriality of the soul, in the de
animae quantitate.
A. cur ergo puer multo amplius itineris conficiebam sine defectu, cum 
aucupandi studio in ambulando exercerer, quam adulescens, cum me ad alia 
studia, quibus sedere magis cogebar, contulissem...
{an. quant. 36)
The context of this passage is rather different to that of the DM, but it does, however, 
provide an insight into Augustine’s use of the image. Firstly, it is a nostalgic glance 
back to his youth which focuses upon the place of play and enjoyment in the learning 
process, the learner should be filled with wonder (“admirans” DM 32) and should 
want to know {“scire cupiebat” DM 32). Secondly, and most significantly, there is the
394 ‘Significatu’ is the the act of signifying, v. sup. § 5.2.1.1
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contrast, in the de animae quantitate passage, between the studious life of the young 
adult and the outdoor life of the young child. The contrast highlights learning through 
direct experience and learning through study.
0570 The use of the birdcatcher image to represent the attempt to grasp at truth is
also used in the contra Academicos. In this passage the image is one of grasping at the
fleeting intelligible item and bringing it down to the level of human understanding,
where it is grasped in a debased form.
...philocalia...amor pulchritudinis...sed ilia uisco libidinis detract a caelo suo 
et inclusa cauea populari uiciniam tamen nominis tenuit ad commonendum 
aucupem, ne illam contemnat. facile euadit, facile reuolat hoc genus auium 
[philosophia] multis inclusis multum mirantibus.
(Acad. 2.7)
The birdcatcher image is one which Augustine regularly employs395 and may be 
influenced by the idea of the bird as a mediator between the earth and the heavens , 
and so is a natural image for the idea of transcending the material world of experience 
in the attempt to grasp the intelligible truths of transcendental reality. However, there 
is perhaps the more obvious source from the Aviary image (“ ... Ttepiaxepeobvcx 
ttva mvToSoatcbv dpviQoov...” Tht. 197d) in the Theaetetus of Plato (196d-199c).
0571 The use of the image in the Theaetetus is also centrally involved with the 
question of how knowledge is acquired. The differences in Augustine’s image are 
significant and revealing397. The Birdcatcher may be interpreted on various levels, all 
of which reinforce each other and accord with Augustine’s general thesis. Firstly, the 
birdcatcher himself, as in the Aviary image in Plato, may be seen as one who is 
involved in the act of grasping discrete items of knowledge (as represented by birds) 
and is employing his equipment so as to gain this knowledge. The equipment is a
395 Cf. util. cred. 2, where the birdcatchers are the Manicheans preying on the thirst for knowledge of 
youths so as to ensnare them.
396 As in the role o f the bird in divination (<auspicium) .
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metaphor for the practical tools which one is in possession of to this end, namely,
reason and the practical tool of argumentation. In this sense, the birdcatcher is an
example of knowledge acquisition. Secondly, the birdcatcher is instructing the
spectator in the use of the equipment so as to capture the bird, or piece of knowledge,
and in this sense is a teacher. Just as Augustine is teaching Adeodatus in the DM, for
Augustine is showing Adeodatus how to both use his own reason and, notably in the
final section which begins immediately after the birdcatcher example (DM 32) and in
which the dialogue significantly turns into a monologue, is demonstrating how he
himself, that is Augustine, employs his reason to the issue at hand so that Adeodatus
can watch and learn. As Adeodatus has previously observed (DM 31), he is unsure of
his abilities to disentangle all of the intricacies which they have been discussing. The
Birdcatcher example also reveals that one must have both an awareness of what is to
be known and the rational tools to achieve this knowledge. That is to say, the
information may be available to one, in its entirety, but unless one has the clarity of
intellectual vision one will be unable to turn this information into knowledge. That
knowledge involves both perceptual398 awareness and the exercise of reason is seen in
the de animae quantitate.
A. quia, quamquam sit aliud sensus, aliud scientia, illud tamen non latere 
utrique commune est, ut ipsi homini et bestiae, quamuis plurimum differant, 
animal tamen esse commune est. non latet enim, quicquid animae adparet, 
siue per temperationem corporis siue per intellegentiae puritatem; atque illud 
primum sensus, hoc autem alterum scientia sibi uindicauit...non continuo esse 
scientiam, si quid non latet, sed si per rationem non latet...
{an. quant. 58)
397 Although an analysis o f the Aviary in the Theaetetus is beyond the scope of this discussion, it 
should be made clear that Plato rejects the image as an adequate analogy.
398 It should be noted that Augustine often uses ‘knowledge’ in a weak sense, concerning knowledge 
gained through material reality, and in a stronger sense, concerning knowledge o f intelligibles. Also, 
the former is often used as a metaphor for the latter, this occurs in the DM where Augustine uses the 
image of intellectual ‘sight’.
0572 Thirdly, in the Birdcatcher it is highly significant that the spectator does not 
capture a piece, or item, of knowledge, like a bird, but rather gains understanding 
through an awareness and comprehension of a series of items involved in a complex 
process. This fact touches upon the third proposal forwarded in the Theaetetus that 
knowledge is true judgement with an account {Tht. 203e f f ). In the Birdcatcher, one 
has all of the information but, crucially, one also understands it.
0573 To return to the specifics of the context within which the Birdcatcher occurs 
there are a number of factors which are seen to be necessary for the demonstration to 
be successful and to avoid any sort of signification. The birdcatcher should not be 
engaged in the act {non... aucupanti), but should be ready to do so {armis...suis 
instructo... iter agenti) and the spectator must be interested intellectually {admirans 
cogitaret) and should desire to find out about what the birdcatcher is about to do
(iquaereret). The birdcatcher should then demonstrate {ostendandi) the act by simply 
doing it {figeret subiret caperet... re ipsa) and without any intention to signify {nullo 
significatu).
0574 As Bumyeat points out (1987, 13), Augustine has chosen a phrase which could 
equally well be applied to a question concerning the meaning of a word to 
demonstrate that to which the spectator’s interest is directed: quaereret quidnam 
sibi hominis ille uellet ornatus” (DM 32). This phrase could be reformulated as:
“quaereret quidnam sibi hominis illud uellet uerburri \  In this way, Augustine 
demonstrates an example of ostension whereby something may be learned without 
words or signs, and a means whereby word meaning may be learned. It should be said 
that this does not in itself answer the problem of how one can be sure the observer
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will identify the right feature399. There will be further discussion of these issues below 
in the consideration of language acquisition (§ 8.1.3).
0575 The image of the Birdcatcher can, in sum, be seen to involve a learning 
process where there exists no prior concept but simply an openness and acceptance of 
the whole process. It is a picture of one with no conceptual, or verbal, prior 
knowledge of the thing observed, or under consideration, one simply observes. In this 
example there is demonstration proper and a presenting of the whole process of 
birdcatching, where the observer is able to visually take in all of the information and 
then to apply intelligence to comprehend what birdcatching involves. The teaching is 
of the thing itself in its totality, while, in addition, the picture presented is a 
explanation of how one learns by looking and seeing, and understanding.
7.1.4. Specificity 131.
0576 The question of specificity is reconsidered in the light of the Birdcatcher
example. Adeodatus is unable to see how this example differs from that of walking.
Ad. metuo, ne quid hie tale sit, quale de illo dixi, qui quaerit, quid sit 
ambulare; neque enim uideo et hie totum illud aucupium esse monstratum.
(32)
The additional factor which must be clarified so as to fully realise the distinction
which Augustine is introducing is that of intelligence.
Aug. facile est hac cur a te exuere; addo enim, si ille intellegens esset, ut ex 
hoc quod uidit totum illud genus art is agnosceret...
(32)
The role of intelligence is central to Augustine’s solution to the problems of 
specificity in ostension. When one is presented, in a direct way, with a complete
399 A possible solution to this will be discussed below (cf. 0576 ff, esp. 0609).
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picture of a procedure then one is in the position to apply one’s intelligence to the 
available facts so as to understand the thing which one has been shown. It is important 
that one has received all of the information, and although one has a complex of 
detailed information, nevertheless, one can extricate and understand the essential 
elements of the process. The Birdcatcher, as mentioned above (0571), is a simplified 
representation of the dialogue as a whole, for Adeodatus has all of the information to 
hand and, through the application of intelligence, the fundamental facts of speech and 
its purpose are drawn out from the mass of potentially accessible information which 
he has stored in his mind. Indeed, as will be discussed (§ 8 and § 9), one has in mind, 
through observing something, all that one needs, in terms of information, to have 
knowledge of that thing and one must access this information, either by recall or by 
being reminded400. It is also notable that the role of intelligence dispels simple 
perception o f  or perhaps by adding intelligence to this simple level of perception 
raises it to a more conscious level of perception. The Birdcatcher demonstrates a 
process which is both general in its scope but which is also focused and directed by 
the application of intelligence. One intentionally observes x performing y, but with no 
prior judgement about what is being performed.
0577 The thesis, wherein there are things which can be shown without signs, with
the addition of the ability to reason about the information which one is receiving,
allows for a broad range of items to fall within its scope. Items such as walking,
which had previously been rejected, can now be seen to fall within the class of things
shown without signs.
Ad. hoc etiam ego possum illi addere: si enim sit bene intellegens, paucis 
passibus ambulatione monstrata totum quid sit ambulare cognoscet.
Aug. facias per me licet nec tantum nihil resisto, uerum etiam faueo...
(32)
400 The important role o f recall will be considered in due course (§8.1.5).
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There are, then, some people who can be taught some things without signs.
Aug. ... uides enim ab utroque nostrum id effici, ut quaedam quidam doceri 
sine signis queant falsumque illud sit... nihil esse omnino, quod sine signis 
possit ostendi.
(32)
7.1.5. Divine Ostension.
0578 In the Birdcatcher example the birdcatcher is performing an action through 
which the spectator can learn for himself. The spectator is simply provided with an 
opportunity to learn. However, the Birdcatcher does not strictly imply such a thing as 
inadvertent or inanimate teaching401 for there is intention on the part of the 
birdcatcher. The intention which the birdcatcher exhibits is in fact to teach, but this 
act of teaching has no further intention than for the spectator to observe the act for 
himself and understand it on his own. Teaching in the sense forwarded by the 
Birdcatcher example simply requires that one act with the intention that a spectator 
may have the opportunity to learn for themselves.
0579 It is with this sense of ostensive teaching in mind that Augustine introduces
the fact that God shows everything to humans. That is to say, the material world is
presented in such a way that humans have the information available to them with
which to learn, presumably about the true reality of the blessed life (cf. beata v. 1).
Aug. ...iam enim ex his non unum aliquid aut alterum, sed milia rerum animo 
occurrunt, quae nullo signo datoper se ipsa monstrentur... solem certe istum 
lucemque haec omnia perfundentem atque uestientem, lunam et cetera sidera, 
terras et maria quaeque in his innumerabiliter gignuntur, nonne per se ipsa 
exhibet atque ostendit deus et natura cernentibus?
(32)
401 As proposed by Burnyeat: 1987, 15.
All things which are learned, observed, by humans are shown by God and, through 
God, by nature itself. This reveals a view whereby humans receive knowledge of the 
world through perception which supplies the information while intelligence is then 
applied so as to comprehend it. Yet, it is clear that everything is purposively shown by 
God and so is shown so as to teach and that there is intention behind all things which 
one observes and attempts to understand.
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8. Things and Signs.
8.1. Nothing is Learned through Signs.
0580 There are apparently two conclusions, central to the theme of knowledge 
acquisition, which have been arrived at by this point in the dialogue: some teaching is 
possible through words, or signs; and some people can be taught some things without 
signs.
0581 In keeping with a discussion on the shifting and ambiguous nature of 
language, and on the difficulty of determining the means of firmly grasping items of 
knowledge, the argument proceeds to turn the first of these conclusions on its head, 
and then the second. Augustine turns first to the proposal that some teaching is 
possible through words or signs.
0582 The process of applying doubt and questioning to the conclusions reached thus
far in the dialogue is continued with the positing that rather than signs having the
purpose of teaching, they actually teach nothing. Augustine suggests that nothing can
be learned by means of signs.
Aug. ... quod si diligentius consideremus, fortasse nihil inuenies, quod per sua 
signa discatur.
(33)
8.1.1. The Paradox of Enquiry.
0583 The Paradox of Enquiry (Plato, Meno 80d-e), which, as discussed above 
(0013-0019), is the implicit issue at the heart of the DM, is finally introduced into the 
discussion. The fact that knowledge is possible (the thesis of the contra Academicos)
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demands an explanation as to how this is possible, which in turn requires a solution to
the Paradox. The introduction of the Paradox does not initially focus upon the wider
implications concerning the acquisition of knowledge per se (these wider implications
are briefly discussed above, 0534-0542, and involve the question as to how any item
whatsoever is known), but uses a form of the Paradox to dismiss the thesis that
anything is learned through words or signs.
Aug. ...cum enim mihi signum datur, si nescientem me inuenit, cuius rei 
signum sit, docere me nihil potest, si uero scientem, quid disco per signum?
(33)
This follows the basic form of the Paradox argument as seen in Plato.
M E N . m i  x i v a  x p o rco v  £r|XT|G£i^ cb Z coK p axe^  x o b x o , o  p q  
o la G a  x o  m p c a t a v  o  x i  egxi; r c o io v  y a p  cbv ook o la G a  
rcpoG eiievoq  £ q x f \a e iq ;  f\ e l  Kai o  x i  |ia A ,ia x a  e v x h y o iq  ab xcp ,
K(bq  e t a e i  o x t  x o b x o  s a x iv ,  o  a b  o b K  flS q aG a;
E Q . fxavG avco o l o v  |5obA £i A sy e iv , & M evcov . o p a q  x o b x o v  a><; 
e p ia x i ic o v  A ,oyov K a x a y e iq , cbq ouk a p a  e a x i  ^ q x e iv  av0pd)7rcp  
o b x £  o  o l6 e v  o b x e  o  jxf\ o lS e v ;  o b x e  y a p  a v  ye o  oISe ^ q x o v  
oiSe y a p , K a i ob S & v 5ei xq> ye x o io b x c o  q^xriaECoc;* o b x £  o  pf] 
oiSev* ooSe y a p  o18ev o  x i  ^ q xfjaE i.
(Plato, Meno 80d-e)
The form of this argument is as follows.
1. Every item is either known or unknown
2. If the item is known, then it cannot be learned (to learn is to get to know 
what is not known)
3. If the item is unknown, then it cannot be learned (for to learn one must be 
able to determine how to search for the item under investigation, and how is 
this possible when one does not know what one is attempting to learn; and, 
even if the item were encountered, one would be unable to recognise it as the 
item under enquiry)
4. Therefore, whether the item is known or unknown, it cannot be learned 
0584 In Augustine’s use of the argument the fundamental question as to the status 
of items known (“cuius rei signum sit... scientem ’) or unknown (“nescientem... cuius 
rei signum sit”) is, at present, passed over. Augustine is primarily concerned at this
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point to demonstrate that, whether something is known or unknown, a sign does not 
perform the function of teaching. The argument, as presented by Augustine, is as 
follows.
1. Whatever a sign signifies is either known or not known
2. If the sign signifies something known then nothing is learned through the 
sign because the item it proposes to teach is already known
3. If the sign signifies something unknown then it cannot teach anything, 
because one would not know what it is that the sign signifies
4. Therefore, whether the item signified is known or unknown, the sign 
teaches nothing
This argument may be analysed as follows.
1. y  signifies *
2. x is either known or unknown
3. If x is known, y  does not teach x (for x is already known402)
4. If x is unknown, y  does not teach x (or it is unknown what x is and, 
therefore, is unknown thaty signifies x403)
5. Therefore, whether x is known or unknown, y  teaches nothing about x
0585 Augustine’s argument assumes two related facts: namely, that x can be known 
(and therefore, presumably, learned), although it is not explained how; and thaty can 
be known (and therefore, presumably, learned), which again is not explained how. 
The reason that these assumptions are not considered at present is on account of a, 
preliminary, answer having been forwarded in the Birdcatcher example. Both objects 
and words are learned in a manner analogous to the way birdcatching is learned404.
0586 The point which is stressed in the argument introduced by Augustine is that, 
given that x andy can be known, y  cannot be shown to make x known. That is to say,
402 This point relies on the given that to learn something is to get to know what was not previously 
known (as stated in stage 2 of the analysis o f the Platonic argument: v. sup. 0584).
403 This point will be discussed below (§ 8.1.2).
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one object, or item, cannot make another object, or item, known. A sign is an item, res 
(v. sup. 0075-0077), which functions so as to bring something into someone’s mind. 
This suggests that all signs are unable to teach something else. That is to say, if jc is a 
sign of y, then x is by definition (cf. Augustine’s various definitions of signs, 0095) 
n o t / 05.
0587 If the basis of semiotics is the bringing of something into someone else’s mind 
and if this bringing of something into someone else’s mind is teaching, and if teaching 
is making something which was previously unknown, known, then there is a 
fundamental problem at the core of the semiotic transfer of information406.
8.1.2. Sarabarae.
0588 The questions raised, by the application of the Paradox to the thesis that 
nothing is learned through signs, are introduced with reference to the term 
‘sarabarae’407. For when one hears (or reads) the term ‘sarabarae’, which, it is
404 The question as to the validity o f the Birdcatcher as a solution to the Paradox will be considered in 
due course (§ 9).
405 Autonymous, and self-signifying, signs appear to create a problem both for Augustine’s definition 
of signs as showing something beyond themselves and for the treatment of the Paradox in this passage. 
Concerning the issue over Augustine’s definitions, it should be said that the most basic and 
fundamental definition (DDC 1.2) simply states that signs signify something and it may simply be that 
signs which signify something beyond themselves are a subspecies of this more general definition. 
Although a subspecies, such signs are by far the largest group of signs and are therefore those most 
commonly discussed. With regard to autonymous, and self-signifying, signs they are, whether known 
or unknown, self-describing items and so cannot be said to teach themselves. Speech, as suggested by 
Augustine (DM 30; 0555) is an unusual case, and just as it cannot show itself without signifying, it 
would appear that it could not signify without showing itself.
406 The central issues of this problem concern the nature o f teaching (and the concept o f ‘recollection’ 
as understood by Augustine) and the nature of knowledge acquisition. Both of these issues will be 
considered in due course (§8.1.5 and § 9). It should also be noted that it is likely that Augustine was 
aware o f the Paradox as applied to the linguistic/semiotic mode via the sceptical tradition, cf. Sextus 
Empiricus PH  2.266-273.
407 ‘Sarabarae’ (Daniel 3:27, Septuagint; 3:94, Vulgate. The vulgate has ‘saraballa’.) is a particularly 
well chosen word for an unfamiliar term is required to make the point in the following argument. The 
meaning of this term is extremely obscure (.RE. 1920, 2.R. 1 col. 2386 s. v. saraballa) and Augustine 
himself may have mistranslated the word (“capitum tegmina” rather than ‘wide trousers’ as from the 
Persian, in L-S: 1989, V.3 col. 1630 s.v. sarabara). Whether Augustine has intentionally or, as is 
perhaps more likely due to his choice of what must have been a very rare word, unintentionally
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assumed, is an unfamiliar word, the word itself does not show the thing which it 
signifies. If a sort of head covering is named by this term, this has not made it 
apparent to the listener (or reader) what a head, or what coverings, are. The listener 
already has a conception of what these terms mean and did not gain such concepts 
from their being named by another408. One knows what a head is, or what coverings 
are, on account of the prior experience of having seen the things signified by them. It 
is this prior perceptual experience which has formed the concept of the thing and it is 
this concept which allows one to understand the word uttered when saying ‘head’, for 
example.
Aug. ... non enim mihi rem, quam significat, ostendit uerbum, cum lego «et 
sarabarae eorum non sunt commutatae». nam si quaedam capitum tegmina 
nuncupantur hoc nomine, num ego hoc audito aut quid sit caput aut quid sint 
tegmina didici? ante ista noueram, neque cum appellarentur ab aliis, sed cum 
a me uiderentur, eorum est mihi facta notitia.
(33)
0589 This is to say,
1. ‘sarabara’ signifies head-covering-*
2. head-covering-* is either known or unknown
3. If head-covering-* is known, ‘sarabara’ does not teach head-covering-* (for 
head-covering-* is already known, that is, one has a concept {notitia) of it)
4. If head-covering-* is unknown,4sarabara’ does not teach head-covering-* 
(for it is unknown what head-covering-* is and, therefore, is unknown that
‘sarabara’ signifies head-covering-*)
5. Therefore, whether head-covering-* is known or unknown, ‘sarabara’ 
teaches nothing (of head-covering-*)
mistranslated the word, the point that one must know what a word applies to is prior to knowing the 
word, as sign, is enforced by his example. It is, however, by no means certain that Augustine’s slip is 
not intentional for he, perhaps significantly, only goes as far as to say: “nam si quaedam capitum 
tegmina nuncupantur hoc nomine...” (DM 33). It is plausible that Augustine has picked an unfamiliar 
word to Adeodatus, and his readers, and, by saying ‘nam si...’, enforces the fact for Adeodatus that he 
is unaware if this is what the term means; and further, it is not what the term means. It may also be 
significant that this passage leads into one which raises the question of authority, and reliable 
testimony.
408 “[For Augustine]... speaking in sets of signs about the world, expressing our thoughts about the 
world, is a way o f ‘informing’ someone else about the world, a passing on of our own thoughts and 
experiences at second hand  (Rist: 1994, 30).
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0590 The process which can be seen from this passage is that one perceives an 
object (ista [res] ...a me uiderentur) and in this way one gains a concept of this object 
(eorum est mihi facta notitia), and then one is told the name applied to the object and 
so gains an understanding of the name (v. sup. § 6.2.5.1) and correlates name to 
signification, which is the concept in sayable form (v. sup. § 5.1.2.2.5.6).
0591 The meaning of a word is, therefore, only learned when one already has the 
mental content so as to correlate word and thing. Knowledge of things would then 
appear to be prior to knowledge of signs.
0592 The diagram representing the causal schema, initially presented above (D28, 
0531), from object to linguistically expressible meaning, may now be more fully 
developed.
(D30)
res <=> notitia = dicibile
(rei)
V
nomen notitia
(nominis)
In this diagram the object (res) causes the concept in the mind (rei notitia), the 
(potentially) linguistically accessible aspect of this concept is the ‘sayable’ (dicibile). 
The name (nomen) exists on account of the concept of which it is the sign, and the 
uttered sound, which is the name, causes the concept of the name (nominis notitia) or 
the name uttered within (v. sup. 0043, DM 2). This concept of the name is that which 
is correlated with the sayable aspect of thought and enables the potential, linguistic 
item, which is the meaningful utterance, to be realised.
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8.1.3. Language Acquisition.
0593 On hearing any word, a word simply qua sound, such as the two syllable
‘capuf (‘head’), one is ignorant as to what this sound [ca-put] signifies. Every word
is, when first encountered, unknown and unfamiliar, like ‘sarabarae’. With the
constant repetition of the word, ‘capuf, the listener makes a note of, and observes
when, it is said, and in this way comes to realise that it signifies something already
familiar to her by sight.
Aug. ... etenim cumprimum istae duae syllabae, cum dicimus caput, aures 
meas impulerunt, tarn nesciui quid significarent, quam cum primo audirem 
legeremue sarabaras. sed cum saepe diceretur caput, notans atque 
animaduertens, quando diceretur, repperi uocabulum esse rei, quae mihi iam 
erat uidendo notissima.
(33)
0594 Before the connection between sound and signification had been made, the
word was simply a sound and was only learned to be a sign when it was realised what
it was a sign of. The item, which the word is a sign of, is learned by seeing it, not by
any act of signifying. In this way the sign is learned when the thing is understood, or
recognised, rather than being learned through the sign being given.
quodpriusquam repperissem, tantum mihi sonus erat hoc uerbum; signum 
uero esse didici, quando cuius rei signum esset inueni, quam quidem ut dixi 
non significatu, sed aspectu didiceram. ita magis signum re cognita quam 
signo dato ipsa res discitur.
(33)
0595 The primary focus of this passage is to clarify the fact that things which are 
known give meaning to signs rather than signs making these things known. However, 
there are striking parallels also in this passage with Augustine’s theory of language 
acquisition as presented, briefly, in the Confessiones (1.13).
0596 The discussion of language acquisition in the Confessiones is sophisticated, 
but is also rather condensed and therefore unclear. Much of the background implicit in
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the Confessiones discussion requires an awareness of the treatment of knowledge 
acquisition and of the relation of word, meaning, and reality in the DM. It is, perhaps, 
due to a lack of familiarity with the DM409 that Wittgenstein famously described 
Augustine’s picture of language acquisition as “ ...the learning of human language as 
if the child came into a strange country and did not understand the language of the 
country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the 
child could already think, only not yet speak. And “think” would here mean 
something like “talk to itself”’ (PI § 32).
0597 Augustine rather presents a picture where there is a continuum between the 
items in the world and the human mind, which is of course also in this world, and this 
continuum is formal. Items are such as to be visible (uisibilia; DM 8), audible 
(audibilia\ DM 8), and generally sensible (sensibilia', DM 39), but more significantly 
they are also such as to be intelligible (intelligibilia; DM 8, DM 39), sayable 
(dicibilia', DD 5.60), and signifiable (signiflcibilia; DM 8)410. The human mind is of 
such a nature as to understand these items (which are formal; v. sup. § 5.1.2.2.5.6) and 
think of them propositionally. To such an extent, when a child is of an age to be able 
to attempt to express its will that it does, in a sense, “talk to itself’. However, this 
‘talk’ is simply a way of saying that the child has intentions and desires and, due to 
the nature of the human mind, that these are capable of being accessed semiotically 
and linguistically.
409 It seems implausible that Wittgenstein was aware of the DM as he proceeds from his criticism of 
Augustine’s view of language acquisition to discuss problems with Augustine’s approach, as he 
understood it, by means o f ostensive definition. The problems introduced are rather similar to those 
discussed by Augustine in the DM by means of ostensive definition also. This is not to say that 
Augustine proceeds to solve the central problem posed by Wittgenstein but rather that he goes further 
towards an analysis o f the problem than Wittgenstein’s presentation gives credit for.
410 The lack o f the term ‘dicibilia’ in the DM is related to the focus of the text upon a predominantly 
semiotic analysis o f language (hence the concern with signiflcibilia). ‘Dicibilia’ occurs in the de 
dialectica where the focus is specifically on language in its logical aspect. The only other occurrence of 
‘dicibilia' is in a sermon (s. 188.2) where the contrast is made between something in its sayable aspect
(dicibilis) and in its visible aspect (visibilis).
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0598 Sentences are not simply made up of strings of words but rather are made up 
of independently meaningful semiotic, and linguistic, units. These units do not all 
name things in some referential manner, as a term like ‘chair’ may be understood to 
do, but many (such as ‘s f , ‘ex \  etc.) are only truly meaningful within the context of 
the proposition, within which they perform a function which is reflective of an aspect 
of the state of affairs411 to which the proposition is a conceptual, or semantic, 
counterpart. The external state of affairs is intelligible due to its rational form, and can 
therefore be expressed in an articulate, linguistic manner. The description of deep 
structure thought as a inner word (cf. trin. 15.24) is to describe the intelligible and 
propositionally available nature of the item understood. The child Augustine describes 
does not already have a language, but would be better described as having the 
potential to semiotically correlate discrete items, such as word and item, and, also, of 
having the potential to linguistically access items stored memorially. These stored 
items are formal and are able to be accessed propositionally and are, therefore, 
sayable.
0599 The picture of language acquisition as revealed in DM 33 (and conf. 1.13) is 
primarily concerned with words which directly relate to physical objects, such as, this 
head here and now, which can be ostensively shown. In this approach Augustine is 
not, as suggested above, concerned to present all language learning as following this 
model but rather is forwarding a thesis whereby children begin by observing material 
objects and by hearing material sounds uttered by material adults, and by perceiving 
both the objects and the sounds uttered the child can correlate, for itself, sound and 
object. Learning begins in this concrete way and builds upon this basis412.
411 Or with terms like ‘i f  or ‘because’, etc., they may reflect an aspect o f the speaker’s relation, with 
respect to intention, state o f mind, etc., to a specific state of affairs.
412 Cf. Quine defends ostension as a means of establishing core terms upon which more complex, and 
abstract, ones can be built (Quine: 1950, 631).
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0600 Important to this is that Augustine closely relates memory, and its function as 
the store of concepts (c o n f10.22), to language acquisition. In early childhood 
Augustine notes how the child slowly begins to become aware (paulatim sentiebam) 
and that before this there is no available memory {nam ista mea non memini). With a 
growing awareness, which is a growing conception of one’s surroundings and the 
world in general {ubi essem), there is a desire to demonstrate one’s will {uoluntates 
meas uolebam ostendere). The demonstration of the will is attempted through 
signifying (signa) which initially involves similarity and resemblance of the items 
sought (similia).
post et ridere coepi, dormiens primo, deinde uigilans. hoc enim de me mihi 
indicatum est et credidi, quoniam sic uidemus alios infantes; nam ista mea 
non memini. et ecce paulatim sentiebam, ubi essem, et uoluntates meas 
uolebam ostendere eis, per quos implerentur, et non poteram, quia illae intus 
erant, foris autem illi, nec ullo suo sensu ualebant introire in animam meam. 
itaque iactabam membra et uoces, signa similia uoluntatibus meis, pauca quae 
poteram, qualia poteram: non enim erant ueresimilia
{conf 1.8)
The picture here is one which also supports the thesis that the early development of 
human language depended on the resemblance between word and object (DD 6). The 
beginning of semiotic awareness, and therefore the beginning of a movement towards 
language acquisition, depends upon a recognition of resemblance between things and 
an attempt to imitate things so that one’s will might be understood by others.
0601 The first stage of his life which Augustine remembers falls within the period
within which he could talk.
nonne ab infantia hue pergens ueni in pueritiam? uel potius ipsa in me uenit et 
success it infant iae? nec discessit ilia: quo enim abiit? et tamen iam non erat. 
non enim eram infans, qui non farer, sed iam puer loquens eram. et memini 
hoc...
{conf. 1.13)
Memory, or the facilitation of its use and the enforcing of it, is closely connected to 
language for Augustine. Boyhood is the first stage of his life able to be certified by
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memory, before this moment he relied on testimony from his parents and inferences 
due to his later observances of babies. At the earlier stage of his development, when 
Augustine was an infant (‘infantia’ meaning, literally, unable to talk), he could not 
talk and so could neither access nor properly entrench his memories: with language 
come these abilities and so one has a memory of the stage of life following on from 
language acquisition. This factor would support the close correlation for Augustine of 
language and concept formation. However, concept formation should not therefore be 
understood as linguistic but rather that concepts are such as to be linguistically 
available. When these concepts are correlated with a semiotic equivalent, such as a 
word, they can be accessed with ease and entrenched in the memory through 
repetition and recall413. The image of writing is used by Augustine as a picture of the 
articulated, linguistic, embedding of memoristic events and of repeated over-writing 
to fix the concept.
haec autem disciplina ipsa dei lex est, quae apud eum fixa et inconcussa 
semper manens in sapientes animas quasi transcribitur, ut tanto se sciant 
uiuere melius tantoque sublimius, quanto etperfectius earn contemplantur 
intellegendo et uiuendo custodiunt diligentius.
(ord 2.25)
0602 Augustine seems to suggest that one learns a language in its entirety from 
scratch, with only the tools of intelligence, desire, and memory. This would accord 
with the picture of learning as presented in the Birdcatcher. However, all of the tools 
mentioned above are further facilitated by the development of practical linguistic 
abilities. That is, the concepts which one has acquired are formal and are therefore of 
such a sort as to be linguistically available, with the development of core linguistic
413 The role o f recollection in language will be discussed below (§ 8.1.5).
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terms through ostension (as in the Birdcatcher model) one is able to employ these core 
terms so as to facilitate the development of yet more terms414.
0603 Augustine directly discusses language acquisition in Confessiones 1.13. The 
picture, as given, is one whereby children learn initially through ostension. This 
ostension is, however, very much like that demonstrated in the Birdcatcher. Language 
is not taught by others {non... docebant me maiores hominespreabentes mihi uerba 
certo aliquo or dine) but is acquired by means of one’s intelligence {sed ego ipse 
mente) which is God given415. The child attempts to express its will {edere uellem 
sensa cordis mei) by various sounds and movements {cum gemitibus et uocibus uariis 
et uariis membrorum motibus) but soon applies memory to the process {prensabam 
memoria) by noting the vocal sound which was made {cum ipsi appellabant rem 
aliquam) and the object to which the person who had uttered the sound moved {cum 
secundum earn uocem corpus ad aliquid mouebant). As in the Birdcatcher the 
birdcatcher does not intend to show how the equipment is used but simply by using it 
he facilitates the spectator’s learning. The spectator applies his intelligence to the 
process and understands how the equipment, or verbal tools, are used. The correlation 
between sound and thing is observed and stored in the memory {uidebam et tenebam 
hoc ab eis uocari rem illam). The child gains extra clues from what Augustine 
describes as the natural vocabulary of all races {tamquam uerbis naturalibus omnium 
gentium), that is the gestures of the face and body, and the tone of the voice, to 
express whether one intends to seek and possess or to reject and avoid {indicante
414 There does of course remain the central difficulty as raised by Wittgenstein, namely, that the child’s 
ability to master such core concepts is presupposed and this presupposition is ultimately based upon the 
formal basis for concept formation and for language acquisition in Augustine’s approach to 
epistemology. Wittgenstein seeks an answer to how concepts and meanings are determined, and this 
answer is not to be satisfied by assuming that these are determined by the way the world is, i.e. formal. 
For further discussion o f this central difficulty in Augustine’s approach v. inf. § 9.
415 Augustine cites the divine presence as an explanation for the learning of language - “I 
conclude...that for the author o f conf. 1.13 its central focus is on God’s responsibility for the mind 
teaching itself’ (Burnyeat: 1987, 4).
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affectionem animi in petendis, habendis, reiciendis fugiendisue rebus). It is not 
exactly clear what Augustine means by this, and how he strictly understands these 
indicators as being natural. However, he defines them as very simple and general 
actions, such as appetition and rejection. These natural indicators are presumably ones 
such as are learned by experience, such as motion from denoting rejection and motion 
towards denoting appetition. These actions are very basic, and fundamental, for one 
must learn at an early stage in life that things sought are moved towards, such as food, 
while those rejected are moved away from, as one reacts to pain, such as when burned 
by a flame.
0604 In such a way words are gradually understood {ita verba...paulatim
conligebam) and through frequently hearing (crebro audita quarum rerum signa
essent) of different words in different contexts {in uariis sententiis locis suis posita)
the child begins, through vocal training {edomito in eis signis o re f16, to articulate his
desires {measque iam uoluntates... enuntiabam). In such a way, through interaction
with, and observation of, one’s parents {pendens exparentum auctoritate nutuque
maiorum hominum) does one become a fully sociable being {uitae humanae
procellosam societatem altius ingressus sum).
... unde loqui didicer am, post aduerti. non enim docebant me maiores homines 
praebentes mihi uerba certo aliquo ordine doctrinae sicut paulo post litteras, 
sed ego ipse mente, quam dedisti mihi, deus meus, cum gemitibus et uocibus 
uariis et uariis membrorum motibus edere uellem sensa cordis mei, ut 
uoluntati pareretur, nec ualerem quae uolebam omnia nec quibus uolebam 
omnibus, prensabam memoria, cum ipsi appellabant rem aliquam et cum 
secundum earn uocem corpus ad aliquid mouebant, uidebam, et tenebam hoc 
ab eis uocari rem illam, quod sonabant, cum earn uellent ostendere. hoc autem 
eos uelle ex motu corporis aperiebatur tamquam uerbis naturalibus omnium 
gentium, quae fiunt uultu et nutu oculorum ceteroque membrorum actu et 
sonitu uocis indicante affectionem animi in petendis, habendis, reiciendis 
fugiendisue rebus, ita uerba in uariis sententiis locis suis posita et crebro 
audita quarum rerum signa essent paulatim conligebam measque iam 
uoluntates edomito in eis signis ore per haec enuntiabam. sic cum his, inter
416 It is notable that Augustine also considers that the sound system of a language is learned.
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quos eram, uoluntatum enuntiandarum signa communicaui et uitae humanae 
procellosam societatem altius ingressus sum pendens ex parentum auctoritate 
nutuque maiorum hominum.
{conf. 1.13)417
0605 When compared with the discussion of ‘caput’ (DM 33) there is clearly a 
coherent view of language learning. There are a number of parallels which it will be 
useful to specify. Most important to the general thesis of the DM is the fact that words 
are learned in what is an inductive manner: “ ... cum saepe dicerentur caput” (DM 33) 
and “ ... uerba... crebro audita quarum rerum signa essent paulatim conligebam”.
Also, when one hears a word used one notes and observes (“ ... notans atque 
animaduertens”, DM 33; “ ... uidebam et tenebam” conf. 1.13) what it signifies
(“ ... quando diceretur, repperi uocabulum esse rei” DM 33; “ ... hoc... uocari rem 
Mam” and “ ... uerba... crebro audita quarum rerum signa essent” conf. 1.13). The 
learning of language, therefore, can be seen to depend upon one’s existing concepts 
which are inductively correlated, through observation and storage in the memory, with 
sounds which become the signs of the objects previously stored in the mind as 
concepts.
0606 A parallel which may be drawn with Augustine’s thesis of language 
acquisition is that of his approach to the differences in learning a first or second 
language.
... uidelicet difficultas, difficultas omnino ediscendae linguaeperegrinae, quasi 
felle aspergebat omnes suauitates Graecas fabulosarum narrationum. nulla 
enim uerba ilia noueram et saeuis terroribus acpoenis, ut nossem, instabatur 
mihi uehementer. nam et Latina aliquando infans utique nulla noueram et 
tamen aduertendo didici sine ullo metu atque cruciatu inter etiam blandimenta 
nutricum et ioca adridentium et laetitias alludentium. didici uero ilia sine 
poenali onere urgentium, cum me urgeret cor meum adparienda concepta 
sua, et qua non esset, nisi aliqua uerba didicissem non a docentibus, sed a 
loquentibus, in quorum et ego auribus parturiebam quidquid sentiebam. hinc
417 In this passage Augustine emphasises the phonetic {edomito in eis signis ore), syntactic (uerba in 
uariis sententiis locis suis posita), and semantic {uerba... audita quarum rerum signa 
essent... conligebam) aspects o f language learning.
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satis elucet maiorem habere uim ad discenda ista liber am curiositatem quam
meticulosam necessitatem.
{conf. 1.23)
A great difference is observed in the ‘teaching’ method, for Greek Augustine was 
terrorised and beaten while for his native Latin he learned of his own accord and 
without compulsion. The distinction is basically one of being unwilling and forced 
and of being willing and actively involved in choosing to learn {aduertendo didici).
The drive to learn comes not from others but from one’s own heart and the desire to 
bring forth one’s own thoughts (concepta). As a child one learns words not from 
other’s teaching but from observing other’s talking and from the desire to share one’s 
thoughts with others. There is a certain degree of healthy curiosity rather than studied 
necessity.
0607 The model for the system of semiotic relations as described for the smoke-fire 
correlation (v. sup. 0138, D5) can be seen to be applicable to Augustine’s approach to 
language acquisition, as presented in DM 33 and conf. 1.13. The model for the smoke- 
fire correlation was also a model of induction. This model describes how the 
correlation occurs between the concept of a thing and the concept of a name as seen in 
diagram D30 (v. sup. 0592). In diagram D30 the picture describes the causal relations 
between object and concept (of object), concept (of object) and name, name and 
concept (of name). The correlation of name and concept (of name) to concept (of 
object) is determined in the above presentation of language acquisition and is 
described as follows.
0608 An individual, R (receiver), has a concept of an object, x, and hears the name, 
y, used to signify jc and it is ostensively defined to R that y  signifies x  Therefore, on 
seeing x , R is ostensively shown x while y  is said, and in this way R correlates y  with 
concept^(which has been formed through numerous previous sightings of samples of
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x). Therefore, the meaning, which is the sayable correlate of A, ofy  is understood by 
R to be X'.
(D31)
R -> x + y 1 -> x + yn
0609 The difficulty with this description of language acquisition is that precisely as 
the Birdcatcher example specifies as a solution to the problem of ostension, namely 
that there must be a level of interpretation, or application of intelligence, for such a 
model to constitute sure knowledge of the fact, for R, that the meaning of y  is 
specifically X '. The process is inductive and, therefore, on each occasion of hearing 
the termy applied to an example of x, R gains a better idea of what specifically is the 
meaning of the term, which is to say, R gains a better idea of how y  is being used by 
ostender1 to ostender11. As is clear, this approach may provide a better understanding 
with each act of ostension (or use of the term in daily usage) but, although this may 
constitute knowledge as commonly understood, this it would appear is not the precise 
type of sure and well-grounded knowledge Augustine is seeking.
0610 The place of interpretation in this process is crucial and would suggest a 
problem with Augustine’s use of the Birdcatcher as a valid model for gaining the sort 
of knowledge sought. This problem is, on this level, essentially social for if it is given 
that R has validly learned, by means of the Birdcatcher approach, concept X  and so 
has knowledge of what essentially constitutes an example of x, then the problem is 
one of communication. This is to say, although R knows x she does not know that 
when another member of her linguistic community uses the term y  that this term also
has the specific meaning X \  y  may mean X ' ' for someone else and as has been shown 
in Augustine’s discussion of ostension, it is difficult to know exactly what a term 
signifies unless one introduces some level of interpretation. However, this 
interpretation is essentially the problem for one continually encounters the question as 
to whether the interpretation is accurate and if so, how is this accuracy achieved.
These questions will be considered in the following discussion, for as will be seen, 
Augustine faces a more central problem concerning this issue, and that is the question 
as to how R can even be said to firmly know that X  is essentially what makes all 
members of x, x (v. inf. § 9.2). At present, however, it would appear that Augustine is 
burdened with a theory of language acquisition which is founded on induction and 
which does, therefore, not constitute a means of accurate transferral of information, in 
any strict sense. Augustine is acutely aware of this fact, however, although the 
inherent difficulty within his thesis is highlighted by his raising of the Paradox, he 
will, in due course, confront the central issue concerning the Paradox and knowledge 
acquisition which will bring to the fore the problems in his thesis on language 
acquisition, and how it reflects upon the question of the suitability of language to 
teach.
8.1.4. Pointing.
0611 At present Augustine is concerned with emphasising that words, and signs, 
depend upon a prior concept, or knowledge, of the thing which is signified by the 
word. When one hears the word ‘head’ for the first time, one is unaware as to whether 
the sound is simply a sound or is a significant sound. In this situation what is sought is 
a concept of the sign, not of the thing which is signified. One may then have
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knowledge of a sound but to have knowledge of a sign one must know what it is a 
sign of.
Aug. ... finge nos nuncprimum audire quod dicitur caput, et nescientes, utrum 
uox ista sit tantummodo sonans an aliquid etiam significans, quaerere, quid sit 
caput - memento nos non rei, quae significatur, sed ipsius signi uelle habere 
notitiam, qua caremusprofecto, quamdiu cuius signum est ignoramus...
(34)
The knowledge of the sign comes through an appreciation of the correlation of sound,
and knowledge of sound, to object, and knowledge of object. This correlation is
achieved through ostensive definition.
Aug. ...si ergo ita quaerentibus res ipsa digito demonstratur, hac conspecta 
discimus signum, quod audieramus tantum, nondum noueramus.
(34)
0612 The two elements in the sign, sound and signification, are central to this
process. The sound is simply perceived through its striking the ear, while the
signification is only grasped by seeing the object which the sign signifies.
Aug. ...in quo tamen signo cum duo sint, sonus et significatio, sonum certe non 
per signum percipimus, sed eo ipso aure pulsata, significationem autem re, 
quae significatur, aspecta.
(34)
In this way, a sound which strikes the ear becomes a sign through one’s grasping that 
the sound is correlated to the object ostensively defined. Thus, the concept of the 
object becomes the signification of the sound and the sound becomes a sign.
0613 Therefore, an encounter with an object leads to a concept of an object:
(1) object -> concept of object.
An encounter with a sound leads to a concept of a sound:
(2) sound -> concept of sound.
The ostensive definition leads to a correlation of sound and object:
(3) sound = object.
This correlation is essentially a correlation of the concepts of object and sound:
291
(4) concept of sound = concept of object.
This correlation marks the concept of the object as a signification of the sound:
(5) concept of sound = concept of object
concept of object/signification. 
The marking of the concept of the object as a signification determines that the sound 
is a sign:
(6) sound/sign.
The sound is, therefore, known as a sign due to its signification. It is, in this way, a 
word.
uerbum... quod cum aliquo significatu articulata uoce profertur
(8)
0614 The act of pointing signifies what the finger is aimed at418, it is not aimed at
the sign but at the object. Therefore, the ostensive act neither shows one the object,
which is already known, nor the sign, which is not pointed out.
nam ilia intentio digiti significare nihil aliudpotest quam illud, in quo 
intenditur digitus; intentus est autem non in signum, sed in membrum, quod 
caput uocatur. itaque per illam neque rem possum nosse, quam noueram 
neque signum, in quod intentus digitus non est.
(34)
0615 Augustine is using the example of pointing, as ostensive definition, for 
simplicity of example. The central point he desires to make is that one does not learn 
anything through words for the signification is understood only after one has 
knowledge of the object signified, one does not come to know the object by means of 
the signification. Learning is achieved through the ‘res ipsa cognita’ not through the 
‘signification.
0616 The act of pointing with the finger is not actually a sign of the thing signified 
but is rather a sign of pointing-out. It is simply another sign, similar in function to the
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exclamation ‘look!’. Therefore, pointing is not free of the dilemma of showing one
sign by means of another, ad infinitum*19. This said, Augustine has discussed the
issues involved in this and now simply uses pointing, which must be understood
together with the caveat concerning such signs from the preceding discussion, as a
simplified way of discussing the present issue.
sed de intentione digiti non nimis euro, quia ipsius demonstrationis signum 
mihi uidetur potius quam rerum aliquarum, quae demonstrantur, sicut 
aduerbium, quod ecce dicimus; nam et cum hoc aduerbio digitum solemus 
intendere, ne unum demonstrandi signum non sit satis. et id maxime tibi nitor 
persuadere si potero, per ea signa, quae uerba appellantur, nos nihil discere; 
potius enim ut dixi uim uerbi, id est significationem, quae latet in sono, re 
ipsa, quae significatur, cognita discimus, quam illam tali significatione 
percipimus.
(34)
0617 The situation as described concerning ‘head’ is likewise seen in numerous
other examples. In such a case as ‘sarabarae\ although one may know the objects
(i.e. head-coverings) by sight, one does not know that they are sarabarae. One
already has the concepts of head and covering, and therefore of head-coverings
generally and can therefore recognise that what is being pointed out is an unfamiliar
sort of head-covering420.
Aug. ...quod dixi de capite, hoc etiam de tegminibus deque aliis rebus 
innumerabilibus dixerim; quas tamen cum iam nouerim, sarabaras illas adhuc 
usque non noui...
(35)
The act of indicating, either by pointing or by using words to point, or direct, one’s 
attention does not teach one but one learns for oneself by looking. Learning is 
achieved through the act of seeing (aspectu) not signifying (significatu).
418 The Quinean ‘ostended point’, cf. Quine: 1969, 39
419 One response may be that pointing is a ‘natural’ sign of the sort discussed in Confessiones (1.13), v. 
sup. 0603, and does not fall into the regress. However, Augustine does not forward this as a possibility.
420 This example supports the view that one gains certain basic core terms upon which one can build. 
Such terms do not teach one what a particular item is but supply enough information so as to allow one 
to know what sort o f thing to look for and so directly learn what it is for oneself.
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Aug. ...quodsi eis [tegminibus] forte conspectis cum simul adero me 
admonuerit dicens: ecce sarabarae, discam rem, quam nesciebam non per 
uerba, quae dicta sunt, sed per eius aspectum, per quern factum est, ut etiam 
nomen illud, quid ualeret, nossem ac tenerem.
(35)
0618 Although one leams through direct experience, or seeing with one’s own eyes,
there is also a clear place for a degree of reliance on another’s words. Trust may be
placed in another’s words as an encouragement to direct one’s attention. This
directing of one’s attention is the seeking what one would see by looking.
Aug. ...non enim, cum rem ipsam didici, uerbis alienis credidi, sed oculis meis; 
illis tamen fortasse ut adtenderem credidi, id est ut aspectu quaererem, quid 
uiderem.
(35)
0619 There are introduced, at this point, a number of themes which will be of 
importance in the following discussion (DM 38-41). DM 35, 36 and 37 are 
transitionary in the movement of the discussion into the final major section of the 
dialogue, which is concerned primarily with the acquisition of knowledge and with 
the consideration of the efficacy of language in this acquisition, particularly in the 
light of the previous analyses of language and various aspects of it. The focus of the 
discussion has begun to shift and is signalled through an alteration of the vocabulary, 
and concepts, employed by Augustine. The discussion of the themes introduced at this 
point will be discussed in due course, and in their relevant sections, however, it will 
be useful to mention them at this point.
0620 The themes which are introduced are: the place of direct experience and that of 
sight, and seeing, in knowledge acquisition; the idea that one leams simply by 
looking; the place of testimony in knowledge acquisition, whether that be putting 
belief in the testimony of others or the placing of tmst in one’s own eyes, or direct 
experience; the usefulness of the directing of one’s attention in the learning process; 
and finally the idea that one must seek so as to see.
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8.1.5. Recollection.
0621 The most that can be said for the effect that words do have is that they remind
one to look for things {admonent... ut quaeramus res). They do not exhibit things that
we might know them.
Aug. ...hactenus uerba ualuerunt, quibus utplurimum tribuam, admonent 
tantum, ut quaeramus res, non exhibent, ut norimus. is me autem aliquid 
docet, qui uel oculis uel ulli corporis sensui uel ipsi etiam menti praebet ea, 
quae cognoscere uolo.
(36)
Teaching is the presenting of what is to be known before the eyes or other senses, or 
before the mind of the learner. Augustine here shows a regard for ‘epistemic 
categories’421. These are such that knowledge may be of two categories of truths:
“ 1. truths such that if x  knows that p, then x  has perceived by sense that /?;
2. truths such that if x  knows that /?, then x  has perceived by the mind that
p .”422
The sense in which teaching is understood has been redefined. Teaching is the 
presenting of the item to be known directly before the senses or before the mind of the 
person who is being taught.
0622 All that is taught by words is the sound of words, for those things which are 
not signs cannot be words. That is to say, even if one has heard a word, one does not 
know that it is a word until one knows what it signifies. Therefore, if one hears the 
word ‘sarabarae’ and does not know that it is a word, as one does not know what it
423signifies, then one merely leams the sound ‘sar-ab-ar-ae’
421 Barnes: 1980, 193-206.
422 Burnyeat: 1987, 19.
423 It is possible that Augustine is thinking here o f the difference, in Stoicism, between utterance and 
speech, and speech and language: “Siacpepei 5e <pcovf\ Kai o n  (pcovf] pev Kai 6 t ix 6<;
ean , §vap8pov povov. 8e Xbyou 8iacpepei, o n  A6yo<; aei anpavnKO*;
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Aug. ...uerbis igitur nisi uerba non discimus, immo sonitum strepitumque 
uerborum; nam si ea, quae signa non sunt, uerba esse non possunt, quamuis 
iam auditum uerbum nescio tamen uerbum esse, donee quid significet sciam.
(36)
The complete understanding of words is only realised with the knowledge of the 
things which they signify. Words consist of two elements, sound (sonus) and 
signification {significatio), and only with knowledge of both can one be said to know 
a word.
Aug. ...rebus ergo cognitis uerborum quoque cognitioperficitur; uerbis uero 
auditis nec uerba discuntur; non enim ea uerba, quae nouimus, discimus aut 
quae non nouimus didicisse nospossumus confiteri, nisi eorum significatione 
percepta, quae non auditione uocum emissarum, sed rerum significatarum 
cognitione contingit.
(36)
Augustine, in this passage, again returns to a form of the Paradox to stress his point 
that words do not even teach one about words. When one hears a word which is 
known to one, one cannot learn it (for one already knows it), and when one hears a 
word one does not know one cannot learn it by means of the sound uttered, unless one 
knows the signification. The signification is not learned through hearing the sound 
uttered but through one’s conception of the thing signified. Therefore, words do not 
even teach one about words.
0623 When words are spoken one either knows what they signify or one does not. If
one knows, then one is reminded rather than leams, and if one does not then one is not
even reminded, unless one is reminded that one should enquire.
Aug. ...uerissima quippe ratio est et uerissime dicitur, cum uerbaproferuntur, 
aut scire nos quid significent aut nescire; si scimus commemorari potius quam 
discere, si autem nescimus nec commemorari quidem, sedfortasse ad 
quaerendum admoneri.
(36)
ecru, 8e Kai acrnpavTOt;, ax; h f&Xu>pi, Xoyo<; §e ob8apd)<^” (Diogenes Laertius 7.57).
The fact that a ‘word’ without significance can actually be learned would appear to be that it is 
articulated (as the meaningless term ‘pAiTUpi’), however, without significance it cannot be learned as a 
word proper.
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0624 There are two related applications of recollection as presented in DM 36. 
Firstly, there is recollection where words serve to remind one of what they signify 
(“ ... uerba... aut scire nos quidsignificent aut nescire; si scimus commemorari... ”), 
and, secondly, there is recollection where words remind one so as to look for what one 
does not know (“ ... quid significent... si... nescimus... ad quaerendum admoneri...
admonent ut quaeramus res ut norimus... ” DM 36).
0625 In the first application words function so as to recall, from their latency in
memory, concepts of the items signified to the mind of the sign receiver. One has a
concept of an item and has a concept of a word which is correlated with this item; on
hearing this word uttered the mind thinks of the word and so is reminded of the
signification, which is to say one accesses the latent concept of the item signified,
from the memory and into one’s consciously thinking mind.
Aug. sic quoque locutione nihil aliud agere quam commemorare, cum 
memoria, cui uerba inhaerent, ea reuoluendo facit uenire in mentem res ipsas, 
quarum signa sunt uerba.
(2)
One can, therefore, be prompted by another, through his saying a word, to recall a 
concept to mind. This is properly described as reminding (v. sup. 0029). However, as 
in DM 2 (above), one may silently think of a word and so remind oneself, that is, 
access a latent memory item. This form of recollection is properly described as recall 
(v. sup. 0030).
0626 The second application of recollection is that whereby one is prompted by 
another’s word to look for what one does not know. So, as in DM 36, which refers 
back to examples such as “ecce: sarabarae/” (DM 35), the words are a prompt to the 
listener to look for that which he does not know, namely sarabarae. Calling this 
‘reminding’ may seem a rather unusual use of the term, however, the act of looking is 
entirely dependent upon the will of the sign receiver and the words of the sign
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transmitter simply remind, or recall to the memory of, the receiver that he does not 
know sarabarae and reminds him of the desire to know (or not to know, in which 
case he will not respond by looking).
0627 Both of the above applications of recollection are related in that words serve to 
access from the memory latent concepts, or knowledge, into the mind of the sign 
receiver.
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9. Knowledge.
9.1. Testimony.
0628 Augustine’s thesis, as so presented, is that no word teaches anyone what it 
signifies. No word, taken singly, can show one what it is that it signifies unless one 
already knows what the word signifies.
0629 In the 4sarabarae’ example, not only does the individual word 4sarabara’ not 
teach anything but neither does the sentence 4sarabarae quaedam capitum tegmina 
sunt\ even when all of the other words are known and perfectly familiar to the 
listener. As stated above (0625-0626), such words as are known merely serve to 
prompt or direct the listener to look so as to learn, for herself, what it is that the 
unknown w ord,4sarabarae’, means. This is essentially the problem at the heart of the 
regress which occurs when words are defined by words (DM 4; v. sup. §3.5-3.5.1), 
and goes some way to supporting the view that this also is Augustine’s reason for 
disregarding definitions as a possible solution to determining word meaning (DM 43): 
the word 4sarabara' cannot teach its meaning to one who does not know what it 
means, neither can any other word, and neither indeed can any combination of words.
0630 The two forms of teaching discussed in the DM, namely, telling and showing, 
are therefore seen to be remarkably similar in that they simply serve to encourage, or 
encourage by reminding, the listener to look and, therefore, learn for herself.
0631 The question of the knowledge of word meaning raises the related issue that if 
knowledge is not learned through words, then what of narrative, and more 
particularly, what of historical narrative. Augustine considers a section of narrative 
from the Book of Daniel (Dan. 3), thereby expanding the discussion from a particular
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term (‘sarabarae’) from the narrative (Dan. 3:94, Vulgate; 3:27, Septuagint) to the 
narrative itself.
0632 The issue is such that if one cannot know the items denoted by a term other 
than by direct experience nor can know the meaning of the term without this prior 
direct experience of the referent, then there would appear to be a problem with all 
historical narrative, and, in fact, with all narrative. Nevertheless, it is clear that such 
narrative is accepted, as, for Christians, in the case of the story of the three youths 
saved from Nebuchadnezzar’s punishment by their faith and religious devotion (Dan. 
3). In such examples it would appear that one does indeed learn, at least in a sense, 
from the words.
Aug. ...quodsi dixeris tegmina quidem ilia capitum, quorum nomen sono 
tantum tenemus, non nos posse nisi uisa cognoscere, neque nomen ipsum 
plenius nisi illis cognitis nosse quod tamen de ipsis pueris accepimus, ut 
regem ac flammas fide ac religione superauerint, quas laudes deo cecinerint, 
quos honores ab ipso etiam inimico meruerint, num aliter haec nisi per uerba 
didicimus?
(37)
0633 The response to this objection is that all of the words from the narrative were
in fact already known to the hearer (or reader), that is to say, the hearer already had a
concept (“ ... cuncta quae illis uerbis significata sunt in nostra notitia iam fuisse.”)
and, therefore, knew the meanings, or significations, of each of the words used. The
listener (or reader) already knew the meanings of the terms ‘three boys’, ‘furnace’,
and so on. However, the boys’ names (Ananias, Azarias, and Misahel) are as
unknown as ‘sarabarae’, and the familiar terms in the story were unable to bring
about knowledge of these names424.
Aug. ...respondebo cuncta, quae illis uerbis significata sunt in nostra notitia 
iam fuisse. nam quid sint tres pueri, quid fornax, quid ignis, quid rex, quid 
denique illaesi ab igne ceteraque omnia iam tenebam, quae uerba ilia 
significant. Ananias uero et Azarias et Misahel tarn mihi ignoti sunt quam illae
424 The story does teach one that these were the names of the boys but gives nothing more than this.
This teaching may indeed be better described to consist of belief rather than knowledge.
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sarabarae, nec ad eos cognoscendos haec me nomina quicquam adiuuerunt 
aut adiuuare iam poterunt.
(37)
0634 The story itself, which primarily demonstrates the power of belief, signals the 
response to the place of narrative within Augustine’s epistemology. Testimony is, in 
itself, concerned with belief and not with knowledge.
0635 Everything which one receives in historical testimony is most accurately
described as something we believe {credere) rather than know {scire). This fact is
observed by the authorities, upon whose testimony one must base one’s belief (“ ... ipsi
quibus credimus... ait enimpropheta”), in Scripture. For it is stated (Isaiah 7:9), that
unless one believes, one will not understand425, which signals an awareness that these
two items (belief and understanding) are distinct.
Aug. ...haec autem omnia, quae in ilia leguntur historia ita illo tempore facta 
esse, ut scripta sunt, credere me potius quam scire confiteor. neque istam 
dijferentiam idem ipsi, quibus credimus, nescierunt; ait enim propheta: «nisi 
credideritis, non intellegetis», quod non dixisset profecto, si nihil distare 
iudicasset.
(37)
What one understands, one also believes, but one does not understand all that one 
believes. Also, what one understands, one knows, but one does not know all that one 
believes.
quod ergo intellego, id etiam credo; at non omne, quod credo, etiam intellego. 
omne autem, quod intellego, scio; non omne, quod credo, scio.
(37)
0636 Although it seems clear that Augustine does to an extent equate knowledge 
with understanding, what he is concerned with particularly at this stage in the 
discussion is belief. The conclusions provided by the above statements (DM 37, v.
425 The concept o f understanding is central for Augustine and in DM 37 he directly parallels knowing 
{scire) with understanding {intellegere)\ “ ...credere...scire...credideritis...intellegetis...” DM 37. 
Augustine’s treatment o f knowledge and understanding in this regard will be briefly considered below 
(§ 9.1.1).
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sup. 0635) are that, although understanding entails knowledge and belief, belief does 
not entail understanding or knowledge.
0637 Belief would then appear to be a prerequisite for knowledge and 
understanding, although not vice versa, and so belief is useful as a progression 
towards knowledge and understanding. That is to say, as knowledge and 
understanding require belief and belief does not require knowledge and 
understanding, then belief must be a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for 
knowledge and understanding.
0638 It is useful to believe much which one does not know, such as the story from
Daniel 3. Although most things cannot be known, what is known, through reasoning
(as seen in 0635-0637), is that there is usefulness in believing such things.
Aug. ...nec ideo nescio, quam sit utile credere etiam multa, quae nescio; cui 
utilitati hanc quoque adiungo de tribus pueris historiam. quare pleraque 
rerum, cum scire non possim, quanta tamen utilitate credantur scio.
(37)
In such a way does Augustine suggest a possible addition to belief so as to achieve 
what might be knowledge, or understanding. For Augustine stresses that, although 
there is much which cannot be known (“ ...pleraque rerum cum scire non possum... ”), 
he does know (“ ... scio”) how useful it is to believe (“ ... quanta tamen utilitate 
credantur”). That Augustine knows this fact, unlike his belief of the story from Daniel 
which is based upon authoritative testimony, is due to the process of reasoning which 
has preceded and upon which the conclusion that belief is useful is based426.
0639 This idea of the usefulness of belief coincides with the proposal which 
Augustine is presenting for language. In the example o f 4sarabara7 sentences such as 
'si quaedam capitum tegmina nuncupantur hoc nomine [sarabarae]7 (DM 33) do tell 
one something about sarabarae, namely that they are a sort of head covering. In
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addition, when one actually sees an example of a sarabara and gains a concept of 
what it is, through this concept one gets to know the meaning of the term ‘sarabara’ 
more fully (‘ ... nomen ipsumplenius... illis cognitis nosse’ DM 37). This does not 
suggest that one learns the meaning of ‘sarabarae’ through hearing the sentence 
which states that they are head coverings but rather that one receives an 
approximation of the meaning and, according to Augustine’s thesis, this 
approximation (functioning like the term 'ecce!\ DM 34) points out, or reminds one, 
what sort of thing to look for. The sentence within which the unfamiliar word occurs, 
therefore, does not teach one what the term means, in the sense that it does not 
transmit any knowledge, but it provides, at best, a sort of testimony which provides 
belief not knowledge.
9.1.1. Knowledge and Understanding.
0640 Augustine presents a clear distinction between knowledge and belief in a 
passage from the Retractationes (1.14.3) on the de utilitate credendi421. The 
distinction is largely based on grounds for justification. True belief is often called 
knowledge, and although this is not accurate in a strict sense of the word, it is, 
nevertheless, an acceptable way of talking in general terms. The sort of justification 
which validates true belief is adequate testimony {quod idoneis testibus credimus), 
and such testimony depends upon sense-perception {quodpercipimus nostri corporis 
sensibus) or upon credible witnesses {quodfide dignis credimus testibus). Knowledge,
426 Augustine’s view o f what constitutes knowledge will be considered more fully below (§ 9.1.1, §
9.3.1, and §9.3.2).
427The following discussion o f the passages cited from the Retractationes and de utilitate credendi is 
indebted to Bumyeat: 1987, 6-7.
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on the other hand, relies on the firm reasoning of the mind {scire... quod mentis firma
ratione conprehendimus).
et quod dixi: «multum inter esse utrum aliquid mentis certa ratione teneatur, 
quod scire dicimus, an fama uel litter is credendum poster is util iter 
commendetur», et paulo post: «quod scimus igitur debemus rationi, quod 
credimus auctoritati», non sic accipiendum est, ut in sermone usitatiore 
uereamur nos dicere scire quod idoneis testibus credimus. proprie quippe cum 
loquimur, id solum scire dicimus quod mentis firma ratione conprehendimus. 
cum uero loquimur uerbis consuetudini aptioribus, sicut loquitur etiam 
scriptura diuina, non dubitemus dicere scire nos et quodpercipimus nostri 
corporis sensibus et quodfide dignis credimus testibus, dum tamen inter haec 
et illud quid distet intellegamus.
{retr. 1.14.3)
0641 While not strictly knowledge, belief is rational and relies on testimony which
is both well grounded and adequate. However, knowledge has some additional factor
which the firm reasoning of the mind adds to true belief. What this additional factor is
may be seen in the contrast between knowledge and belief in de utilitate credendi.
quod intellegimus igitur, debemus rationi, quod credimus, auctoritati, quod 
opinamur, errori.
{util. cred. 25)
The contrast between knowledge and belief, which is described in terms of ‘scire’ and 
4credere’ in the retractationes (1.14.3), uses the term 4scire’ as an equivalent term for 
4 intellegere\ as it occurs in the passage from de utilitate credendi (25). What 
differentiates knowledge from belief is reasoning such as to make the item in question 
understood. Justified true belief cannot, in this sense, be equated with knowledge, for 
such belief does not provide an understanding of something. It is only the firm 
reasoning of the mind, leading to an understanding of the item under consideration, 
which can accurately be described as knowledge.
0642 The distinction between knowing and believing as presented in DM 37 (v. sup. 
0635-0639) follows this pattern. Knowledge requires belief together with the 
additional factor of rational understanding.
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9.2. The Inner Christ.
0643 Everything which is understood depends not upon some external testimony 
(“ ... non loquentem qui personat for is”) but rather one consults an inner truth
(“ ... intns... consulimus ueritatem”). Words may, as discussed above (§ 8.1.5), function
so as to remind an individual to look, although they do not teach in any strict sense.
The obvious contrast being made here is that understanding is not an externally
directed process (foris) but is essentially inner (intus). External elements may serve so
as to remind or encourage one to understand, but the process of actual understanding
can only occur inwardly.
Aug. ...de uniuersis autem, quae intelligimus, non loquentem, qui personat 
foris, sed intus ipsi mentipraesidentem consulimus ueritatem, uerbis fortasse 
ut consulamus admoniti.
(38)
Truth, as it were, sits before, and directs {praesidentem), the mind inwardly {intus ipsi 
menti), and would appear to be such as to be ever present to the mind and directional 
in nature. The sense of ‘praesidentem’ seems to be somewhat paradoxical in this 
passage in that the truth is present before the very mind of an individual and is 
available for consultation, as one might look at an external object for verification. 
Truth sits before the mind and one would appear to simply have to open the eye of the 
mind, as it were, to consult it. Yet it also functions so as to direct the mind. In the 
primary sense o f ‘praesidentem* (‘to sit before’) the mind appears to have an active 
role, while in the secondary sense (‘to direct’) the mind has a less active, perhaps even 
passive role.
0644 This truth which presides inwardly over the mind and which truly teaches
(<docet), in that it brings about understanding, is Christ. Christ dwells in the inner man
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(“ ... in interiore homine habitare”428). In this sense the paradoxical nature of
6praesidentem’ is more accurately understood. There is a difference between looking
and seeing and the truth is present before one’s mind. However, one must firstly look
so as to be able to see, and on looking one may be directed rightly, by the truth itself,
or Christ, so as to see. Implicit within this is the idea of seeking so as to find.
Knowledge is available to the human mind but to attain it one must attempt to
understand, and through enquiry one may be granted understanding. Christ, as the
consultative power for the human mind, will be seen to be Augustine’s solution to the
Paradox of Enquiry (v. inf. § 9.2). Christ, as truth, is the unchangeable power
{incommutabilis... uirtus) and eternal wisdom {sempiterna sapientia) of God. It is this
power and wisdom which every rational mind consults in its attempt to understand.
Aug. ... ille autem, qui consulitur, docet, qui in interiore homine habitare 
dictus est Christus, id est incommutabilis dei uirtus atque sempiterna 
sapientia, quam quidem omnis rationalis anima consul it...
(38)
0645 The religious dimension of understanding is seen in the fact that understanding 
depends upon an awareness, through direct inner consultation, with the truth. This 
truth is Christ, and Christ is the power and wisdom of God.
0646 This wisdom is revealed (panditur) and so is dispensed upon an individual 
who is not strictly active but this revelation is dependent upon how capable the 
individual is to receive understanding and in this sense the individual is proactive. 
Augustine embraces the paradoxical nature of the Paradox of Enquiry through a 
paradoxical solution. The passage from ignorance to knowledge depends upon a 
mediator, and this mediator is Christ. In this sense the human mind cannot bridge the 
gap in the Paradox between ignorance and knowledge and requires an agency to
428 Augustine uses this same phrase in de vera religione: “in interiore homine habitat
ueritas.” vera rel. 72. The ultimate source for this phrase is Ephesians 3:14-20, although Augustine’s
Neoplatonic interpretation o f it may be influenced by Plato’s ‘ b £vxd<; dvSpcojcoq’ (R. 589a).
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facilitate this. Truth is transcendental and to pass from the material to the 
transcendental the human mind needs a mediator. This mediator is most obviously 
that which dwells in both realms, which is Christ, namely, the Word of God made 
flesh.
0647 However, the solution can also be stated in more humanistic terms, where
there is a large degree of active movement towards understanding on the part of
humans. For between the paradoxical terms of ignorance and knowledge there is the
intermediary of belief and to move from ignorance to knowledge one must do so
through belief Belief is the primary aspect in the relationship between humanity and
God, through Christ.
Aug. ...sed tantum cuique panditur, quantum caper e propter pr opr iam siue 
malam siue bonam uoluntatem potest.
(38)
0648 The human passage from ignorance, through belief, to knowledge is active. 
The passage from ignorance, through Christ, to knowledge depends upon divine 
grace. In the left-hand column the initiation of the process is human and proceeds 
from ignorance to knowledge. In the right-hand column the initiation of the process is 
divine and demonstrates how knowledge is passed on to the ignorant via Christ.
(D32)
IGNORANCE IGNORANCE
(BELIEF) (CHRIST)
KNOWLEDGE KNOWLEDGE
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0649 Understanding is only achievable for an individual insofar as the enquiry is 
directed towards the correct moral end429. The granting of insight, or understanding, 
depends upon the will (uoluntatem, v. sup. DM 38, 0647) of the individual. Augustine 
presents a concept of the will which is prior to and independent of the act of 
intellectual cognition, yet fundamentally different from sensual and irrational 
emotion” (Dihle: 1982, 127). The will reflects the active choice made by anyone in 
seeking truth, that is, the beliefs they engage in. If these beliefs are grounded in a 
good will (bonam uoluntatem) the revelation will be more, if in a wicked will
(malam... uoluntatem) then the revelation will be less, or perhaps not at all.
[A]s stated by St. Augustine himself (s. 150.4; cf. ep. 130.9, lib. arb. 3.22ff.) 
the striving of amor430... is regarded as aiming at happiness or perfection 
(eb6ai|xovia, beatitudo) by means of assimilation to what is being loved 
(Plato Ig. 10.904a-b; August, s. 96.1), and disregards, in the more advanced 
stages on the way to perfection, the whole realm of matter and sensual life.
But differently from the Platonic tradition St. Augustine does not believe that 
the goal is approached exclusively in a chain of cognitive acts. To him, human 
life and progress is to be conclusively evaluated in terms of caritas and 
concupiscientia or obedience and disobedience - that is to say in terms of will 
- rather than in those of knowledge and error or vision and 
blindness431... Fruitio Dei, the ultimate goal of human endeavor432... is defined 
by St. Augustine as continuous love of God and one’s neighbor for their own 
sake (as fruendum Deo et proximo in Deo, civ. 19.70, doctr. chr. 1.4, en. Ps. 
915, etc.), that is to say without trying to get hold or dispose of them in order 
to proceed towards a further goal. The perverted will (mala uoluntas) in the 
empirical state of mankind, however, constantly exchanges the adequate 
objects of uti (diligere propter aliud, love for the sake of some other thing) 
and frui (diligere propter se ipsum, love for the sake of the thing itself433).
(Dihle: 1987,126 n.18)
0650 The human is here involved in an active choice and it is upon this basis which 
the directing power of truth will be granted in greater or lesser degree. Humans have 
different abilities and the path to knowledge is therefore presented as a gradual 
process, quicker for some than others (tantum... quantum). However, it would appear
429 Cf. vera rel. 3; ord. 2.25; sol. 1.2.
430 As compared with the Platonic epco<; of, primarily, the Symposium.
431 C f Holte: 1962.
432 Cf. Haussleiter: 1972, 551fF.
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that even for one with a relatively bad will there is the possibility of ascent, for if one 
is granted as much understanding as one is capable of receiving then one can still 
potentially arrive at the level of understanding attainable by humans434. Knowledge 
therefore depends upon divine grace but also upon how far one is able to receive such 
knowledge, and this ability depends upon one’s intention in seeking after knowledge 
in the first place.
0651 Error is not caused by any defect in the truth which is consulted by an 
enquirer. As it is not the fault of the light when one’s eyes make a mistake when 
perceiving something. Augustine draws the parallel between perception of the 
external world through perception by means of the eyes and perception of intelligible 
items, or understanding through reason, by means of the eye of the mind. In both 
cases there is an illumination through which the eyes can see, or the mind can 
understand, depending on the ability of the eyes, or mind, to do so.
0652 The metaphor of light and illumination is central to Augustine’s treatment of 
the acquisition of knowledge435. As light in the material world shows {ostendit) the 
items available to perception, so too does truth, or Christ, show intelligible items, and 
the connectedness between them. In this sense the illumination is not unlike the 
Birdcatcher example (DM 32) for the equipment for birdcatching, and 
interrelationship between them so as to enable the actual act of catching a bird, are 
shown to the observer and her understanding of birdcatching very much depends upon 
her own intelligence, or her ability to ‘see’ the items and their connectedness.
433 Cf. Thraede: 1977, 130.
434 How far humans can achieve true knowledge, if at all, will be considered in due course (§ 9.3.1, §
9.3.2, and § 11).
435 This depends upon the Neoplatonic treatment of illumination arising from Plato’s use o f the sun 
image in the Republic (507d f f ) and from illumination in his 7th letter (ep. 7.341c).
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0653 An item of knowledge is present, in its totality, and available for
comprehension and the level of understanding very much depends upon one’s
individual ability to look and see.
Aug. ...et si quando fallitur, non f i t  uitio consultae ueritatis, ut neque huius, 
quae foris est, lucis uitium est, quod corporei oculi saepe falluntur, quam 
lucem de rebus uisibilibus consult fatemur, ut eas nobis, quantum cernere 
ualemus, ostendat.
(38)
9.3. Immediacy.
0654 Knowledge of the material world is accessed through employing the elements
of this world (elementa huius mundi), that is, the corporeal bodies which one
perceives (eademque corpora quae sentimus) and the senses themselves (sensusque
ipsos) though which one perceives them. The mind uses {mens utitur) these elements
of the material world as interpreters so as to know such things {quibus tamquam
interpretibus ad talia noscenda). Knowledge of intelligibles is accessed through a
rational interaction with the inner truth.
Aug. ...quod si et de coloribus lucem et de ceteris, quae per corpus sentimus, 
elementa huius mundi eademque corpora quae sentimus sensusque ipsos, 
quibus tamquam interpretibus ad talia noscenda mens utitur, de his autem, 
quae intelleguntur, interiorem ueritatem ratione consulimus...
(39)
In both cases there is the correlation of like with like436, for knowledge of what is 
perceived through the body is accessed by consulting the very elements of this world 
(i.e. the things perceived and the senses which perceive them) and knowledge of the 
intelligible world is accessed through consultation with intelligible truth437. In the case
436 For a discussion o f the place o f the doctrine o f like-knows-like with particular reference to Plato’s 
epistemology cf. Anscombe: 1993, 90-98.
The idea o f ascent to, and union with, the divine through the intellect has a long history in 
Platonism, based upon the view that humans are similar to the divine by reason o f the intellect. This 
idea was developed in a Christian context by Origen, cf. princ. 4.4.9.
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of sensible items the mind uses the elements of the world as a means of interpreting 
what is to be known438.
0655 Knowledge, therefore, depends upon direct contact with the object of
knowledge. Augustine’s epistemology depends upon immediacy, such that for any x
to be known, one must directly perceive jc perceptually or intellectually439. Words then
teach nothing but their own sounds, for the items they refer to are known either
through direct perceptual contact or through direct intellectual contact.
Aug. ...quid d id  potest, unde clareat uerbis nos aliquid discere praeter ipsum, 
qui aures per cut it sonum?
(39)
All perception is either through the senses (sensu corporis) or through the mind
(mente), the former are sensible (sensib ilia), or carnal (carnalid), items, while the
latter are intelligible (intelligibilia), or spiritual (spiritalia), items.
Aug. ...namque omnia, quaepercipimus, aut sensu corporis aut mente 
percipimus. ilia sensibilia, haec intellegibilia siue, ut more nostrorum 
auctorum loquar, ilia carnalia, haec spiritalia nominamus.
(39)
9.3.1. Sensibilia.
0656 Sensible items must be immediate and available for verification when they are 
the objects under discussion. When one is questioned about a sensible item which is 
present (praesto) one is able to answer, so that when asked about, for example, the 
new moon, while looking at it (intuentibus), one is able to respond because the moon 
is present to one for verification.
438 The role o f interpretation in the act o f acquiring knowledge o f the material world will be expanded 
on below (§ 9.3.2 and § 10). Also, v. sup. § 6, § 7, and § 8. One only has knowledge proper of 
intelligible items because there is no need for interpretation and the mind can directly grasp the things 
in themselves.
439 Cf. the ‘epistemic categories’ introduced above (0621).
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Aug. ...de illis [sensibilibus] cum interrogamur, respondemus, sipraesto sunt 
ea, quae sentimus, uelut cum a nobis quaeritur intuentibus lunam nouam, 
qualis aut ubi sit.
(39)
The introduction of the example of the moon is significant here for the moon is that 
which is the celestial body which is metaphorically opposite to the sun. The idea of 
illumination gives rise to the opposites of sun440, for the intelligible reality, and moon, 
for sensible reality.
0657 The moon, as having a sphere of influence opposite to that of the sun, is used 
to present situations where belief, opinion, or doubt are implied, while the sun and 
light refers to the opposite cases where knowledge, understanding, and truth are under 
consideration.
R. ergo uel ita deum nosse tibi satis est, ut nosti, quo eras signo luna cursura 
sit?
A. non est satis, nam hoc sensibus adprobo. ignoro autem, utrum uel deus uel 
aliqua naturae occulta causa subito lunae ordinem cursumque conmutet. quod 
si accident, totum illud, quodpraesumpseram, falsum erit.
R. et credis hoc fieri posse?
A. non credo, sed ego, quid sciam, quaero, non quid credam. omne autem, 
quod scimus, recte fortasse etiam credere dicimur, at non omne, quod 
credimus, etiam scire.
R. respuis igitur in hac causa omne testimonium sensuum?
A. prorsus respuo.
(sol. 1.8)
The use of the moon image in the DM passage under discussion (DM 39) brings with 
it the implication of the fallibility of the senses and the idea of the lack of certainty in 
the sensible realm. Therefore, although Augustine is concerned with the need for 
immediacy so that one may have verified access to what is under discussion, there is 
with this image (of the moon) the contrast between awareness of what is true (that is, 
what belongs to the intelligible realm and which is accessed through illumination, 
discussed in DM 40) and what is not (that is, what belongs to the sensible world).
440 Cf. Plato, R  507d ff.
312
0658 When, in contrast to the situation where one speaks of what is before one’s
eyes, one is asked about something which is not present and immediate to the person
raising the questions, the questioner then simply believes one’s testimony. This
individual does not directly perceive the item under discussion for himself {non uidet)
and so does not learn anything unless he actually sees what is under discussion. What
is learned depends upon the item observed and the faculty of sight rather than upon
the words. Words in themselves have no impact for they sound the same to one who
sees the item as they do to one who does not. The crucial element in the process is the
actual act of seeing the item.
Aug. ... hie ille, qui interrogat, si non uidet, credit uerbis et saepe non credit, 
discit autem nullo modo, nisi et ipse quod dicitur uideat, ubi iam non uerbis, 
sed rebus ipsis et sensibus discit. nam uerba eadem sonant uidenti, quae non 
uidenti etiam sonuerunt.
(39)
0659 In the situation where it is what is not presently perceived {non... quae coram
sentimus) but what was perceived in the past {quae aliquando sensimus) that is under
discussion, what is actually spoken of {loquimur) is not the actual item {non iam res
ipsas) but rather the image of it which is impressed in the memory {imagines ab eis
[rebus] impressas memoriaeque mandatas). These images are not the things
themselves and so are, in this sense, false (falsa) and one can only accurately speak of
the items under discussion {uera dicamus) by speaking not of what is seen and
perceived {non nos ea uidere ac sentire... narramus) but rather of what has been seen
and perceived (uidisse ac sensisse narramus)u l .
Aug. ...cum vero non de his, quae coram sentimus, sed de his, quae aliquando 
sensimus, quaeritur, non iam res ipsas, sed imagines ab eis impressas 
memoriaeque mandatas loquimur, quae omnino quomodo uera dicamus, cum 
falsa intueamur, ignoro, nisi quia non nos ea uidere ac sentire, sed uidisse ac 
sensisse narramus.
(39)
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0660 These images are stored in the memory (imagines in memoriae
penetralibus... gestamus) and serve as proofs442 of a sort (<quaedam documenta) of
things previously perceived {rerum ante sensarum). They serve as a private validation
(animo contemplantes) of the accuracy {bona conscientia non mentimur) of what one
speaks about {cum loquimur).
Aug. ...ita illas imagines in memoriae penetralibus rerum ante sensarum 
quaedam documenta gestamus, quae animo contemplantes bona conscientia 
non mentimur, cum loquimur.
(39)
0661 These proofs are such for the individual who possesses the images {sed nobis 
sunt ista documenta). If the listener had perceived the item, or items, in the past and 
which are now spoken he, therefore, learns nothing through another’s words but 
simply re-accesses {recognoscit) the images which he has stored {ablatis... 
imaginibus) within his own memory. Words in this sense simply serve as reminders in 
that they prompt the re-accessing of latent information stored within one’s memory. 
Words as items causing recollection, therefore, are not, in this sense, in any way 
similar to the aruo-eia uJtopvriaTiKCc (v. sup. § 2.3) but are rather understood as 
functioning along the lines of Platonic ava|ivnai<; (v. sup. § 2.3.1) in that they 
remind one of something already seen and which is available to one’s consciousness 
through accessing information which is latent. If anything in this process could be 
described as aTjpsia bftopvricruKCx it would be the imago which serves as a proof of 
the item previously perceived. This proof lies in the relation of the concept, or image, 
to the item previously perceived and not in the relation of word to concept or in word 
to item. The word serves as a prompt to recall an item stored in the memory and is not 
evidence about the object referred to, or even about the mental content signified.
441 DM 39 and particularly the import o f the past tense with regards to signification is discussed above 
(0366-0373).
442 For the Augustine’s use o f ‘documentum' as ‘proof c f  conj. 5.25; 7.26; div.qu. 13; 20; etc.
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0662 If the listener has not previously perceived the item under discussion, he can
only be said to believe the words not to learn anything from them.
Aug. ...sed nobis sunt ista documenta; is enim qui audit, si ea sens it atque 
adfuit, non discit me is uerbis, sed recognoscit ablatis secum et ipse 
imaginibus; si autem ilia non sens it, quis non eum credere potius uerbis quam 
discere intellegat?
(39)
0663 The above passage (DM 39) raises serious problems for Augustine’s view of 
sensible memory and its role in his epistemology. Memory is crucial in Augustine's 
epistemology, within its bounds lie everything which the human mind can think of or 
about. Memory can be divided into that of what is sensible and that of what is 
intelligible. Sensible memory is concerned with all sensible objects and experiences 
so that to encounter anything with spatial or temporal extension requires just such a 
faculty. One cannot perceive or understand even the shortest word, or indeed syllable, 
without sensible memory, for the beginning of the sound is temporally distinct, no 
matter how brief the time span, from the end and so for one to grasp the word, or 
sound, one must remember the beginning of the sound on hearing the end (cf. mus. 
6.21). In an epistemology placing such importance in memory one would, therefore, 
expect memory to be regarded on the whole as reliable.
0664 It is, therefore, rather surprising that Augustine appears to question the 
reliability of sensible memory, that is, memory of past perceived objects, in DM 39. 
When making a claim, based on memory, about something which is now either absent 
or non-existent one relies upon memory images; which is to say, one makes a claim 
about a present image, not about the actual past object and in so doing there would 
appear to be a break with both the object and therefore with the past. This in turn 
raises questions over the reliability of such claims, for the object is no longer available 
as a means of verification.
315
0665 Three main issues of importance in DM 39 will briefly be considered: firstly, a 
consideration of the problem arising from the distinction between memory-image and 
past object; secondly, a consideration of the wider implications of this for Augustine’s 
epistemology; and finally, an analysis of Augustine’s view on the reliability of such 
memory claims.
0666 Due to the difficult nature of the passage, a brief translation of the central
section will now be given, with a view to bringing out and clarifying the major issues
involved, to this end the translation has been kept as literal as possible.
When we are asked about [sensible things], we reply, if the things which we 
perceive through the senses are present, just as when we are looking at a new 
moon it is asked of us of what sort or where it is... But when there is enquiry 
not about those things which we perceive in person, but about those which we 
formerly perceived, we now talk not of the things themselves but of the 
images impressed by them and committed to the memory. How we can at all 
talk of these as being true when we can see that they are false, I shall ignore; 
unless it is because we say that we do not see and perceive them, but that we 
have seen them and have perceived them. Thus we bear these images in the 
recesses of our memory as some sort of proof of things previously perceived, 
which we contemplate in the mind and can speak of with clear conscience that 
we do not lie. But these are proofs for us...
(39)
0667 Augustine conceives of sight, or perception, in a literal and metaphorical
sense. One is sensory and the other is mental.
uisiones enim duae sunt, una, sentientis; altera, cogitantis.
(trin. 11.16)
What is spoken of is that to which the will directs one’s attention. In any physical act
of seeing a present object the will directs one’s sight towards a physical object.
ea quae oculis aut ullo alio corporis sensu requiruntur, ipsa mens quaeritur - 
ipsa enim etiam sensum carnis intendit, tunc autem invenit, cum in ea quae 
requiruntur idem sensus venit.
(trin. 10.10)
However, in a memory act involving past perceived objects one directs one’s inner 
sight towards one’s mental image of the past perceived object.
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tamen eandem eius (sc. corporis) imaginem non corpus in spiritu, sed ipse 
spiritus in se ipso facit celeritate mirabili.
(Gn. litt.. 12.33)
In Augustine’s thought the object of one’s speech and that of one’s articulate thought 
are essentially the same thing.
omnia...quae per sensus sui corporis...percepta scit animus humanus, thesauro 
memoriae condita tenet, ex quibus gignitur uerbum uerum, quando quod 
scimus loquimur, sed uerbum ante omnem sonum, ante omnem cogitationem 
soni. tunc enim est uerbum simillimum rei notae443, de qua gignitur et imago 
eius, quoniam de uisione scientiae uisio cogitationis exoritur.
{trin. 15.22)
The inner-word {uerbum ante omnem sonum) is essential in actualising latent memory
images to the conscious mind.
nec tamen quia dicimus locutiones cordis esse cogitationes, ideo non sunt 
etiam visiones exortae de notitiae uisionibus, quando verae sunt, foris enim 
cum per corpus haec fiunt, aliud est locutio, aliud visio; intus autem cum 
cogitamus utrumque unum est.
{trin. 15.18)
The inner-word being the means for accessing and actualising one's 'visio scientiae’ 
or i visio notitiae’. If one speaks of whatever one sees, then in talk of past perceived 
objects one sees memory images. Therefore, when asked about previously perceived 
objects one speaks about images, “imagines...loquimur” (DM 39).
0668 Therefore, it would appear that if the speech is not about the actual things 
{vera), then it is in fact about things which are false {falsa), and that these inner 
images are only evidential {documenta) for those who possess them. The things which 
speech is about are falsa  in every case where one is talking about the past, just 
because they are not the actual things. This raises two main questions: firstly, how far
443 The inner-word is described as “simillimum rei notae’’. the ‘thing known’ being the latent 
knowledge within the memory. However, Augustine also equates the inner-word and this knowledge:
“verbum quod eiusmodi sit omnino, cuiusmodi est ilia scientia de qua nascitur”  (trin. 15.19). The inner 
word and the latent knowledge in the memory would appear to be equated when the word is used so as 
to actualise the knowledge which may then be utilised verbally (v. inf. 0671).
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are another’s words reliable; and secondly, how reliable are one’s own memory 
images and can they be verified?
0669 Through direct experience of objects a kind of likeness or immaterial trace is 
left in the memory, which Augustine likens to a great store-house (conf. 10.12-15) or 
to a stomach.
quasi glutiens in uentrem ita in memoria reposuerit, poterit recordando 
quodam modo ruminare...
{trin. 12.23)
nimirum ergo memoria quasi uenter est animi...
{conf. 10.21)
These likenesses are recalled by the will directing the mind’s attention.
et quemadmodum cum per sensum corporis dicimus corpora, f i t  eorum aliqua 
similitudo in animo nostro, quae phantasia memoriae est: non enim omnino 
ipsa corpora in animo sunt, cum ea cogitamus; sed eorum similitudines.
{trin. 9.16)
0670 In any act of perception one perceives ‘forms’ (cf. ‘species’, trin. 11.6; 
form ae\ civ. 11.27) of the objects which one is perceiving, and these forms bring 
about forms in the sense, which in turn bring about forms in the memory, and finally 
there arise forms in the mind {trin. 11.2-6). The perceiver is not merely passively 
affected by these forms, which are emitted by objects, but rather the will focuses the 
attention on the object and actively brings about the occurrence of forms in one’s 
mind: “ ... [in] the act of vision... the faculty of seeing is joined with the object of 
visual perception by the will of the perceiving individual” (Dihle: 1982, 125). As 
with acts of perception so too is there a similar process involved in memory acts; as in 
perception where the sensible object produces a form within the senses, so inwardly is 
an articulate image produced by the latent memory image. In vision there is the visible 
form through which the sense is enformed.
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species uisibilis qua sensus corporis formabatur, et eius similitudo quae flebat 
in sensu formato...
{trin. 11.6).
In memory acts the likeness, or form, is stored by the commemorative mind.
cum constet ex corporis similitudine quam memoria tenet, et ex ea quae inde 
formatur in acie recordantis animi; tamen sic una et singularis apparet...
{trin. 11.6)
The will focuses the attention towards these latent memory images, actualising them 
as articulate memory-images. These memory-images are, insofar as memory of past 
perceived objects is concerned, a representation of the object once seen and one, as it 
were, looks at this image when recalling its object.
0671 Both articulate image and speech arise from information contained in the 
memory; for past perceived objects this information is latent images of which ‘copies’ 
are actualised. The inner-word, which is not itself in any specific language444, 
actualises a formed thought from what is known which can be utilised verbally and 
thus used as a word in any particular language, and so any verbal word signifies both 
physical object and one’s image of it. It is here that a major problem lies. For it would 
appear that Augustine does not find any difficulty in images qua images. In DM 39 he 
raises no objection against images per se but rather objects that one speaks about one 
thing as though it were another (that is to say, call what is falsa , uera). This sits 
comfortably with the argument concerning language and reality in the dialogue. The 
force of uera!falsa in the passage is that an error of signification has been made (as in 
the sophism of the lion, DM 23, where the error of confusing the word’s meaning and 
its object, allows one to assert that in saying ‘lion’ one produces the actual creature 
from one’s mouth); and that when one says, for example, ‘Carthage’ (as a past 
perceived object) then to regard the signification as the actual city is to mistake what
444 v. inf. 0686.
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is uera with what is falsa. Augustine is, to this extent, concerned with the relationship
between word, image, and a now absent object or state of affairs. In sense perception
there is a reliability, or sorts, in the knowledge acquired, for one has the actual and
present object before one, but in the recollection of past perceived objects one is
talking necessarily about what is in the past (“uidisse...sentisse... ”, DM 39) and the
object is no longer present, or perhaps no longer existent. The images are not {fa lsa \
DM 39; cf. ep. 7.3) the objects and the relationship between the two is problematic.
0672 The memory-image has an essential function in mediating between any act of
recollection and the physical object itself and so it would seem that, for Augustine,
when a claim is made concerning a past perceived object that the claim is not about
the object at all, but rather about its image in one’s memory. In effect Augustine
seems to be saying that “ ... whenever...asked about familiar, but absent, sensible
things we respond by changing the subject”445. How one can properly be said to
succeed in answering another person’s question comes to the conclusion that to talk at
all, on hearing another's words, one must turn one’s mind to that which is signified.
audit is uerbis ad ea feratur animus, quorum ista sunt signa...
(22)
That is to say, one turns one’s attention to that which is signified.
signo dato id, quodsignificatur, adtendere...
(23)
Therefore, for there to be meaningful discourse, the things signified must be available 
to those who speak. When this is taken with the additional premise that “ ...that which 
a man’s words signify is what he speaks o f ’446, one does indeed return to the position 
that memory-claims are not what they appear to be about (that is, their physical 
object) but rather about their images. So there would appear to be evidence, internal to
443 Matthews, inMarkus: 1972, 168.
446 Matthews in Markus: 1972, 171.
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the DM and regarding Augustine's general view of sensation, memory, and language 
to support this interpretation.
0673 Although there is no direct discussion, in Augustine, of the objects of memory 
claims, there are a number of passages which do support the above interpretation of 
DM 39 when considered in conjunction with it.
0674 Much of the relevant textual evidence supports the view that when a sensible
object is present it is the object of sight which is the subject, while when it is absent
there is a shift in subject matter to image.
proque ilia uisione quae foris erat cum sensus ex corpore sensibili formaretur, 
succedit intus similis uisio, cum ex eo quod memoria tenet, formatur acies 
animi, et absentia corpora cogitantur: uoluntasque ipsa quomodo foris  
corpori obiecto formandum sensum admouebat, formatumque iungebat, sic 
aciem recordantis animi conuertit ad memoriam, ut ex eo quod ilia retinuit, 
ista formetur, et sit in cogitatione similis uisio.
{trin. 11.6)
The object of thought and that to which the will directs the attention is the image.
Indeed, in an earlier passage in the de trinitate the suggestion would appear to be that
when an object is absent one must think about the image of it.
quae uestigia tanquam imprimuntur memoriae, quando haec quae foris sunt 
corporalia sentiuntur, ut etiam cum absunt ista, praesto sint tamen imagines 
eorum cogitantibus.
{trin. 10.11)
When one considers that the object of thought about past perceived objects and that of 
speech are in effect the same thing, there would appear to be a similar rationale at 
work in both the above passage and in DM 39. That is to say, when an object 
previously perceived is absent there is no suggestion in either passage that one 
thinks/speaks about the object via the intermediary of the memory-image but rather 
that one simply thinks/speaks about the image. In both passages there is a firm 
awareness of the relevant sense of what is absent and what is not.
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... respondemus, sipraesto sunt ea, quae sentimus...sed...quae aliquando 
sensimus...non iam res...sed imagines...loquimur.
(39)
haec...corporalia...etiam cum absunt ista, praesto sunt tamen imagines eorum 
cogitantibus
{trin. 10.11)
Much importance is focused on what ‘object’ is present.
dicimus locutiones cordis esse cogitationes... [quae] sunt etiam uisiones 
exortae de notitiae uisionibus, quando uerae sunt, foris enim cum per corpus 
haec fiunt, aliud est locutio, aliud uisio: intus autem cum cogitamus, utrumque 
unum est.
{trin. 15.18)
0675 It appears then that Augustine is making the perfectly valid claim that 
recollection does not entail a direct connection with the actual past perceived object 
which one is recalling. However, in doing so he also asserts that any speech of past 
perceived objects is wholly referential to these memory-images. Memory-images 
which are evidential only for their possessor. This raises the question how, if the 
actual object is no longer accessible and if, in such contexts, thought is about the 
image, which is apparently severed from its object and thus from its connection with 
the past, there can then be verification in any reliable sense. Matthews’ (in 
Markus:1972, 173-174) interpretation comes to the conclusion that in attempting to 
say how we can answer questions about past perceived objects Augustine comes to 
the conclusion that we actually cannot. The problem is that, apparently, Augustine's 
approach is too restrictive, for the question as to how we can “ ... answer questions 
about sensible things from memory can be taken in at least two rather different 
ways...(l) What mental mechanism makes it possible for us to speak of things from 
memory?..(2) How does one make a response count as answering a question about 
absent sensible things?” (Matthews, inMarkus: 1972, 173). Augustine, according to 
Matthews, focuses on (1) and not on (2); for he would seem to hold that Augustine
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provides an explanation of the mechanism, that is, by considering memory-images, 
but gives no proper regard to the possibility of reliable verification . other than the 
‘proof of his own memory-images” (Matthews, in Markus: 1972, 174). That is to say, 
Augustine shows how one can give an answer to a question about past perceived 
objects but not why it is a reliable, or valid, answer.
0676 If one is to give a valid answer it is not sufficient that one gives an accurate or 
truthful account of one’s own memory-image but that one is able to confirm this 
image as an accurate reflection of the past perceived object, and in so doing establish 
the answer as being about the actual object and not simply about one’s personal 
memory-image.
0677 In Augustine’s epistemology, memory performs a central function and in so 
far as knowledge depends upon memory, one cannot perform even the simplest 
cognitive act without the intermediary of memory. It is, therefore, evident that, for 
Augustine, memory must then play a crucial role in all knowledge claims, not simply 
claims concerning past perceived objects. This in turn suggests that “ ... in a sense 
every knowledge claim does involve changing the subject, since every knowledge 
claim involves memory” (Bubacz: 1975, 192).
0678 Perhaps those claims which are most relevant to DM 39, and to the 
distinctions made there, are those concerning claims about present sensible objects. 
For Augustine clearly sees a distinction between these and claims concerning past 
perceived objects and an understanding of this distinction may better provide an 
insight into how Augustine perceives the issue of memory claims.
0679 For Augustine, in any act of perception one does not, strictly speaking, see the 
thing itself but rather one experiences a series of images (or forms): that is, the image 
given off by the actual object, the image produced in the sight, the image produced in
the memory, and finally that produced in the mind (cf. mus. 6.2-3; 6.6; 6.15; 6.22; 
trin. 11.3). One’s perception is of the images of bodies and so these are what one 
actually speaks about. Also, in that all knowledge claims are inner and depend upon 
the will directing the attention, or ‘mind’s eye’ (‘mentis acies\ trin. 2.1; 2.18; 4.20;
4animi acies\ trin. 11.7; 11.8; 11.11; and passim), towards latent images, they are 
essentially imaginal (with the exception of intelligible things such as mathematical 
principles or number which are present to the mind in themselves447) and thus involve 
a change of subject.
0680 There appears to be no reason to suppose that Augustine was not aware of this 
consequence. He in fact makes clear the essentially inner nature of knowledge claims 
and their imaginal nature. As has been suggested, it seems that his concern was not 
images per se but rather that, whether they are both imaginal or not, present claims 
and memory claims are different and this difference relates precisely to the difficulty 
raised by Matthews - that of verifiability448.
0681 For Augustine, there are two kinds of sight, that of physical, external objects
and involving the eyes, and that of immaterial, inner images and involving the
‘mind’s eye’ (animi acies). The only real difference between physical sight and that
evident in memory acts, and imagining, is that in physical sight there is an actual
physical process which accompanies the inner sight. That is to say, one’s sense organs
are actually affected, while in memory acts they are not.
cum sensus non procedat ex cor pore illo quod uidetur, sed ex cor pore 
sentientis animantis, cui anima suo quodam miro modo contemperatur: tamen 
ex corpore quod uidetur gignitur uisio, id est, sensus ipse formatur; ut iam 
non tantum sensus qui etiam in tenebris esse integer potest, dum est
447 Cf. for example: “ilia omnia, quae de doctrinis liberalibuspercepta...nec eorum imagines, sed res 
ipsas gero” (conf. 10.16); “cum uero de iis agitur quae mente conspicimus, id est intellectu atque 
ratione, ea quidem loquimus quae praesentia contuemur in ilia interiore luce ueritatis” (DM 40). 
Intelligible items will be discussed below (§ 9.3.2).
448 This is not to suggest that Augustine was unaware of the difficulty o f verifying present perceptions 
(v. inf. 0683).
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incolumitas oculorum, sed etiam sensus informatus sit, quae uisio uocatur. 
gignitur ergo ex re uisibili uisio, sed non ex sola, nisi adsit et uidens.
{trin. 11.3)
This affection requires an actual physical object to be present and it would appear that
insofar as there is a reaction in the mind during the process of perception that there
must be an object causing it.
quandoquidem cum imprimitur rei cuiusque imago in memoria, prius necesse 
est, ut adsit res ipsa, unde ilia imago possit imprimi.
{conf. 10.25)
Although inner sight occurs together with this physical sight it often occurs without
any physical affect: in memory acts for example. It is in this that there is the major
difficulty for Augustine with regards to memory acts involving past perceived objects,
for in physical sight there is an actual object there and thus something which is
verifiable for oneself or for others. The objection which may be raised that physical
sight also depends upon images and, therefore, is liable to the same problem would
not appear to be valid. This being due to the fact that the mind is absolutely active in
the process and, in that one sees, the mind must be aware.
nam sensum puto esse, non latere animam quodpatitur corpus.
{an. quant. 41)
Augustine does demonstrate an awareness that there can be difficulties at times in 
being certain that one is actually seeing something and not, for example, dreaming449. 
However, he does hold that normally it is clearly evident that one is being affected 
physically, for the will actively applies the attention and, as noted above, the mind is 
aware of the bodily affect upon it. This affect being absent in memory acts, being, as 
they are, internal.
449 “cum enim uel in somnis uel in extasi corporum exprimuntur imagines, non discernuntur omnino a 
corporis, nisi cum homo redditus sensibus corporis recognoscit se in illis fuisse imaginibus, quae non 
per sensus corporis hauriebat. quis enim, cum a somno euigilaverit, non continuo sentiat imaginaria 
fuisse, quae uidebat, quamuis, cum ea uideret dormiens, a  uigilantium corporalibus uisis discemere 
non ualebat?’'' {Gn. litt. 12.3).
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neque enim aut corpus illud sensibile ibi est, quod omnino discretum est ab 
animantis natura, aut sensus corporis ibi formatur ut fia t uisio, aut ipsa 
uoluntas id agit ut formandum sensum sensibili corpori admoueat, in eoque 
formatum detineat: sed pro ilia specie corporis quae sentiebatur extrinsecus, 
succedit memoria retinens illam speciem quam per corporis sensum comb ib it 
anima; proque ilia uisione quae for is erat cum sensus ex corpore sensibili 
formaretur, succedit intus similis uisio, cum ex eo quod memoria tenet, 
formatur acies animi, et absentia corpora cogitantur.
(trin. 11.6)
0682 Augustine would then appear to hold that one can generally distinguish when 
one physically sees or when one internally sees in that the mind is in some way, 
although how is not clearly explained, aware of the body’s being physically affected. 
Similar to this, although not involving images as such, is Augustine’s discussion of 
memory of emotions in Confessiones (10)450, where one is observed to recall an 
emotion, or experience of an emotion, but does not physically re-experience it. This 
can perhaps be most clearly elucidated by reference to pain in that when one is 
actually hurt one is acutely aware of it but one can recall pain without any physical 
affect. It would seem that, when one sees something one is, to a much less 
pronounced extent, physically aware451 and when recalling the object one is once 
again unaffected physically.
0683 When one is perceiving an object one is aware of actually perceiving it and, 
therefore, that it is there; and to this extent it is available for verification. There is an 
object which is physically present to oneself, and to others. While it is precisely the 
fact that memory claims depend upon images which no longer have an available 
object which would appear to concern Augustine. Physical sight does have an outer 
dimension in that there is an object separate from the percipient, but in memory of 
past perceived objects there is nothing separate and external, only the image.
450 Although the status of remembered emotions and sensations is, by Augustine’s own account, 
problematic, with regard to how the emotions (passiones) enter, and are available to, the mind it is 
asked: “sed utrum per imagines an non, quisfacile dixerit?” ( conf. 10.23).
451 Cf. the discussion o f sensation as a passio in de quantitate animae (4 Iff).
0684 In DM 39 Augustine wants to draw a distinction between speech of present 
objects and that of past perceived objects. The distinction between the two types of 
claim is essentially one of verifiability. This does not dispel the problem of imaging 
as such, but there is, nevertheless, clearly a distinction to be made between the two 
types of image, and in terms of verifiability the past image would appear to be the 
more problematic. Augustine felt that the presence of the object in present claims 
answered, or at least went some way to answering, the apparent difficulty caused by 
present claims also depending on images.
0685 Augustine is aware of the complexities inherent in the validity of reference to 
past perceived objects, but he is also aware that there exists a related problem 
concerning present objects, in that claims about them also involve inner sight432. 
Nevertheless, a distinction between the two is possible and is significant with respect 
to the concerns of the DM. There would appear to be an acute awareness of the 
problematic nature of remembered objects, experiences, and emotions, as concerns 
their nature, the possibility of speaking about them, and of their verification. Yet, 
there is also, the understanding that there is a close parallel between seeing, 
imagining, and remembering, which all essentially involve inner sight and are, 
therefore, equivalent to some degree in terms of their being spoken of and verified. 
This said, although the texts demonstrate an awareness on Augustine’s part of these 
issues, for those who see images and their remove from reality as an inherent 
weakness in Augustine’s representational theory of perception and memory it must, 
however, be said that this difficulty does not appear to be adequately countered and 
that there remains this difficulty for Augustine’s epistemology.
452 “magis nos arbitror ratione comprehendere esse interiorem quemdam sensum, ad quem ab istis 
quinque notissimis cuncta referantur. namque aliud est quo uidet bestia, aliud quo ea quae uidendo 
sentit, uel uitat uel appetit; ille enim sensus in oculis est, ille autem intus in ipsa anima” (lib. arb. 2.8).
0686 The presence of the objects (of sight or of memory) depends precisely upon 
their being presently existing things. A presently perceived object is a presently 
existing image of a present object of consciousness (conscious being that one is 
conscious of being physically aware); while a memory image is then a present image 
of a past perceived object. The consequence of this is that, unless there is valid 
verification, one no longer has any reliable sort of access to the past. Whereas with 
present images one at least has access to present and verifiable objects, with memory 
images of past perceived objects there is no such access and so, if Augustine presents 
these images as unverifiable, there is a serious difficulty. For if there is no means of 
verifying memory-images, and if memory is fallible (as it clearly is and as Augustine 
acknowledges453) one cannot reliably know anything of the past.
0687 Claims about present perceived objects can be verified in that one can, with 
some certainty, know that one is physically seeing an object and, since it is actually 
present before one, therefore, can be tested for reliability. It remains to give 
consideration to his account of past perceived objects and to investigate whether 
Augustine felt there to be a valid method of verifying these.
0688 To this end, it will firstly be necessary to briefly refer to Augustine’s concept
of the inner-word and its relationship to the memory-image.
ipsa enim phantasia eius [Carthaginis] in memoria mea uerbum eius, non 
sonus iste trisyllabus cum Carthago nominatur, uel etiam tacite nomen ipsum 
per spatia temporum cogitatur; sed illud quod in animo meo cerno, cum hoc 
trisyllabum uoce profero, uel antequam proferam.
{trin. 8.9)
The knowledge which lies latent in the human mind can be actualised via the inner- 
word as visible and articulate memory-image and as articulate word. These memory- 
images are an accessible form of articulate thought and are also, therefore, word-
453 “quid? cum ipsa memoria perdit aliquid, sicut fit, cum obliuiscimur et quaerimus, ut recordemur.” 
{conf. 10.28).
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potentials454, which can be employed as the verbal word. As Bubacz states (1975,
191), this amounts to an analysis of meaning in that the inner-word, as actualisation of
memory-image, is in effect the meaning of the outer word.
quisquis igitur potest intelligere uerbum, non solum antequam sonet, uerum 
etiam antequam sonorum eius imagines cogitatione uoluantur: hoc enim est 
quod ad nullam pertinet linguam...necesse est enim cum uerum loquimur, id 
est, quod scimus loquimur, ex ipsa scientia quam memoria tenemus, nascatur 
uerbum quod eiusmodi sit omnino, cuiusmodi est ilia scientia de qua nascitur. 
formata quippe cogitatio ab ea re quam scimus, uerbum est quod in corde 
dicimus: quod nec graecum est, nec latinum, nec linguae alicuius alterius; 
sed cum id opus est in eorum quibus loquimur perferre notitiam, aliquod 
signum quo significetur assumitur.
{trin. 15.19)
In this process memory plays a central role in that it is an intermediary, in perception
as well as in language. It is, therefore, of little surprise that the process of memory
recall is described in linguistic terms, that is to say, with reference to an inner-word
which has an “ ...essential function...in all acts of remembering” (O’Daly: 1987, 141).
The inner-word is not merely a means of accessing latent images so as to render them
available for expression in language but is essential for rendering any memory-image
articulate. Therefore, through a consideration of the analysis of linguistic processes as
expressed in the de dialectica can one more clearly understand the application of the
‘linguistic metaphor’ (O’Daly: 1987, 141) used by Augustine in his treatment of
memory and memory recall. Of particular importance to this issue is the passage on
signification (in the DD) where it is stated that:
quidquid autem ex verbo non aures sed animus sentit et ipso animo tenetur 
inclusum, dicibile uocatur. cum uero uerbum procedit non propter se sed 
propter aliud aliquid significandum, dictio uocatur. res autem ipsa, quae iam 
uerbum non est neque uerbi in mente conceptio, siue habeat uerbum quo 
significari possit, siue non habeat, nihil aliud quam res uocatur proprio iam
454 Cf. the articulated memory-image with the Stoic XoyiKod qxxvTOcaica in that both are rational 
impressions (the Stoic concept being corporeal, while for Augustine this is not so) which can be 
presented linguistically by means o f the dicibile and Xektov respectively.
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nomine...quod dixi dicibile, uerbum est, nec tamen uerbum, sed quod in uerbo 
intellegitur et animo continetur, significat.
{dial. 5.50-62)
The dicibile is a non-verbal word; a 4uerbi in mente conceptio’ which is available to
be employed as a verbal expression. That is,
cum animo [uerba] sensa sunt, ante uocem dieibilia erunt; cum autem propter 
id quod dixi proruperunt in uocem, dictiones factae sunt.
{dial. 5.73-76)
This amounts to a word-potential in that it is a non-vocalised thought which is, 
nevertheless, available as a verbal expression. It need not be utilised verbally, but is 
always available as a verbal entity.
0689 The dicibile depends upon one’s knowledge which is gained from sense 
perception and makes possible the expression of this knowledge in language. One’s 
latent knowledge, insofar as it is accessible as an articulate and significant memory- 
image, can be expressed verbally in that it has a corresponding dicibile. The image, 
therefore, is both rational in its structure and has a verbal potentiality455. The 
actual/potential relation of the inner word which actualises a latent memory image (or 
form), to the dicibile which actualises the verbal word is as follows: the inner word 
actualises a latent memory image as a formed thought, and this formed thought has a 
linguistic correlate which is the dicibile which in turn actualises the verbal word. 
(D33)
imago -> verbum {intus)
dicibile verbum {foris)
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0690 In acts of perception there is an inherent rational structure to the image which 
means that it can be presented linguistically and has propositional content. Although 
there need not be an accompanying linguistic expression, the potential is inherent in 
the very nature of the image. Any such image will have one, or indeed many linguistic 
correlates; for example, ‘Carthage’ will also have the correlate ‘city’. As suggested by 
O'Daly (1987, 142), the dicibile may actually have just such a ‘generic semantic 
function’ which allows the identification of both particular things and other things of 
similar type. This ‘generic semantic function’ arises from the formal nature of 
mentally accessible items. That is to say, just as an image will have one or more 
linguistic correlates, so too for any dicibile there may be any number of possible 
images, so that even though different people may have different thoughts there will 
still be a general, objective dicibile to correlate to the image ‘city’ for example.
0691 In a comparison of memory acts with the linguistic model the comprehension 
of a word’s meaning parallels the act of perceiving an object; the storing of it as a 
dicibile parallels that of storing a memory image; and the expression of it as a dictio 
parallels that of the act of recollection. Such a comparison would appear to support a 
view where memory acts are essentially meaningful and objective. In contrast to this 
apparently remains DM 39 in that in claims made about past perceived objects one is 
the only witness of one’s image and although the claim may have a general 
significance the question remains as to how it can be validated and thus confirmed as 
objective.
0692 Unlike claims concerning present objects there is no obvious object of 
reference for claims about past perceived objects, and to understand how such claims
455 The use o f ‘potential’ should be qualified here in that the dicibile makes it possible for a verbalised 
word to have meaning, but is not itself something which can actually become a spoken word (as an 
Aristotelian reading o f  the potential/actual relation would imply).
can be seen to fit to a general schema for knowledge claims there will now finally be a 
consideration of the context within which DM 39 occurs.
0693 The DM is essentially concerned with language and what role, if any, it plays 
in the process of learning. In the course of this investigation two major issues arise: 
that of what it is that words refer to and how it is possible to transfer this information. 
The second issue arising from the first in that Augustine takes the line that there is a 
difficulty in transferral of information due to the fact that one must necessarily have 
access to the object under discussion for there to be truly meaningful discourse. This 
can perhaps best be seen with reference to the example of ‘sarabarae’ (DM 35) in that 
for one to accurately know what is being spoken of when someone says 4sarabarae’ 
one must have seen this object oneself. In his analysis of language (DD 5), Augustine 
understands any meaningful linguistic act {dictio) as involving a threefold distinction: 
firstly, the spoken word (■verbum); secondly, that which the spoken word signifies 
{dicibile)', and thirdly, the material reality to which the signification refers {res). The 
DM in effect adds to this analysis that for one to understand what is signified by the 
verbum one must possess the dicibile, and to possess the dicibile one must have had 
direct access to the res. The point being that unless one has, or has had, access to the 
objects referred to then, strictly speaking, there can be no transfer of meaning. 
Therefore, there can in fact be no transfer of knowledge at all, for either one knows 
what a word means or one does not (DM 33).
0694 It should be said that Augustine is not denying the possibility of any 
meaningful transfer of information: his theory of language and the role of the dicibile 
in allowing one to discuss general terms would argue against this. However, with 
specific regard to the possibility of learning and gaining knowledge from another’s 
words it is another question altogether. It is possible for one to discuss a city, for
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example, which one has never before seen in general terms as a city; but to discuss a 
specific city, Alexandria for example, one must either have had direct experience of it 
oneself (that is, have been there) or one must believe the words of another. This can 
be seen to provide one with information to some extent, but one’s understanding and 
grasp of the word 4 Alexandria’ remains somewhat vague and dependent upon 
another’s reliability until one directly experiences the city oneself
0695 In DM 39 the major emphasis rests upon the person who has no direct access 
to images of what is discussed and in this respect can only believe the words of one 
who does possess the images; to this extent the images being 4 nob is... document a"
(DM 39). One cannot transfer these document a, and one only knows that, for 
example, the word ‘sarabarcC is the thing, sarabara, when one sees a sarabara\ to 
this extent Augustine is following a priority of knowledge developed throughout the 
dialogue: that of object over word. Language is presented as being a meaningful 
method of transfer of known information but not, strictly, of the teaching of new 
information.
hinc est quod a prima aetate caeci, cum de luce coloribusque interrogantur, 
quid respondeant non inueniunt. non enim coloratas ullas patiuntur imagines, 
qui senserunt nullas.
(ep. 7.6)
If one has absolutely no experience of something then one can have no concept of 
what that thing is. The DM develops the point in that one cannot then learn this thing 
through words. So with possession of images one at least has a standard by which to 
judge another’s words, which is more satisfactory than trusting completely in others. 
One’s images are documenta which can be judged inwardly through one’s reason, not 
merely by belief about objects of which one has no experience.
0696 When one speaks about something which one has personal experience of one 
has one’s own means, though not infallible, of testing another’s words. Indeed, when
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it is about something not personally confirmable, such as a historical story (DM 37), 
one must depend on authority and belief. Yet simply because Augustine defends the 
position that to possess one’s own documenta as a means of verifying another’s 
speech is preferable to possessing no image and thus relying entirely upon the other’s 
words, this does not imply that one’s documenta are not themselves open to testing. In 
fact, it would seem that the general development of the passage tends to imply the 
opposite.
0697 Augustine’s choice of the word documentumx56 deserves a brief consideration 
for it would actually tend to point towards memory-images being verifiable, or at least 
potentially so, rather than simply being private, inner, proofs. ‘Proof indeed would 
appear to be the most suitable translation given the context in the DM, Augustine’s 
common use of the term457, and Hus’ conclusion that: documentum, in the period 
studied, "... conserve ainsi toujours, de Plaute a Vepoque d'Hadrien, une reelle unite, 
ses differents sens etant en realite des nuances... ” (Hus: 1965, 360) and that it serves 
“ ...d'exemple, de legon, de temoignage, depreuve... ” (Hus: 1965, 378). It is further 
stated that “ ... les caracteristiques de documentum sont les suivantes: 1. Le 
documentum est toujours quelque chose d'exemplaire, sortant du commun. 2. Le 
documentum vise toujours a docere, qu'il s'agisse d'instruire, d'eclairer ou de 
prouver. 3. Le documentum n 'est jamais un objet impersonnel, mais presque toujours 
un etre humain ou un acte, un evenement, une situation mettant en cause des etres 
humains ” (Hus: 1965, 360), which would all accord well with the passage in the DM 
in that it is an instructive example, relating to the human domain and functions so as 
to prove something, or put it to the test. Taken that it “ .. .n'est jamais une <preuve>, 
constatation etonnante a priori... ” (Hus: 1965, 360) it would appear that the sense of
456‘Documentum’ has a range o f meanings from ‘example’ to ‘instruction’ and in later Latin also 
included such meanings as ‘evidence’ and ‘document’ - cf. L-S; OLD, and TLL 2, 144.
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the word tends towards something that by its very nature can be put to the test itself.
In this context the force o f “nobis..documenta” (DM 39) would appear to refer to their
essentially inner nature and not to any lack of possibility for being verified. It would
then seem that for any given situation, when individual x has documenta, y  has
documenta, and z has no documents, that these documenta cannot be transferred to z,
thereby giving z a less firm standard by which to judge jc’s account of the situation.
Yet, i fy  does have documenta by which to judge x ’s words then clearly x  can also
make use o fy ’s recollection of the situation so as to validate his own recollection and
to further strengthen his belief based on both memory-image and external verification.
By the very introduction of a second witness in possession of his own documentum
Augustine implies the possibility for the testing of one’s documenta.
is enim qui audit, si ea sensit atque fuit, non discit meis uerbis, sed 
recognoscit ablatis secum et ipse imaginibus; si autem ilia nion sensit, quis 
non eum crederepotius uerbis quam discere intellegat?
(39)
0698 Of utmost importance in any consideration of Augustine’s position on
knowledge claims and their verifiability is the fact that, in the final analysis,
Augustine held the sensible world to be changeable and therefore, to this extent, false.
So in the strictest sense, one can have no true knowledge of the sensible world but can
have, as it were, a worldly knowledge which would serve for practical purposes in
daily existence. This distinction in types of knowledge is seen in the distinction
between ‘sapientia’ (knowledge as understood in its strict sense) and ‘scientia'
(knowledge of mutable world) in the de trinitate.
cum enim neglect a caritate sapientiae, quae semper eodem modo manet, 
concupiscitur scientia ex mutabilium temporaliumque experimento...
{trin. 12.16)
457 v. sup. 0660 n.442.
335
Although scientia is not perhaps strictly knowledge in the same sense as sapientm,
Augustine nevertheless holds it to be a sort of knowledge all the same, for he
“••• rejected the basic tenet that only indubitable knowledge is admissible as
knowledge” (Markus in Armstrong: 1967, 370)458. This said, it is as the foundation for
this scientia that memory-images would appear to function, they are the source of
knowledge of the sensible world.
nullus enim eis [sensibilibus corporalibusque] uti posset etiam bene, nisi 
sensarum rerum imagines memoria tenerentur.
{trin. 11.8)
This type of knowledge is, in effect, belief, but Augustine accepts belief as a valid
means of acquiring knowledge and “ ... extends459 the domain of belief at the expense
of that of knowledge” (Rist: 1994, 74).
sed absit a nobis ut ea quae per sensus corporis didicimus, uera esse 
dubitemus: per eos quippe didicimus coelum et terram, et ea qui in eis nota 
sunt nobis, quantum ille qui et nos et ipsa condidit, innotescere nobis uoluit. 
absit etiam ut scire nos negemus, quae testimonio didicimus aliorum: alioquin 
esse nescimus Oceanum; nescimus esse terras atque urbes, quas celeberrima 
fama commendat; nescimus fuisse homines et opera eorum, quae historica 
lectione didicimus; nescimus quae quotidie undecumque nuntiantur, et indiciis 
consonis contestantibusque firmantur; postremo nescimus in quibus locis, uel 
ex quibus hominibus fuerimus exorti; quae haec omnia testimoniis credidimus 
aliorum. quod si absurdissimum est dicere; non solum nostrorum, uerum 
etiam et alienorum corporum sensus plurimum addidisse nostrae scientiae 
confitendum est.
{trin. 15.21)
One depends to a great degree on the reports of others for one’s beliefs, but these 
reports can be confirmed by “ ... indiciis consonis contestantibusque”. The implication 
is clearly that to strengthen one’s beliefs one must confirm them by reference to 
other’s words, and other’s words by reference to reality. In the DM the focus is upon 
the fact that if something is not, or has not been, directly experienced one has a 
weaker basis for belief, and that there is a close relation between sensible experience
458 Cf. de trinitate 15.21-22.
and one’s learning about it. However, with the introduction of a second percipient into 
the discussion in DM 39 it seems clear that one who does have scientia (that is 
memory-images) can, and should, confirm it by “indiciis consonis contestantibusque”. 
Indeed, the end of the above passage {trin. 15.21) stresses the importance of others’ 
senses for the increase in one’s knowledge, or rather, belief.
0699 In this light it would appear that the cross-reference and confirmation of past 
perceived objects are of importance in increasing and verifying one’s beliefs. 
Verification is in this sense rather less stringent than would hold for knowledge in its 
strictest sense, but one must understand it within the framework of his epistemology 
and with regard to the role of belief within this epistemology.
0700 In such terms should the introduction of the second percipient in DM 39 be 
understood. Granted that whether two, or two hundred, people compare memory- 
images it still remains problematic that what are being compared are images. 
However, insofar as the greater the agreement and the firmer the authority of the 
witnesses that support the grounds for one’s belief, to this extent does Augustine 
accept the verification as granting a sort of knowledge which is both practical and 
necessary for worldly existence.
9.3.2. Intelligibilia.
0701 The difficulties encountered for sensibilia are absent for intelligibilia for, as 
items of knowledge, intelligibilia are always, potentially immediate. Intelligible items 
are perceived by the mind {mente conspicimus), by means of the intellect (intellectu) 
and reason (ratione), and when such items are spoken of they are immediately
459 That is, extends with regard to the general Platonic position concerning knowledge and belief, to 
which he broadly adheres.
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perceived (praesentia contuemur) in the inner light of truth (in ilia interiore luce
ueritatis). That is to say, they are made intelligible, or available to the mind, through
Christ (v. sup. § 9.2). Through the inner light of truth, by which one grasps intelligible
items through understanding and reasoning, the inner person (homo interior) is
illuminated (illustratur) and achieves delight (fruitur).
Aug. ...cum uero de his agitur, quae mente conspicimus, id est intellectu atque 
ratione, ea quidem loquimur, quae praesentia contuemur in ilia interiore luce 
ueritatis, qua ipse, qui dicitur homo interior, illustratur et fruitur...
(40)460
0702 Items which are perceived in the inner light of truth (quae... contuemur in ilia 
interiore luce ueritatis) are such as are perceived in the mind (quae mente 
conspicimus), which is to say, they are items which are understood and rationally 
grasped (id est intellectu atque ratione). There has been a gradual development in the 
dialogue, in the search for how knowledge is acquired, from language, through 
sensible experience, to, finally, mental comprehension. This progression is most 
succinctly described by the movement from learning by acts of signification 
(‘significatu\ DM 8), through the dismissal of this for that by acts of seeing 
(‘aspectu\ DM 35), and to dismissal of seeing for learning by means of the act of 
understanding (‘ intellectu’, DM 40). This is not to entirely dismiss all acts of 
signifying or seeing but rather stresses the relative importance of such acts when 
considered in conjunction with understanding. Both signification and seeing (and all 
sensible acts) provide useful and valid forms of belief which may be applied so as to 
arrive at understanding. Principle Pi (DM 25, 0503), which has been applied
460 Cf. “sat est enim ad  id, quod uolo, Platonem sensisse duos esse mundos, unum intellegibilem, in quo 
ipsa ueritas habitaret, istum autem sensibilem, quern manifestum est nos uisu tactuque sentire; itaque 
ilium uerum, kune ueri similem et a d  illius imaginem factum, et ideo de illo in ea quae se cognosceret 
anima uelut expoliri et quasi serenari ueritatem, de hoc autem in stultorum animis non scientiam sed 
opinionem posse generari...” A cad. 3.37.
extensively in the latter part of the dialogue (v. sup. § 6 and § 7), is once again 
applicable.
Pi If x exists on account of y, thenjy is of more value than x.
The focus rests upon the fact that both signification and (sensible) perception are acts 
which exist on account of understanding, or knowledge. Both are used so as to 
achieve, or at least assist in achieving, understanding. It is this understanding which 
may finally accomplish the end which can be enjoyed (fruitur). The utilfrui distinction 
(v. sup. 0520-0524) is relevant at this point for Augustine signals the end towards 
which the other useful acts (of signifying and seeing) have led with the only use of the 
word (frui) in the dialogue. It is truth which is that which illuminates and is to be 
enjoyed by the inner person and this is only finally achieved through understanding, 
that is through reason and through the granting of the whole item of knowledge 
through the Inner Christ. The term ‘utf  occurs variously throughout the dialogue but, 
significantly, only with regard to those forms of testimony which are in themselves 
insufficient for knowledge: signs and words (often with reference to teaching) - DM 
6, 9, 26, 41, 46461; authority - DM 14; and sensible items (for the purpose of 
understanding) - DM 39.
0703 All items, if they are to finally constitute knowledge, must be understood 
rationally by the inner person. One may use various forms of testimony, whether it be 
direct sensible experience, recalled sensible experience, or testimony from others, 
both historical (through the authority of texts) and direct, from personal 
communicative interaction. However, there is the necessary process of personal, 
internal reasoning and understanding so as to finally move properly towards 
knowledge.
461 The ‘usefulness’ o f speech (and signs) will be commented upon in due course (v. inf. §11).
339
0704 Intelligible items which are seen by the mind are understood and rationally
grasped, however, only in the interior light of truth.
Aug. ... quae mente conspicimus, id est intellectu atque ratione... praesentia 
contuemur in ilia interiore luce ueritatis...
(40)
The metaphor is of a person with functioning sight, who is in a room filled with 
objects, but must wait for the light to be turned on before either the items or the 
interrelations between them can be perceived. The truth, or Christ, is that light and the 
knowledge which any person can gain is, in the final analysis, a revealed knowledge. 
Augustine’s ascent to knowledge is, in the DM, a Plotinian ascent with the final gap 
to be bridged, in the Paradox of Enquiry, being achieved only through divine 
revelation.
0705 This gap is that which was highlighted in discussion of D29 (0540-0541). 
(D29.1) Y
V
Y = M
Namely, although one has a grasp of a concept, Y, this does not constitute knowledge 
of the Transcendental Form, Y.
0706 Indeed, either in gaining firm knowledge of an individual item, that is, 
grasping the Form intellectually, or in gaining a full understanding of any field of 
knowledge, there is the question of how one progresses ultimately from an inductive, 
or a general grasp of an item or a field of knowledge to a valid, secure, and specific 
grasp of this said knowledge. For Augustine this entails a movement from a
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conceptual grasp of any item to a formal awareness of it, or from a degree of 
understanding of any field to a full understanding. Such complete knowledge is, 
strictly, the only form of true knowledge in Augustine’s analysis and the movement 
from partial, human, understanding, to full understanding is achievable only through 
divine grace. The direction of motion from Y to an understanding of Y, which can 
fully constitute knowledge, is downwards.
(D34) Y
V
Y
A person may employ various modes of testimony and apply intelligence towards an 
understanding of any item or field of knowledge, yet the gap between belief and full 
knowledge must, in Augustine’s analysis, be bridged only by an intellectual 
clarification, as it were, through Christ as mediator.
0707 The movement for the individual is from data, which relies on testimony, 
through reasoning, and then via divine illumination to knowledge.
(D35) Knowledge
A
Inner Truth/Christ 
A
Reasoning
A
Testimony
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0708 When one converses with someone who understands intelligible items, this
person perceives these items with his own private (secreto) and simple (simplici) eye
and, therefore, has knowledge not through words but through his own contemplation
{sua contemplatione).
Aug. ...sed turn quoque noster auditor, si et ipse ilia secreto ac simplici oculo 
uidet, nouit quod dico sua contemplatione, non uerbis meis.
(40)
0709 That the person’s eye is described as private {secreto) clarifies the fact that it 
is only accessible for the individual in his inner self and is not verifiable to another. 
Also, the use of the term ‘simple’ {simplici) focuses upon the direct, immediate, and 
unqualified mode of access which the knower has to the item of knowledge, while the 
use of the term ‘contemplation’ {contemplatione)462 stresses the complete nature of 
the knowledge which such an individual may possess.
0710 Even in a situation where the speaker is stating something true and the listener
is perceiving this truth, the speaker’s words do not teach the listener. The truth is here
perceived by the items being made apparent (... ipsis rebus... manifest is) through
divine disclosure (... deo intus pandente...). It is due to this disclosure that one such an
individual is able to respond when questioned.
Aug. ...ergo ne hunc quidem doceo uera dicens uera intuentem; docetur enim 
non uerbis meis, sed ipsis rebus deo intus pandente manifestis; itaque de his 
etiam interrogatus respondere posset.
(40)
0711 Augustine is thinking of the slave in Plato’s Meno (82b-85b)463, who is able to 
answer when he is questioned {interrogatus respondere posset) not on account of 
Socrates’ words {docetur... non uerbis meis) but, according to Augustine’s thesis, due
462 The sense o f a complete knowledge o f this sort is essentially PJotinian ‘Qecoptcc’ (c f Plotinus 1.1-8). 
The idea o f this as the highest category o f knowledge, at least potentially, is suggested by Aristotle 
{metaph. 989b).
463 Cf. Cicero, Tusc. 1.57-58.
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to the truth being disclosed to him by God (... vera intuentem... ipsis rebus deo intus 
pandente manifest is... )464.
0712 The idea of intellectual disclosure by God relates to the intelligible world
where one grasps a priori truths465 and where knowledge actually moves beyond
reasoning and involves intuition. However, the grasping of truth is, in the final
analysis, always intuitive.
audiam et intellegam, quomodo «in principio» fecisti «caelum et terram»466 
scrips it hoc Moyses, scrips it et abiit, transiit hinc a te ad te neque nunc ante 
me est. nam si esset, tenerem eum et rogarem eum et per te obsecrarem, ut 
mihi istapanderet, etpraeberem aures corporis mei sonis erumpentibus ex ore 
eius, et si Hebraea uoce loqueretur, frustra pulsaret sensum meum nec inde 
mentem meam quidquam tangeret; si autem Latine, scirem quid diceret. sed 
unde scirem, an uerum diceret? quod si et hoc scirem, num ab illo scirem? 
intus utique mihi, intus in domicilio cogitationis nec Hebraea nec Graeca nec 
Latina nec barbara ueritas sine oris et linguae organis, sine strepitu 
syllabarum diceret: uerum dicit et ego statim certus confidenter illi homini tuo 
dicerem: uerum dicis. cum ergo ilium interrogare non possim, te, quo plenus 
uera dixit, ueritas, rogo, te, deus meus, rogo, «parce peccatis meis»46 , et qui 
illi seruo tuo dedisti haec dicere, da et mihi haec intellegere.
(conf 11.5)
The grasping of the truth of anything is described as though truth itself (‘ ueritas’) 
were the assenting agent (‘ ... diceret: uerum dicit'). The model here is that of the 
human will’s assenting, propositionally, to an impression468. However, the assent 
actually arises from the truth itself and is the basis of the act of assent to any true 
impression.
464 trin. 12.24 suggests that Augustine was unaware o f what questions Socrates actually put to the slave. 
Augustine’s knowledge o f the Meno most likely comes from Cicero, and at any rate he is not directly 
familiar with the original text.
465 Cf. “nam in illo libro, qui inscribitur Mevcov, pusionem quendam Socrates interrogat quaedam 
geometrica de dimensione quadrati...ex quo ejfiici uult Socrates ut discere nihil aliud sit nisi 
recordari...nec uero fieri ullo modoposse ut apueris tot rerum atque tantarum insitas et quasi 
consignatas in animis notiones, quas £vvota<^ uocant, haberemus...” Cicero, Tusc. 1.57
466 Gen. 1:1.
467 Job 14:16.
468 Cf. Stoic KaTcarjttTiKai cpavxaaiat (Sextus Empiricus, M  7.248) and assent to such impressions 
(Cicero, Acad. 2.145).
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0713 The person who has intelligible truths available to her is in no way taught by
another’s words but rather could in fact answer questions about these matters if
questioned about them.
Aug. ...quid autem absurdius quam eumputare locutione mea doceri, qui 
posset, antequam loquerer, ea ipse interrogatus exponere?
(40)
This is the point which the slave experiment in Plato’s Meno (82b-85b) attempted to
demonstrate. Yet it is clear that one often denies something and only after further
questioning comes to admit the truth of it. This does not, apparently, reveal a
weakness in the thesis here presented but rather reveals that here is a weakness in
one’s intellectual ‘vision’ (imbecillitate cernentis). This weakness, which signals
some degree of intellectual elitism469, is due to the lack of ability to perceive the
whole thing through the light of truth (de re tota lucem consulere non potest).
Aug. ... quodsaepe contingit, ut interrogatus aliquid neget atque ad id 
fatendum aliis interrogationibus urgeatur, f i t  hoc imbecillitate cernentis, qui 
de re tota illam lucem consulere non potest...
(40)
0714 The truth is available to the individual but on account of a lack of discernment
the person cannot grasp the whole thing as a unity, or as an interrelated whole. Such
an individual is assisted in coming to a full understanding by being reminded
(admonetur) of the individual parts (de istis partibus) and in this way is able to
gradually grasp the parts which ultimately make up the whole (partibus... quibus ilia
summa constat, quam totam cernere non ualebat).
Aug. ...quod ut partibus faciat, admonetur, cum de istis partibus interrogatur, 
quibus ilia summa constat, quam totam cernere non ualebat.
(40)
469 This elitism is such as to imply a denial of non-intellectual access to the divine and is characteristic 
of the young, more Neoplatonic, Augustine. For a discussion o f this Neoplatonic aspect o f Augustine in 
contrast to later Pauline aspects, with regards to the reception o f Augustine in the Renaissance, cf. 
Bergvall: 2001.
Augustine’s analysis of Recollection can in this sense be seen as a mental event 
whereby latent a priori truths are accessed through the reconsideration and conceptual 
re-ordering of factors which depend upon these truths. That is to say, one has latent 
mathematical information, for example, accessible to the mind, and perhaps upon the 
basis of which one often makes judgements, but one is not actually aware of this 
information. However, when one considers a series of items, such as the geometrical 
experiment in Plato’s Meno (82b-85b), one may, through these prompts, grasp the 
wider implications of the experiment and recall, as it were, the a priori truths which 
one in fact already had access to.
0715 Words may be used in such a case as prompts or directional aids {uerbis
perducitur), they do not, however, teach but simply raise questions in such a way as to
allow the person who is questioned to put discrete pieces of information together. This
discrete information was already known, or available to the person, and by putting it
together, or re-ordering it, he may grasp the connectedness of these items and the
implications of this connectedness. This understanding is also dependent upon the
ability of the person to understand for himself, and his ability to be properly
illuminated by the truth.
Aug. ...si uerbis perducitur eius, qui interrogat, non tamen docentibus uerbis, 
sed eo modo inquirentibus, quo modo est ille, a quo quaeritur, intus discere 
idoneus.
(40)
In such a way Augustine both demonstrates the wider thesis of the DM and presents 
an argument for the effectiveness, and usefulness, of dialectic. While it is absolutely 
clear that there is, in its strict sense, no other teacher than Christ, for no individual 
person can cause another to understand what he does not, nevertheless, in the DM as a
whole there is presented a demonstration of one human teaching another470. Augustine 
has assisted Adeodatus in coming to an understanding for himself by a series of well 
directed questions which have enabled Adeodatus to disambiguate the topic under 
discussion and to re-order information which he has already within himself Through 
this process Adeodatus has been able to discover the wider whole, through an analysis 
of the parts471.
0716 The Birdcatcher is also relevant to this for it is clear that when one has all of 
the information available to one, that is, all of the equipment for birdcatching, one 
does not have knowledge beyond those discrete items. Knowledge of birdcatching 
depends upon one observing the process which connects these parts together and 
through this process one may come to understand birdcatching. However, as is 
pointed out, one still needs to apply one’s intelligence so as to properly have 
knowledge of birdcatching and clearly some may be better able to do this than others.
0717 Augustine highlights the fact that the dialogue has been a demonstration of its
own thesis by introducing the topic which has been under discussion, and the manner
in which it has been discussed, as a defence of the fact that one may be led to an
understanding of something through being questioned about its parts.
Aug. ... uelut si abs te quaererem hoc ipsum quod agitur, utrumnam uerbis 
doceri nihil possit, et absurdum tibi primo uideretur non ualenti totum 
conspicere, sic ergo quaerere oportuit, ut tuae sese uires habent ad 
audiendum ilium intus magistrum . ..
(40)
0718 The implication, in certain contexts, that one learns from another’s words is 
false for one can actually be seen to be more involved in the process than might be the 
case if one were simply receiving information and accepting it. The statement that one
470 That the DM is in fact a demonstration of the thesis it proposes is signalled from the outset: “Aug. 
...at egoputo esse quoddam genus docendi per commemorationem, magnum sane, quod in hac nostra 
sermocinatione res ipsa indicabif (1).
471 Cf. Plato, Tht. 203c-208b.
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has seen a flying man is less readily accepted than the statement that wise men are 
better than fools.
Aug. ...ut dicer em: ea quae me loquente uera esse confiteris et certus es et te 
ilia nosse confirmas, unde didicisti? responderes fortasse, quod ego 
docuissem. turn ego subnecterem: quid si me hominem uolantem uidisse 
dicerem, itane te certum uerba mea redderent, quemadmodum si audires 
sapientes homines stultis esse meliores?
(40)
In such a context it is clear that one either does not believe the former statement, that 
there was a flying man, or at least that one does not know it, even if one believed it. 
The latter statement, that wise men are better than fools, however, is felt to be known 
with certainty472. From this it can be seen that one has not learned anything from the 
words for either one does not know (as in the former example) or one knows (as in the 
latter).
Aug. ... negaresprofecto et responderes illud te non credere aut etiamsi 
crederes ignorare, hoc autem certissime scire, ex hoc iam nimirum 
intellegeres neque in illo, quod me affirmante ignorares, neque in hoc, quod 
optime scires, aliquid te didicisse uerbis meis, quandoquidem etiam 
interrogatus de singulis et illud ignotum et hoc tibi notum esse iurares.
(40)
0719 Through a correct analysis of the parts one can come to accept for oneself, and
understand for oneself, the whole which one may previously have denied. This fact
has been demonstrated by the dialogue as a whole for Adeodatus’ initial response to
Augustine’s question as to the purpose of speech was that through words one teaches
or learns (“aut docere aut discere” DM 1), whereas he now accepts the thesis that
nothing is learned (or taught) through words.
Aug. ...turn uero totum illud, quodnegaueras, fatereris, cum haec, ex quibus 
constat, clara et certa esse cognosceres, omnia scilicet, quae loquimur, aut 
ignorare auditorem, utrum uera sint, aut falsa esse non ignorare aut scire 
uera esse.
(40)
472 The certainty o f the truth o f this statement is apparently felt to be so obvious, and so immediately 
contained in the concepts, that one can judge it solely by reference to one’s own reason.
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0720 The whole which Adeodatus had denied has been shown through its parts.
After hearing another’s statement (y) the hearer (x) has three possible relationships 
with the statement:
(1) x does not know whether y  is true
(2) x knows that y  is false
(3) x knows that y  is true
In (1) x either believes, has an opinion abouty473, or doubtsy; in (2) x rejects y; and in
(3) x accepts y. In none of these situations can x be said to learn.
Aug. ...horum trium in primo aut credere aut opinari aut dub it are, in 
secundo aduersari atque renuere, in tertio attestari...
(40)
Therefore, it has been shown that the person who does not know {qui post uerba
nostra rem nescit), the person who knows that he has heard a falsehood {qui se falsa
nouit audisse), and the person who could respond with the same answers as what was
said {qui posset interrogatus eadem respondere quae dicta sunt), have all learned
nothing from the speaker’s words.
Aug. ...nusquam igitur discere, quia et ille, qui post uerba nostra rem nescit, et 
qui se falsa nouit audisse, et qui posset interrogatus eadem respondere, quae 
dicta sunt, nihil uerbis didicisse conuincitur.
(40)
0721 Therefore, even with respect to intelligible items one learns nothing through
another’s words, for one must perceive such things also for oneself to know them. At
best it is useful to believe what one does not know.
Aug. ...quam ob rem in his etiam, quae mente cernuntur frustra cernentis 
loquelas audit, quisquis ea cernere non potest, nisi quia talia quamdiu 
ignorantur utile est credere.
473 Cf. util. cred. 25.
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The person who, on the other hand, is able to perceive such things can be said to be a 
student of truth within {intus est discipulus ueritatis) while outwardly such a person is 
a judge of a speaker or rather of what is said.
Aug. ...quisquis autem cernere potest, intus est discipulus ueritatis, for is iudex
loquentis uelpotius ipsius locutionis...
(41)
The teacher is truth and the student is one who learns inwardly through gaining an 
understanding of any object of knowledge. By means of such inner understanding one 
is able to make judgements on the truth or falsity of the statements of others. 
Augustine’s position can be seen to have attempted a move towards a solution of the 
Paradox, and of the linguistic model of the Paradox as presented by Wittgenstein, and 
there has been considerable advance in the understanding of the problem at hand. 
However, it must be said that the final movement from the position of ignorance to 
knowledge is still not broached other than through the intervention of an unexplained 
force, namely the divine, in the person of Christ. The gap between the independent, 
objective world and the thinking subject is left, and the means of bridging it left 
obscure and mysterious. It should be said that Augustine pushes the argument to its 
extreme and does not merely presuppose that a child, or one in a position of 
ignorance474, already has certain concepts as a foundation for knowledge acquisition 
(and for language acquisition). What he does presuppose is that there are real objects, 
or items of knowledge, which are such as to be available to the human mind; and one 
would expect this of one who holds with what is a fundamentally Platonic 
metaphysics. However, Augustine’s solution to the ultimate means of passing from a 
position of ignorance to a position of understanding and of grasping such real items is 
reliant on the divine and is, as such, necessarily mysterious and therefore
474 This, in fact, includes all o f humanity.
unsatisfactory. The analysis presented by Augustine takes it that there are real objects 
and that one has access to these objects so as to form concepts and so as to enable one 
to grasp the meaning of linguistic expressions. For there to be a valid model for 
knowledge acquisition and concept formation, and for language acquisition, it must be 
compatible with the metaphysical viewpoint taken by Augustine. The means whereby 
this is achieved basically lacks explanatory force, for the explanation is the divine.
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10. Speaker’s Word and Speaker’s Mind.
0722 Augustine now turns to the relation between the words of a speaker and the 
speaker’s thoughts, or intentions in speaking. This finally allows a consideration of 
commemorative signs. It has been argued above that the idea of recall, or recollection, 
both with regards to words and with regards to mental events, or items (v. sup. .§8.1.5 
and § 9.3.1, 0661 f£), is an Augustinian treatment of the Platonic concept of
ocva|iV T jaiq . In both of these contexts words function as recall items which remind the 
hearer or, perhaps better, prompt the hearer to recall information. There is no sense in 
which the words, qua reminders, function as evidence. Recollection, or 
commemoration, as a theory of reminding as the reaccessing of latent, and potentially 
available, information is the central treatment of avapvT|Gi<; in the DM. However, 
this treatment is from the point of view of the hearer in relation to the 
information and in relation to the hearer’s mind. That is to say, the analysis focuses 
upon the word which is heard and how it relates to the hearer’s inner, intellectual, 
processes: individual, x, may hear a word, y, which reminds x of concept z. The 
relation concerns the hearer, x , the word, y, and the concept, z, which y  signifies for x.
0723 Augustine now turns to the further element involved in the process, namely 
the speaker. The speaker also has concepts, which his words signify, and intentions, 
which are enacted in uttering the words. It is the relation between the words, the 
hearer, and the speaker’s mind or intentions which will now be considered. Words are 
signs which show what the speaker is thinking, or at least what he wants the hearer to 
think of and in this sense they function, it would appear, as a sort of evidence. It is, 
therefore, in the relation of speaker’s words to speaker’s mind, as received and
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understood by hearer, that Augustine’s approach is closest to the idea of words as 
evidential, or commemorative, signs ( a u j x e i a  \)jropvT |G TiK bc).
0724 Due to the focus of the dialogue upon how one can acquire knowledge and the 
role of language, if any, in this process, the direction of study has been from 
transmitter through sign to receiver.
(D36)
transmitter -> sign -> receiver
Augustine now turns briefly to the opposite direction, namely, from receiver through 
word to transmitter.
0725 The efficacy of words as commemorative signs will therefore depend upon 
their ability to accurately communicate the thoughts and intentions of the speaker. In 
Augustine’s approach to language acquisition it has been seen that one gains an 
inductive sense of what another intends by uttering a word (v. sup. § 8.1.3), how far 
this can be determined as providing evidence which gives knowledge depends upon 
the soundness of the sign as evidence.
10.1. Intention Failure.
0726 In the case of a person stating truths and yet being unaware that what he says 
is true, it seems unreasonable to hold that such a person teaches by means of his 
words. In such a case the speaker states truths but holds them to be false475, and yet
475 Cf. ‘non enim omnis, quifalsum dicit, mentitur, si credit aut opinatur uerum esse quod dicit, inter 
credere autem atque opinari hoc distat, quod aliquando ille, qui credit, sentit se ignorare quod credit, 
quamuis de re, quam se ignorare nouit, omnino non dubitet, si earn firmissime credit, qui autem 
opinatur, putat se scire quod nescit. quisquis autem hoc enuntiat quod uel creditum animo uel 
opinatum tenet, etiamsi falsum sit, non mentitur. hoc enim debet enuntiationis suae fidei, ut illudper 
earn proferat, quod animo tenet, et sic habet, ut profert. nec ideo tamen sine uitio est, quamuis non
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does so with exactly the same words as someone would use who does know that they 
are truths.
Aug. ...namplerumque scit ilia, quae dicta sunt, eo ipso nesciente, qui dixit 
uelut si quisquam Epicureis credens et mortalem animam putans eas rationes, 
quae de immortalitate eius a prudentioribus tractatae sunt, eloquatur illo 
audiente, qui spiritalia contueri potest, iudicat iste uera eum dicere. at ille, qui 
dicit, utrum uera dicat ignorat, immo etiam falsissima existimat; num. igitur 
putandus est ea docere, quae nescit? atqui isdem uerbis utitur, quibus uti 
etiam sciens posset.
(41-42)
0727 When someone who speaks what is true but believes it to be false is speaking
to someone who does in fact know that the speaker’s words state truths, it follows that
the words do not even indicate the speaker’s mind. In this situation the person hearing
the words, and knowing that they state the truth, judges that the speaker is stating the
truth. However, the speaker does not know that he is speaking the truth. In such a
situation it is clear that words do have a public, and, in a general sense, objective
meaning but that this does not necessarily convey accurately the speaker’s intention,
or speaker’s meaning. The communicative process is faulty here for the hearer in
effect takes what he will from the public utterance, irrelevant of what the speaker
intends and irrelevant of whether the speaker knows what he is saying or not.
Aug. ... quare iam ne hoc quidem relinquitur uerbis, ut his saltern loquentis 
animus indicetur, si quidem incertum est, utrum ea, quae loquitur, sciat.
(41-42)
10.2. Intentional Concealment.
0728 Related to the case of someone stating truths unintentionally, while thinking 
them false, is that of liars476. Liars are aware of what it is that they are stating, and
mentiatur, si aut non credenda credit aut quod ignorat nosse se putat, etiamsi uerum sit. incognitum 
enim habetpro cognito’ {mend. 3).
476 Augustine went on to discuss lying, most relevantly to the above consideration, in his De mendacio.
353
further know that it is untrue, but they state what is false as though they believed it to
be true477. It is apparent that liars do not reveal what they are thinking, or what they
intend, but in addition they actually attempt to conceal what they have in mind.
Aug. ...adde mentientes atque fallentes, per quos facile intellegas non modo 
non aperiri, uerum etiam occultari animum uerbis.
(42)
0729 If it were possible to keep liars from speaking then speakers could express
their minds to some extent. In this way it is proposed that there may be the potential,
given the ideal situation where no-one was a liar, for people to reveal what they have
in mind. The intention of most people is to tell the truth and make their mind apparent
and they do accomplish this in some way (“ ... idquodam modoprofiteri ut animus
loquentis appareat... ”). The qualification (quodam modo) signals the conclusions that
have been arrived at over the length of the dialogue that words signify inner events
and as such cannot be truly accessed by another. However, this said, it is nevertheless
ceded that there can be some level of information transfer, or of communication.
Aug. ... nam nullo modo ambigo id conari uerba ueracium et id quodam modo 
profiteri, ut animus loquentis appareat, quod obtinerent omnibus 
concedentibus, si loqui mentientibus non liceret.
(42)
10.3. Divergence in Speech and Thought.
0730 There is also the case where one says one thing while thinking another.
Aug. ...quamquam saepe expertifuerimus et in nobis et in aliis non earum 
rerum, quae cogitantur, uerba proferri . ..
(42)
In the first two examples there is a case of the speaker saying what he means but not 
what he intends. In the first example (§ 10.1) the speaker means to argue, for example,
477 Cf. ‘...ille mentitur, qui aliudhabet in animo et aliuduerbis uel quibuslibet significationibus
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that immortality is true but intends that it be understood as false. While in the second 
example (§ 10.2) the liar means to say what is false but intends that it be understood 
that he thinks it true. In both of these cases the meaning of the words are apparent but 
the intended reception of them or the actual intention behind them is not.
0731 In the case of saying one thing while thinking another the meaning of the 
words and their intention are the same, however, the words do not, at the moment of 
utterance, reflect the speaker’s thoughts.
0732 There are two ways in which this might occur. Firstly, there is the situation
where one has committed a speech to memory and has been practised to such an
extent that one can think about other things while speaking. A common example of
this is seen in singing.
Aug. ...cum aut sermo memoriae mandatus et saepe decursus alia cogitantis 
ore funditur, quod nobis cum hymnum canimus saepe contingit...
(42)
The second case is where there is a slip of the tongue. In this case there is also a
contrast between meaning and intention in that one says what one did not intend and
so the meaning of one’s utterance is contrary to one’s intention.
Aug. ... aut cum alia pro aliis uerba praeter uoluntatem nostram linguae ipsius 
errore prosiliunt; nam hie quoque non earum rerum signa, quas in animo 
habemus, audiuntur.
(42)
0733 The case of slips of the tongue raises the point that the utterance, 
unintentionally, does not reflect what the speaker has in mind. In the case of liars, 
however, the utterance, intentionally, does not reflect what they have in mind. To this 
extent, liars do think of what they say, however, the listener does not know whether 
they are speaking the truth. A liar, therefore, means what he says but intends it to be 
deceptive. Indeed, although the listener knows what the liar has in mind, for his words
enuntiat. ’ {mend. 3).
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reflect what he is thinking, the listener does not know from the words what the liar
intends, namely, to be deceptive. If a liar should be thinking of something else while
speaking or should experience a slip of the tongue, then he will of course not be
thinking what he is saying.
Aug. ...nam meritientes quidem cogitant etiam de his rebus, quas loquuntur, ut 
tametsi nesciamus an uerum dicant, sciamus tamen eos in animo habere quod 
dicunt, si non eis aliquid duorum quae dixi accidat...
(42)
In the case of liars there is a contradiction between word meaning and speaker’s 
intention, while in the case of slips of the tongue there is only a difference between 
speaker’s intention and word meaning. Someone who experiences a slip of the tongue 
means x intends to say jc but actually says y. A liar means jc and intends to say jc, but 
additionally intends that it be understood that he intends x as true while he in fact 
knows that actually y  is true.
0734 It is clear then that there are different levels of intention in speech relating to 
intention of word meaning and to intention of the reception of this utterance in 
relation to truth and falsity.
0735 In the case of intention failure (§ 10.1):
jc intends to say y  and does so, but also jc intends y  to be understood as false, 
unaware that y  is in fact true.
In the case of intentional concealment (§ 10.2):
jc intends to sayy and does so, but also jc intends y  to be understood as true, 
knowing that it is in fact false.
In the case of slips of the tongue:
jc intends to say y  but says z , jc also intends that y  be understood as true.
0736 There is clearly a distinction drawn between what one intends to say and what 
one intends to be understood in what one says, or in what one intends to be
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understood as the intention behind one’s utterance. These distinctions may be 
described as (1) utterance-intention, where there is a correlation between the meaning 
of an utterance and one’s intended meaning (there is, for example, a failure in the 
utterance-intention with a slip of the tongue as there is a divergence between what 
one’s words mean and what one actually meant to say; and as (2) reception-intention, 
where there is a correlation between one’s utterance and the intention behind the 
reception of this utterance (there is, for, example, a failure in reception-intention in 
cases of intention failure as there is a divergence between the reception of one’s 
utterance and one’s intention behind the reception of this utterance - one intended it to 
be taken as false, for example, whereas it is in fact true and is taken as such).
10.4. Lexical Confusion.
0737 In cases where the speaker does signify what he is thinking of, the significance
may only grasped by the speaker and perhaps a few others, but the person to whom he
is speaking, and perhaps several others, understand a different signification in the
utterance. This confusion arises essentially from the use one puts a word to and how
this is understood by a particular listener.
Aug. ...sed his accedit aliud genus sane late patens et semen innumerabilium 
dissensionum atque certaminum, cum ille, qui loquitur, eadem quidem 
significat, quae cogitat, sedplerumque tantum sibi et aliis quibusdam, ei uero, 
cui loquitur, et item aliis nonnull is non idem significat.
(43)
0738 This confusion can be best observed by way of an example such as when 
someone should say: “ab aliquibus beluis homo uirtute superatur” (“Man is surpassed 
in virtue by some beasts”). In such an example the word ‘uirtus’ can signify either 
virtue or physical strength. In such a case the confusion is not to be explained by his
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lying, or by his being in error about things, or by his citing words from memory while
thinking something else, or due to a slip of the tongue. The confusion lies in the fact
that he is applying a different term to what he is thinking of than that which his
interlocutor would apply.
Aug. ...dixerit enim aliquis audientibus nobis ab aliquibus beluis hominem 
uirtute superari; nos ilico ferre non possumus et hanc tam falsam  
pestiferamque sententiam magna intentione refellimus, cum ille fortasse 
uirtutem uires corporis uocet et hoc nomine id, quod cogitauit, enuntiet nec 
mentiatur nec erret in rebus nec aliud aliquid uoluens animo mandata 
memoriae uerba contexit nec linguae lapsu aliud quam uolebat sonat, sed 
tantummodo rem, quam cogitat, alio quam nos nomine appellat, de qua illi 
statim assentiremur, si eius cogitationem possemus inspicere, quam uerbis 
iam prolatis explicataque sententia sua nondum nobispandere ualuit.
(43)
In such a case there would be complete agreement if only the interlocutor could, as it 
were, look into the speaker’s mind (si eius cogitationempossemus inspicere). 
Speaker’s meaning and speaker’s intention are, in the final analysis, reliant upon an 
internal event and, as the thrust of the argument of the DM has shown, this leads to a 
fundamental and unbridgeable gap in any precise understanding between 
interlocutors.
10.5. Definition.
0739 Definition is briefly introduced as a suggested means of combating such 
confusions as occur with lexical confusion. Through the definition of the word under 
consideration the issue would be clarified, for the confusion is over the word and not 
the thing.
Aug. ...huic err or i definitiones mederi posse dicunt, ut in hac quaestione, si 
definiret, quid sit uirtus, eluceret aiunt non de re, sed de uerbo esse 
controuersiam...
(43)
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0740 Although Augustine may concede that the confusion is over the word and not
the thing, he quickly dismisses the use of definitions as a solution to this problem. The
question is raised as to how many people are actually good at definitions, which
implies that definitions very often introduce more problems than they solve. There
are, Augustine states, many arguments against the use of definition as an approach,
arguments which he does not entirely agree with, but discussion of this is passed over
as unsuitable to the present discussion.
Aug. ...quod ut concedam ita esse, quotus quisque bonus definitor inueniri 
potest? et tamen aduersus disciplinam definiendi multa disputata sunt, quae 
neque hoc loco tractare opportunum est nec usquequaque a me probantur.
(43)
0741 Augustine raises a similar concern in the DD (5.12-16), where he proposes to
discuss the problems of definition later in the work. Unfortunately, the section in
which definitions was to be discussed was never completed. As Darrell Jackson notes
(1975, 125 n.5), Capella (nup. Phil. 4.349) included a paragraph on definition under
de loquendo and this may have been the section in which Augustine intended to
discuss this in the DD. However, what is important is that Augustine raises the
question as to whether words are correctly defined and whether the words used in
definitions will themselves have to be followed by further definitions.
haec omnia quae defmita sunt, utrum recte definita sint et utrum hactenus 
uerba defmitionis aliis definitionibus persequenda fuerint, ille indicabit locus, 
quo definiendi disciplina tractatur.
{dial. 5.12-16)
This argument may lie at the heart of Augustine’s dismissal of definitions, for the 
discussion of the DM begins with the problem of the regress of attempting to define 
words with words. To return to this question would be to repeat much of what has 
already been discussed. This, however, is not to dismiss definition as entirely useless, 
but in the present context and in the topic under discussion it would appear that
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Augustine holds that definition does not solve the essential difficulties encountered in 
determining the strict relation between words and objects.
10.6. Mishearing.
0742 The final confusion to be introduced concerning confusions arising over
speaker’s words and speaker’s thoughts is that of mishearing. Mishearing is an
obvious case where confusion can arise over what is being intended by a speaker for
the speaker may utter one word and the hearer may think he has heard another. Often
there is not even any similarity in sound between the two mistaken words.
Aug. ...omitto, quod multa non bene audiuimus et quasi de auditis diu 
multumque contendimus, uelut tu nuper uerbo quodam Punico, cum ego 
misericordiam dixissem, pietatem significari te audisse dicebas ab eis, quibus 
haec lingua magis nota esset. ego autem resistens quid acceperis tibi omnino 
excidisse asserebam; uisus enim mihi eras non pietatem dixisse, sed fidem, 
cum et coniunctissimus mihi assideres et nullo modo haec duo nomina 
similitudine soni aurem decipiant. diu te tamen arbitratus sum nescire, quid 
tibi dictum sit, cum ego nescirem, quid dixeris; nam si te bene audissem, 
nequaquam mihi uideretur absurdum pietatem et misericordiam uno uocabulo 
Punice nominari. haecplerumque accidunt. sed ea, ut dixi, omittamus, ne 
calumniam uerbis de audiendi neglegentia uel etiam de surditate hominum 
uidear commouere.
(44)
Such cases of mishearing are more trivial than those other cases discussed above (§
10.1 - § 10.4). These earlier examples are more problematic as the present cases
where one speaks the same language as a speaker and clearly hears what is said and
yet still does not know what the speaker is thinking.
Aug. ...ilia magis angunt, quae superius enumeraui, ubi uerbis liquidissime 
aure perceptis et Latinis non ualemus, cum eiusdem linguae simus, loquentium 
cogitata cognoscere.
(44)
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11. The Teacher.
0743 Augustine finally concedes that words, which are heard by someone who
knows them, do allow this person to know that the speaker had been thinking about
the things that they signify. Under these circumstances, and with the possible
confusions which were discussed above (§ 10) being absent, words can function as
evidential signs of what the speaker has in mind. However, in conceding this point,
Augustine has not lessened the force of the primary thesis of the DM, namely that no
person teaches another, for the person who has heard the words has not learned
whether what is said is true.
Aug. sed ecce iam remitto atque concedo, cum uerba eius auditu, cui nota 
sunt, accepta fuerint, posse illi esse notum de his rebus quas significant 
loquentem cogitauisse; num ideo etiam, quod nunc quaeritur, utrum uera 
dixerit, discit?
(45)
0744 Language, therefore, does not fulfil the role which was initially proposed as its 
function (DM 1), namely, to teach. However, with a redefined understanding of what 
teaching is, language has been seen to fulfil a more limited but nevertheless useful 
role. Words function on the level of reminding and recalling, and so the idea of the 
purpose of speech rather depends on a clearer understanding of the function of words.
0745 Teachers do not pass on their thoughts for these are not what a student 
perceives and grasps, but rather it is the actual disciplines themselves which are 
presented to the student by means of language. That is to say, teachers explain the 
disciplines which they profess to teach and the students then judge for themselves 
whether what has been explained is true or not. The explaining (explicauerint), in 
accordance with the method demonstrated in the DM, would then entail 
demonstrating the parts of a discipline in such a way as to encourage the student to
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understand the whole discipline. However, the actual act of passing judgement takes
place within the student’s mind and is achieved in respect of the student’s ability to
grasp the complete discipline in the light of truth itself.
Aug. ...num. hoc magis tri profitentur, ut cogitat a eorum ac non ipsae 
disciplinae, quas loquendo se tradere putant, percipiantur atque teneantur? 
nam quis tarn stulte curiosus est, qui filium suum mittat in scholam, ut quid 
magister cogitet discat? at istas omnes disciplinas, quas docere profitentur, 
ipsiusque uirtutis atque sapientiae cum uerbis explicauerint, turn illi, qui 
discipuli uocantur, utrum uera dicta sint, apud semetipsos considerant 
interiorem scilicet illam ueritatem pro uiribus intuentes.
(45)
0746 The point at which the students in fact learn is that at which they grasp for
themselves the validity of what is being said to them. Learning is rather a process of
inner discovery, or understanding. Indeed, if the teachers themselves state what is true
it is only because they themselves have been taught also, for they too have been
enlightened by the inner light of truth478.
Aug. ...tunc ergo discunt, et cum uera dicta esse intus inuenerint, laudant 
nescientes non se doctores potius laudare quam doctos, si tamen et illi quod 
loquuntur sciunt.
(45)
The fact that people mistakenly think that such men are teachers is due to the fact that
there is no delay between the act of speech and the act of knowing. The speaker
prompts the student, through reminding him, and the student quickly learns within,
that is to say, he quickly understands. The person who has done the reminding,
therefore, appears to have done the teaching.
Aug. ...falluntur autem homines, ut eos qui non sunt magistros uocent, quia 
plerumque inter tempus locutionis et tempus cognitionis nulla mora 
interponitur, et quoniam post admonitionem sermocinantis cito intus discunt, 
foris se ab eo, qui admonuit, didicisse arbitrantur.
(45)
478 Cf. ep. 19.1.
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0747 The usefulness of words is not negligible but as Augustine has taught, that is 
has prompted or reminded, Adeodatus during the discussion, one should not attribute 
more to words than they actually accomplish. In the process involved in learning there 
is the necessary development where belief (plus reason) leads to understanding; where 
there is a role for authority; and where Christ as Inner Teacher is the criterion of truth 
for individual humans seeking to understand and perceive what is true.
0748 As has been demonstrated in the DM, there is a process where one moves
from belief towards gaining an understanding, and this understanding leads to an
acceptance of the authority of scripture, and the truth of what is stated by this
authority, that there is no teacher on earth but only the divine teacher.
Aug. ...sed te tota utilitate uerborum, quae, si bene consideretur, nonparua 
est, alias, si deus siuerit, requiremus. nunc enim ne plus eis quam oportet 
tribueremus, admonui te, ut iam non crederemus tantum, sed etiam intellegere 
inciperemus, quam uere scriptum sit auctoritate diuina, ne nobis quemquam 
magistrum dicamus in terris, quod unus omnium magister in caelis479 sit.
(46)
Christ reminds people externally through the signs (signis admonemur foris) which
humans use, and through the prompting of these signs one is encouraged (erudiamur)
to turn inward (intro conuersi) and so towards Christ. This is the final end to which all
are directed, and this is the happy life which all seek.
Aug. ...quid sit autem in caelis, docebit ipse, a quo etiam per homines signis 
admonemur foris, ut ad eum intro conuersi erudiamur, quern diligere ac nosse 
beata uita est, quam se omnes clamant quaerere, pauci autem sunt, qui earn 
uere se inuenisse laetentur.
(46)
479 The phrase 'unus omnium magister in caelis’ is an echo o f Matthew 23:8-10, “unus enim est 
magister vester, omnes autem vos fratres estis... unus enim est pater vester qui in caelis est, nec
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11.1. The Learner.
0749 After his long monologue Augustine now returns to Adeodatus to question
what judgement he passes upon the disquisition as a whole (de hoc toto meo
sermone). The process has advanced through a discussion, and a disquisition by
Augustine latterly, of the parts of the subject under consideration and now Adeodatus
is asked to give judgement on the whole.
Aug. ... sed iam mihi dicas uelim, quid de hoc toto meo sermone sentias.
(46)
In passing judgement on what has been said Adeodatus must firstly say whether he
knows that what has been said is true (si enim uera esse quae dicta sunt nosti). Also,
if questioned about each of the propositions (de singulis sententiis interrogatus) he
must say whether he would have known them (ea te scire dixisses).
Aug. ...si enim uera esse, quae dicta sunt, nosti, etiam de singulis sententiis 
interrogatus ea te scire dixisses. uides ergo, a quo ista didicer is...
(46)
0750 In this way, it is possible for Adeodatus to see from whom he has learned. It is
not from Augustine as Adeodatus would have given all the required answers if
questioned by Augustine. Also, if Adeodatus were not to know whether what has been
said is true, then no-one has taught him, not even Christ, for Adeodatus would clearly
be not yet able to learn.
Aug. ...uides ergo, a quo ista didicer is; neque enim a me, cui roganti omnia 
responderes. si autem uera esse non nosti, nec ego nec ille te docuit; sed ego, 
quia numquam possum docere, ille, quia adhuc tu non potes discere.
(46)
vocemini magistri, quia magister vester unus est Christus...”. For references to this passage cf. Madec: 
1976, 545-548.
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0751 Adeodatus states that he has learned through being prompted, or reminded, by 
Augustine’s words (didici admonitione uerborum tuorumm) that words do nothing, in 
fact, other than prompt one to learn (admoneri hominem ut discat). The extent to 
which a speaker’s thought is evident in his utterances is actually of little importance 
for what matters is the ability for the individual, who hears the words, to learn for 
himself.
Ad. ego uero didici admonitione uerborum tuorum nihil aliud uerbis quam 
admoneri hominem, ut discat, et perparum esse, quod per locutionem 
aliquanta cogitatio loquentis apparet...
(46)
0752 Judgement of what is true is taught through Christ. Also, it is notable that
Adeodatus equates an advancement in learning, or understanding, with a deepening of
one’s love of Christ.
Ad. ... utrum autem uera dicantur, eum docere solum, qui se intus habitare, 
cum foris loqueretur, admonuit, quern iam fauente ipso tanto ardentius 
diligam, quanto ero in discendo prouectior.
(46)
Augustine’s continuous monologue both anticipated and resolved all of Adeodatus’ 
doubts, and Adeodatus’ assented to everything which has been argued. The source of 
Adeodatus’ assent is the inner oracle which affirmed for him the truth of what was 
said.
Ad. ... uerumtamen huic orationi tuae, quaperpetua usus es, ob hoc habeo 
maxime gratiam, quod omnia, quae contradicere paratus eram, praeoccupauit 
atque dissoluit, nihilque omnino abs te derelictum est, quod me dubium 
faciebat, de quo non ita mihi responder et secretum illud oraculum, ut tuis 
uerbis asserebatur.
(46)
0753 Augustine frequently uses the term ‘ oraculum’ to refer to divine precepts 
(Acad. 1.1; beata v. 31; mor. 1.12; conf. 12.22; etc.), to Scripture (conf. 8.29; etc.), to
480 In Confessiones 7.16 Augustine uses admonitus to refer to the divine use o f the books o f the 
Platonists as an admonitio to him. Also, in De liberio arbitrio 2.38 one is reminded outwardly but 
taught within (foris admonet intus docef).
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divine inspiration (such as the preaching of Ambrose, conf. 6.4), and also, as
occurring in DM 46, to refer to divine revelation.
... audiat te intus sermocinantem qui potest; ego fidenter ex oraculo tuo 
clamabo...
{conf. 11.11)
The use o f 4oraculum' is particularly well chosen in DM 46, however, for the word,
which derives from ‘orare' (to speak), reflects the verbal theme of the dialogue and
ends the texts with a metaphor whereby the inner truth assents, in verbal imagery, to
the truth of speech which one encounters. In a discussion of Augustine’s reception of
a passage by Moses, the inner truth, again, is described in linguistic terms as assenting
to the truth of the passage which Augustine has been considering.
audiam et intellegam, quomodo «inprincipio» fecisti«caelum et terram». 
scripsit hoc Moyses... sed unde scirem, an uerum dicer et? ... intus utique mihi, 
intus in domicilio cogitationis ... ueritas ... diceret: uerum dicit et ego statim 
certus confidenter ... dicerem: uerum dicis.
{conf. 11.5)
In like manner, on hearing Augustine’s disquisition Adeodatus has consulted481 the 
inner truth as to the truth of what has been said and the oracle has asserted ‘uerum 
dicit'482. Therefore, Adeodatus is able here too, at the end of the DM, to say to 
Augustine ‘uerum dicis' .
481 The active role of the learner in this process and the necessity for a well directed will is crucial. For 
Augustine the “... [w]ill became the point o f reference in the doctines of intellect and sensual life, 
freedom and determination, moral evaluation of purpose and action, and, above all, in that o f fall and 
redemption” (Dihle: 1982, 127).
482 Cf. John 18:37.
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12. Conclusion.
0754 The DM is a work which is in effect greater than the sum of its parts, that is to 
say the argument is not only the line of thought developed throughout the text but is 
essentially the work itself as a whole. The DM develops in a reasonably linear, though 
intricate, fashion; however, the greatest piece of argumentation for Augustine’s thesis 
in the DM is in fact the DM itself. The DM is a demonstration of the position 
forwarded in the text that there is a place for a ‘teacher’ in the student/teacher 
relationship and that all students in the final analysis learn for themselves. The DM 
demonstrates this and in so doing also ‘teaches’ the reader through the text qua 
demonstration ; indeed, the reader himself engages in the process and through the 
demonstration learns, if so inclined to engage fully in the process and if capable of 
learning. For this reason, the approach taken in this thesis is such as to attempt to 
follow the intricacies of Augustine’s argument in the DM in a linear fashion, as far as 
this has been possible. The purpose of this has been to avoid losing the cumulative 
impact of the argument as demonstrated in the DM and at the same time to attempt to 
analyse the progressive stages of Augustine’s thought throughout the text. The 
process has been a difficult, and perhaps futile, one but whether any small success has 
been achieved in elucidating the development of the argument of the DM without 
castrating it of its cumulative and emergent power must remain finally in the 
judgement of the reader.
0755 The development of the argument in this thesis has always attempted to 
remain specifically focused upon what has been forwarded as the central concern of 
the DM: namely, the question of the possibility of the acquisition of knowledge and
483 Cf. § 4 and § 7 on the role o f demonstration as a teaching method.
the place of the Paradox of Enquiry in relation to the development of the discussion of 
the possibility of such acquisition. The following brief conclusion will therefore not 
attempt to reiterate the strictly linear development of the DM as considered in this 
study, which is presented in outline form in the introduction484. The argument of this 
thesis will now be briefly reconsidered with reference to the development of the 
themes within the DM with specific reference to the ever present background of the 
search for a solution to the Paradox and therefore for a theory of knowledge 
acquisition.
0756 Augustine has been shown to have attempted to analyse and ultimately solve 
the problem of knowledge acquisition initially through introducing a consideration of 
the function of language as dependent upon a form of teaching and learning through 
commemoratio485. There was seen to be a tension within the treatment of 
commemoratio in that language can count as a form of evidence such as informs the
486sign-receiver, or hearer, what the speaker is thinking , or more accurately what it is 
that the speaker wants the hearer to think of. Commemoratio also has the, 
epistemically more significant, role of serving to cause the hearer to recollect latent
487information only available inwardly within the individual’s mind . The words of 
others therefore serve as prompts, and as evidence of what they intend but no more. 
The items of knowledge to be accessed are wholly internal to the individual sign-
488receiver and are the only valid bases upon which any learning can depend
0757 Related to this treatment of commemoratio is the fact, for Augustine, that 
things can only be learned directly. This point is developed over the course of the
368
discussion of ostension and, more specifically, of demonstration489. There is a clear 
sense in which there is shown to be a semiotic separation from reality in any 
communicative act; for there is a lack of immediacy in linguistic acts490 and the sign- 
receiver has no grounds for knowledge which are objectively shared with the sign- 
giver. The sign-receiver is forever bound to an interpretation of what the sign-giver 
actually intends491.
0758 The necessity for immediacy, or presence, for the acquisition of knowledge 
brings the argument back to the role of commemoratio as Recollection492. This 
ultimately confines the role of language in knowledge acquisition to, at best, that of 
prompt or encouragement towards learning. However, it also raises once again the 
question as to how the individual can in fact be said to have valid grounds upon which 
to base what is essentially an inner act of knowledge acquisition. These grounds are 
given by the introduction of the theory of illumination and the Inner Christ493, which 
are ultimately unsatisfactory in providing an acceptable solution to the Paradox as the 
gap between knower and known is in the final analysis broached by the introduction 
of a third, divine, factor. The introduction of this factor appears to provide a solution 
to an insurmountable paradox. However, this is a philosophically unnecessary tactic 
on Augustine’s part due, perhaps, to the fact that what he is doing is working out a 
solution based upon preconceived ideas.
0759 These ideas are central to Augustine’s approach in the DM and, although there 
is a great deal of progress made in his discussion of language and in possible 
approaches to learning, there are more fundamental metaphysical, ontological and 
epistemological issues which cause the greatest difficulty in his approach to the
489 Cf. § 4 and § 7.
490 Cf. § 9.
491 Cf. § 6 and § 7.
492 § 8 and § 9.
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Paradox. Augustine is fully committed to a realist approach to his ontology and to the 
necessity of direct and immediate presence of any item of knowledge for it to be 
known494. It is essentially these commitments and an inability to adequately fit them 
with a theory of language and of knowledge acquisition which must be revised rather 
than introducing a divine mediator to close the divide between the ever present item 
of knowledge and the would be knower. In addition, it is the introduction of just such 
a mediator as a means of providing validity to any item of knowledge which disallows 
any sense in which there can be external and objective grounds upon which one may 
be said to communicate information from one individual to another.
0760 Augustine, in the final analysis, is argued in this thesis to provide a 
sophisticated solution to a complex problem. However, the solution gives, perhaps, 
the best way out of a problem within given parameters rather than taking the 
necessary recourse to divine mediation and to denying anything beyond a limited 
usefulness to linguistic communication as a prompt to reconsider the very parameter 
upon which the approach to the problem rests.
Appendix 1: de mazistro translation
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Chapter Divisions
The chapter divisions (which are mine) correlate with the thematic divisions followed 
in the preceding thesis. The exceptions to this are Chapters 4 and 6, which are not 
separately discussed in the thesis.
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The Teacher.
(1) The Purpose of Speech.
1. Augustine: What do you suppose we want to accomplish when we speak?
Adeodatus: As it appears to me at this moment... either to teach or to learn.
Aug.: I appreciate the former, for it’s obvious that when we speak, we want to teach; 
but to learn, how’s that?
Adeo.: How else do you suppose but when we ask questions?
Aug.: Even then I don’t think we intend anything other than to teach; for instance, do 
you ask questions for any other reason than to teach the person you’re questioning 
what it is that you want?
Adeo.: You’re right.
Aug.: So you see, when we speak, we intend nothing but to teach.
Adeo. : Not quite. For if speaking is nothing other than uttering words, I’m aware that 
we do this when we sing; and as we often sing when we’re alone and when there’s no- 
one about to learn, I don’t think we intend to teach anything.
Aug.: Yet, for my part, I think there’s a certain kind of teaching through reminding, an 
important kind at that, which the very subject matter of our discussion will reveal. 
However, if you don’t think that we learn when we remember or that he who reminds 
us is teaching, I’ve no objection. For the present, I propose two reasons for speaking: 
either to teach, or to remind others or ourselves, which is something we certainly do 
when we sing; or don’t you think so?
Adeo. : Not entirely. As it’s rare that I sing to remind myself; mostly I do so just for 
the pleasure of it.
Aug.: I see what you mean. But surely you’re aware that what gives you pleasure in 
song is a certain rhythm of the sound? Now, since this can be added to words or taken 
away from them, speaking is one thing and singing another: music’s produced on 
pipes and the harp, birds sing, and we too sometimes sing a certain tune without 
words. This sound can be called song but not speech. Or do you disagree?
Adeo.: Not at all.
2. Aug.: So, you agree that speech is undertaken only to teach or remind?
Adeo.: I would, but it concerns me that we undoubtedly speak while praying, and yet 
it’s improper to believe that God is taught or reminded of anything.
Aug. : I take it you’re unaware that we were instructed to pray in closed chambers495- a 
name which signifies the inmost recess of the mind - for no other reason than because 
God does not require to be reminded or taught by our speech in order to grant us what 
we desire. For one who speaks produces a sign of his will through articulate sound.
Yet God should be sought and prayed to in the very depths of the rational soul, which 
is called ‘the inner man’, for he wanted these to be his temples. Have you not read in 
the work of the Apostle : Know you not that you are the temple o f God and that the 
Spirit o f  God dwells in yo u 96; and: Christ dwells in the inner man91! Have you not 
noticed in the Prophet: Speak in your hearts and be stung in your bed-chambers. Offer 
the sacrifice o f justice and have hope in the Lord98? Where do you think the sacrifice 
of justice is offered except in the temple of the mind and in the bed-chambers of the 
heart? Where sacrifice should be offered, there also should be prayer. For this reason, 
when we pray there is no need of speech - that is, of spoken words - except perhaps to 
signify [what is in] one’s mind, as the priests do, not that God may hear but that men
495 Matth. 6:6.
496
I Cor. 3:16.
may, and, with a sense of unanimity through the reminding, may be raised up to God. 
Or do you think otherwise?
Adeo:. I absolutely agree.
Aug: Then doesn’t it concern you that the greatest Teacher taught the disciples certain 
words when he was teaching them to pray, and in so doing seems simply to have 
taught them how to speak in prayer?
Adeo: That doesn’t concern me at all; for He didn’t teach them the words but rather 
taught them of the things themselves by means of the words. Words with which they
might remind themselves what it is they should pray for and from whom, when they
prayed, as has been said, in the inmost recess of the mind.
Aug.: You understand correctly. For, even if someone were to contend that, although 
we utter no sound, we are nevertheless speaking inwardly in the presence of our mind, 
due to the fact that we call to mind the words themselves; at the same time I believe, 
however, that you’re aware that, in this regard also, we do nothing through speech 
other than remind. This is because the memory, to which the words are fixed, repeats 
them and in this way makes the things themselves come into the mind, and the words 
are the signs of these things.
Adeo: I understand and am following.
(2) The Problem of Communication.
3. Aug: So we agree that words are signs.
Adeo: We do.
Aug: Can a sign be a sign unless it signifies something?
498Ps. 4:4-5 (RSV); 4:5-6 (Vulgate).
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Adeo/. It can’t.
Aug.: How many words are in this verse: si nihil ex tanta super is placet urbe 
relinquf"  (If it pleases the gods that nothing remain from so great a city)?
Adeo.: Eight.
Aug.: So there are eight signs.
Adeo.: Yes.
Aug. : I take it that you understand this verse.
Adeo.: Well enough, I suppose.
Aug.: Tell me what each word signifies.
Adeo.: I know what ‘i f  signifies, but I can’t think of another word with which to 
describe it.
Aug.: Whatever’s signified by this word, you can at least think of the place in which it 
exists.
Adeo. : I suppose it signifies doubt, and where else is doubt but in the mind?
Aug.: I’ll accept this in the meantime; go on to the other words.
Adeo.: What else does ‘nothing’ signify but that which is not?
Aug.: Perhaps you’re right, but I’m prevented from agreeing by the fact that you’ve 
just conceded that there is no sign unless it signifies something; and surely, that which 
is not, can in no way be something. Therefore the second word in this verse isn’t a 
sign because it doesn’t signify anything, and we mistakenly agreed either that all 
words are signs or that every sign signifies something.
Adeo. : You’re pressing too hard, but it is foolish to utter a word when we don’t grasp 
what it signifies. However, I believe that as you’re speaking with me now you aren’t 
producing any sound in vain, but with every word which comes out of your mouth,
499 Vergil, A. 2.659.
you give a sign to me so that I may understand something. For this reason, you 
shouldn’t utter those two syllables while you speak, if you don’t signify anything by 
them. But if you know that a necessary utterance is made through them and that we 
are taught or reminded when they sound in our ears, surely you can see what I want to 
say, but am unable to explain.
Aug.: What then are we to do? Are we to say that what is signified by this word, 
rather than the thing itself, which is nothing, is a certain affection of the mind when it 
does not see a thing, and yet finds or thinks that it has found that which is not?
Adeo.: Perhaps that is what I was struggling to explain.
Aug.: Therefore let’s go on from here, however it may be, in case a most absurd 
situation befalls us.
Adeo.: What can that be?
Aug. : If nothing detain us and we should be delayed.
Adeo.: That is ridiculous and yet I see that in some way this could happen, in fact I see 
that it has happened.
4. Aug.: We shall have a clearer understanding of this sort of contradiction in its 
own place, if God be willing. Now, return to that verse and try, as you can, to explain 
what the other words in it signify.
Adeo.: The third word is the preposition ‘from’, for which I think we can say ‘o f.
Aug. : I'm not asking that you propose for one well known word another equally well 
known word which signifies the same thing, if indeed it has the same meaning; but in 
the meantime let us grant that it does. Certainly if that poet had not said ‘from so great 
a city’ but ‘of so great a city’, and I were to ask you what ‘o f  means, you would say 
‘from’, since these two words, that is signs, would signify, as you think, one thing.
However, I’m looking for that one thing, whatever it may be, which is signified by 
these two signs.
Adeo. : It seems to me to signify a certain separation from that thing in which 
something had been, and which is said to be ‘from’ it, whether the thing does not 
remain, as in this verse where the city no longer remains but some Trojans were able 
to be ‘from’ it, or whether it does remain, just as we say that traders ‘from’ the city of 
Rome are in Africa.
Aug. : Even if I concede to you that this is so and don’t list how many exceptions can 
be found to this rule of yours, it’s certainly easy for you to see that you have 
explained words with words, that is signs with signs, and what is familiar with what is 
equally familiar. Yet, I would like you to show me, if you can, those things of which 
these are the signs.
5. Adeo. : I’m astonished that you’re unaware, or rather pretend to be unaware, 
that what you wish can in no way be accomplished by my response, since we are 
holding a discussion where we are unable to respond except with words. You, 
however, are asking for things which, whatever they may be, are certainly not words, 
and yet you’re using words to ask them of me. Therefore, first of all you ask without 
using words, and then I may respond in accordance with that condition.
(3) Ostensive Definition.
Aug. : I admit that that’s fair; but if I were to ask what’s signified when the three 
syllables ‘paries' (wall) are spoken, surely you’d be able to indicate it with your 
finger so that, while you were showing me and yet not using any words, I could 
immediately see the thing itself, of which this three-syllable word is the sign?
Adeo:. I concede that this could be done only with regard to names which signify 
objects, if those same objects are present.
Aug: Surely we don’t call colour an object but rather a certain quality of a object? 
Adeo: That’s right.
Aug.: Then how is it that this can also be pointed out with one’s finger? Or do grant in 
addition to objects also the qualities of objects, so that when they are present, they too 
are no less able to be taught without words?
Adeo: When I said objects, I meant all corporeal things; that is, everything which is 
perceived in objects.
Aug: Yet consider whether you should also make some exceptions here.
Adeo: You’re right to warn me; for I shouldn’t have said all corporeal things but 
rather all visible things. I admit that sound, smell, taste, weight, heat, and things 
which pertain to the other senses, although they can’t be perceived without objects 
and therefore are corporeal, are nevertheless unable to be pointed out with one’s 
finger.
Aug: Haven’t you ever seen how people hold a conversation, as it were, with the deaf 
by means of gesture and how the deaf themselves no less by gesture ask questions, 
respond, teach, or indicate all that they wish, or certainly most of it? When this 
occurs, not only visible things are revealed without words, but also sounds and tastes 
and all other such things; for in the theatres actors also often set forth and relate entire 
stories by means of dance and without using words.
Adeo: I’ve nothing to say against this, except that not only I, but not even that 
dancing actor could indicate to you what ‘from’ signifies without using words.
*
The ambiguity in the meaning o f is problematic for the meaning shifts, sometimes
intentionally, between ‘name’ and ‘noun’. There is much o f philosophical interest which arises from 
Augustine’s use o f this ambiguity and therefore the standard translation o f ‘name’ will be employed 
throughout.
6. Aug.\ Perhaps you’re right; but let’s suppose that he can. You don’t doubt, I 
think, that whatever the movement of his body by which he tries to show me the 
thing, which is signified by this word, it wouldn’t be the thing itself but a sign of it. 
Therefore, he too will none the less indicate not a word with a word, but rather a sign 
with a sign, so that both the monosyllable ‘from’ and the gesture will signify one and 
the same thing, which I wanted to be shown to me without it being signified.
Adeo:. I ask you, who can do what you’re asking?
Aug.: In the same way as the wall could be shown.
Adeo: Our reasoning has taught that not even that can be shown without a sign. For 
the pointing of a finger certainly isn’t the wall, but a sign is given by means of which 
the wall can be seen. So, I don’t see anything which can be shown without signs.
Aug: What if I were to ask you what walking is, and you were to get up and do it, 
surely you’d be employing the act itself to teach me rather than words or any other 
signs?
Adeo: I admit that it’s so and I’m embarrassed not to have seen so obvious a thing; 
and from this thousands of things now occur to me, which can be shown through 
themselves and not signs, such as eating, drinking, sitting, standing, shouting, and 
countless others.
Aug: Tell me then, if I were completely ignorant of the meaning of the word 
‘walking’ and were to ask you, while you were walking, what walking is; how would 
you teach me?
Adeo: I’d do the same thing somewhat quicker, so that following your question you’d 
be shown through some new element and yet there would be nothing other than what 
ought to be shown.
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Aug. : You do know that walking is one thing, hurrying another? For he who walks 
does not necessarily hurry, and he who hurries does not necessarily walk; for instance, 
we speak of haste in writing, in reading, and in countless other pursuits. Therefore, 
when you were to do more quickly, after my question, what you were in the process 
of doing, I would think that walking was nothing other than hurrying: you had added 
this new element, and because of this I would be misled.
Adeo. : I admit that we can’t show something without a sign if we’re asked when 
we’re in the act of doing it; for if we add nothing, the enquirer will think that we’re 
unwilling to show him and, while ignoring him, are continuing in what we were 
doing. Yet if he should ask about those things which we’re able to do, and doesn’t ask 
while we’re doing them, we can do it after his question and so demonstrate what he 
asks by means of the thing itself rather than by a sign - unless he should ask me what 
speaking is while I’m actually speaking; for whatever I should say so as to teach him, 
it’s necessary that I speak. And from there, I’ll teach him without any trouble until I 
make plain to him what he wants to know, neither withdrawing from the thing itself, 
which he wants shown to him, nor seeking signs beyond the thing with which I may 
reveal it.
7. Aug.: Very clever! Now then, consider whether we’re agreed that it’s possible, 
without signs, to show those things which we’re not doing when we’re asked and yet 
are able to do immediately or which are perhaps signs themselves when we do them; 
for instance, when we talk we produce signs isigna facere), from where we derive the 
word ‘signify’ (significare).
Adeo.: Agreed.
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(4) Classification of Communicables and Modes of Communication.
Aug.: Therefore, when there’s a question raised about certain signs, the signs can be 
shown by means of signs; however, when its about things which aren’t signs, they can 
be shown either by performing them after the question is raised, if they can be 
performed, or by giving signs through which they can be brought to mind.
Adeo.: That’s right.
(5) Classification (TV Signs Shown by Signs.
Aug. : Therefore, in this threefold division let us consider firstly, if you will, that in 
which signs are shown by signs; for surely words aren’t the only signs?
Adeo.: No.
Aug.: It seems to me then that in speaking we signify by words either words 
themselves or other signs, as when we say ‘gesture’ or Tetter’ - for the things 
signified by these two words are none the less signs - or we signify something else 
which isn’t a sign, as when we say ‘stone’. This word is a sign, for it signifies 
something, but what it signifies isn’t necessarily a sign. However, this class, that is 
when those things, which aren’t signs, are signified by words, isn’t relevant to the 
topic which we’ve determined to discuss. For we’ve undertaken to consider that class 
in which signs are shown by means of signs, and in this we’ve discovered two parts, 
since through signs we teach or recall either the same signs or different signs; or 
doesn’t it seem so to you?
Adeo.: No, it’s clear.
8. Aug.: Tell me then to which sense do the signs which are words pertain.
Adeo:. To hearing.
Aug: What of gesture?
Adeo: To sight.
Aug: What of when we find written words, they’re undoubtedly words, aren't they?
Or are they more properly understood as signs of words, as a word is that which is 
uttered in an articulate voice with some significance - however, the voice can’t be 
perceived by any sense other than hearing? So it happens that when a word is written 
it becomes a sign for the eyes, by which that which pertains to the ears may enter the 
mind.
Adeo: I’m in complete agreement.
Aug: I take it that you also agree that when we say ‘name’, we signify something. 
Adeo: That’s true.
Aug: What, then, do we signify?
Adeo: Clearly, what each thing is called, for instance ‘Romulus’, ‘Rome’, ‘virtue’, 
‘river’, and countless other things.
Aug: Those four names surely signify something, don’t they?
Adeo.: Of course.
Aug: Is there no difference between these names and the things which are signified by 
them?
Adeo: A very great difference.
Aug: I’d like to hear from you what it might be.
Adeo: This above all, that the former are signs, and the latter aren’t.
Aug: Shall we agree to call those things, which can be signified by signs and aren’t 
signs, ‘signifiable’, just as we call those things ‘visible’ which can be seen, so as to 
more easily discuss them from now on?
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Adeo.: We shall.
Aug. : Well then, are those four signs, that you just mentioned, signified by no other 
sign?
Adeo.: I’m astonished you think I’ve already forgotten that we discovered that written 
words are signs of those signs which are spoken.
Aug.: Tell me what difference there is between them.
Adeo.: The former are visible, the latter audible; for why not also allow this name, 
‘audible’, if we allow ‘signifiable’?
Aug. : Certainly I’ll allow it and I’m grateful for the suggestion. Yet I ask again, can 
these four signs be signified by no other audible sign, in the same manner as the 
visible ones you recalled?
Adeo. : I recall that this also was said just recently; for I answered that ‘name’ signifies 
something, and set these four names under this signification, and I know that both 
name and these names, if spoken, are audible.
Aug.: What then is the difference between an audible sign and audible significates 
which in turn are signs?
Adeo.: I see this difference between what we call a ‘name’, and those four names 
which we set under its signification, namely that the former is an audible sign of 
audible signs, but that the latter, while they’re audible signs, are not of signs but are 
partly of visible things, such as Romulus, Rome, river, and partly of intelligible 
things, such as virtue.
9. Aug.: I accept and approve of this. Yet, do you know that all things, which are 
uttered by an articulate voice with some significance, are called words?
Adeo. : I do.
Aug.: So, a name is a word, since it’s uttered by an articulate voice with some 
significance. Also, when we say that an eloquent person uses ‘good words’, he 
certainly also uses names, and when the slave in Terence’s play said to his old master 
“Good words, I beg”500, that old man also had spoken many names.
Adeo. : I agree.
Aug.: So, you concede that a name is also signified by these two syllables, which we 
utter when we say ‘word’ (verbum), and for this reason ‘word’ is a sign of ‘name’. 
Adeo.: Yes.
Aug.: I’d like you to answer this also: since ‘word’ is a sign of ‘name’, and ‘name’ is a 
sign of ‘river’, and ‘river’ is a sign of a thing which can now be seen, just as you’ve 
said what the difference is between this thing and ‘river’, which is its sign, and 
between this sign and ‘name’, which is a sign of this sign; what do you think is the 
difference between the sign of ‘name’, which we found to be ‘word’, and ‘name’ 
itself, of which it’s the sign?
Adeo. : I understand the difference is that what is signified by ‘name’ is also signified 
by ‘word’ - for just as ‘name’ is a word, so too is ‘river’ a word. However, those 
things which are signified by ‘word’ aren’t all signified by ‘name’ as well. For, that 
‘i f ,  which the verse you proposed has at its beginning, and this ‘from’ - due to which 
we have, after long effort and with reason as our guide, reached this point - are both 
words and yet are not names, and many such examples are to be found. So, since all 
names are words but not all words are names, I think it’s clear what the difference is 
between ‘word’ and ‘name’, which is to say, it’s the difference between the sign of a 
sign which signifies no other signs, and the sign of a sign which in turn signifies other 
signs.
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Aug. \ Do you concede that every horse is an animal and yet not every animal is a 
horse?
Adeo:. Who could doubt it?
Aug: So, the difference between ‘name’ and ‘word’ is the same as that between horse 
and animal. Unless perhaps you’re discouraged from agreeing by the fact that we 
speak of ‘word’ (verbum) in another way, by which are signified those things that are 
conjugated through tenses, as ‘I write, I wrote’, ‘I read, I have read’. These are clearly 
not names.
Adeo: You’ve stated exactly the doubts I had.
Aug: Don’t let this concern you. For we call ‘signs’ in general all those things which 
signify something, and among these we also find words. We speak of ‘military 
ensigns’ (signa militaria) as well, which are appropriately called signs, but words 
don’t pertain to this class. However, if I were to say to you that as every horse is an 
animal, and yet not every animal a horse, so too every word is a sign, and yet not 
every sign a word; I suppose you wouldn’t have any doubts.
Adeo: I now understand, and certainly agree that the difference between word in 
general and name is the same as that between animal and horse.
10. Aug: Do you also know that when we say ‘animal’, this trisyllabic name, 
which is uttered by the voice, is one thing and what it signifies is another?
Adeo: I’ve already conceded this concerning all signs and signifiables.
Aug: You don’t think that all signs signify something other than what they are, do 
you? For instance, when we say ‘animal’, this trisyllabic word by no means signifies 
the very same thing that it is itself.
Adeo: Not altogether. For when we say ‘sign’, it signifies not only other signs, 
whatever they are, but also itself. I mean, it’s a word and all words are certainly signs.
Aug.: What then with regard to the disyllable, when we say ‘word’ (verbum), surely a 
similar thing occurs? For, if  everything, which is uttered by an articulate voice with 
some significance, is signified by this disyllable, it itself is also included in this class. 
Adeo.: That’s right.
Aug. : Why then, surely it applies similarly to ‘name’? For it signifies names of every 
gender and ‘name’ itself is a name of neuter gender. If I were to ask you what part of 
speech a name is, could you answer me correctly other than by saying ‘name’?
Adeo.: You’re right.
Aug.: So, there are signs, which among the other things, which they signify, also 
signify themselves.
Adeo. : There are.
Aug.: Now, when we say ‘conjunction’ (coniunctio), this four syllable sign doesn’t 
seem to be the same, does it?
Adeo. : Not at all. For, the things which it signifies aren’t names, although it itself is a 
name.
11. Aug.: You’ve been very attentive. Now see whether we can find signs which 
signify each other reciprocally so that just as the former is signified by the latter so 
too is the latter signified by the former. For there is no such relationship between this 
four-syllable word, when we say ‘conjunction’ {coniunctio), and those words, which 
are signified by it, as when we say ‘i f , ‘or’, ‘for’, ‘for surely’, ‘unless’, ‘therefore’, 
‘because’, and the like. These are signified by that one word, however that single 
four-syllable word is signified by none of these.
Adeo.: I see; and I’d like to know which signs do signify each other reciprocally.
Aug.: Don’t you know, then, that when we say ‘name’ and ‘word’ we’re saying two 
words?
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Adeo:. Yes.
Aug: Well, don’t you know that when we say ‘name’ and ‘word’ we’re saying two 
names?
Adeo.: I know this too.
Aug: So you know that ‘name’ is signified by ‘word’ just as ‘word’ is signified by 
‘name’.
Adeo: I agree.
Aug: Can you say what difference there is between them, except that they are written 
and pronounced differently?
Adeo: Perhaps I can; for I see that it’s the same as I said just recently. When we say 
‘words’, we signify everything which is uttered in an articulate voice with some 
significance. For this reason, every name and even ‘name’ itself, when we say it, is a 
word; but not every word is a name, although when we say ‘word’ it’s a name.
12. Aug: What if someone were to state to you and prove that just as every name 
is a word, so too is every word a name, could you find any difference between them 
except in the sound of the letters?
Adeo: I couldn’t, and I don’t think that there is any difference.
Aug: What if all things, which are uttered in an articulate voice with some 
significance, are both words and names, but are words for one reason and names for 
another; will there be no difference between ‘name’ and ‘word’?
Adeo: I don’t understand how that could be.
Aug: At least you understand that everything coloured is visible and everything 
visible coloured, although these two words have a distinct and different signification. 
Adeo: Yes.
Aug.: What, then, if likewise every word is a name and every name is a word, 
although these two names or two words, that is ‘name’ and ‘word’, have a different 
signification?
Adeo. : I see now that it could happen, but I’m waiting for you to explain how.
Aug.: I think you see that everything, which is expressed in an articulate voice with 
some significance, both strikes the ear, so as to be perceived, and is committed to the 
memory, so as to be known.
Adeo.: Yes.
Aug. : So two things happen when we utter something with a sound of this sort.
Adeo.: That’s right.
Aug.: What if words are so called from one of these two and names from the other: 
namely, words {verba) from the striking (verbere), and names (nomina) from the 
knowing (noscere), so that the first should be called after its connection with the ears, 
and the second after its connection with the mind?
13. Adeo.: I’ll concede this when you’ve shown how we can rightly say that every 
word is a name.
Aug.: That’s easy. For I believe that you’ve learned and accept that a pronoun is so 
called because it can stand for a name, though it denotes its object with a less 
complete signification than the name. I think this was the definition which you used to 
repeat to your grammar teacher: a pronoun is a part of speech which, when put in 
place of a name, signifies the same thing but less fully.
Adeo. : I recall this and agree.
Aug.: So, you see that according to this definition, pronouns stand for nothing except 
names and can be used only in the place of names. For example, when we say, ‘this 
man’, ‘the king himself, ‘the same woman’, ‘this gold’, ‘that silver’ - ‘this’,
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‘himself, ‘the same’, ‘this’, and ‘that’ are pronouns; ‘man’, ‘king’, ‘woman’, ‘gold’, 
‘silver’ are names, and these signify the things more fully than the pronouns do.
Adeo:. Yes, I agree.
Aug: Now then, mention a few conjunctions, whichever you like.
Adeo: ‘And’, ‘too’, ‘but’, ‘also’.
Aug: Don’t you think that all of these, which you’ve said, are names?
Adeo: Not at all.
Aug: At least you think I spoke correctly when I said: “...all of these, which you’ve 
said...”?
Adeo: Quite correct. And now I understand how remarkably you’ve shown that I did 
mention names, for otherwise ‘all of these’ could not correctly have been said of 
them. Yet, still, I’m afraid that you seem to me to have spoken correctly only because 
it’s undeniable that these four conjunctions are also words, and so ‘all of these’ can 
correctly be said of them because it’s correct to say ‘all of these words’. However, if 
you ask me what part of speech ‘words’ is, I’ll give no other reply than ‘a name’. So 
perhaps the pronoun was attached to this name, and so, that expression of yours was 
correct.
14. Aug: Your mistake’s subtle. So that you might stop being deceived, pay closer 
attention to what I’m about to say; if I’m able to say what I intend. Using words to 
consider words is as complicated as interlocking and rubbing the fingers of one hand 
with those of the other, where it’s scarcely discernible, except by the person doing it, 
which fingers are itching and which are relieving those that itch.
Adeo: You’ve got my full attention; for this analogy has caught my interest.
Aug: Words surely consist of sound and letters.
Adeo: Yes.
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Aug:. So, to use that authority which is dearest to us, when the Apostle Paul says, “In 
Christ there was not is and is not, but is was in Him”501,1 don’t suppose one should 
think that these three letters, which we enunciate when we say ‘is’ (est), were in 
Christ, but rather that what is signified by these three letters in Him.
Adeo: You’re right.
Aug.: Then you understand that he who said Us was in Him’, said nothing other than 
‘that which was in Him, is called is\ In the same way, if he had said, ‘virtue was in 
Him’, surely he would be taken to have said, ‘that which was in Him, is called virtue’. 
We shouldn’t think that those two syllables, which we enunciate when we say 
‘virtue’, were in Him, but rather what is signified by those two syllables.
Adeo: I understand, and am following you.
Aug: Of course you also understand that there’s no difference in whether one says, 
‘it’s called virtue’ or ‘it’s named virtue’?
Adeo: That’s obvious.
Aug: So it’s just as obvious that there’s no difference in whether someone says, ‘that 
which was in Him, is called is9 or ‘is named is\
Adeo: I don’t see any difference here either.
Aug: Do you now see what I want to show you?
Adeo: Well, not yet.
Aug: So you don’t see that it’s a name by which something is named?
Adeo: Clearly I can see that there’s nothing more certain.
Aug: You can see then that ‘is’ is a name, since that which was in Christ is named 
‘is’.
Adeo: I can’t deny it.
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Aug. : Yet if I were to ask you what part of speech ‘is’ is, I don’t think you’d say that 
it’s a name but that it’s a verb, although reason has shown that it too is a name.
Adeo.: It’s exactly as you say.
Aug.: Surely you don’t still doubt that the other parts of speech are also names in the 
same way as we’ve demonstrated?
Adeo. : I don’t, since I must admit that they signify something. Yet if you ask what 
each of the things, which they signify, are called, or rather, are named, I can give no 
answer except that they’re those parts of speech, which we don't call names, but 
which, as I see, we are constrained to so call.
15. Aug.: Doesn’t it disturb you at all that there might be someone, who could 
upset our argument by saying that authority should be attributed to the Apostle not 
over words but over things; and that for this reason the foundation of this argument is 
not as secure as we think? As it’s possible that, although he lived and taught with 
great rectitude, Paul spoke less correctly when he said Us was in Him’, especially 
since he himself confesses that he is inexperienced in speech. How do you think that 
man could be refuted?
Adeo. : I’ve got no reply. Can you please find one of those to whom is granted the 
greatest knowledge of words, by whose authority you can the better achieve what you 
desire?
Aug. : Then you think that without authorities reason itself is less adequate. Reason 
has demonstrated that all parts of speech signify something and that this something is 
so called on that basis; yet, if something is so called, it’s also named; if named, it’s 
certainly named by a name, which is easily discerned in different languages. If I were 
to ask what the Greeks name that which we name ‘who’, who can’t see that the 
answer is ‘tv;’; or what the Greeks name what we name ‘wish’, that the answer is
‘0eAxo’ ; or what they name what we name ‘well’, that the answer’s ‘kocXok;’; or what 
they name what we name ‘writing’, that the answer’s ‘to yeypa|i|a.evov’; or what 
they name what we name ‘and’, that the answer’s ‘kcci’; or what they name what we 
name ‘from’, that the answer’s ‘arco’; or what they name what we name ‘alas’, that 
the answer’s ‘o i’. In fact, with regard to all those parts of speech, which I’ve just 
listed, he’d speak correctly who was to ask questions in such a way, which wouldn’t 
be possible unless they were names. Therefore, as we’re able, through such reasoning, 
to dispense with the authority of all eloquent men and to hold that the Apostle Paul 
spoke correctly, what need is there to ask which person supports our proposal?
16. Yet in case some slower or more impudent person should still not give in, and 
should refuse to do so except on the authority of those who, it is generally agreed, lay 
down the rules of usage: what can be found in the Latin language of more excellence 
than Cicero? In fact, in his most renowned orations, which are called the Verrines, he 
calls ‘coram’ a name; ‘coram' which is a preposition, or rather, in that particular
502passage, an adverb . However, since it’s possible that I don’t understand that passage 
very well and that it may be interpreted differently at another time either by myself or 
by another, there is, I think, an argument to which there can be no reply. For, the most 
eminent teachers of dialectic tell us that a name and a verb constitute a complete 
statement, which can be affirmed or denied. In a certain passage, Cicero calls this a
503proposition . Now, when the verb is in the third person, they say that the nominative 
case of the name should go with it, and rightly so. For if you’ll consider with me that 
when we say ‘a man sits’ or ‘a horse runs’, I think you recognise that they are two 
propositions.
Adeo.: Yes.
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Aug.: You can see that in each one there’s one name, ‘man’ in one, and ‘horse’ in the 
other, and one verb, ‘sits’ in one, and ‘runs’ in the other.
Adeo.: Yes.
Aug.: So, if I were only to say ‘...sits’ or ‘...runs’, you’d rightly ask me, ‘who?’ or 
‘what?’, so that I’d answer ‘a man’ or ‘a horse’ or ‘an animal’ or anything else by 
which the name could be restored to the verb so as to complete the proposition, that is, 
such a statement as can be affirmed or denied.
Adeo.: I understand.
Aug.: Now pay attention. Imagine we see something rather far away and are uncertain 
whether it’s an animal, a rock, or something else, and I say to you: ‘Because it’s a 
man, it’s an animal’. Wouldn’t I be speaking rashly?
Adeo.: Very much so, but surely it wouldn’t be rash for you to say: ‘If it’s a man, it’s 
an animal’.
Aug.: You’re right. So, the ‘i f  in your statement is acceptable to me and to you, and 
yet the ‘because’ in mine is unacceptable to both of us.
Adeo. : I agree.
Aug. : Now see if these two statements are complete propositions: ‘I f  is acceptable’ 
and ‘Because is unacceptable’.
Adeo.: They are.
Aug.: Now then, in those statements, which are the verbs and which are the names? 
Adeo.: The verbs are ‘is acceptable’ and ‘is unacceptable’. As for the names, what else 
are they than ‘i f  and ‘because’?
Aug.: So, it’s been satisfactorily proved that these two conjunctions are also names. 
Adeo. : Quite so.
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Aug:. Can you prove on your own that this is the same with regards to the other parts 
of speech, according to the same rule?
Adeo: Yes.
17. Aug: Then let us pass on from here. Now tell me, just as we found all words 
to be names and all names to be words, do all names seem likewise to be designations 
(vocabula), and all designations to be names?
Adeo: I don’t clearly see what difference there is between these except the different 
sound of the syllables.
Aug: In the meanwhile I make no objection, although there is no lack of those who 
distinguish them also with regard to signification, but whose opinion there is no need 
to consider just now. But certainly you notice that we have now reached those signs 
which signify each other reciprocally, with no difference between them except sound, 
and which signify themselves together with all the other parts of speech.
Adeo: I don’t understand.
Aug: Then you don’t understand that ‘name’ is signified by ‘designation’ and 
‘designation’ by ‘name’, so that there’s no difference between them except the sound 
of the letters, as far as concerns the general term ‘name’. For we also speak of the 
specialised ‘name’, which among the eight parts of speech is such that it does not 
include the other seven.
Adeo: I understand.
Aug: But this is what I said: ‘designation’ and ‘name’ signify each other reciprocally.
18. Adeo: I grasp that, but I am asking what you meant when saying: ‘They 
signify themselves also along with the other parts of speech’.
Aug.: Surely our previous reasoning has taught us that all the parts of speech can be 
called both names and designations; namely, are able to be signified by both ‘name’ 
and ‘designation’?
Adeo.: That’s right.
Aug. : What then if I were to ask you what you would call ‘name’ itself, that is, that 
sound expressed by two syllables, surely you’d correctly answer ‘a name’?
Adeo.: Yes.
Aug.: Surely this sign, which we enunciate with four syllables when we say 
‘conjunction’ {coniunctio), doesn’t signify itself in this way? For this name cannot be 
counted among those things which it signifies.
Adeo.: Accepted.
Aug. : That is, what was meant by: ‘name’ signifies itself along with the other things 
which it signifies. You can understand for yourself that the same also holds for 
‘designation’.
Adeo. : It’s easy now. But it comes to my mind that ‘name’ is spoken of both generally 
and specifically, yet ‘designation’ is not taken to be among the eight parts of speech. 
Therefore, apart from the difference in sound, I take them to differ in this respect also. 
Aug.: Do you think that ‘name’ and ‘ovojxa’ differ other than in the sound, by which 
also the Latin and Greek languages are discerned?
Adeo.: Here I don’t see any other difference.
Aug.: So we’ve discovered those signs which signify themselves, and the one is in 
turn signified by the other, and whatever is signified by one is signified by the other, 
and there is no difference between them except in sound. For we have just now 
discovered this fourth type; the three previous ones are understood to concern both 
‘name’ and ‘word’.
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Adeo:. Yes it has been discovered.
(6) Review.
19. Aug: Now I’d like you to review what we have found out through our 
discussion.
Adeo: I’ll do so as far as I am able. First of all I recall that we discussed the question 
as to why we speak, and discovered that we speak for the sake of teaching or 
reminding. Since, when we ask a question, we do nothing other than teach the person, 
who is being questioned, what we want to hear. Also in singing, which we seem to do 
for the sake of enjoyment (but the enjoyment is not properly from the speech), and in 
prayer to God, whom we cannot regard to be taught or reminded, the words achieve 
the effect that either we remind ourselves or that others are reminded or taught by us. 
Then, when it was sufficiently clear that words are nothing other than signs, and that 
those things, which do not signify anything, cannot be signs; then you quoted a verse, 
and I tried to show what each of its words signified. The verse w as:4If it pleases the 
gods that nothing from so great a city remain’. We were unable to ascertain what the 
second word (nihil) of this verse signified, although it’s well known and obvious. 
Although it seemed to me that we don’t pointlessly introduce this word in speech, but 
do so as we teach the listener something by it, you responded that perhaps the 
affection of the mind itself is indicated by this word when it finds, or thinks it has 
found, the thing which it was seeking, to be non-existent. Then, avoiding the 
profundity of the question with a joke, you deferred the explanation to another time - 
in case you think that I have forgotten your debt also.
Then, when I was struggling to explain the third word in the verse, you urged me to 
show not another word which meant the same, but rather the thing itself which was 
signified by the word; and when I said that this was impossible for us to do in 
conversation, we came to those things which are shown to enquirers by a pointed 
finger. I thought that all these things were corporeal, but we found this only to hold 
for visible things. Somehow from here we came to the deaf and actors, who not only 
signify things which can be seen, but many other things besides, and virtually 
everything which we say, they signify without the voice but by means of gesture; yet 
we found that these same gestures are signs. Then again we began to ask how we 
could show, without any signs, the things themselves which are signified by signs, 
when that wall, colour, and every visible thing, which is shown by the pointing of a 
finger, was clearly demonstrated to be shown by some sign. Here I was mistaken 
when I said that it was impossible for such a thing to be found, and at length we 
agreed that those things could be demonstrated without a sign which we are not in the 
act of doing when they are asked of us, and which we are able to do after being asked. 
However, speech is not from that class, for even if we were speaking when we were 
asked what speaking is, it was apparent enough that it could easily be demonstrated 
through the act itself.
20. From this we realised that either signs are shown by signs, or other things, 
which are not signs, are shown by signs, or even without signs things, which we can 
do after being asked, can be demonstrated; and of these three we accepted that the 
first should be considered and discussed more diligently. From this discussion it was 
clear that there were partly signs which could not in turn be signified by those signs 
which they signified, as is this four-syllable word, when we say ‘conjunction’
(coniunctio); partly those which can, as when we say ‘sign’ we also signify ‘word’,
and when we say ‘word’ we also signify ‘sign’; for ‘sign’ and ‘word’ are both two 
signs and two words. In this class however, in which they signify each other 
reciprocally, it was shown that some mean not quite the same, some the same to a 
certain degree, and some do indeed mean the same thing. For this two syllable word, 
which sounds when we say ‘sign’ (signum), signifies everything by which anything is 
signified; however, when we say ‘word’, it is not a sign of all signs, but only of those 
uttered by an articulate voice. From which it is clear that, although ‘word’ is signified 
by ‘sign’, and ‘sign’ by ‘word’, that is, the former two syllables (verbum) by the latter 
{signum) and the latter by the former; ‘sign’ has a wider range of meaning than 
‘word’, namely, the latter two syllables signify more than the former. However,
‘word’ in its general sense means just as much as ‘name’ in its general sense. For our 
reasoning showed that all parts of speech are also names, because pronouns can be 
added to them, and concerning all of them it can be said that they name something; 
and there is not one of them which cannot complete a proposition when a verb is 
joined to it. Although ‘name’ and ‘word’ have the same range of meaning for the 
reason that all things, which are words, are also names; nevertheless, they are not the 
same. For it was argued, with enough probability, that they are called words for one 
reason and names for another. Indeed, it was shown that one of these was denoted 
with regard to the reverberation in the ear and the other with regard to the recollection 
in the mind. This can be understood from the fact that in speaking we rightly say, 
‘What is the name of this thing?’, when we want to commit a thing to memory; but 
are not accustomed to say, ‘What is the word for this thing?’. We found ‘name’ and 
‘ovopa’ to not only have the same range of meaning, but to signify exactly the same 
thing, and there to be no difference between them except the sound of the letters. 
Indeed, in that class in which they signify themselves reciprocally, I forgot that we
found no sign which does not signify itself also among the other things which it 
signifies.
I’ve recalled these things as well as I can. Now you, whom I think said nothing in this 
discussion except with knowledge and assurance, can see whether I have summarised 
these things well and in good order.
21. Aug:. You have indeed recalled satisfactorily from memory everything which I 
wanted and I must confess that these distinctions now seem much clearer to me than 
when we were both, through enquiry and discussion, rooting them out from I know 
not what hiding places. What end I strive to reach with you through so twisting a 
route is difficult to say at this point. Perhaps you think that we’re playing a game and 
divert the mind from serious matters, as it were, with childish problems; or that we 
seek some small and mediocre expedient; or if you suspect that this discussion is to 
produce something great, perhaps you want to know it right now, or at least to hear it. 
I’d want you to believe that I didn’t undertake this conversation for cheap sport, 
although we may perhaps have been amusing ourselves, yet that should not be 
considered in a childish sense, nor should it be thought that the benefits are small or 
mediocre. If I were to say that there is a certain blessed and eternal life, to which I 
desire that we be led by God the guide, namely Truth itself, along certain steps suited 
to our feeble gait; I am afraid that I may seem ridiculous, I who began to set out upon 
so great a way in consideration not of things in themselves, which are signified, but in 
that of their signs. Therefore, you’ll grant me pardon if I play this prelude with you, 
not for the sake of play, but to exercise the strength and sharpness of the mind, by 
means of which we might be able not only to endure the heat and light of that region, 
where is the blessed life, but also to love them.
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Adeo: Go on as you’ve begun; for I would never think those things contemptible 
which you think worthy of speech or act.
(7) Classification (2.1): Things Shown by Signs.
22. Aug.: Let’s consider the division when other signs are not signified by signs,
but those things which we call signifiables (significabilia). In the first place tell me 
whether man {homo) is man {homo).
Adeo:. Now I truly don’t know whether you’re fooling or not.
Aug.: Why so?
Adeo: Because you think it need be asked of me whether man is anything other than 
man.
Aug: So you would think that fun is being made of you if I were also to ask whether 
the first syllable of this name is other than 'ho' and the second other than 'm o'.
Adeo: Certainly.
Aug: But those two syllables together make 4homo’; or will you deny this?
Adeo: Who could deny it?
Aug: So I’m asking whether you’re those two syllables joined together?
Adeo.: In no way, but I see what you mean.
Aug: Tell me then, so that you don’t think me offensive.
Adeo: You think the conclusion is that I’m not a man.
Aug: Don’t you think the same, since you grant the truth of all the previous 
arguments from which this is deduced?
Adeo:. I’ll not tell you what I think until I firstly hear whether, when you asked 
whether ‘man’ is ‘man’, you were asking me about those two syllables or about the 
thing which they signify.
Aug: Rather, you answer in the sense in which you took my question; for if it’s 
ambiguous, you should have been wary of this first of all and not answered me until 
you were sure in what way I had asked it.
Adeo: Why should this ambiguity impede me, when I have answered both questions? 
For ‘man’ certainly is ‘man’; and those two syllables are nothing other than those two 
syllables, that is, what they signify is nothing other than that which ‘man’ is.
Aug: Very clever, but why have you taken this alone in both senses called ‘man’, and 
not the other things which we spoke of?
Adeo.: Why am I being taken to task for not taking the others also in such a way? 
Aug: To omit other reasons, in regard to the very first question of mine if you had 
taken it entirely in the sense of the syllable sounds, you would not have answered me 
at all; for I would have seemed to you not to have asked anything. Now when I in fact 
pronounced three words, I repeated the middle one, saying ‘whether man is man’ 
(utrum homo homo sit), you took the first and last words not according to them as 
signs, but in accordance with those things which are signified by them. And from this 
alone it is immediately clear that you thought, in all certainty, that the question should 
be answered.
Adeo: You’re right.
Aug: Then why did you decide to take in that way only the word which is placed in 
the middle, namely both according to its sound and according to what it signifies? 
Adeo: Look, I’m actually taking it in its entirety from that aspect only by which it is 
signified; for I agree that we cannot hold a discussion at all unless the mind is carried
by the words that we hear to those things whose signs they are. So, now show me how 
I was deceived by this reasoning, through which it is concluded that I am not a man. 
Aug:. Rather, I’ll ask the same questions again, so that you may yourself discover 
where you went wrong.
Adeo: Fine.
23. Aug: I’ll not ask what I asked firstly, since you’ve already conceded it. So, 
consider carefully whether the syllable "ho" is nothing other than ‘ho’ and whether 
‘mo’ is nothing other than ‘mo’.
Adeo: Here I see absolutely nothing else.
Aug: Consider also whether ‘man’ (homo) results from the combination of these two. 
Adeo: In no way should I have granted this; for it was accepted, and rightly so, that 
when a sign is given one should pay heed to that which is signified, and from 
consideration of this grant or deny what is said. However, as to those syllables 
pronounced separately, because they have sound without any significance, it was 
granted that they are the sounds themselves.
Aug: Therefore, you accept and hold that one should not answer questions except 
with regard to those things signified by words.
Adeo: I don’t see why it should be unsatisfactory, if they are only words.
Aug: I’d like to know how you would reply to that man, about whom we hear in the 
joke that he concluded that a lion came out of the mouth of a person with whom he 
was arguing. For when he had asked whether those things which we say come out of 
our mouths, and the other was unable to deny it; he caused the man, and he I so easily, 
to say lion in the course of the discussion. When this was done he began to scoff at 
the ridiculous nature of this and to insist that since he had admitted that whatever we
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say comes out of our mouth and that he could not deny that he had said lion, 
therefore a decent fellow seemed to have spewed up so terrible a beast.
Adeo:. It would not be difficult to refute this trickster; for I would not concede that 
whatever we say comes out of our mouth. Those things which we speak of we signify; 
not the thing, which is signified, but the sign, by which it is signified, issues from the 
mouth of the speaker, except when signs themselves are signified - a class which we 
discussed earlier.
24. Aug: Indeed, in this way you would be well prepared against him. Yet what 
answer would you give me if I were to ask whether ‘man’ is a name?
Adeo: What else except that it is a name?
Aug. : When I see you, surely I don’t see a name?
Adeo: No.
Aug: Do you want me then to tell you what follows?
Adeo: Please don’t. For the refutation itself shows me that I am not ‘man’, since 
when you asked me whether ‘man’ was a name I replied that it was. For we decided to 
assent to or deny what is said from the basis of the thing which is signified.
Aug: Yet it seems to me that you have not in vain fallen into this reply; for the very 
law of reason itself, imposed upon our minds, overcame your vigilance. If I were to 
ask what man is, you would perhaps reply ‘an animal’; however, if I were to ask what 
part of speech ‘man’ is, you could in no manner reply correctly except by saying ‘a 
name’. Therefore, since ‘man’ is found to be both a name and an animal, the former is 
said as a result of that division by which it is a sign and the latter from that by which it 
is being signified. Therefore, to him who asks whether man is a name I should give no 
other reply than ‘it is’; for he adequately signifies that he wishes to hear an answer 
from that division by which it is a sign. If however he asks whether it is an animal, I
should answer much more readily; for if, remaining reticent about ‘name’ and 
‘animal’, he were only to ask what man {homo) is, the mind (by that accepted rule of 
speech) would hasten to that which is signified by these two syllables and would give 
no reply other than ‘an animal’; or even the whole definition would be stated, namely, 
‘a rational, mortal animal’. Or does it not seem so to you?
Adeo.: Absolutely. But when we granted that it is a name, how are we to avoid that 
extremely insulting conclusion by which we are deduced not to be men?
Aug:. How do you think but by making clear that the inference is not drawn from that 
division in which we agreed with the questioner. Or if he admits that he inferred it 
from the other division, it should by no means be feared. For why should I be afraid to 
admit that I am not ‘man’ {hominem), that is, those three syllables?
Adeo: Nothing could be truer. Therefore, why does the mind take offence when one 
says: ‘Therefore you are not man’; since according to what was granted nothing truer 
could be said?
Aug. : Because, as soon as those words are pronounced, I am unable but to think that 
the conclusion refers to that which is signified by these two syllables, that is, in 
accordance with the rule which is naturally the more forceful, so that when the signs 
are heard the attention is carried towards the things signified.
Adeo: I accept what you say.
25. Aug: Now then, I want you to understand that the things which are signified 
should be given more weight than the signs. For whatever exists on account of 
something else is necessarily of less worth than that on account of which it exists, 
unless you think otherwise.
Adeo: I think that here one should not rashly agree; for when we say ‘excrement’, I 
think this name is by far superior to the thing it signifies. What offends us when
hearing the word does not pertain to the sound of the word itself; for the name 
‘excrement’ (<caenum), by virtue of one changed letter, becomes ‘heaven’ {caelum). 
But between the things signified by these names we see how great the difference is. 
Therefore, I should in no way attribute to this sign what we loathe in the thing which 
it signifies; and moreover I rightly prefer the former (sign) to the latter (thing), for we 
more willingly hear the former than come into contact with the latter with any of our 
senses.
Aug:. You’re very vigilant. So it is false that all things should be given more weight 
than their signs.
Adeo: So it seems.
Aug: Therefore, tell me what do you think those people intended who gave a name to 
this foul and detestable thing; or whether you approve or disapprove of them?
Adeo: I dare not approve or disapprove of them, nor do I know what they intended. 
Aug: Are you at least able to know what you intend when pronouncing this name? 
Adeo: I can clearly do this; for I want to signify that I am teaching or am reminding 
him, with whom I am talking, about that thing which I deem he should be taught or 
reminded about.
Aug: This teaching or reminding, or this being taught or reminded, which either you 
fully express by means of this name or is expressed to you, must surely be held as 
more important than the name itself?
Adeo: I grant that the knowledge which results from this sign is more important than 
the self same sign, but I do not think likewise as regards the thing itself.
26. Aug: Therefore, in our opinion, although it is false that all things should be 
preferred to their signs, it is however not false that everything which exists on account 
of something else is more worthless than that on account of which it exists. Certainly
406
the knowledge of excrement, on account of which this name was established, should 
be held of more worth than the name itself, which we ascertained to be preferable to 
the self-same excrement. For it is not for any other reason that this knowledge is 
considered superior to the sign, with which we are concerned, unless it is because the 
sign is demonstrated to exist on account of the knowledge, and not the knowledge on 
account of the sign. As when a certain glutton and, as the Apostle says, a worshipper 
of his belly504 said that he lived so that he might eat; a frugal man who heard him was 
unable to endure this and said, ‘How much better it would be were you to eat so as to 
live’. He said this according to the very same rule; for the glutton caused displeasure 
for no other reason than that he valued his own life so little that he regarded it cheaper 
than the pleasure of the palate, when saying that he lived for feasting. The other man 
justly deserves praise because in regard to these two things, understanding which 
exists on account of which, that is, what was inferior to what, he warned that one must 
eat rather so as to live than live so as to eat. Similarly, to some talkative lover of 
words who were to say ‘I teach so as to talk’, both you and some other man not 
unskilled in discernment would respond ‘My man, why don’t you rather speak so as 
to teach?’
If these are true, as you recognise them to be, you surely see how much the less words 
ought to be considered than that on account of which we use the words, since the very 
use of words should now be held superior to the words. For words exist so that we 
may use them; however, we use them for teaching. Therefore, in proportion as 
teaching is better than speaking, so speaking is better than words. So, instruction is 
much better than words. But I want to hear what objections you may want to make.
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Rom. 16:18.
27. Adeo.: I agree that instruction is better than words, but I don’t know whether 
there isn’t something which can be used in objection to that rule by which it is said 
that everything which exists on account of something else is inferior to that on 
account of which it exists.
Aug.\ We’ll discuss this more conveniently and more thoroughly at another time. For 
the present, what you concede is enough for that which I want to establish. For you 
grant that the understanding of things is more valuable than their signs; and so, an 
understanding of things which are signified must be preferred to an understanding of 
signs. Or does it not seem so to you?
Adeo. \ Surely I conceded not that a knowledge of things is superior to a knowledge of 
signs but rather to the signs themselves? And so, I’m apprehensive about agreeing 
with you here. For what if, just as the name ‘excrement’ is superior to the thing which 
it signifies, so too the knowledge of this name is also superior to the knowledge of the 
thing, although the name itself is inferior to this understanding? Indeed there are four 
things here: the name and the thing, the knowledge of the name and the knowledge of 
the thing. Therefore, just as the first is superior to the second, why not also the third to 
the fourth? But were it not superior, surely it should not be inferior?
28. Aug.: I see how remarkably you have both upheld what you’ve granted and 
explained what you’ve thought. But, as I think, you understand that this trisyllabic 
name, which is pronounced when we say ‘vice’ (vitium), is superior to that which it 
signifies, although the knowledge of the name itself is far inferior to the knowledge of 
vices. Therefore, although you may also distinguish these four; and consider the name 
and the thing, the knowledge of the name and the knowledge of the thing, we justly 
place the first before the second. For when Persius says, ‘But he is benumbed by 
vice’, this name, when placed in the poem, does not debase the verse, but indeed adds
some embellishment; yet when the thing which is signified by this name is present in 
anyone, it compels them to be vicious. But the third thing does not thus excel the 
fourth, rather we observe that the fourth surpasses the third. For a knowledge of this 
name is inferior to a knowledge of vices.
Adeo:. Even when this knowledge makes people more miserable, do you think it is 
preferable? For the same Persius places this one before all punishments, which either 
the cruelty of tyrants has devised or their greed calculated, by which men are tortured 
who are compelled to acknowledge vices which they cannot avoid?
Aug: In this way you could deny that the knowledge even of the virtues should be 
preferred to the knowledge of this name (virtue), because to see virtue and not to have 
it is a torment; a torment with which that same satirist hoped the tyrants would be 
punished.
Adeo: May God avert this madness. For I now understand that it is not knowledge 
itself, with which the best instruction of all imbues the mind, which is to be blamed; 
but those people should be judged the most miserable of all, just as I think Persius 
deemed, who are affected by such a disease that not even so great a medicine can 
relieve.
Aug: You understand well; but whatever the opinion of Persius means to him, what is 
it to us? For we are not subjected to the authority of such as him in these matters. 
Besides, if one knowledge is to be preferred to another sort, it’s not easy to explain 
here. I am satisfied that it has been shown that the knowledge of things which are 
signified, even if it is not superior to the knowledge of signs, is nevertheless superior 
to the signs themselves.
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(8) Classification (2.2): Things Shown bv Performance.
Therefore, now let’s analyse in preference that class of things which we said could be 
shown through themselves, without signs, such as speaking, walking, sitting, lying, 
and others of this sort.
Adeo.: I recall what you’re talking about.
29. Aug.: Do you think that all actions which we’re able to do as soon as we are 
asked can be shown without a sign, or is there any exception?
Adeo.: Considering this whole class again and again I still can’t find anything which 
can be taught without a sign, except perhaps speaking, and perhaps teaching if 
someone were to ask what it is. For whatever I should do after his question, so that he 
may learn, I don’t deviate from the act itself which he wants demonstrated to him. If, 
for example, someone were to ask me what walking is while I was doing nothing, as 
has been said, or while doing something else; and immediately I should try, without 
signs, to teach him what he wants to know by walking. How am I to warn him against 
thinking that walking only consists in as much as I have walked? And if he thinks 
this, he’ll be deceived; for he will not judge anyone who has walked more or less than 
I to have walked. And what I have said about this one word applies to everything 
which I had agreed could be shown, apart from those two which we have excepted.
30. Aug.: I accept this; but doesn’t speaking seem to you to be one thing, teaching 
another?
Adeo. : Certainly. For if they were the same no one would teach without speaking. But 
since we teach many things by signs other than words, who could doubt the 
difference?
Aug.: Are teaching and signifying different or are they not?
Adeo. : I think they’re the same.
Aug. : Surely he speaks rightly who says that we signify so as to teach?
Adeo.: Absolutely.
Aug. : What if someone were to say that we teach so as to signify, he can be easily 
refuted by the previous statement, can’t he?
Adeo.: That’s right.
Aug.: Therefore, if we signify so as to teach but do not teach so as to signify, teaching 
is one thing, signifying another.
Adeo. : You’re right, and I was wrong to reply that both were the same.
Aug.: Now answer whether he who teaches what teaching is does so by signifying or 
otherwise?
Adeo. : I don’t see how he can do it otherwise.
Aug. : So you were wrong just recently in saying that a thing can be taught without 
signs; since, when it is asked what teaching is, we see that not even this can be done 
without giving signs, as you’ve granted that signifying is one thing and teaching 
another. For if they are different, as it appears, and teaching can’t be demonstrated 
except through giving signs, it certainly can’t be demonstrated through itself, as 
seemed so to you. So, as yet, nothing has been found which can be shown through 
itself except speech, which also signifies itself among other things. Yet since it is 
itself a sign also, it is not yet entirely clear what can apparently be taught without 
signs.
Adeo.: I have no reason not to agree.
31. Aug. : Therefore it is agreed that nothing can be taught without signs and that 
knowledge itself should be dearer to us than the signs by which we gain knowledge, 
although not everything which is signified can be superior to its own signs.
Adeo/. So it seems.
Aug.: Can you remember the long circuitous route by which we achieved so small a 
result? For since we began our verbal wrangling, which we have done for so long, it 
has been a toil to discover these three points: whether nothing can be taught without 
signs; whether certain signs should be preferred to the things which they signify; and 
whether the understanding of things itself is better than their signs. But there is a 
fourth point, which I would like briefly to ascertain from you: whether you think that 
our findings are such that you cannot now have doubts about them.
Adeo.\ Fd wish that through such circumlocutions and intricacies we had arrived at 
certainty. But your question somehow worries me and deters me from agreeing. For I 
think you would not have asked this of me unless you had some contradiction to 
make; and the very complexity of the issues disallows me from wholly examining 
them and from safely responding. I fear that in such envelopments there is something 
hidden which the keenness of my mind might not reveal.
Aug. : I willingly accept your hesitation; for it signifies an in no way imprudent mind, 
which is the greatest guardian of serenity. It is extremely difficult not to be perturbed, 
when those things which we held with easy and ready approval are shaken by 
opposing arguments and are, as it were, tom from our grasp. Therefore, as it is 
reasonable to yield to arguments well considered and proven, so it is perilous to hold 
the unknown as known. For, since those things are often undermined which we most 
steadfastly presume will remain firm and established, there is the fear that we fall into 
such hatred or fear of reason that it might not seem worthy to have trust even in 
evident tmth.
32. But come, let us more freely reconsider whether you rightly thought that those 
things should be doubted. For I ask you, if someone ignorant of how to deceive birds,
which are captured with canes and birdlime, were to meet a bird-catcher who was 
equipped with his tools but was not actually hunting, but was rather making a journey. 
And on seeing the bird-catcher he were to hurry up and, as happens, in wondering to 
himself were to reflect and ask himself what the man’s equipment were to mean; yet, 
when the bird-catcher saw the other paying attention to him, in an eagerness to show 
off, were to disengage his canes and seeing some small bird nearby were to intercept, 
overcome, and capture it with his reeds and hawk. Surely, he would teach the 
spectator without any signification but by means of the thing which he desired to 
know?
Adeo:. I fear that what is here is such as I said concerning that man who asks what 
walking is; for I don’t see that even here the whole of bird catching has been shown. 
Aug: It’s easy to free you from this concern. For I add that we suppose him intelligent 
enough to learn the complete character of the art from what he has seen; it is enough 
to make the point that some people are able to be taught some things without signs, 
even if not all things.
Adeo: To that I can add this also: if he were intelligent enough he would learn all that 
walking is when it is demonstrated by a few steps.
Aug: It’s acceptable to me that you do so and I not only have no objection but favour 
this. You see it has been shown by both of us that some people can be taught certain 
things without signs and that is false which a short time ago seemed correct to us, 
namely, that nothing can be shown without signs. For now from these examples there 
occur to me not one thing or another, but thousands of things which are demonstrated 
through themselves without any sign. Why, I ask you, should we doubt this?
Omitting the innumerable spectacles which men directly exhibit in all the theatres 
without signs, does not God and nature exhibit and show, through themselves, to
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those beholding them, the sun itself and the light which pours forth and clothes all 
these things, also the moon and other stars, the land and the seas, and all the things 
which are innumerably begotten in them?
(9) Things and Signs.
33. What then if we consider this more carefully, perhaps you will find nothing 
which can be learned through its own signs. For when a sign is given to me, if it 
should find me ignorant of the thing whose sign it is, it can teach me nothing, but if it 
find me in a position of knowledge, what am I to learn through the sign? When I read, 
‘Their sarabarae were not changed’505; the word ‘sarabarae’ does not show me the 
thing which is signified. If certain coverings for the head are called by this name, 
surely on hearing this I have not learned either what a head is or what coverings are? I 
knew these things before and knowledge of them did not come to me when they were 
named by others, but when I saw them. For when first those two syllables, when we 
say ‘head’ {caput), struck my ears, I was as ignorant of what they signified as when 
first I heard or read ‘sarabarae’. But when ‘head’ was often repeated I discovered, 
through noting and marking when it was said, that it was the designation for a thing 
which was already well known to me by sight. Before I discovered this, the word was 
only a sound to me; but I learned that it was a sign when I discovered of what thing it 
was the sign, which indeed, as I have said, I had learned not by signification but by 
seeing it. So the sign is learned more through the perception of the thing than the 
thing is learned through the giving of the sign.
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34. That you may understand more clearly, imagine that we now hear ‘head’ being 
spoken for the first time, and in ignorance as to whether it is only a vocal sound or 
whether it also signifies something, ask what ‘head’ is - remember that we wish to 
have knowledge not of the thing which is signified, but of the sign itself which we 
clearly lack as long as we are ignorant of that which it is the sign of. So, if enquiring 
in this way, the thing itself is pointed out to us, it is by seeing it that we learn the sign 
which we had only heard, but had not yet known. Yet since there are two elements in 
this sign, namely, sound and signification, we certainly do not perceive the sound by 
means of the sign but through the ear being struck by the sound; but we perceive the 
signification by seeing the thing which is signified. For that pointing of the finger can 
signify nothing other than that to which it is pointed; it is not, however, pointed 
towards the sign but to the member which is called the head. Therefore, by that 
pointing I am not able to know the thing which I had already known, nor the sign 
towards which the finger is not pointed. But I am not overly concerned with the 
pointing of the finger, because it seems to me a sign of the indication rather than of 
the other things which are being shown, just like the adverb which we call Took!’ 
(ecce). Indeed, we are accustomed to point even with this adverb, in case one sign of 
indication should not be enough. I am above all striving to convince you, if I can, that 
we leam nothing through those signs which are called words. As I have said, we learn 
the force of a word, that is its signification which is hidden in the sound, by 
comprehending the thing itself which is signified, rather than perceive the reality by 
means of such signification.
35. And as I have said about ‘head’, I might also say concerning ‘coverings’ and 
countless other things; yet although I now know about these, I still don’t yet know 
about those sarabarae. If someone were to signify them to me by means of gestures,
or were to paint them, or show me something which they are like, that I may not say 
that he does not teach me (which I could easily prove, if I wanted to speak slightly 
longer); but what is to the point is that he would not be teaching me with words. And 
if, seeing them by chance when I was present, he should catch my attention and say: 
‘Look, there are sarabarae'\ I should leam what I did not know, not through the 
words which were spoken, but by seeing it, and through this act of seeing it occurred 
that I grasped and understood what that name meant. For when I learned of the thing 
itself, I did not trust another’s words but my own eyes; yet perhaps I did believe those 
words so that I might direct my attention, that is to say, so that I might seek by 
looking at what I would see.
36. As far as I can grant it, words are important in that they only urge us to seek 
things, but do not show them to us that we may know them. However, he teaches me 
something who shows those things, which I wish to know, to my eyes, to any other 
bodily sense, or indeed to my mind itself. Therefore, by words we leam nothing 
except words, in fact only the sound and murmur of words; for if those things which 
are not signs cannot be words, although I have already heard a word, I do not know 
that it is a word until I know what it signifies. It follows that when things are 
understood, the understanding of words is also achieved; indeed, when words are 
heard, not even the words are learned. Those words which we know, we do not leam, 
and those which we do not know, we cannot grant ourselves to have learned except by 
grasping the signification of them; and this happens not by the hearing of vocal 
emissions, but by the understanding of the things signified. For certain it is the truest 
reasoning and is truthfully said that when words are uttered either we know what they 
signify or we do not; if we do, we are reminded rather than taught, and if we do not, 
we are not even reminded, but are perhaps being urged to enquire.
(10) Knowledge.
37. But if you were to say that we could not recognise, unless we saw them, those 
coverings for heads whose name we possess only as a sound and that we cannot fully 
know the name unless we recognise the things; yet we do nevertheless accept that 
story concerning the boys506, how they overcame the king and the flames through their 
faith and piety, what praise they sang to God, what honour they received even from 
their very enemy himself Surely we have not learned of these things other than 
through words? I’ll reply that everything which is signified by these words were 
already within our knowing. For what ‘three boys’ are, what ‘a furnace’, what ‘fire’, 
what ‘a king’, and finally, what ‘unharmed by fire’, and all the other things which 
these words signify, I already knew. But Ananias, Azarias, and Misael are as 
unknown to me as those sarabarae, nor have these names helped me at all to know 
them, nor are they able to help me now. Yet all of these things, which are read of in 
that account happened at that time just as is written; this I confess myself to believe 
rather than to know. And those same people whom we believe were not ignorant of 
that difference; for the Prophet says, ‘Unless you believe, you will not understand’507. 
He would surely not have said this, if he did not judge that there was a difference. 
Therefore, what I understand, I also believe; but not everything which I believe, do I 
also understand. Yet everything which I understand, I know; but I do not know 
everything which I believe. But I am not therefore unaware how useful it is to believe 
also many things which I do not know; and to this usefulness I ascribe also the 
account of the three boys. Therefore, although most things I cannot know, yet I knowr 
how useful it is to believe them.
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38. Concerning, however, all those things which we understand, we do not consult 
a speaker who sounds from without, but rather we consult the Truth which presides 
over the very mind within, though perhaps urged by words to take consultation. He 
who is consulted does teach; He who is said to dwell in the inner man is Christ; that 
is, the unchangeable Power and eternal Wisdom of God. The Wisdom which every 
rational soul consults, but to each only so much is disclosed as they are able to take 
due to their own good or evil will. And if ever one is deceived, it does not occur 
through some fault in the consulted Truth, just as it is not a fault of the light, which is 
outside, that our corporeal eyes are often deceived; and this light we admit ourselves 
to consult as regards visible things that it may reveal them to us, as far as we are able 
to see them.
39. If we consult light with regard to colours, and regarding the other things which 
we perceive through the body, we consult the elements of this world and the same 
bodies which we perceive, and the senses themselves which the mind uses, as it were, 
as interpreters for knowing such things; and, further, regarding those things which are 
intelligible, we consult the inner truth through reasoning; what can be said, from 
where is the clarity that we leam something through words other than the sound itself 
which strikes our ears? For everything we perceive, we perceive by bodily sense or by 
the mind. The former we call sensible, the latter intelligible or, that I may speak in the 
manner of our own authors, we call the former carnal, the latter spiritual. When we 
are asked about the former, we reply, if the things which we perceive through the 
senses are present, just as when we are looking at a new moon it is asked of us of 
what sort or where it is. In this case, if he who does the asking does not see the object, 
he believes the words and often does not believe them; however he in no way learns
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unless he himself sees what is being spoken of, where he now learns not by words, but 
by the things themselves and by his senses. For the words have the same sound for 
one who sees as for one who does not see. But when there is enquiry not about those 
things which we perceive in person, but about those which we formerly perceived, we 
now talk not of the things themselves but of the images impressed by them and 
committed to the memory. How we can at all talk of these as being true when we can 
see that they are false, I shall ignore; unless it is because we say that we do not see 
and perceive them, but that we have seen them and have perceived them. Thus we 
bear these images in the recesses of our memory as some sort of proof of things 
previously perceived, which we contemplate in the mind and can speak of with clear 
conscience that we do not lie. But these are proofs for us; for if one who hears this has 
perceived these things and paid attention, he does not leam by my words but himself 
recalls the images set away within himself. Yet, if he does not perceive them, who 
does not understand that he believes my words rather than leams by them?
40. But when it concerns those things which we perceive in the mind, that is by 
the intellect and reason, we speak of those things which we contemplate instantly in 
that inner light of tmth, through which he who is called the inner man gains 
enlightenment and pleasure. Then he who hears me, if he also sees those things with a 
private and sincere eye, knows what I speak of through his own contemplation, not 
through my words. Therefore, I don’t even teach this man even though I speak the 
truth and he sees the truth; for he is taught not by my words, but by the things 
themselves manifested by God revealing them inwardly. So, when asked about these 
things, he could reply. What could be more absurd than to think that he is taught 
through my speech, who, before I spoke, could explain these very things if asked? For 
as often happens, when one is asked he denies something and when asked further
questions is compelled to admit it; this occurs due to the weakness of his vision, as he 
is unable to consult that light with regard to the whole matter, which he is urged to 
deal with by parts, when he is asked about these parts on which the whole depends, 
which he was unable to discern in its totality. If in this situation he is persuaded by the 
words of the man who questions him, yet he is not taught by the words, but they put 
him to enquiry in such a way as that man by whom it is sought is able to leam 
inwardly. Just as if I were to ask you concerning this very subject which is being 
discussed whether nothing can be taught through words, and at first it would seem 
absurd to you, being unable to see it in its entirety; so it would be necessary to 
question you so that your strength could direct itself for hearing that inward Teacher. 
So I should say, ‘Where did you leam those things which, when I was talking, you 
admitted to be true, and are certain and confirm that you know them?’ You would 
perhaps reply that I taught you. Then I would add, ‘What if I were to say that I had 
seen a man flying; would my words give so much certainty to you, just as if you were 
to hear that wise men are better than fools?’ You would surely deny it and reply that 
you did not believe it or, even if you believed, that you did not know it; yet that you 
certainly knew the latter statement. From this you would certainly understand that you 
had not learned anything from my words, either in the case where you did not know 
what I affirmed, nor in that where you knew very well, since, when asked about each 
of them, you would swear that you were ignorant of the former and that you knew the 
latter. Then indeed you will admit that whole proposal, which you had denied, when 
you have understood clearly and certainly those things from which it is ascertained; 
namely, that regarding all the things which we say the hearer either does not know 
whether they are true, or knows they are false, or knows they are true. In the first of 
these three options he either believes, supposes, or doubts; in the second he opposes
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and denies; in the third he attests to its truth. Therefore, in none of them does he leam, 
because he who does not know the thing after our words, he who knows that he has 
heard what is false, and he who could, when asked, have answered with the same 
words which had been spoken, prove that nothing had been taught through the words.
(11) Speakers’ Words and Speakers’ Minds.
41. For this reason, in those things also which are perceived in the mind, whoever 
cannot discern them listens in vain to the words of him who can, except that it is 
useful to believe such things as long as one is ignorant of them. Yet, whoever is able 
to discern them is inwardly a disciple of the truth and outwardly a judge of the 
speaker, or rather of the words themselves; for, generally, he knows those things 
which are said, even when the speaker himself is ignorant. Just as if someone, who 
believes in the Epicureans and thinks that the soul is mortal, sets forth the arguments 
which are propounded by wiser men concerning its immortality, for a listener who can 
perceive spiritual things, and judges him to speak truly. And the man who is speaking, 
is ignorant as to whether he is speaking the tmth; indeed he even esteems them utterly 
false. So, surely one cannot think that he teaches those things which he does not 
know? Yet he uses the same words which one with knowledge could also use.
42. Therefore it is not even left to words that at least the mind of the speaker is 
revealed by them if it is indeed uncertain whether he knows those things which he is 
saying. Add also the liars and deceivers, through whom you can easily understand that 
the mind is not only unrevealed, but is even concealed by them. In no way do I doubt 
that the words of tmthful people try, and make some claim to reveal the mind of the 
speaker which they would bring about, with the acceptance of all, if liars were not
allowed to speak. And yet we have often experienced both in ourselves and in others 
that words are uttered not of those things which are thought about; which I see can 
happen in two ways: either when a speech is committed to memory and when often 
spoken comes out of the mouth of one thinking of other things, which often happens 
to us when singing a hymn; or when some words rush out in the place of others, 
against our will and by a slip of the tongue. Here also the signs of those things which 
we have in mind are not heard. In fact, liars also think about those things which they 
are saying, so that even if we don’t know whether they are speaking the truth, we do 
nevertheless know that they do have in mind what they are saying, provided one of 
those two things which I mentioned does not happen to them. If anyone contends that 
these things both happen occasionally and are apparent when they do, though they are 
often hidden and have often escaped my notice when listening, nevertheless I make no 
objection.
43. But there occurs, in addition to these, another class which is certainly widely 
evident and is the seed of innumerable dissentions and disputes; when the speaker 
signifies what he is thinking of, but generally only to himself and to some others, but 
does not signify the same thing to him whom he addresses and to some other people. 
For someone may say, with us overhearing, that mankind is surpassed in virtue by 
certain beasts; we are immediately unable to accept this, and with great insistence 
refute this statement as absolutely false and pernicious. When he is perhaps calling 
bodily strength ‘virtue’ and expresses by this name what he is thinking of, and he 
neither lies, nor is in error with regard to those things, nor does he use words 
committed to memory, while thinking of something else. Neither does he, by a slip of 
the tongue, utter something other than he intended, but merely calls that which he is 
thinking of by another name than we do; and concerning that thing we should
immediately agree with him, if we were able to see his thought which he has been 
unable to reveal to us through the words he used and in expressing his opinion. They 
say that definitions can remedy this sort of mistake, so that in this case, if he were to 
define what ‘virtue5 is, he would make clear, they say, that the dispute concerns the 
word not the thing. I would grant that this is so, but how many can be found who are 
good at definitions? Yet there have been many disputes over the discipline of giving 
definitions, which are unsuitable to consider at this point, and I don’t entirely approve 
of them.
44. I omit the fact that there are many things which we do not hear well and argue 
much and long about what we have heard, just as recently with regard to a certain 
Punic word when I had said it meant ‘compassion5, you said that you had heard that it 
meant ‘devotion5 from those to whom this language is well known. However, I 
resisted this and asserted that you had forgotten what you had been told; for you 
seemed to me not to have said ‘devotion5 but ‘faith5 even though you were sitting 
very close to me and in no way do these two names deceive the ear through a 
similarity in sound. Yet, for a long time I thought that you did not know what had 
been said to you, since I did not know what you had said. For if I had heard you 
correctly, it would have in no way seemed absurd to me that ‘devotion5 and 
‘compassion5 were called by one Punic word. These are frequent occurrences. But, as 
I have said, let us omit them, in case I seem to raise a malicious charge against words 
due to the negligence of the listener or even due to human deafness. Those things are 
more troublesome which I have listed above, where we are unable to understand the 
thoughts of speakers when the words are most distinctly heard and are in Latin, and 
when we speak the same language.
(12) The Teacher.
45. Yet I now agree and concede that when words have been heard by one to 
whom they are known, he can know that the speaker was thinking about those things 
which they signify. But does he in this way also learn whether those things are true, as 
is now our enquiry?
Surely teachers don’t claim that their thoughts and not the disciplines which they 
think they pass on by speaking are perceived and grasped? For who is so ridiculously 
curious that he sends his child to school so as to learn what the teacher is thinking?
But when they have explained by means of words all those disciplines, which they 
profess themselves to teach, even those of virtue and wisdom; then those who are 
called pupils consider to themselves whether what has been said is true, that is, by 
looking to that inner truth according to their ability. It is then that they leam, and 
when they have found within that the truth has been spoken they give praise not 
knowing that they don’t praise the teachers but rather those who have been taught, if 
they indeed know what it is that they have said. Yet people are mistaken, as they call 
teachers those who are not, because for the most part there is no delay imposed 
between the time of speaking and the time of understanding; and because, after the 
speakers remind them, they swiftly leam inwardly, and think that they have learned 
externally from the one who reminds them.
46. If God be willing, we shall, at another time, look into the complete utility of 
words and if properly considered this is no small task. For the present, I have 
reminded you not to grant more to words than is fitting; so that we should now not 
only believe, but also begin to understand how truly it has been written with divine 
authority that we should call no one on earth our teacher because the one teacher of all
presides in heaven. W hat4 in heaven’ means, He will teach us, by whom we are 
reminded through men by outward signs, so that we are taught to turn inwardly to 
Him; to love and to know whom is the blessed life which all claim to seek, yet there 
are few who may rejoice that they have truly found it. But now I want you to tell me 
what you think about this entire discourse of mine. For if you know that what has 
been said is true, and if asked about each point, you would have said that you knew 
them. Therefore, you see from whom you have learned these things; for it is not from 
me, to whom you would have given all the answers if I asked. Yet if you do not know 
that they are true, neither I nor He has taught you; not I because I am in no way able 
to teach, not He because you are still unable to leam.
Adeo. : Truly I have learned, through your words reminding me that nothing else 
occurs through words than man is reminded to leam, and that what the considerable 
thought of a speaker reveals through his speech is very little. Moreover whether the 
truth is spoken He alone who dwells within can teach; He whom I shall with his help 
love the more ardently as I advance in learning. However, I am extremely grateful for 
this discourse of yours, which you performed without interruption, for it has 
anticipated and refuted every objection which I was ready to make. You passed over 
nothing at all which was causing me doubt, and nothing concerning which that secret 
oracle might not have responded to me in such a way as was claimed by your words.
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Appendix 2: Textual Notes
For the de magistro the text standardly followed is the CCL (29) edition by K. Daur. 
The editions by G. Weigel (CSEL 77), G. Madec (BA, Paris 1976, repr. 1999), and G. 
Wijdeveld (Aurelius Augustinus De magistro, Amsterdam 1937) have also been 
consulted. The following translations have been consulted: G.G. Leckie (1938), J.M. 
Colleran (1950), J.H.S. Burleigh (1953), G. Madec (1976), A. Pieretti (1990) and P.
508King (1995) . All translations given are my own unless otherwise stated. Extensive
use has also been made of the electronic resource CAG edited by C. Mayer. All 
citations are drawn from the CAG resource which uses the CCL (29) edition.
There is one different reading from the Daur text509:
29.8 discedere for discere
This reading, following Weigel, occurs in codex B and in the consensus codicum \  
(MLN), p (PQ), and 0 (AG).
B = fragmentum Bemense AA 90, 18 s. IX
M  = codex Monacensis Latinus 18540b s. X
L = codex Londinensis 10, 940 s. XI
N  = codex Vindobonensis 766, 6 s. XII
P = codex Parisinus Latinus 2974 s. XI
Q = codex Monacensis Latinus 14330 s. XI
A = codex Andegavensis 286 s. XII
G = codex Gratianopolitanus 204 s. XII
The reading in discere occurs in codices R, V, and in the consensus codicum cp (ST)
and m (Patrologia Latina).
R = codex Ramensis 392 s. IX
V = codex Vaticanus Latinus 515 s. IX
S = codex Sangallensis 140 s. X
T = codex Londinensis 8. C III Royal, s. X
508 For a fuller listing o f translations available cf. Pieretti (1990), 60-61.
509 In the following citation the chapter number, as standardly used throughout this thesis, is followed 
by the line number as it occurs in the Daur edition.
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Augustine's Works: abbreviations, titles, editions.
The following list includes the works of Augustine cited in this thesis. All citations in 
this thesis are taken from those editions of Augustine’s works used in the CAG 
electronic resource.
Acad. contra Academicos PL 32; CSEL 63; CCL 29
an. quant. de quantitate animae PL 32; CSEL 89
beata v. de beata vita PL 32; CCL 29
civ. de civ it ate dei PL 41; CSEL 40; CCL 47-48
conf. confessiones PL 32; CSEL 33; CCL 27; ed. M. 
Skutella
cura mort. de cura pro mortuis
gerenda ad Paulinum PL 40; CSEL 41
dial.fDD de dialectica PL 32; ed. J. Pinborg
div. qu. de diversis
quaestionibus PL 40; CCL 44A
doctr. chr.lDDC de doctrina
Christiana PL 34; CSEL 80; CCL 32
en. Ps. enarrationes in
Psalmos PL 36-37; CCL 38-40
ench. enchiridion ad 
Laurentium de fide
et spe et caritate PL 40; CCL 46
ep. epistulae PL 33; CSEL 34, 44, 57, 88
Gn. litt. de Genes i ad litter am PL 34; CSEL 28.1
gramm. ars sancti August ini 
pro fratrum
mediocritate breviata, ed. Weber
Io. ev. tr. in Iohannis 
evangelium tractatus
CXXIV PL 35; CCL 36
lib. arb. de libero arbitrio PL 32; CSEL 74; CCL 29
DM de magistro PL 32; CSEL I f  CCL 29
mend. de mendacio PL 40; CSEL 41
mor. de moribus ecclesiae 
catholicae et de 
moribus
Manichaeorum PL 32
mus. de musica PL 32
ord. de ordine PL 32; CSEL 63; CCL 29
retr. retractationes PL 32; CSEL 36; CCL 57
s. sermones PL 38-39; CCL 41; SMP 1 RB 51
s. dom. m. de sermone domini
in monte PL 34; CCL 35
sol. soliloquia PL 32; CSEL 89
tv in. de trinitate PL 42; CCL 50-50A
util. cred. de util it ate credendi CSEL 25.1
vera re/. de vera religione PL 34; CSEL 77; CCL 32
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